James Ledbetter is a financial journalist, an author with several books to his credit, and currently the editor-in-charge of Reuters.com. His new book, Unwarranted Influence: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Military-Industrial Complex, recalls the president's farewell address, in which he cautioned against the rising influence of the defense establishment and its industrial partners. In his own words, the author aims not to defend or discredit the notion of the military-industrial complex, or MIC, but to describe the origins of the idea and to show how it has evolved since the famous speech. As such, the book is an intellectual history, the anatomy of a sound bite. The author tries to place Eisenhower's remarks within the context of a larger concept and, to some extent, credit the president with calling attention to a growing threat.
The initial sections are successful, as the author does an admirable job of tracing the evolution of the concept from the emergence of a modern US Navy and the steel industry that helped to create it through America's current involvement in an extended conflict in the Middle East. His arguments concerning the growth of wasteful military spending and the outsized role for the military in American society attributed to the MIC are convincing in the light of the massive deficits the nation has accrued owing, in part, to financing a globally deployed military force.
The author seems on less solid ground, however, in describing Eisenhower's own philosophy regarding national security and defense policies. He characterizes America's commitment to NATO as part of Eisenhower's New Look policies when the decision to join the alliance and the long-term commitment of troops to Europe were both decisions made by President Truman. The broad conclusion that the administration's strategic policies led to active US involvement in even minor disputes around the world overlooks Eisenhower's restraint in dealing with the Chinese threat to Quemoy and Matsu, as well as his caution in dealing with the insurgency in Vietnam. For the most part, the Eisenhower administration preferred to employ covert methods and psychological warfare to deal with potential threats to national security rather than to apply military force. In describing the tension among Eisenhower's advisors between balanced budget advocates and those supporting increased military spending, the author places Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson in the latter camp. In fact, Wilson eagerly supported Eisenhower's drive to reduce military spending, much to the chagrin of the Army in particular.
Although he briefly describes some of the interservice rivalry during the Eisenhower administration, the author understates the impact of the newly created Department of Defense on the growing military-industrial relationship. The establishment of the US Air Force as a separate service and the unification of the armed services caused the defense budget to become something of a zero-sum game. Particularly under the shrinking defense budgets of the New Look, each service struggled for its fair share of a limited pot. As the Army, Navy, and Air Force bickered among themselves, defense industries allied with the service of their choice to lobby Congress in support of their favorite programs. It was probably this aspect of the MIC that galled Eisenhower more than any other.
As the United States sank more deeply into Vietnam, Eisenhower's turn of phrase became something of a battle cry for those protesting American involvement in the war. On more familiar ground here, the author sums up nicely growing concerns with the nation's military and strategic policies. He notes that the defense establishment becomes a convenient target for protests against the war and to an increasing extent, broader concerns about the nation's social and political course. Here, though, the work goes a step too far. The author's conclusions regarding the extension of a culture of secrecy and the suppression of individual liberty also attributed to the MIC seem to be a bit of a reach. Detentions at Guantanamo, sanctioned “harsh” interrogations, and the warrantless wiretaps enabled by the post–September 11th Patriot Act were deliberate political decisions made by the country's elected leaders. It is harder to define them as the product of an out-of-control defense establishment. Ultimately, critics of the MIC come to a point where they accuse its proponents of promoting conflict in order to increase their own profit margins. Unfortunately, this comes uncomfortably close to the charge that the US government flew the planes into the Twin Towers on 11 September 2001. I'm just not ready to sign up for that notion and I doubt that Eisenhower would have either.
By the end of the book, the reader is forced to make a choice. Although the author clearly describes many of the challenges and concerns facing America in the twenty-first century, it just seems too easy to lay them all at the feet of the MIC. The reader is left to decide whether Dwight D. Eisenhower was remarkably prescient in his warning about the growing influence of the MIC, or that apparatus has simply become a convenient target of opportunity, in lieu of asking tougher questions. In a roundabout way, Ledbetter's book raises a number of interesting issues. Although Eisenhower's warning serves as an effective point of departure, by the end of the book it has become something of a red herring, drawing attention away from a deeper discussion.
