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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 September 2005
Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909) is without doubt one of the most controversial and enigmatic figures of the Ottoman 19th century. The “Red Sultan” for some, the “Grand Ruler” for others, he is clearly the “Last Sultan” who ruled as well as reigned. His successors, Mehmet V and Vahdettin, were nothing more than figureheads who had only symbolic power during the Young Turk era and World War I. The thirty-three years of Abdülhamid II's reign remain the most critical period in recent history, not only for Turkey, but for most of the successor states.
François Georgeon has finally given us an admirable biography that combines the life story of the man with the history of his era. If one remembers that the last biography of Abdülhamid was published in 1958 (Joan Haslip's The Sultan), one appreciates that this book is long overdue. Starting with the sultan's childhood, a subject doomed to the twilight zone of rumor and hearsay because of the notorious lack of hard data on the private lives of Ottoman rulers, the writer manages to give us a book of rare quality.
One cannot think of Abdülhamid without his “foil,” Midhat Paşa, the great reformer and the sultan's archrival. Paşa, usually considered the paragon of democracy and liberalism, appears here in a different light. Vain and imperious, he was outmaneuvered by the sultan, who managed to make him appear as the primary bulwark against reforms demanded by the foreign powers. Thus, the last of the Tanzimat liberals was dispensed with, and the stage was set for the era of personal rule, or “Hamidian despotism,” as it came to be known. Nevertheless, Georgeon shows us that “despotism” is not as straightforward as it may seem.
Abdülhamid could move only within very precise parameters and always found himself hemmed in by foreign ambassadors, lack of money, the influence and power of the local notables and shaykhs, and, indeed, public opinion. Even though a “despot” is not commonly associated with concern for public opinion, there is no doubt that he could not have moved against the men of the Tanzimat if they had not been discredited by the disastrous war of 1877–78, the flood of Muslim refugees from lost lands in the Balkans, and, above all, the growing resentment on the part of the Muslim lower classes regarding what they saw as non-Muslim insolence. All the same, harassed by overbearing diplomats and militant nationalists and deprived of his most lucrative revenues by the Public Debt Commission, Abdülhamid managed to survive and lay the basis of a modern state. Georgeon draws a very vivid picture of the “systeme hamidienne,” an elusive creature consisting of a blend of time-honored Ottoman methods such as threats and flattery and internal exile with modern education, statistics, railways, and the first modern fire brigade. State primary schools appear in mountains and deserts; a railway carries pilgrims to the Hijaz; and a whole generation that will ultimately depose him and go on to form the leadership cadres of the Turkish Republic as well as Arab states are trained in his Military Academy and School of Civil Service.
Above all, the author shows us that Abdülhamid and his empire remained masters of their own fate. The Ottoman Empire remained a unique phenomenon, an Islamic great power in a world dominated by ever more arrogant and predatory Christian imperialists and colonialists. Georgeon makes the very astute observation that the French ambassador to Istanbul, Paul Cambon, “could not have been more wrong” when he said that Abdülhamid was a “fanatic by conviction.” Georgeon points out that the sultan acted “in keeping with totally rational aims” (p. 444).
In all works dealing with the Ottoman Empire's last century, one subject serves to define the “color” of the writer: the Armenian crisis. Overall, Georgeon's treatment of this question is admirably measured and free of value judgments. He makes it very clear that the Armenian revolutionary committees had an agenda that was patterned on “the Bulgarian model”—that is, regional autonomy leading to eventual independence, a situation that the Ottomans could never accept. He also points out that the Armenian revolutionaries did not shrink from causing provocations that they knew would result in the slaughter of their innocent brethren. Neither does he shrink from a frank and cool-headed assessment of questions concerning Abdülhamid's personal complicity in the horrendous massacres of Armenians between 1894 and 1896. In one sense, such a radical measure would go against the grain of the sultan's habitually cautious policies of not wanting to provoke the Great Powers. Although the official position was that the massacres were a result of “spontaneous popular outrage” that the authorities could not control, Georgeon traces the singularly coordinated timing of the outbreaks of anti-Armenian violence. He also notes that Abdülhamid “wanted to teach the Armenians a lesson” (pp. 287–88) and that he was singularly reluctant to use the army against Muslims.
This book is very well written and covers most of the past and recent literature on the topic. In such a thorough survey of the sources it is all the more surprising to find some striking lacunae. In the chapter “La Politique du Caliphat,” there is no mention of Abdülhamid's obsession with preventing the acquision of property in the Hijaz by non-Ottoman Muslims. Fearing that British Indian, French Algerian, or Dutch Javanese Muslims would accumulate strategic properties and would thus serve as a fifth column for the Western imperialists, the Ottoman authorities were given strict instructions to prevent such an eventuality. Since Georgeon does not fail to mention that the British were attempting to delegitimize Abdülhamid's caliphate by pushing the “Arab Caliphate” policy, this gap in the story is all the more surprising. Another key omission in the chapter is the attempt made by the Ottomans to prevent the giving of ostentatious gifts by rival Muslim rulers that could rival their prestige. More striking is the fact that Georgeon makes no mention of the very matrix of Ottoman claims to the caliphate: the espousal of the Hanafi mezheb, the branch of Islamic jurisprudence that allows a non-Arab to become caliph.
Despite these important omissions, Georgeon has signed his name to a remarkable achievement: a book that stands to become the seminal work on the man and his time. One wishes that it will one day be translated into English. It will almost surely be translated into Turkish. Another felicitous aspect of the book is that it can be read by “general readers” as well as scholars. Some good things are worth waiting for.