In The Concept of World from Kant to Derrida, Sean Gaston positions Jacques Derrida at the culmination point of a line of thinking in Continental philosophy that runs from Kant through to Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger. While each offers an innovative concept of world, Gaston presents Derrida as the only one insightful enough to acknowledge the necessary inadequacy of the concept, even going so far as to contemplate “the possibility that there is no world” (132). In this respect, the book concludes on a negative note, especially where the attempt to shore up the endeavours of environmentalism is concerned. Nevertheless, the negativity that we are left with is, in paradoxical deconstructive fashion, also productive and salutary. Even so, despite the fact that the book takes its inspiration from the iconic images of the Earth as viewed from space by Gagarin (and by later Apollo missions), the new ‘Copernican Turn’ that Gaston envisions does not live up to its ambitious promise.
As I read it, the book has two primary aims: 1) to situate Derrida within a coherent tradition of thinking about the world and 2) to elucidate Derrida’s distinctive concept of world. I will say more about the first of these aims in this review. Before doing so, it should be acknowledged that many Derrida scholars would reject the proposition that Derrida belongs to any one tradition. Such an appropriating gesture may be seen as antithetical to the postmodern destabilization of tradition and runs counter to Derrida’s many attempts to rethink the ‘proper’. Nevertheless, Gaston makes a persuasive case for more attentively heeding the influence of this particular set of philosophers.
According to Gaston’s narrative, Kant is the first philosopher to show that the world cannot be viewed as existing in an objectively real sense because the world as a whole is an idea of reason that cannot become an object of possible experience (13). The concept of world is therefore characterized by “radical insufficiency” (18) and we only act “as if” there is a world (28). This conclusion closely mirrors Derrida’s position, although Derrida is quick to drop the epistemological presuppositions on which it is based. By contrast with Kant’s 28 pages, Hegel is dealt with in 17 pages but he is less central to Gaston’s narrative. His primary function is to reinforce the idea that the world is not initially presupposed but must be constructed (30) and to introduce the problem of differentiating humans from animals vis à vis the world (39).
It is in the analysis of Husserl and Heidegger that we see the real power of Gaston’s reading of Derrida as part of a tradition. In Chapter 3, Husserl’s contributions to the concept of world are rooted in the idea of a subjective turn that regards the lived body as the anchor for the experience of a world whose existence is suspended methodologically but never truly challenged (64-5). Gaston then makes the more audacious claim that, “This link between the world, the other and death has its origins in Derrida’s fifty-year engagement with the thought of Husserl” (100). The claim is audacious given the influence of Levinas and Blanchot (among others) on this topic. Nevertheless, Gaston tracks the influence of Husserl’s views on the contingency of the world (as contrasted with the absolute necessity of the pure ego) and the inability of consciousness to experience the ‘world’ of the other. These key theses, in conjunction with lessons from the Talmud and Paul Celan’s poetry, inform Derrida’s claim that the concept of world is necessarily predicated on a possible destruction of the world (108). From my perspective, this analysis of the influence of Husserl is easily one of the finest parts of Gaston’s book, with his careful reconstruction of Heidegger’s concept of world being a close second.
Heidegger provides further support for the view that the world is a problematic concept for philosophy that is disclosed by Dasein’s experience of anxiety in Being and Time (69) and through the analysis of transcendence in “On the Essence of Ground” (81). In The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics–World, Finitude, Solitude, Heidegger’s elucidation of the unique status of humans who are “world-forming” over and against animals, plants and stones that are “poor in the world” or “worldless” (89) is also foundational. Derrida carefully rejects such categorical thinking and he proceeds to question whether it is really humans who may be characterized as worldless or as occupying a “world without horizon” (123) or even multiple worlds at once (132).
Gaston calls the possible lack of world a “beguiling but difficult proposition” (94) and he is right. However, part of the reason is that this claim is based on an extremely close reading of Derrida’s oeuvre that becomes overwhelming at times. Derrida did not write systematic treatises in the manner of the other philosophers presented in the book, so the bulk of Gaston’s work involves mining diverse texts for insight. We are thus drawn at breakneck pace through a fascinating range of works by Derrida and drawn along paths that lead in many directions at once. Notwithstanding a strong sense that these ideas have to be digested more slowly, Gaston’s efforts are to be commended and his extensive footnotes are a useful roadmap (although he rarely strays from the primary texts). Moreover, one of the greatest strengths of the book is the engagement with Derrida’s newly published series of seminars and lectures (129).
All things considered, the impact of the book as a whole would have been strengthened if Gaston had made Derrida the central figure in the book from the beginning. I suspect that the readers who will benefit most from it are those who have already read a great deal of Derrida’s works, even though I believe it should be read by anyone interested in the way that the concept of world has been interpreted in Continental philosophy.
