It is difficult to overstate the influence of John Rawls and that of his intellectual progeny on contemporary political thought. John Rawls and Christian Social Engagement: Justice as Unfairness, edited by Anthony B. Bradley and Greg Forster, examines Rawls’ conception of “justice as fairness” (JAF) “from the perspective of both Christian political thought and Christian political practice” (3). Loosely divided into three sections, it brings together 12 authors from diverse fields to (1) better understand Rawls’ thought; (2) assess Rawls in relation to Christian ethics; and (3) examine Rawls’ impact as applied in society. As the book's subtitle suggests, its assessment of Rawls is not favorable. It argues that Rawls’ conception of JAF stands at odds with itself, at odds with Christian commitments, and, when applied, leads to a more selfish and intolerant society.
Initial essays by Kareen Taliaferro and Micah Watson provide an accessible scholarly orientation to Rawls’ basic theses and their development over time. The role of human will is appropriately prominent here. Taliaferro writes, “Agreement, then — both hypothetical agreement in the original position and actual agreement in the form of overlapping consensus among citizens of different worldviews — stands at the heart of Rawls's ideal of justice as fairness” (21). Further, Watson observes that Rawls’ late work is characterized by public reason, “… thinking in a way that is common or accessible to all citizens across cultural divisions such as religion, and directed toward public matters” (29–30), and an overlapping consensus in which citizens “endorse a public conception of politics and justice, even if they do so based on their own particular … ‘comprehensive doctrines’” (31). Notably, these chapters account for Rawls’ extensive proprietary lexicon of terminology, engaging “the original position,” the “veil of ignorance,” “reflective equilibrium,” the “principle of equality,” the “difference principle,” etc.
Most of the essays challenge the internal consistency of Rawls’ thought. Taliaferro argues that Rawls’ priority for the right (procedural) over the good (substantive), conceals an “individualist and self-referential” (24) conception of the good. Likewise, Watson's lucid critique — which includes a sobering assessment of Stephen Macedo's extensions of Rawls’ thought — highlights the extent to which JAF fails to be freestanding, relying instead on contested truth claims akin to comprehensive doctrines. Matthew Parks (Chapter 5) admirably shows how Rawls’ criteria for political equality (especially “reasonableness”) are under-inclusive on their own terms — excluding the unborn, the permanently disabled, and anyone “deemed unreasonable” (which can include those who disagree with Rawls).
Related to this, Hunter Baker, Joseph Knippenberg, and Bryan McGraw (in Chapters 6, 7, and 9, respectively) all challenge Rawls’ account of public reason — commonly accessible grounds for political decisions that stand apart from any comprehensive doctrine and are instead the product of an overlapping consensus on what is mutually willable. Baker and Knippenberg argue that Rawls subtly expands the application of the public reason standard beyond officials engaging “constitutional essentials” and “basic justice,” effectively proscribing citizens’ comprehensive doctrines from other important public policy areas where they are ostensibly permitted. The result, Bryan McGraw argues, is that public reason can relativize serious religious faith, treating it as “fundamentally unreasonable and undemocratic” (175–176) and thus deepening, rather than bridging, cultural fissures. In casting JAF as intolerant of religion and potentially illiberal, McGraw's critique poses a significant challenge to Rawls’ effort to accommodate conflicting comprehensive doctrines.
Among the potential directions for further work in this area are calls for political society to reflect more pluralism than what Rawls allows. Both Knippenberg and McGraw suggest that the deeper pluralism of a constitutional consensus (rather than an overlapping one) could be an asset rather than a liability (115–117), providing both increased stability and safeguards against tyranny. But how substantive might such a “thinner” consensus be? And on what might it be based? Matthew Parks (Chapter 5) indicates — but does not elaborate — how natural rights and natural law might serve in this capacity. These matters clearly warrant further articulation and exploration.
Some arguments will leave readers unpersuaded or distracted by their tone. Among the more sweeping claims are the connection Daniel Kelly makes in Chapter 8 between Rawlsian thought and current jurisprudence involving healthcare and marriage and John Teevan's (Chapter 9) linkage of zero-sum “extraction” economic theory to Rawlsian thought. Indeed, portions of Greg Forster's concluding chapter border on the polemic — for instance, he describes A Theory of Justice as “a sort of low-budget, dumbed-down sequel to Leviathan” (192). Such rhetoric risks drawing attention away from his more substantive arguments — that Rawls’ conception of justice is relativistic (agnostic about the meaning of life), materialistic (makes justice about things rather than people), irresponsible (oriented toward human desires rather than moral agency and virtue,) and selfish (excludes non-self-seeking motives) — which merit attention.
Consistent with the purpose of this volume, many contributions highlight where Rawlsian commitments stand at odds with Christian ones. Taliaferro argues that Christianity insists upon the good (substantive) being prior to the right (procedural), casting doubt upon the compatibility of Christianity and JAF. Likewise, Matthew Arbo (Chapter 3) indicates that JAF abstracts individuals from their relational contexts and as such is antithetical to biblical love in which “‘right’ always refers to an objective relationship in reality” (57). Jerome C. Foss (Chapter 4) connects many of Rawls’ arguments to Rawls’ own religious biography, contrasting the young, religious Rawls’ pursuit of theodicy (justifying God's goodness in light of evil in the world) with the older, no-longer-Christian Rawls’ “technodicy” — a constructed justice in the “here and now” (71) and accomplished apart from God.
The explicitly Christian perspectives in Bradley and Forster's volume may strike some readers as narrow, limiting its audience and argument. There may be some degree of truth in this; perhaps few committed Rawlsians will be convinced by these essays. But the terms of Rawls’ project suggest that it should be able to hold up under the scrutiny of serious religious believers. Rawls attempts to overcome the problem of “reasonable pluralism” among adherents of competing religious and philosophical comprehensive doctrines and to instead ground political liberalism apart from, but inclusive of such bases. If successful, a Rawlsian liberal society should provide an accommodating home to citizens adhering to a range of religious commitments who can, in turn, support the political order from within their comprehensive doctrines. It is not without irony or import then, that a project explicitly aimed at accommodating religious difference finds itself so roundly critiqued by religious adherents. Given the nature of Rawls’ effort, such critiques merit attention from scholars beyond those who share the authors’ perspectives.
