James E. Block's book takes on the important issue of how, at the birth of nationhood, American child-rearing practices changed with the nation's new understanding of itself as a liberal democracy. Block astutely points out that the new nation sought to legitimate its form of government based on the consent of its citizens. This mode of legitimation, he shows, required a citizenry capable of giving meaningful consent, rather than the compliance demanded by traditional society. The author then demonstrates how the new nation's narrative of individual freedom transformed authority relations not only in the public realm but also in family and education. In essence, he argues that adoption of a legitimation narrative founded on meaningful consent caused the nation to turn away from using the coercion of adults to gain compliance with the collective demands of liberal democratic society and, instead, to turn to socializing and educating children. In doing so, he contends, citizens' wills were still coerced, but the coercion—now accomplished through socialization and education in place of openly coercive authority—grew more subtle.
Block fills an important historical gap in tracing out changes in the rearing of the nation's youth. Not only did the American Revolution delegitimize the use of coercion to gain compliance of citizens, but the liberal democracy it put into place also required much more of citizens than the passive acquiescence demanded in an authoritarian society. Early attempts at postrevolutionary child-rearing models from both Federalists and Jeffersonians failed to meet the needs of the new nation: The Federalist model of continuing deference to authority could not develop the agency necessary for republican citizens; the Jeffersonian model of cultivating children's innate virtue was unrealistic for developing the civic virtues needed in a republican form of government. Block traces the path by which a new form of socialization evolved that encouraged initiative but also prepared youths for integration into the social order.
Yet the richness of the history mapped out by Block is muted by his treatment of liberal democracy as its motivating force. He begins by recognizing that the transformation of early American society was a “highly contested process” (p. 6); yet his account largely presents the changes in child rearing he describes as controlled by liberalism, conceived as a unitary, purposive actor. At one point he details how “American liberalism after the revolution placed the future of its national project in the hands of the institutions of childhood socialization” (p. 19), at another how “American liberalism expanded [a particular] developmental process into a model for citizen formation” (p. 84). Yet American liberalism has never been a single, purposeful entity capable of action. Instead, changes in the mode of child rearing were initiated not by the needs of liberal democracy itself but by people—many of whom had very different motivations and agendas more or less closely connected with the purposes of liberal democracy. Among them were parents eager to ensure that their children rose to the top of the heap in an increasingly unequal society, women seeking to carve out a sliver of power in the transforming domestic sphere, industrialists seeking the development of a productive and relatively docile workforce, xenophobes seeking to ensure that Catholic immigrants' children absorbed Protestant American ideals, and many others. Exploring the actors involved, their differing ideas and motivations, and how these contesting ideas and motivations created tensions and contradictions, as well as backwards, forwards, and sideways movements in the developing model of child rearing, would have made Crucible of Consent much richer.
Likewise, the book would have benefited from a deeper engagement with the evolution of the theoretical concepts underlying the transformations explored by Block. While he focuses on the changing child rearing practices in response to the nation's understanding of itself as a liberal democracy, except for the obligatory references to Hobbes and Locke, he largely takes the meaning of liberal democracy—and of the related concepts of freedom and consent—as a given, making little effort to trace out the complexity of these concepts, or their evolution during the period in question. As a result, he never explores how different actors during this period infused these concepts with very different meanings that evolved over time. As Eric Foner notes in a related context, “It is now clear that if nineteenth-century Americans shared a common language of politics, the very universality of that rhetoric camouflaged a host of divergent connotations and emphases. Concepts central to the era's political culture—independence, equality, citizenship, freedom—were subject to constant challenge and redefinition, their substance changing over time as different groups sought to redraw their boundaries and reshape their meanings” (Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men, 1995, p. x).
Had Block engaged more deeply with earlier American notions of freedom, he might have been more restrained in his assertion that children's socialization was inimical to American conceptions of the free self (e.g., “[G]iven the focus on individual liberty, the young could not even be encouraged to strike a more permissive balance between deference and independence. Rather, they had to be persuaded that a life of freedom was being nurtured from the outset. Americans thus demanded of child rearing a seemingly paradoxical outcome: an individual both convinced that he was entirely self-determining and yet fully adaptive in his conduct” [p. 21]). Certainly, many liberal democrats of the period would not have subscribed to the notion that the American commitment to freedom necessarily required that individuals be “entirely self-determining,” as Block asserts is the case (p. 21); they would instead have seen individuals as necessarily socialized into a particular social order and freedom as consisting of having a limited range of autonomy in adulthood. In setting up socialization as inherently opposed to the complete freedom that citizens were supposed to have, and as conflicting with the consent that they were supposed to give, Block reads in an irreconcilable conflict that many early Americans would not have recognized.
Finally, this work would have been enriched by engagement with the ways that our best contemporary liberal thinkers have sought to reconcile the collective imperative of forming children's liberal democratic character against liberalism's more individualist ideals. Contrary to Block's assertion that “[s]cholars have lent credibility to the liberal culture of freedom by minimizing the role of social engineering and treating child rearing as an apolitical process[, in which the] critical work of shaping the young [is] unsullied by the instrumental demands of programmatic agendas and designs” (p. 24), a number of fine scholars—including Stephen Macedo, William Galston, Nancy Rosenblum, Thomas Spragens, and Eamonn Callan—have conducted a sophisticated conversation about the legitimacy of socializing young citizens for citizenship and have participated in nuanced discussions about the means and appropriate limits on such socialization. Attention to their varied positions might have led Block to see child rearing and education projects in terms of shades of gray rather than black—recognizing that some child rearing and educational methods are less coercive than others, and that many are potentially more justified under particular strands of liberal democratic thought than outright coercion. Attention to these shades of gray would have allowed him to consider how the many historical changes detailed in his book fit into this more nuanced picture of the varieties of liberal theory and its attendant practices.
