This book centers on a problem that is important for both international relations and security studies—the need for better theoretical tools to explain cooperation between states even when such cooperation is not systematically explained by international relations theory. Flying Tiger examines why and how the interests and policies of states align by using the case of French and German cooperation in developing advanced military technologies. As Ulrich Krotz writes, IR theory “offers explanations and predictions about the processes and outcomes of weapons development and production,” thus “allowing us to derive expectations regarding what states want and do in security, defense, and arming” (p. 4). For the author, the problem is that realism, liberalism, and neoliberalism do not answer satisfactorily why France and Germany developed an advanced helicopter cooperatively.
As Krotz writes, “specific types of institutionalization and construction between states affect the national interests and security policies of the states involved” (pp. 4–5), but this does not provide a comprehensive theoretical basis for understanding why and how states' interests align. He seeks to redress this theoretical gap by using the concept of “political institutionalization,” or “institutionalized relations,” as a way to explain how interactions among states provide “autonomous sources of national interest and foreign policy” (p. 11). This research embraces the concept of “interstate institutionalization and construction, domestic construction, and the domestic political system as three separate sources of national interest and policy” (p. xx). While the “impact of the institutionalized set of Franco-German relations on French and German ‘foreign policy will-building processes’”was “uneven and contingent” (p. 9), what makes this problem interesting is Franco-German cooperation during the Cold War.
To understand how states' foreign policies are shaped, Krotz uses the concept of institutionalized relations, which he organizes into three levels: “1) regularized intergovernmentalism,” characterized as “‘business-like’ patterns of political-administrative interaction and communication”; 2) “a host of predominantly symbolic acts and practices by public representatives; and potentially 3) “a net of parapublic underpinnings that stabilizes the other two elements of institutionalized relations” (p. 14). By developing a “constructivist-institutionalist model of national interest formation and foreign policy formulation” to theorize about interstate relations in the context of domestic politics, the book tests these ideas to explain “what interests and policies have formed and why they have taken shape” (p. 17). The case study chapters (3–6) examine how French and German interests and policies converged or aligned to develop an advanced military helicopter.
The book explores the extent to which institutionalization and constructivist concepts influence how states define interests and formulate policies. The author argues that the book “uncovers new causes and mechanisms of state arming and arms procurement (p. 26). He writes that this work identifies “important and casually consequential aspects of institutionalization and constructivism at the level of the international system” (p. 192). When these ideas are tested in the case of Franco-German cooperation in developing advanced military technology, Krotz observes, it is not surprising that in some cases, “institutionalized bilateral processes molded or reconfigured French and German objectives and policies,” while in other cases, such “relations had no effect on interest generation or –modification” (p. 17).
A fundamental question for scholars is whether such IR theories as realism, liberalism, and neoliberalism leave unanswered—or poorly answered—the problem that Krotz examines in this work. One point of consensus in the study of IR theory is that no theory or theories totally or thoroughly explain all of the nuances at play in the interactions that states define as interests and policies. It is on this level that the book makes a contribution, but it does not resolve existing theoretical gaps. Fundamentally, there are matters that cannot be ultimately resolved for various well-understood reasons: lack of unitary actors, unclear perception of interests, failure to communicate the same, organizational forces, frictions among actors as they seek to resolve conflicting interests, and so forth. What is not theoretically problematic is that states, despite conflicting views, interests, and policies, as well as enduring sources of hostility, cooperate to protect their strategic interests.
Flying Tiger tackles an interesting but not central theoretical problem. As Krotz writes in Chapter 2, states “seek security and influence,” but this does not imply that all calculations by states about their interests and policies are based entirely on “external security contexts and security pressures broadly” (p. 52). Nor does the author argue that this is the case, but the decision to develop ideas about institutionalization implies rightly that existing theories are inadequate. What remains unanswered is whether political institutionalization explains better than other theories how states shape their interests and policies. For this reviewer, the concept of institutionalization-constructivism is subordinate to realism, while realism is influenced undoubtedly by political institutionalism, itself derivative of neoliberalism.
In effect, political institutionalization likely operates at the margins of states' perception of threats and opportunities. It us highly unlikely that political institutionalization will displace IR theories, exercise inordinate influence on how states define their interests and policies, or produce new alignments of interests and policies. Unless it meets these tests, political institutionalization remains, at best, an important addendum to existing IR theories.
It is with debates in mind about influences on state interests and policies that we should properly judge this work. It makes a strong contribution to more systematic thinking about the institutional forces that mirror or at least reinforce existing observations in the literature about how states define their interests, how institutions shape policies, and how political institutionalization derives from realism, liberalism, and neoliberalism. With intellectual clarity and the use of case-study analysis (bolstered by some empirical work), the author develops ideas about the theory and practice of political institutionalization. One is struck not only by the depth of this research but also by the enduring and unresolved nature of this debate. What is particularly compelling is his systematic analysis of the ways in which institutionalization influences policy, as well as his efforts to define more precisely the language of institutionalization—while noting that the failure to develop clear language afflicts too many fields of study.
Given the intrinsic importance of this issue and the quality of scholarship, this book in my view merits scholarly interest. It joins the debate surrounding all decisions about why states make foreign policy choices, and sheds light on the lesser but nonetheless important ideas that shape the alignment of states' interests and policies, often in concordance with conclusions raised by earlier scholarship.
My principal criticism is that the author's central arguments are often clouded or obstructed by excessively wordy and unnecessarily dense language. He could have articulated the central arguments far more precisely, but the dense language inhibits such precision. This is not to argue that language alone fundamentally weakens the book, but it would be analytically more persuasive if its central arguments had been defined more sharply, distinctly, and clearly. In addition, the book makes a theoretical overstatement by implicitly arguing that existing IR theories are inadequate. However, it is unlikely that political institutionalization is a serious alternative, even though it complements, but does not displace, existing theories.
Furthermore, the book would benefit from an introduction that more clearly and succinctly defines the central problem, how this manuscript will deal with that problem, and the precise steps taken to help scholars better understand and resolve the problem. By contrast, the conclusion very effectively summarizes the principal arguments, both theoretical and practical, that emerge from this research, and thus clearly outlines the author's central arguments about the ways in which institutionalization influences states' procurement of weapons.
In the end, Flying Tiger makes an important scholarly contribution to our understanding of political institutionalization as a framework for studying foreign policy. This reviewer is struck by the depth and breadth of the research, as well as the extent to which the analysis reinforces our understanding of the enduring dilemma about how and why states define their interests and policies in formulating foreign policy. What makes this book interesting from a scholarly perspective is its reaffirmation of the centrality of domestic processes to foreign policy, the fact that their precise influence is unresolved, and the continuation of the debate on this matter by scholars and policymakers. Ultimately, political institutionalization is an important instrument for scholars who debate why states make the foreign policy choices that they do.
