The gradual, and often painful, process of privatizing welfare provision in the Middle East has been unfolding for more than two decades. The first-order repercussions of this process have long been documented. Uncovering and explaining some of the less obvious, longer-term effects are Anne Marie Baylouny's primary objectives in Privatizing Welfare in the Middle East.
The book focuses on kin-based mutual aid associations in Jordan and Lebanon. Baylouny defines kin-based mutual aid associations as “collectively owned membership organizations, registered as NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] and built on exclusive identity criteria for membership” (p. 7). Although membership in these groups is limited to individuals who share a common kin identity, kinship is defined with some fluidity in local contexts. Latent identity attributes are activated, or sometimes reactivated, as individuals seek to establish or join these groups.
Baylouny goes to great lengths to explain what these groups are as well as what they are not. Distinct from both the Islamic and secular charitable NGOs that have been the subjects of much previous research and largely serve society's poor, kin-based mutual aid organizations are established to meet the needs of their typically middle-class group members. Baylouny also emphasizes that these groups are not established by elites seeking to solidify vertically oriented, patron–client relationships for reasons of political influence but rather are typically organized by individuals and families seeking horizontal social and economic ties. As a result, kin-based mutual aid organizations tend to eschew explicitly political objectives in favor of serving the immediate social and economic needs of group members.
Kin-based mutual aid organizations tend to be relatively small in size, with membership in the hundreds. Groups of this sort might own a hall for weddings, funerals, and commemoration of religious holidays. Financed by membership dues and contributions of labor and goods, they provide assistance to group members in the form of interest-free loans, emergency medical aid, educational scholarships, and maintenance of shared collective goods such as preschools, libraries, or ambulances. These organizations’ relatively small budgets do not allow them to meet the needs of all members; rather, kin-based mutual aid societies offer a spotty form of social insurance against the types of economic shocks that might force a middle-class family into poverty. Perhaps even more important than the material assistance these groups provide are the opportunities for social-capital building that help individuals tap into broader networks for employment.
The crux of Baylouny's argument is that kin-based mutual aid organizations arise when middle-class families are unable to obtain other types of social insurance in any other way. Baylouny carefully describes how social insurance against economic calamity has taken a variety of forms in both countries. In Jordan before the introduction of neoliberal economic reforms, the state—through a combination of welfare provision, consumer subsidies, and public sector employment—offered security to many Jordanians, particularly the East Bankers who have served as a core base of support for the regime. In Lebanon during the civil war, sectarian militias served as proxies for the state in terms of social insurance provision. Labor unions or private markets for insurance might have offered other possibilities, but for a variety of reasons these options remained unavailable for most Jordanians and Lebanese.
With the end of the war in Lebanon and the deepening of structural adjustment efforts in Jordan, citizens sought to institutionalize kin networks in order to guard against economic shocks. The result, according to Baylouny, was a proliferation of kin-based mutual aid organizations in ways that are consistent with the causal narrative that she lays out. For example, kin associations were relatively rare in Jordan prior to 1989, but after the double shock of economic liberalization and the return of expatriate breadwinners in the wake of the first Gulf War, the number of kin groups increased exponentially. This number increased again after the end of the civil war and in the absence of alternative forms of social insurance.
Baylouny tests for additional observable implications of the theory through an examination of variation within Jordan and Lebanon across various sectarian and national groups. It is here that Baylouny's analysis shines. East Bank Jordanians were the primary beneficiaries of state social-insurance provision in the pre-1989 period, and it is precisely this group that saw the largest increase in kin-based mutual aid associations in the 1990s. The few kin-based societies that existed before 1989 were set up by Jordanians of Palestinian descent and Jordanian Christians, two constituencies that did not enjoy state-provided social insurance prior to economic liberalization. In Lebanon, Baylouny argues that only one militia continued to effectively function after the civil war—Hizbullah. In the Shiʿa community, within which Hizbullah serves as a guarantor of social insurance as a result of its state-like functions, kin-based mutual aid associations are virtually nonexistent. Yet kin-based aid societies have meanwhile grown in number and importance for other sectarian communities in Lebanon.
One area in which the empirical work could have been pushed further is with regard to the external validity of the findings. If, as Baylouny maintains, kin is “present as an organizing idiom in the Arab world” (p. 44), then her argument should resonate for a broader set of country cases. The shrinking of state services, combined with a decline in state employment opportunities, has been a common experience in many countries in the region. Given the weakness of organized labor and private markets for social insurance across much of the Arab world, Baylouny's argument would lead us to expect to see individuals and families seeking economic security through kin-based mutual aid associations across many Arab countries. Are such groups growing in size and number in Egypt, for example, where structural adjustment has had an important impact on social welfare provision and state employment opportunities? We would also expect that countries that have undertaken less strenuous forms of economic liberalization, such as Syria, would not have experienced the development of kin-based mutual aid associations. One way to address some of these issues would have been to clarify the scope conditions for the argument more fully, particularly with regard to whether or not societies need to already be “primed” for certain types of tribal organization in order for the argument to be applicable.
What are the implications of Baylouny's findings? Although kin-based mutual assistance organizations are not state creations, the growing influence of such groups might contribute to the status-quo political situation in at least two ways. By substituting for services previously provided by the state, the proliferation and, indeed, success of such groups could help sustain existing regimes by dampening discontent. And by offering individuals and families yet another strategy for “muddling through” in the short term, the existence of kin-based organizations may be simultaneously decreasing demand for organizations with a more explicitly political agenda of programmatic change.
Privatizing Welfare in the Middle East is an important book for scholars interested in the development of civil society organizations as well as those seeking an evaluation of some of the long-term impacts of neoliberal economic policies. In order to live up to its title, the book should have explicitly addressed how arguments concerning Jordan and Lebanon apply to a broader sample of cases. Despite this drawback, the book offers a number of important insights into an increasingly significant associational type.
