In the last decade there has been a growing interest in how political philosophy developed during the Hellenistic and early Roman periods, laying the conceptual foundations for later Roman imperial accounts of governance. Central to these debates are the questions of how the power of the ruler originated and how it could be justified, questions debated by reference to both new and pre-existing theories about nature, reason, human well-being and what constitutes a life well-lived.
It is generally agreed that Stoic authors played an important role in this discussion of the origin and nature of political power and helped to define and shape how the argument proceeded. Recent studies have also been inclined to regard the Stoic polymath Posidonius of Apamea (c. 135–55 b.c.) as having had a pivotal role in the early development of the debate. The reconstruction of Posidonius' position is dependent upon how one isolates and interprets the evidence provided in Seneca's Ep. 90, which selectively presents and then argues against aspects of Posidonius' account.
Z.'s monograph is divided into two major sections. In the first section he offers a comprehensive review of recent scholarship on the interpretation of Ep. 90 and offers a defensible reconstruction of Posidonius' position. In the second section he explains the significance of Seneca's criticisms and counter-proposal. Three appendices defend emendations proposed to the text of Ep. 90 and two other texts particularly important to Z.'s discussion (Alex. Aphr. De fat. 28; Gal. Anim. mor. corp. temp. 11).
Ep. 90 opens with a section (§§1–3) lauding philosophy as the unique means of arriving at virtue and thus, the good life. In contrast to some earlier commentators, Z. argues that the source for this section is not Posidonius, but rather Cicero's lost Hortensius, comparing several fragments of the latter work preserved in Lactantius and Augustine. This section of the letter, while lacking specifically Posidonian features, sets up and frames the subsequent discussion of Posidonius' position by introducing a point on which Seneca and Posidonius are in fundamental agreement: life can only be well lived when it is guided and directed by philosophical wisdom, which is the fullest and most complete expression of reason and leads on to virtue.
It is only in the next section of the letter (§§4–7), Z. argues, that Seneca begins to introduce Posidonius' thought. Posidonius offers there an account of humanity in its primordial state, using a descriptive, historical narrative to make claims about the emergence of political power, implicitly tying such power back to an underlying purpose that is conditioned by certain normative values.
In Z.'s reconstruction, Posidonius regarded humanity as imperiled at the outset of its existence. Individuals lived isolated lives with uncertain access to things necessary for life, each looking narrowly after his or her own affairs. These individuals were subsequently drawn together not by animal instinct (a pre-rational consideration of benefits to be had), but rather by a social impulse emerging from and guided by right reason. Those gathered together needed direction and care; reason supplied this need through the rule of sages, who functioned as philosopher-kings of their respective regions.
The sages, embodying reason, not only persuaded others to pursue virtue but also initiated technological innovation in areas important to the preservation of human life. It was the sages who introduced the fabrication of metal tools, the cultivation of crops and the building of houses, giving these innovations to the people, who could then adapt them in further ways. Sages were thus responsible not only for promoting moral progress, but also for ensuring the preservation of human life through the development of material culture.
In Posidonius' view, the rule of the sages provided optimal conditions for justice to be maintained, since the sage embodied and taught what was just and, by the use of discretion, could prevent specific individual harms that the uniform enforcement of written laws could not prevent. Later, as justice became increasingly perverted by the use of force, the sages provided a foundation of legislation so that a measure of justice (protecting the weaker from the stronger) might be preserved during the subsequent decline into tyranny.
Z. suggests that the work of Posidonius used by Seneca was the Protrepticus and that its contents were intended to commend to educated members of the Roman elite a model of philosophy as the comprehensive wisdom essential to governance. Governance, in turn, must be understood as a form of service that aims to preserve and protect the lives of those who are governed, always acting in their interest.
Following an earlier analysis of the structure of Ep. 90 by G. Mazzoli, Z. believes that after nominally affirming Posidonius' account (§7), Seneca gradually withdraws his support and develops a subtle but progressive critique of Posidonius' position (§§7–35a). This prepares the way for Seneca to state his own account of humanity in the primordial age (§§35–43) and, thus, his own views of how (Stoic) philosophy might be appropriated by the Roman elite and influence governance.
Seneca, drawing upon Stoic and Cynic themes, depicts the initial state of humanity as an idyllic life close to nature and characterised by simple abundance. The emergence of the practical and productive arts came much later and had nothing to do with either governance or philosophical wisdom. Technological innovation and the development of material culture arose instead from pre-reflective shrewdness, which comes easily to all people from nature and experience (§§11; 13–14; 31; 35; 44). Even slaves and those who are least wise may possess such shrewdness (§§25; 34), so the philosopher-governor has no need to concern himself with such things (§30). Indeed it would be ridiculous to imagine the wise man plowing or in the mill (§20).
Seneca also regarded the practical arts (particularly the building arts) as having introduced artificiality and a craving for more into human life. This led to dissolute living (luxuria) and a grasping after possessions (avaritia), which in turn produced anxiety, fear and anger and led to division, conflict, war and poverty (§§26; 36; 38). The philosophically minded should have nothing to do with such arts (§30) since they are not essential to the well-being of the wise. One should instead strive to live as simply as possible, for humans were born with a ready supply of what little is actually needed (§§18; 38; 40–1). The wise man therefore trains himself to seek only that truth which commands action that is honorable and tempered by justice and courage, not allowing himself to be diverted by unnecessary matters.
In the end, Z. notes, it was predominantly the vision of Seneca, not Posidonius, which shaped the self-perception of the Roman elite and their ways of understanding the connection between Stoic philosophical wisdom and governance. Posidonius had viewed the philosopher-ruler as a polymath involved in the common affairs of human life, playing a crucial role in technological innovation and the development of material culture. For Seneca, these things were a diversion and departure from philosophy, which required a narrower, more disciplined, inward focus if justice and purity of intention were to be maintained; it is this concentrated focus that defines the sage and what he brings to the task of governance.
Z.'s careful analysis of Ep. 90 is commendable and generally compelling, but two minor criticisms can be offered. First, his contention that Seneca was dependent upon Posidonius' Protrepticus may exceed the available evidence, since very little is extant that can be ascribed with certainty to that work. Second, not all of the textual emendations proposed by Z. seem equally convincing; one may doubt, for example, the restoration of the name ‘Posidonius’ in the text of Philodemus discussed on p. 136. These minor criticisms aside, Z.'s work is to be commended to all scholars who have a serious interest in early Roman political philosophy.
