While this book is badly done in several respects, it is absolutely essential reading for anyone interested in debates regarding anthropological dualism versus physicalism. The book began as Marsh's D.Phil. dissertation at Oxford, undertaken after retirement from a distinguished career in medicine. The title adequately captures the subject addressed, and Marsh provides the strongest imaginable case for understanding extra-bodily experiences (EBE) as brain-state phenomena.
Marsh first examines a significant sample of the literature on EBE: eight texts published between 1976 and 1998. After careful scrutiny of the experiences recounted, and an evaluation of the extent to which they support the authors’ theories regarding their significance (not at all strongly), he offers his own thesis: these reports do not arise from ‘moribund brains, thus allowing the “inner person” to escape and sample the delights of the afterlife’ (p. xix). Rather, they are reports of ephemeral events lasting from a few seconds to a few minutes, undergone just prior to resumption of normal conscious awareness, and caused by well-known brain disturbances.
Marsh uses a method from dream research in which a word-count of the description of the experience can be translated into an estimate of the duration of the experience. Since many of the experiences include, near their end, the intrusion into consciousness of actual events such as physical pain caused by medical treatments, they can be shown to have occurred immediately before the return to normal consciousness.
Marsh provides three sorts of arguments for his brain-disturbance thesis. One is to show the unlikelihood of the actual-experience-of-the-afterlife thesis (1) by noting the inconsistency among accounts, making it impossible for them all to be describing an actual ‘other world’, and (2) by noting their congruence with the subjects’ prior beliefs about the next life.
His second line of argument considers the phenomena which are common to many EBE, such as the impression of looking at one's body from a different location, passing through a tunnel, approaching a brilliant light. These he systematically relates to identical experiences with known neural causes. For example, a frequent psychological effect of migraine attacks is the perception of a passive mirror image of the subject due to ‘a marked temporary cortical ischaemia’ (pp. 111–12). The experience of being pulled through a tunnel occurs in normal dreaming, along with other sensations of movement, and is probably due to activation of ‘the VIIIth cranial nerve which takes origin from the inner ear structures that are concerned with balance and body-in-space mechanisms’ (p. 135).
Marsh's third line of argument is to note the incongruity between near-death experiences and traditional Christian theology regarding the afterlife, which is communal and based on the bodily resurrection of Jesus, not on the escape of an immaterial component of an individual to another ‘place’.
This very brief review cannot come close to doing justice to the power of Marsh's arguments. The level of the book's importance, therefore, is matched by an equally high level of frustration (on the part of this reader) with its flaws. The excessive repetition typical of a dissertation should have been edited out. More important would have been the substitution of ordinary English for the heavy use of technical terms from medicine and neuroscience, since the probable audience will be philosophers, theologians and educated lay readers. Finally, there are numerous arguments which are either circular or are based on lack of understanding of the nature of the mind or soul postulated by dualists. For example, he deems ‘absurd’ the thesis that ‘Pam’ experienced NDE at the time when her brain was dormant (flat EEG) because her brain ‘obviously lacked the ability to activate the cerebral processes associated with sensory perception and, importantly, with memory, an essentially necessary function if Pam was ever to recall any of these perceived events’ (p. 25). However, this critique fails to consider that the dualist's thesis is specifically that it is the mind or soul which perceives and remembers; hence the brain's inability to perform these functions at that time is exactly the point of the dualist's argument.
While I wish that Marsh had taken the time to revise his dissertation into a much more widely accessible (and affordable?) book, I nevertheless judge it a landmark contribution to philosophy of mind, religious studies and Christian theology.
