Persons who experience severe brain injury often suffer significant disorders of consciousness. Anoxic injuries from cardiac arrest or strokes and traumatic injuries from falls, vehicular crashes, or assaults can result in several conditions in which patients lose or have diminished consciousness for an extended period of time.1
Winslade WJ. Confronting Traumatic Brain Injury: Devastation, Hope and Healing. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press; 1998.
Tovino SA, Winslade WJ. A primer on the law and ethics of treatment, research and public policy in the context of severe traumatic brain injury. Annals of Health Law 2005;14:1–54.
Prominent among many of the conflicts that erupted in the Schiavo case were disputes about her medical diagnosis and prognosis.3
Carey B, Schwartz J. Most experts say they see little chance of recovery. New York Times 2005 Mar 26.
Goodnough A. Jeb Bush files brief in case of woman on life support. New York Times 2003 Oct 8.
Brain Functions and Map, TBI Resource Guide. Available at: http://www.neuroskills.com/brain.shtml, last visited Feb 15, 2006.
Schwartz J. Neither “starvation” nor the suffering it connotes applies to Schiavo, doctors say. New York Times 2005 Mar 25; Goodnough A. Judge delays feeding tube removal. New York Times 2005 Feb 23.
Despite the testimony of qualified medical experts, some physicians, commentators, and Terri Schiavo's parents and siblings insisted that she was not in an irreversible VS but rather was in a MCS and should be treated to promote further recovery of consciousness.7
McNeil DG Jr. In feeding-tube case, many neurologists back courts. New York Times 2003 Oct 26.
Giacino J, Whyte J. The vegetative and minimally conscious states: Current knowledge and remaining questions. The Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilitation 2005;20:30–50 at 33.
Grady D. The hard facts behind a heartbreaking case. New York Times 2005 Jun 19.
Goodnough A. Schiavo autopsy says brain, withered, was untreatable. New York Times 2005 Jun 16; Benedict C. Inside the injured brain, many kinds of awareness. New York Times 2004 Apr 5.
This article provides an overview of key legal and ethical issues relevant to treatment and research involving patients in a VS and MCS. Drawing upon a recent meta-analysis of current knowledge about medical treatment and rehabilitation for vegetative and minimally conscious patients, I argue that treatment and research are problematic because of therapeutic and prognostic uncertainties.11
See note 8, Giacino, Whyte 2005:30–50.
Winslade WJ. The minimally conscious patient: When can life support be terminated? The Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilitation 2002;17:71–3.
Medical and Scientific Background
The distinction between vegetative and minimally conscious states has emerged as a result of the clinical work, research, and collaboration among health professionals who identified a subgroup of severely brain injured patients who retained or regained an inconsistent capacity for consciousness and purposeful behavior. Some patients in a VS will recover some level of consciousness; some minimally conscious patients will achieve higher levels of consciousness. Others may survive in a VS for years, even, on at least one occasion, for 40 years.13
Colburn D. 40-year vigil for Rita Greene. Washington Post Health 1991 Mar 21.
See note 8, Giacino, Whyte 2005:37.
Recent developments in brain imaging techniques have enabled brain injury researchers to better describe and assess the neuropathology of brain injury of patients in vegetative and minimally conscious states.15
See note 8, Giacino, Whyte 2005:34–6.
VS appears to be considerably more heterogeneous than previously believed, and there are critical neuropathologic differences between VS and MCS that are likely to influence prognosis and clinical management. More research is needed to determine the aspects of neuropathology that are causal (i.e. necessary and sufficient) for each disorder.16
See note 8, Giacino, Whyte 2005:36.
Researchers have also sought to determine the prognosis for survival, return of consciousness, and prediction of functional level that vegetative and minimally conscious patients will achieve. Although survival after severe brain injury when a patient is in VS or MCS is generally less than normal life expectancy, it is difficult to predict how long VS or MCS patients will live. It may be days, months, or years. Prognosis for recovery of consciousness relies on time postinjury and rate of functional change, but, again, predictions in individual cases are of uncertain reliability.
At the group level, it is clear that the same factors that predict return of consciousness in the VS—time post-injury, current functional level, and rate of functional change—also predict degree of functional improvement in VS and MCS. Unfortunately, although a statistical prediction of overall outcome is possible at the group level, it is not accurate enough to support individual decision making.17
See note 8, Giacino, Whyte 2005:37.
The usual types of treatment for rehabilitation of patients in VS or MCS are pharmacological interventions, sensory stimulation, physical management, hyperbaric oxygen therapy, and deep brain stimulation. Although clinicians may favor one or another type of intervention based on their clinical experience, Giacino and Whyte claim that
no treatment has been definitely shown to accelerate the pace of recovery or improve functional outcome. Consequently, there are no standards of care to guide clinical decision making and little consistency in practice patterns across rehabilitation centers.18
See note 8, Giacino, Whyte 2005:44.
If Giacino and Whyte are correct in their analysis of therapeutic and prognostic uncertainties, this has significant implications for decisionmaking about treatment and research regarding VS and MCS patients.
Implications of Therapeutic and Prognostic Uncertainty
When a patient with a severe brain injury has survived emergency and acute treatment but has lapsed into a VS or a MCS, clinicians and surrogate decisionmakers must deal with the uncertainties of prognosis and further treatment modalities. It is tempting for clinicians to recommend one or another of the usual treatments based on their experience in previous cases and to minimize the uncertainty of the outcomes of treatment. Surrogates, relieved that their loved one is still alive, may also minimize uncertainty in favor of a hope for recovery. But clinicians are obligated not only to fully disclose therapeutic and prognostic uncertainties, but also to make sure that surrogate decisionmakers understand and appreciate them. Surrogates who intensely desire to see the patient recover may not fully appreciate or accept therapeutic uncertainties or a poor prognosis. It is not uncommon for family members to substitute false hopes of cure for a realistic appraisal of the patient's prospects for recovery of consciousness. At the same time clinicians cannot completely rule out recovery of consciousness for VS patients or improved consciousness for MCS patients. The rare but real possibility of individual improvement is documented in the medical and reported in popular literature. When seeking consent to treat such patients, clinicians must steer a careful course between overemphasizing the potential for either therapeutic success or failure. Yet clinicians must also prepare surrogates for the possibility that, after a reasonable treatment effort, continued treatment may be increasingly unlikely to produce therapeutic benefits. This message is also difficult for surrogates to receive and process. At some point it may be appropriate to consider termination of therapeutic procedures as well as life-sustaining procedures. Some VS and MCS patients, like Terri Schiavo, are biologically “tenacious” in the sense that their organic life can be sustained with minimal medical care, supportive care, and the provision of nutrition and hydration. In such cases, it is tempting to postpone decisions about termination of treatment.
After a prolonged period of treatment with no evidence of therapeutic benefits, clinicians and surrogates eventually must address the prospects of therapeutic futility with only a remote possibility of a recovery of or improvement in consciousness. Sometimes clinicians and surrogates can reach a consensus that further therapeutic efforts are highly likely to be of no benefit. A further consensus may be reached that life-sustaining procedures, such as ventilatory support or nutrition and hydration, may be terminated. Even if a consensus is not achieved, clinicians or surrogates may reluctantly accept a recommendation to terminate treatment in view of evidence that further therapeutic efforts appears to be futile. Terri Schiavo's husband (after many years of treatment) accepted the views of clinicians who evaluated her and diagnosed her vegetative state to be irreversible.19
Schiavo's Husband Marries Girlfriend. New York Times 2006 Jan 23.
Sometimes, however, surrogates or clinicians believe for religious or secular reasons that even minimal organic life should be presented and prolonged at all costs. This view, usually called vitalism, may not be widely held, but it is ardently defended by its adherents. Vitalists believe that no steps should be taken to shorten life or hasten death by withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining procedures. Terri Schiavo's parents, siblings, and their supporters vigorously endorsed vitalism, as did Pope John Paul II and other right-to-life groups.
Intractable value conflicts arise between those who believe that prolonging organic life is not obligatory when no therapeutic benefit can be achieved for VS or MCS patients and vitalists who believe that even VS and MCS patients should receive all life-sustaining procedures. Legal rules or health policies may recognize either position. It is increasingly common, for example, for advance directive statutes to permit patients or their surrogates to opt for refusal or continuation of life-sustaining procedures in the face of terminal illness or irreversible conditions. Although courts are sometimes willing to permit termination of life-sustaining procedures for patients in an irreversible VS, they seem unwilling to do so in the case of MCS patients despite what legally authorized surrogates request unless the patient's own preferences have been clearly documented.20
See note 12, Winslade 2002.
Texas Health & Safety Code Sections 166.001–10.
Similarly, the view that it is ethically permissible to terminate life-sustaining procedures that offer no therapeutic benefits other than to prolong organic life is defended by some medical ethicists whereas others support some types of religious or secular vitalism. Both camps invoke various ethical theories or principles in support of their views with no realistic prospect of persuading those who subscribe to the opposing view to abandon their values. Among the general public and policymakers a similar division, or sometimes a polarization, occurs about termination of life support versus some form of vitalism. As a result, medical decisionmaking concerning treatment for VS and MCS patients is often contentious and controversial, though not usually as inflammatory as the Schiavo case.
Another aspect of the conflict between futility and vitalism concerns the economic and emotional costs to families for life-sustaining treatment for VS and MCS patients. Long-term medical and life-sustaining care can be extraordinarily expensive and emotionally exhausting to families and caregivers. For example, one patient who was in a near vegetative state for three and a half years (after suffering a traumatic brain injury from an assault) incurred medical costs of US$2.3 million. Cases like this are sometimes classified as therapeutic extravagance when little or no therapeutic benefits other than prolonging life are achieved.22
See note 2, Tovino, Winslade 2005:28–31.
Winslade WJ. Permanently unconscious patients; a radical proposal. Texas Medicine 1993;89:16.
Because therapeutic effectiveness for rehabilitative treatment of VS and MCS patients has not been established by rigorous and reliable research, there is no established standard of care for such patients. And because prognosis for recovery of consciousness or functional capacities in individual cases is also uncertain, it is important that further research be conducted to determine what treatments will offer therapeutic benefits to VS and MCS patients. Some current research is designed to increase knowledge of brain function rather than to provide therapeutic benefits. Nontherapeutic research, such as research based on various types of brain imaging, may yield results that will contribute to subsequent therapies. But, like stem cell research, nontherapeutic brain research is justified on utilitarian grounds that future patients will eventually benefit from newly discovered therapies. Other research aims to evaluate therapeutic benefits of alternative types of treatment interventions such as those listed earlier. Although therapeutic research may result in benefits to particular subjects, the research may only provide actual benefits to future patients. Research may reveal that the proposed therapies fail to provide the anticipated benefits. However, unless research on alternative therapies is undertaken, patients who might be helped may be neglected or even ignored if it is falsely assumed that no therapies can improve their condition.24
Fins JJ. Constructing an ethical sterotaxy for severe brain injury: Balancing risks, benefits and access. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 2003;4:323–7.
Nevertheless, because VS and MCS patients are a particularly vulnerable population, controversy has arisen not only about the informed consent process, but also about the authority of surrogates to consent to research on behalf of such patients. An unresolved controversy has emerged about what type of surrogate should be authorized to consent to research on behalf of VS and MCS patients (and other cognitively or emotionally incapacitated persons such as those with Alzheimer's disease or severe mental illness). The alternative surrogates might include any of the following:
- A person designated under a general Medical Power of Attorney statute to consent to treatment
- A person given authority under a specific Medical Power of Attorney for Research
- A person appointed by a court as a legally authorized representative to consent to research
- A close family member (with or without judicial approval) who may be counseled by a research subject advocate
- A Guardian Ad Litem for Research.
A variety of reasons might be given to prefer one or another of the surrogates listed above. But the underlying factor that gives rise to the list is debate about who can best protect vulnerable patients from being exploited or exposed to undue risks or discomfort. Even if researchers take every precaution not to take advantage of these patients as research subjects, the concern is, in part, that patients suffering from impairments of consciousness may either not understand what is happening to them if they are in a MCS or, if they are VS patients, that they are helpless and totally vulnerable. Unless there is evidence that VS or MCS patients had previously specifically endorsed being a research subject, or at least the patient's values were consistent with being a research subject, some commentators feel that research on VS or MCS is unavoidably exploitive. This restricted view of the permissibility of research, however, makes it highly unlikely that therapies will be discovered to benefit VS and MCS. As a consequence of this narrow view of the permissibility of research, VS and MCS patients may be subjected to therapeutic neglect and denied an opportunity to recover.25
See note 2, Tovino, Winslade 2005:34–7. A full discussion of the surrogacy controversy in the context of research on cognitively impaired subjects is beyond the scope of this paper.
Although further policy development is required to determine who is best suited to serve as a surrogate to decide whether or not to enroll severely brain injured patients in a research project, a policy that greatly inhibits such research is irrational. Because we invest substantial resources in rescuing and preserving the lives of persons suffering from severe brain injuries, it seem obvious that we should seek to discover effective therapies and establish better prognostic criteria for individual cases. I agree with Giacino and Whyte that, given the inadequate empirical evidence for establishing a standard of care for rehabilitative treatment of VS and MCS patients at present, further multicentered, objective research on recovery of consciousness and functional capacity is needed:
Advances in treatment will not be made through further case series because of the great variability in untreated outcome, and the fact that spontaneous recovery confounds all uncontrolled assessments of treatment. Thus, the future demands a program of large-scale, rigorous, controlled research on treatments of interest so that evidence-based interventions can be provided in the future. Any treatment-induced changes in outcome may also further shape the ethical and legal debates.26
See note 8, Giacino, Whyte 2005:47.
If the research on VS and MCS patients shows that a standard of care can be established, a stronger case can be made for investing in continued treatment. In addition, if better criteria for individual prognoses can be established, this will provide a rational basis for investing resources in the care of particular patients.
However, the results of the research may not succeed in establishing a standard of care for treatment or enable clinicians to reliably predict which individual patients are likely to recover capacities for consciousness. Then the ethical and policy justifications for continued treatment or even for provision of life-sustaining care are diminished. Even though vitalists may be unconvinced or, like the late Pope, advocate continued research, support for vitalist policies will be weakened. It will still be permissible for vitalists to invest personal resources to prolong life at all costs, but it would be increasingly unlikely that the expenditure of public funds will be endorsed by policymakers. Instead, given the limited resources available for long-term treatment, if evidence for effective treatments cannot be produced, the resources should be diverted from patients who are unable to benefit from our therapeutic efforts to those who can.
