John Davenport's case for a league of democratic nations opens with a trilemma vividly formulated in connection with Syria: other nations (1) should stand back and allow brutal dictators to slaughter their people, or (2) they should muster support for a “humanitarian intervention” but not follow up with the support required to rebuild the country in question, or (3) they should commit themselves in such cases to intervene and to follow through on rebuilding. Although the third option is clearly preferable, Davenport argues it requires commitment from a sufficient number of nations if the costs are not to fall excessively on a few. One aim of his book is to explain why this option has not been chosen: it is an illustration of a collective action problem (CAP) in which, despite the fact that all prefer it, there are reasons for individual nations to free ride or otherwise fail to commit themselves. A league of democracies with the authority and capacity to resolve CAPs is his solution. He makes a compelling case, even if there remains some doubt whether his proposal is the single or best solution available.
The idea of a league of democracies is not new with Davenport, but a great strength of his book is that the argument for it is tightly and carefully presented. He first makes a principled argument that such a league captures a “cosmopolitan framework” and so can lay claim to whatever legitimacy such a framework provides. Next he offers an account of global public goods where at least some cannot be achieved without overcoming collective action problems. Third, a core “consolidation argument” offers a conceptual case for a stronger federal government at the global level: “government power is prima facie justified when it is needed to overcome any CAP that blocks crucial public goods” (74). Finally, an argument (based on empirical evidence) that neither the UN nor a system of global governance that relies on a network of NGOs and IGOs can secure the relevant global public goods. So, a league of democracy is required—it meets a “moral minimum” (7) and offers a realistic utopia (14).
An important initial step in Davenport's argument is his claim that for transnational bodies to be legitimate, they must reflect what he calls a “cosmopolitan framework” (52). His target here seems to be forms of associationism (or statism) that fail to meet a minimal moral threshold sketched out by cosmopolitans: the individual is the basic unit of moral concern, not peoples, states, or other collectives; a commitment to universal standards of rational inquiry and “justificatory individualism,” or the idea that rule can be exercised on the basis of reasons each person could accept; and a claim about global interdependency, that we live in a world in which a global “basic structure” (Rawls) exists (52). Though discussed only briefly, this framework bears a heavy load, as it plays an important role in his argument that a democratic form is required for his model of supranational governance to be legitimate (73).
A second step is his account of global public goods. The failure of markets to secure public goods is a well-known problem in economic theory, and Davenport offers a summary that makes the case for extending the idea to the sphere of production as well as consumption. Also useful is his emphasis on the increasing number of global public goods—cybersecurity, mitigation of the effects of climate change, global financial stability, regulation of immigration, and so on. The plausible claim is that because of familiar CAPs, such as free riding, markets are not sufficient to secure these goods. Davenport offers a tentative list of eight categories of public goods (109–11), though he focuses primarily on three: security from foreign invasion, protection against nongovernment threats, and the recognition and legal establishment of basic human rights. This chapter also considers the overlap of these global public goods and the goals of the UN sustainable development.
The core argument, however, which is found in chapters 2 and 4, is his consolidation principle which states, roughly, that a governing body should possess sufficient capacities to address urgent problems. The principle is drawn from a reading of The Federalist Papers but, for him, ultimately has roots in instrumental reason: if we (rationally) will the ends, we must also will the means (75). Although much can be said in support of this principle (and Davenport reviews several considerations), it is important to see how Davenport makes his case for a democratic league of (democratic) nations. In fact, Davenport relies on two distinct arguments for his position. The first is an argument that we have reason to support a level of government sufficient to address the problems at hand—and if there are global public goods, his claim is that a global government is required. This is the consolidation argument more narrowly tailored to the purpose at hand. But, second, to make the case that government should be democratic in form—and not, say, a more loosely conceived associative federation—Davenport must also show that this system of governance is legitimate only if it is democratic in form, and this is especially challenging at a transnational level. These two steps are evident in Davenport's summary of the argument (77, 226). But, as he would grant, steps 4 and 5 are not entailed by the consolidation principle, and require an additional argument that a transnational government must be democratic in form if it is to be legitimate. The prudential considerations supporting the consolidation principle do not themselves address the question of legitimacy (see also his remarks on p. 82). Perhaps this worry is not crucial since Davenport's major argument centers on the fact that there are global CAPs that can only be solved through a consolidated federal system. I mention it because democratic legitimacy seems relevant to his attempt to present the league as an alternative to a voluntary international association, on the one hand, or to networks or a transnational systems of governance (such as that proposed by Terry MacDonald), on the other (125). Especially in the second case, it seems that it is the failure to capture the “cosmopolitan framework” that precludes it as an option.
The last chapters offer arguments for pursuing a new league of democracies (rather than reforming the United Nations), a sketch of the institutional structure of a league, and responses to possible objections to his proposal. Davenport offers various considerations for his position, but I was still left wondering why we should not also seek to build upon institutions that already exist—an option he rules out (214). There is certainly much inertia and flawed institutional design within the UN, but Davenport is perhaps too optimistic that similar problems would not also arise within a league of democracies characterized by huge differences in economic wealth and power and, at least at the outset, comprising only about one-fifth of the world's nations. Nonetheless, his engaging book offers a great deal of valuable reflection for any future system of global governance.
