David Slater is well known for his work on social movements, critical perspectives on development narratives and the power play politics of the United States. His latest book brings these interests together into one volume, the central thrust of which is to review and apply a post-colonial view of geopolitics and development.
The opening chapter picks its way through competing definitions and claims for the Third World, South, and West, and Euro-Americanism, drawing from the work of Edward Said, Antonio Gramsci and Michel Foucault. Slater develops an idea of geopolitical pivot, a metaphorical device that echoes Halford Mackinder, but here located specifically in the nation-state subjected to pressures from above and below. The following two chapters draw out concepts of Empire, as the tangible space and process of imperialism, to the more open category proposed by Hardt and Negri. The discussion focuses on the United States, its representation of an imperial mission, from Jefferson, Monroe and (Teddy) Roosevelt, concretised through interventions in Puerto Rico, Cuba and the Philippines, among others. Slater argues that invasiveness is both a desire and a capacity to intervene in other societies, imposing ideas and values, dressed up as civilised, progressive and eventually ‘normal’, while simultaneously devaluing those values of the recipient. Diversity and difference are thus erased, and there is limited opportunity for the recipient to represent visions of an alternative project. With the onset of the Cold War, the imperial mission elides the geopolitical and development projects notably through the idea of containing communism. As the ‘culmination of the West,’ to quote Rostow's description of the final stage, development was depicted as ‘Western’ and essentially ‘American’. While the Third World was not passive to the notion of development, its institutionalisation through international agencies or the realpolitik of the Cold War, the non-West was consistently represented as ‘outside’.
None of these processes are constant, and in the fourth chapter Slater argues that neo-liberalism represents an expansion of Occidental power, emerging as the Cold War waned and globalisation gathered pace and scope. Slater critiques the tenets of neo-liberalism and develops a sequence that moves from structural adjustment, to good governance and the promotion of social capital. The emergence of a self-regulating economy, once freed of the constraints of an over-bearing and predatory state, the evocation of governance as both representing a certain kind of limited state and inducing a passive politics, and the reduction of ‘the social’ to social capital are all critiqued. For me this is the weakest chapter, the illustrative detail is sketchy, the sequential rolling out of neo-liberalism seems too neat, and the links to Reagan-end of Cold War politics are treated too briefly.
Tracing the resistance to these Occidental desires and impositions is a fundamental part of Geopolitics and the Post-Colonial. Slater opens with a discussion of dependency writing, arguing that much of what was written in the 1960s and 1970s remains valid today. As a ‘critical interruption’ to writing on modernisation, dependency stressed the histories of colonialism and the importance of sovereignty, as well as the struggle to get different ideas heard in the stultifying geopolitical atmosphere of the period. As Slater indicates, dependency has points in common with post-colonial writing, yet the primacy of economy over social and cultural theory and especially the ignorance of how representations of the developing world contributed to the construction of the West, was always and remains a weakness. Read for today, dependency can inform the process and effects of asymmetric flows of information and technology, the new forms of denationalisation wrought through neo-liberalism as well as representing an autonomous intellectual identity (though the debt to Marx and Luxembourg is rather eclipsed).
What hope the more contemporary engagements with post-modern and post-colonial theories? Post-modern thought has enabled a de-essentialised knowledge that critiques ‘the West’ and has opened fissures to the insertion of ideas from ‘outside’. Yet many post-modern writers have little to say about the non-West, and adopt broadly linear and occasionally pessimistic visions of history and politics. Slater introduces the possibilities of post-colonial theory, that is more directly challenging to Western discourses than post-modernism, offering a more complicated relation of coloniser/colonised, outsider/insider, and a more positive ‘ethico-political dimension’. To some extent this potential is illustrated in the next two chapters that scope across the currents and representations of US hegemony, from Manifest Destiny to the Project for a New American Century, and the precarious subjectivities being constructed around social movements, from the Zapatistas to the World Social Forums. These chapters are engaging, largely optimistic and provocative, though Slater might have used the material more reflexively to critique post-colonial theory.
For an ambitious book that draws on chapters written originally as individual papers, the coherence of the Conclusion is vital. Here, Slater recapitulates his key arguments; namely, that Western modernity has gone together with the silencing of a non-Western other, that the supposed superiority of the West in terms of modernisation, civilisation and democracy is predicated on representations of non-West as less civilised, less modern and less democratic (though many might agree with the latter categorisation). These representations predicate a desire to intervene that, matched with a capacity to do so, establish ‘a discourse of justification’ inducing consent supported by coercive power. Resistance is not futile however, and whatever Roosevelt or Wolfowitz might wish, the compliance of ‘others’ cannot be taken for granted. That said, the discursive opposition offered by dependency and post-colonial thinkers, while challenging the production of knowledge, has been only weakly counter-hegemonic. So where next? Slater urges us to consider an ‘ethic of responsibility’, but even after 230 pages it is unclear what this ethics should look like and how it might be achieved. Are we, post 9–11, at a new development and geopolitical impasse?
Geopolitics and the Post-colonial makes an important contribution to how we construct views of the world and how these legitimate interventions. I would have liked the author to post more critical reflection of key concepts such as ‘Western modernity’: presumably the United States and Norway do not see themselves, construct representations of ‘others’ or justify their interventions in the same ways. More detail too would have been useful on how representations are constructed, especially in the cultural sphere, for and by whom. Does a Frida Kahlo exhibition confirm Western ideas of Mexican culture as spiritual, does it recapture a political memory of indigenism and nationalism, or hold the promise of syncretic modernity? And how do representations change given media revolutions? How do we understand representations set out in a speech by George W. Bush and offerings of Disney, Le Monde or Fox Sports? Notwithstanding these gripes, Geopolitics and the Post-colonial is provoking, timely and delivered with panache.
