I. INTRODUCTION
U.S. immigration agencies first began using DNA tests to verify family relationships in 2000. Little changed about that use of DNA tests in the immigration context until the summer of 2018, when Health and Human Services (“HHS”) Secretary Alex Azar announced a plan to use DNA testing to reunite thousands of children and parents who had been separated at the United States-Mexico border in the preceding months and had not yet been reunited. Since then, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) have rapidly expanded DNA collection and analysis in the immigration sphere. Most notably, in October 2019, the DOJ proposed regulations that would require DNA collection from immigration detainees and storage of their genetic information in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (“FBI”) Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”), a national DNA database for criminal forensic investigation. In March 2020, these regulations, largely unchanged, were finalized.
U.S. immigration agencies first began using DNA tests to verify family relationships in 2000.Footnote 1 Little changed about that use of DNA tests in the immigration context until the summer of 2018, when Health and Human Services (“HHS”) Secretary Alex Azar announced a plan to use DNA testing to reunite thousands of children and parents who had been separated at the United States-Mexico border in the preceding months and had not yet been reunited.Footnote 2 Since then, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) have rapidly expanded DNA collection and analysis in the immigration sphere.Footnote 3 Most notably, in October 2019, the DOJ proposed regulations that would require DNA collection from immigration detainees and storage of their genetic information in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (“FBI”) Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”), a national DNA database for criminal forensic investigation.Footnote 4 In March 2020, these regulations, largely unchanged, were finalized.Footnote 5
Each of these recent expansions of the use of DNA testing in the immigration context has prompted intense outcry from advocates for immigrants. What is it about this technology—which has revolutionized health care, criminal investigations, and genealogy—that makes it objectionable to use in this context? This Article recounts the history of DNA testing in the U.S. immigration context; describes the privacy risks of expanding DNA surveillance generally and for immigrants, in particular; and summarizes the significance of DOJ's new DNA collection policy for bioethics and immigration law.
II. DNA TESTING IN THE IMMIGRATION CONTEXT
Understanding U.S. policy on DNA testing in immigration contexts in the past—and how past usage relates to current and proposed uses—is critical for determining appropriate privacy safeguards as DNA testing and its many uses by the government evolve.
A. Voluntary Participation in DNA Testing
1. Immigration Petitions
Official guidance on the use of DNA testing for the purpose of verifying family relationships by U.S. immigration agencies was first issued in 2000.Footnote 6 Since that time, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), a sub-agency of DHS that processes immigration and naturalization applications, has accepted DNA test results as evidence of family relationships in the context of the family-based immigration petition, which is the primary way in which noncitizens legally immigrate to the United States.Footnote 7 Generally, immigration law permits U.S. citizens to petition for the admission of their spouses, children, parents, and siblings, and permits lawful permanent residents to petition for their spouses and children.Footnote 8 DNA testing in the context of family-based immigration petitions is not specifically authorized by statute or regulation, but is described in policy documents for USCIS and the Department of State (“DOS”), which evaluate immigration petitions involving intended beneficiaries located within and outside of the United States, respectively.Footnote 9
The policy and procedure for DNA testing in the context of family-based immigration petitions for intended beneficiaries located within the United States has changed very little since it was established in 2000.Footnote 10 When documentary evidence of a family relationship is unavailable or inadequate, immigration officers have discretion to suggest the DNA test option to petitioners and intended beneficiaries.Footnote 11 DNA testing is voluntary.Footnote 12 Participants are responsible for making necessary arrangements with an accredited laboratory and for the costs.Footnote 13 The results are sent directly to USCIS.Footnote 14 Participants may request a copy of the results from the lab.Footnote 15 Testing laboratories provide results in the form of a degree of certainty of the plausibility of the claimed relationship.Footnote 16 If a DNA test indicates that the plausibility of the claimed relationship is less than 99.5%, it is generally not accepted as proof of relationship.Footnote 17 Immigration officers consider the DNA test results alongside any other evidence submitted; therefore, a DNA test establishing the claimed relationship does not guarantee approval of the petition.Footnote 18
2. Reunification of Separated Families in the Summer of 2018
In October 2017, DHS began implementing a policy of routinely separating immigrant families who attempted to enter the United States from Mexico outside of an official port of entry in order to prosecute the parents for the misdemeanor crime of illegal entry.Footnote 19 In April 2018, the policy became official: DHS's “zero-tolerance” policy directed prosecutors to charge every adult in such circumstances with criminal immigration violations, even if the family expressed a credible fear of returning to their country of origin.Footnote 20 As children cannot be held in criminal detention, zero tolerance required separating these adults from the children with whom they traveled to the border—a secondary goal of the policy that the administration believed would deter immigrant families from Central America from coming to seek asylum in the United States altogether.Footnote 21 Detained immigrant children are housed in facilities operated by the Office of Refugee Resettlement (“ORR”), a sub-agency of HHS.Footnote 22
Criminal proceedings for most of the separated parents concluded in guilty pleas with a sentence of time served.Footnote 23 They were then detained in facilities operated by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), a separate sub-agency within DHS responsible for adult immigration detainees.Footnote 24 The vast majority were not reunited with their children upon their return to ICE custody.Footnote 25 Some parents were ultimately released from ICE custody while their immigration cases were pending, and others were deported to their countries of origin without their children.Footnote 26 The media reported stories of prolonged detention in poor conditions, traumatized children, and parents unable to locate or obtain release of their children after release or deportation.Footnote 27
On June 26, 2018, a federal district court directed DHS and HHS to reunify immigrant parents and children who had been forcibly separated upon arriving at the United States-Mexico border.Footnote 28 The litigation revealed significant dysfunction in the administration's planning and execution of its family separation policy, including a failure to properly record the identities and locations of immigrant children in its custody.Footnote 29 This mismanagement prevented DHS and HHS from relying on traditional channels of verifying family relationships in order to comply with the court's order.Footnote 30
Amid this chaos, on July 5, 2018, ORR announced that it would use DNA tests to verify the relationships between detained immigrant children and the adults seeking to have the children released into their custody.Footnote 31 Part of ORR's rationale for using DNA tests was the looming court deadline to reunify children with their parents.Footnote 32 Obtaining birth certificates would take too long and ORR deemed information obtained from children about their parents' identity to be “unreliable.”Footnote 33 This use of DNA tests was different from prior usage in the immigration context in several ways. First, the U.S. government was directly responsible for forcibly separating families. In family-based immigration petition scenarios, petitioners and intended beneficiaries make the decision to leave family members behind, even if it is under difficult circumstances.Footnote 34 Second, DNA tests were used as the first, and sometimes the sole, basis for determining family relationships; until then, DNA tests had been used to confirm family relationships after documentary evidence had been sought or considered.Footnote 35 Third, DNA tests had never before been deployed on such a mass scale for the purpose of verifying immigrant family relationships.Footnote 36
In the rollout of this unprecedented use of DNA testing in the immigration context, DHS and HHS provided very little information to the public about why they had decided to rely on DNA testing; the type of DNA test that would be performed and the profile generated; how DNA samples and profiles would be stored, used, and destroyed; how long profiles would be retained; and the impact of a non-match on separated family members.Footnote 37 Unsurprisingly, ORR's announcement was widely condemned by ethicists, scientists, and advocates for immigrants.Footnote 38 The sources of condemnation were various, and some critics absolutely opposed the use of DNA tests for this purpose even though such tests could hasten reunification and have been used for decades in other immigration contexts.Footnote 39
On July 10, 2018, Judge Sabraw ordered DHS and ORR to use DNA tests “only when necessary to verify a legitimate, good-faith concern about parentage or to meet a reunification deadline.”Footnote 40 The order required the government to attempt other established techniques for determining family relationships before using DNA tests, obtain consent from participating adults prior to conducting DNA tests, ensure that the DNA samples and profiles generated from the tests would not be shared with federal agencies outside of HHS, destroy DNA samples and profiles within one week of obtaining a result, forbid contractors performing the DNA tests from retaining samples and profiles, and require contractors to destroy samples and profiles within one week of obtaining a result.Footnote 41
It is unclear, even today, if all of the children who were separated from their parents at the border under the “zero tolerance” policy have been reunited with their parents, due to the inadequacy of DHS and HHS tracking systems.Footnote 42 Although it is unlikely that this or a future administration would implement a family separation policy like the one that drew such popular condemnation in the summer of 2018, immigrant children continue to be detained and separated from their family members at the border.Footnote 43 When the government determines that children would be unsafe in the custody of a parent because of the parent's criminal history, for example, it may decide to take the children into ORR custody.Footnote 44 Or if a child presents at the border with a relative who is not their parent, the child may be separated from them and held in ORR custody until the agency conducts background checks on family members seeking their release.Footnote 45 Therefore, it is still important for ICE to have a thoughtful and comprehensive policy on DNA testing to reunify immigrant family members.
3. Rapid DNA Testing Pilot Project at the Southern Border
After Judge Sabraw's June 2018 order put an end to DHS's family separation policy, the administration became concerned that adult immigrants would seek more lenient treatment by immigration officials by coming to the United States-Mexico border with their or others' children.Footnote 46 At the time, family units with minor children at the border who demonstrated a credible fear of persecution in their native countries were processed differently from adults: They were less likely to be detained than adults traveling without children because of legal limits on the length and conditions of detention for children,Footnote 47 and they were permitted to reside and work in the United States while their asylum applications were pending.Footnote 48
In response, DHS formulated a voluntary rapid DNA testing pilot project to verify family relationships for the dual purposes of (1) determining how an otherwise inadmissible claimed family unit should be processed and (2) aiding in the criminal investigation and prosecution of immigrants making false claims about family relationships.Footnote 49 The pilot was conducted over a three-day period in May 2019.Footnote 50 In mid-June, ICE announced “a 120-day extension of the pilot program and expansion to five additional locations along the southwest border to assess long-term implementation, starting late June [2019].”Footnote 51
Concurrent with the expansion of its rapid DNA testing pilot project in June 2019, DHS released a Privacy Impact Assessment (“PIA”) analyzing the privacy risks and mitigation efforts related to its use of rapid DNA technology.Footnote 52 The PIA describes the process by which the expanded pilot is being implemented.Footnote 53 If ICE personnel suspect that members of a claimed family unit are lying about their relationship, they can solicit the family members' participation in rapid DNA testing.Footnote 54 A short privacy statement provided to immigrants selected for participation describes
[T]he purpose of the Rapid DNA testing, the legal authority under which DNA is collected, that information related to the collection of DNA (e.g., the existence of a positive or negative match) may be shared according to federal law and policy, and that submitting to Rapid DNA testing is voluntary, but that failure to submit to Rapid DNA testing may be taken into account as one factor in ICE's assessment of the validity of the claimed parent-child relationship.Footnote 55
Written consent for the test is obtained from adults on their own behalf and on behalf of any claimed children.Footnote 56 The PIA does not address the risk of coercion and how that might impact an immigrant's ability to meaningfully consent to participate in DNA testing.Footnote 57 Finally, the PIA describes the technological and other limitations on ICE's handling and processing of DNA samples and test results.Footnote 58
The rapid DNA testing pilot represents another shift in the use of DNA analysis: from a tool for reunifying immigrant families to a tool for law enforcement purposes. It is an example of “function creep,” defined as “the gradual and sometimes imperceptible expansion of surveillance mechanisms, once in place, for secondary uses beyond those originally intended or contemplated.”Footnote 59 A system of surveillance instituted for the purpose of identifying immigrant family units in order to determine their treatment under immigration law is simultaneously used for the purpose of solving unsolved crimes. It is also an example of the criminalization of immigration itself; merely attempting to enter the country makes one an object of scrutiny for law enforcement purposes. For those attempting to enter the country legally, failing to clear any number of procedural hurdles can lead to criminal prosecution.Footnote 60
B. Compulsory DNA Collection
1. Refugee Family Reunification Pilot in East Africa
Historically, DHS and DOS have instituted compulsory DNA testing for only one category of immigrants seeking family-based visas: participants in the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program Priority Three (“P-3”) program.Footnote 61 These are the spouses, unmarried children, and parents of people of designated nationalities who entered the United States as refugees or who were granted asylum.Footnote 62 Suspicions of fraud in the P-3 program were the primary driver of the testing policy, which was piloted in 2008 and mandated in 2012.Footnote 63 Although compulsory DNA tests have not been instituted in other family-based immigration contexts, the possibility of expansion is real: The impetus for the pilot DNA testing policy in the P-3 program was a 2006 recommendation by the USCIS Ombudsman to DHS to issue regulations authorizing the USCIS Director to require DNA tests as evidence of family relationships.Footnote 64
2. Immigration Detainees
Congress authorized the Attorney General to collect DNA from persons in federal custody, including immigration detainees, in the DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005.Footnote 65 The DNA profiles that are generated from this collection are stored in the FBI's DNA database, CODIS.Footnote 66 The collection and storage of DNA information in CODIS is for the purpose of law enforcement identification.Footnote 67
The implementing regulations for the DNA Fingerprint Act mandate the collection of DNA from all persons who are arrested on federal criminal charges and from all “non-United States persons” in immigration detention.Footnote 68 However, the Attorney General has discretion to limit or exempt the collection of DNA by certain agencies.Footnote 69 A special provision permitted the Secretary of Homeland Security to exempt DNA collection from immigration detainees, including circumstances in which “collection of DNA samples is not feasible because of operational exigencies or resource limitations.”Footnote 70 To date, DHS has not implemented compulsory DNA collection of immigration detainees who do not have a criminal record, based on this exemption authority.Footnote 71
In October 2019, DOJ proposed regulations that would reallocate the exemption authority for compulsory DNA collection from immigration detainees from the Secretary of Homeland Security to the Attorney General;Footnote 72 a final rule was issued on March 9, 2020.Footnote 73 Although DOJ accurately states that “this rulemaking does not require DHS to expand DNA-sample collection,” former Attorney General Jeff Sessions made no secret that this had been the intention since the rulemaking began.Footnote 74 In anticipation of the rule change, DHS began implementing a pilot project to collect DNA from immigrants detained by Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) in the Detroit sector and at the Eagle Pass Port of Entry in southwestern Texas.Footnote 75 The final rule went into effect on April 8, 2020.Footnote 76
III. PRIVACY RISKS OF EXPANDING DNA SURVEILLANCE
As a foundation for analyzing DOJ's justification for expanding DNA collection from immigration detainees, this Part provides an overview of privacy harms related to mass collection and sharing of biometric information by the government, with a focus on potential privacy harms arising from the new policy. Concerns about privacy harms are among the most important reasons for the government to refrain from expanding DNA databases and are often voiced when the government proposes to expand biometrics surveillance on a mass scale.Footnote 77 Increased collection and sharing of DNA information across agencies enhances the government's ability to surveil members of the population.Footnote 78 However, policymakers and courts have always balanced the value of individual privacy with other values that are considered socially beneficial.Footnote 79
For example, privacy harms associated with a certain level of government surveillance in order to investigate crimes and protect public safety are generally tolerated. U.S. law enforcement first began using DNA testing to investigate crimes by linking crime scene evidence with the DNA of violent offenders.Footnote 80 DNA profiles in CODIS are stored permanently and can be accessed by law enforcement at any level without consent, suspicion, or a warrant.Footnote 81 Over time, state and federal laws rapidly expanded the list of offenses eligible for DNA collection and profile retention in CODIS, and some jurisdictions began collecting DNA from people who had merely been arrested on suspicion of having committed a crime.Footnote 82
The issue of whether the government may collect DNA from people who have not been convicted of a crime implicates the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search.Footnote 83 Several federal and state courts that initially considered this question reached opposite conclusions.Footnote 84 In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Maryland's statute authorizing pre-conviction collection of arrestees' DNA as a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, “[i]n light of the context of a valid arrest supported by probable cause” relating to an alleged crime.Footnote 85 The Court considered compulsory DNA collection in this context to be reasonable because (1) it serves important governmental interests related to law enforcement, (2) CODIS provides adequate privacy protections, and (3) a cheek swab to collect DNA is a minimal intrusion on individual privacy.Footnote 86
In Immigration Surveillance, a seminal article documenting the rise of surveillance mechanisms in immigration enforcement activities, Anil Kalhan adopts the following definition of surveillance: “the systematic monitoring, gathering, and analysis of information in order to make decisions, minimize risk, sort populations, and exercise power.”Footnote 87 He describes in detail the use of four surveillance activities in immigration enforcement: “identification, screening and authorization, mobility tracking and control, and information sharing.”Footnote 88
In immigration enforcement, biometric identifiers such as fingerprints, facial recognition-ready digital photographs, iris scans, palm prints, hand vein scans, voice prints, and DNA are favored over documentation as more efficient and accurate mechanisms to identify individuals.Footnote 89 They are used to analyze, screen, and authorize noncitizens in a variety of settings unrelated to international travel, including at “local police stations, private workplaces, benefits agencies, universities, [and] health insurers and providers.”Footnote 90 Biometric information systems are one of several tools that the government uses to track and control the movement of U.S. citizens and noncitizens across borders.Footnote 91 Finally, biometrics information of noncitizens is shared among several government database systems, including systems housed in “intelligence agencies, law enforcement, immigration authorities, international entities, foreign governments, and other institutions, both public and private.”Footnote 92
Biometric information about noncitizens—specifically fingerprints, facial recognition-ready digital photographs, and iris scans—are stored in DHS's Automated Biometric Identification System (“IDENT”), which is housed in government-run data centers.Footnote 93 DHS is developing a new cloud-based system, the Homeland Advanced Recognition Technology System (“HART”), which will contain all of the information currently stored in IDENT and will have expanded capacity to store and analyze additional biometric identifiers such as palm prints, scars, tattoos, physical markings, and voices.Footnote 94 Biometric information is linked to machine-readable travel documents such as passports and visas, which incorporate biometric identifiers.Footnote 95 ICE has recently ramped up the routine collection of fingerprints from children in immigration detention, including those held by CBP at or near the border with their parents and those in ORR shelters.Footnote 96
DOJ justifies its new policy requiring DNA collection from all immigration detainees by describing several governmental interests that parallel the interests served by collection from arrestees and that the Supreme Court relied upon in Maryland v. King: “identification of persons in custody, facilitating safe and secure custody, informing decisions concerning detention and release pending further proceedings, clearing the innocent, and bringing the guilty to justice.”Footnote 97 Ensuring public safety is the overarching rationale.Footnote 98
Finally, it is important to note that the title of this Article refers to DNA testing at “the border.” By this term, I am referring not merely to a territorial boundary, but to the more nuanced concept in which it is understood in the context of immigration governance.Footnote 99 Even after noncitizens have entered and are residing within the country, they are subject to direct and indirect immigration enforcement, which “draws the migration border inward, self-consciously constructing virtual, domestic border checkpoints throughout the country's interior.”Footnote 100 Direct enforcement is the initiation of removal proceedings based on unlawful presence or post-entry conduct such as criminal convictions.Footnote 101 Indirect enforcement can occur whenever a public or private actor must verify immigration or citizenship status in order to make an eligibility determination.Footnote 102 This includes many activities of day-to-day life, such as applying for a job, public benefits, or a driver's license; registering for school; seeking health care; renting a home; or buying a bus ticket.Footnote 103 Both types of enforcement have increased dramatically in recent decades and can affect immigrants who have not recently crossed a territorial border.Footnote 104 Post-entry enforcement actions have fueled the growth of immigration detention and will therefore fuel the growth of DNA surveillance of immigrants under DOJ's new policy.
A. Unpredicted Uses of DNA Data
DNA contains much more information than other biometrics, including information that many people consider sensitive such as “gender, familial relationships, and other hereditary information, race, health, disease history and predisposition to disease, and perhaps even sexual orientation.”Footnote 105 The potential applications of DNA analysis are infinite and are expanding every day.Footnote 106 Even as the law has struggled to keep pace with these new applications, it can be surmised from recent history that, as technology improves, the role of DNA in immigration and criminal processes will continue to grow.
In its new policy, DOJ seeks to alleviate concerns about privacy harms by characterizing the DNA profiles stored in CODIS as “sanitized ‘genetic fingerprints,’” claiming that they are useful only to identify an individual and cannot be used to “disclose the individual's traits, disorders, or dispositions.”Footnote 107 However, it is becoming increasingly evident that this “non-coding” DNA contains more information than previously believed and that technological advances will likely enable more information to be mined from the profiles stored in CODIS.Footnote 108
In addition, because DOJ retains DNA samples and not just DNA profiles, it is entirely possible for the government to mine these samples for sensitive information that we know to be linked with DNA.Footnote 109 The sample itself contains information about a person's entire genetic make-up, which is significantly more than and different in kind from the type of biometric information that is currently gathered, as some courts have recognized.Footnote 110 Government access to a person's DNA information goes far beyond serving the purpose of identifying that person.Footnote 111 The combination of interoperable data systems storing biometric information, unlimited data retention times, and little oversight and transparency over the retrieval and use of sensitive biometric information increases the likelihood of function creep.Footnote 112
B. Perpetuation of Inaccuracies
Widespread collection and sharing of DNA information across government agencies can perpetuate inaccuracies that originate from one source.Footnote 113 These inaccuracies can cause the wrong people to be profiled and surveilled, subjecting them to repeated intrusions of privacy in the form of searches and interrogations.Footnote 114 Based on current information-sharing practices designed to protect national security, we know that existing immigration records are “notoriously inaccurate and out-of-date.”Footnote 115 For example, thousands of U.S. citizens have been transferred to ICE custody by state and local law enforcement based on inaccurate immigration records.Footnote 116 As this experience shows, we know that when such errors are disseminated across multiple systems and agencies, they can be very difficult to correct.Footnote 117
Even when the information in DNA databases is accurate, those whose DNA is in the system are more likely to be wrongly implicated in a crime.Footnote 118 In a comment opposing the DOJ regulations expanding compulsory DNA testing of immigration detainees, the Electronic Frontier Foundation describes the case of Lukis Anderson, whose DNA was transferred by the paramedics who had treated him to a crime scene where they treated a victim hours later.Footnote 119 Anderson was arrested and charged with murder even though he was in the hospital at the time the murder occurred.Footnote 120 If his DNA had not been in the system, he would not have been wrongly implicated in the crime. While Anderson's DNA was in the state criminal database because of a prior felony charge, immigration detainees' DNA will be entered into CODIS even if they have never been arrested for a crime.Footnote 121 This means that the risk of this type of mistake is disproportionately likely to affect immigrants who have never had any involvement with the criminal justice system.
C. Alienage Differential
The new DOJ rule is an example of an alienage differential in privacy under the Fourth Amendment.Footnote 122 The circumstances leading an immigrant to be detained by immigration law enforcement officers are distinct from the circumstances that lead to criminal arrests because, in the vast majority of cases, immigrants in civil detention have not been suspected of committing a crime.Footnote 123 Although there is no link between lack of immigration status and criminality, the new DOJ policy seems to assume that an immigration detainee, like a criminal arrestee, is under heightened suspicion of criminal behavior.Footnote 124 Therefore, the collection of DNA under the new DHS policy represents an “unprecedented shift” from an intrusion on privacy based on conduct to one that is based on status.Footnote 125 In other words, every immigrant is a suspect. Legal experts on immigration and genetic privacy recently opined in The New York Times, that “[b]y severing the longstanding prerequisite of prior (alleged) criminal conduct for compelled DNA collection, the government puts us all at risk.”Footnote 126 They warn that “once you break the norm requiring criminal conduct for inclusion in CODIS, it is difficult to re-establish.”Footnote 127
D. Exacerbating Racial and Ethnic Inequities
Black and Latino men are disproportionately represented in U.S. law enforcement biometrics databases, including in CODIS.Footnote 128 Existing racial bias in the criminal justice system has caused Black and Latino men to be unequally targeted by law enforcement for arrest and convicted of crimes.Footnote 129 The new policy would exacerbate this inequity in the criminal justice system by adding a disproportionate amount of genetic information about Latinx people to CODIS.Footnote 130
E. Data Breach
Whenever personal information is stored in a database, it is subject to breach.Footnote 131 DOJ has dismissed concerns about privacy harms in the event of a data breach affecting CODIS.Footnote 132 However, a recent report of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs identified numerous vulnerabilities in the computer networks of federal agencies that hold personal data.Footnote 133 One of the worst federal agency data breaches in recent years was the 2015 Office of Personnel Management breach, which resulted in the disclosure of security clearance data of more than 20 million current and former federal employees, including more than 5.6 million fingerprint records.Footnote 134 Those whose DNA profiles are stored in CODIS therefore face greater privacy risks from unauthorized access to their genetic information than do people who have not been subjected to a DNA test by law enforcement.
IV. UNIQUE RISKS FOR NONCITIZENS
This Part describes the unique and more immediate risks that noncitizens face from the expansion of DNA surveillance. It is designed to address arguments that expansions of DNA surveillance and data mining are inevitable and will affect citizens and noncitizens alike, and that it is therefore futile to object to this incremental expansion of DNA surveillance. It explains how DOJ's new policy imposes risks on a politically and socially marginalized population.
Deportation for a violation of civil law is a unique risk of heightened biometric surveillance that only noncitizens face. Even prior to the implementation of DOJ's new policy, documented and undocumented immigrants were under heightened surveillance because of existing biometric collection and sharing practices.Footnote 135 DHS's Secure Communities program requires state and local law enforcement agencies to share fingerprint data with ICE in order to determine if they belong to a noncitizen and in order to enable ICE to decide whether to pursue an enforcement action against the person.Footnote 136 With more DNA profiles of noncitizens being added to CODIS under DOJ's new policy, noncitizens face a heightened risk of immigration surveillance in states that authorize DNA collection from arrestees.
When noncitizens are deported, some face discrimination or worse treatment upon return to their native countries.Footnote 137 The United States has entered into data-sharing agreements with other nations that could result in biometric information about immigration detainees being shared with the governments to which they are deported or where they choose to reside after deportation.Footnote 138 Refugees and asylum seekers are particularly at risk if their biometric information is returned to the countries from which they fled.Footnote 139 Foreign governments can request DNA information about their citizens who are immigration detainees through Interpol.Footnote 140 The misuse of DNA information by foreign governments is not a theoretical harm: From 2016 to 2017, the Chinese government collected DNA from nearly 36 million people, primarily Uighurs, an ethnic and religious minority in the country, as a strategy to track the activities of people suspected of not being loyal supporters of the Communist Party.Footnote 141 Uighur Chinese citizens have received asylum in the United States for past persecution on the basis of ethnicity and religion.Footnote 142 For some, deportation is a death sentence.Footnote 143
Finally, DOJ's new rule exacerbates the criminalization of immigration in the United States.Footnote 144 DOJ states that neither the purpose nor the effect of DNA collection from immigration detainees will be to “stigmatize and vilify migrants and treat them as threats and criminals.”Footnote 145 It equates DNA collection with other biometric information collection (such as fingerprinting and photographing) without addressing the distinctive privacy harms, discussed earlier, that DNA collection can impose. However, it ignores the larger policy context in which this administration has criminalized immigration by cracking down on prosecutions for immigration violations;Footnote 146 vilifying nonwhite immigrants through harsh rhetoric;Footnote 147 and stigmatizing longtime undocumented residents by rescinding immigration policies intended to integrate them.Footnote 148 Advocates for immigrants blame this toxic combination for an increase in hate-crime violence against Latinx people.Footnote 149
V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW DNA COLLECTION POLICY
A. The Bioethics Perspective
The expansion of DNA surveillance in the immigration context is troubling from the perspective of bioethics in part because it could be the proverbial canary in the coalmine. In a New York Times op-ed, law professors Daniel I. Morales, Natalie Ram, and Jessica L. Roberts characterize DOJ's new policy as “the latest development in a worrying trend of escalating DNA surveillance.”Footnote 150 They predict, ominously, a dystopian future in which all U.S. residents are subject to compulsory DNA collection: “This new immigration policy moves us toward completion of [a genetic panopticon]: a genetic database that will ultimately encompass anyone within United States borders, including ordinary Americans neither convicted nor even suspected of criminal conduct.”Footnote 151
While some might disregard such predictions as hyperbolic, there is ample evidence that DOJ is not adequately considering the potential privacy harms of its new policy. In response to concerns that DNA collection from immigration detainees would perpetuate inaccuracies in criminal investigations, DOJ responded that “DNA matches are not taken as conclusive evidence of guilt. Rather, they are used as investigative leads.”Footnote 152 DOJ cites its prior rulemaking for the proposition that “an increase in the number of [DNA] profiles … ‘does not create a significant risk of innocent persons being implicated in crimes.’”Footnote 153 DOJ implicitly dismisses this privacy risk by not addressing when such a risk becomes significant.
Likewise, DOJ fails to recognize the significance of using a prospective risk assessment of criminality for immigrants. Some of the comments submitted in response to DOJ's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking noted that DNA-sample collection of initial entrants to the United States would not serve many of the purported governmental interests relating to public safety because “initial entrants … cannot have previously committed crimes within the United States, so there could not be crime-scene DNA evidence that would match to their DNA profiles.”Footnote 154 DOJ defended its policy by stating inter alia that “the benefits of DNA-sample collection include the creation of a permanent DNA record that may match to DNA evidence from a later crime, if the detainee remains in or later reenters the United States and commits such a crime.”Footnote 155 DOJ invoked the purpose of prospective risk assessment again in response to comments criticizing the permanent retention of immigration detainee DNA profiles in CODIS.Footnote 156
Finally, DOJ does not acknowledge a problem with the disparate impact that DNA collection from immigration detainees will have on ethnic minorities. It simply states that the regulation is neutral with respect to national origin, race, ethnicity, and other demographic characteristics.Footnote 157 It also states that “[t]he ethnic and racial proportions in the DNA databases parallel the representation of demographic groups among the persons from whom DNA samples are collected,” without acknowledging how racial and ethnic profiling can play a role in determining who ends up in immigration detention.Footnote 158
B. The Immigration Policy Perspective
In this time of extreme immigration policymaking that has included increasing workplace immigration enforcement raids,Footnote 159 family separations,Footnote 160 the “remain in Mexico” policy for asylum seekers,Footnote 161 kids in cages,Footnote 162 the Muslim ban,Footnote 163 and the change in public charge policy,Footnote 164 it is fair to ask: Why does the DOJ's new policy pertaining to DNA collection of immigration detainees matter?
For U.S. citizens, there is a self-interested reason to pay attention to how the new policy is implemented: We may be next in line for compulsory DNA collection. Beyond this, however, the new policy matters because it is another attempt by this administration to dehumanize immigrants. Even if it seems less degrading than some of the policies listed above, it is part of this administration's broader agenda to criminalize immigration through reliance on false claims. For example, shortly after winning the 2016 election, President-Elect Donald Trump stated his intention to deport or incarcerate two or three million undocumented immigrants “that are criminal and have criminal records, gang members, drug dealers.”Footnote 165 The estimate blatantly misrepresents the actual number of undocumented immigrants with criminal convictions.Footnote 166
Likewise, DOJ claims that ensuring public safety is the overarching rationale of its new DNA collection policy.Footnote 167 However, DOJ fails to provide any evidence that its new rule will increase public safety.Footnote 168 First, DHS acknowledges in a PIA for the new DNA collection policy that “it is unlikely that CBP or ICE would be able to use a DNA profile match for public safety or investigative purposes prior to either an individual's removal to his or her home country, release into the interior of the United States, or transfer to another federal agency” because of the time it would take for the FBI to process a DNA sample.Footnote 169 Second, studies of DNA databases in the United States and European countries show that merely increasing the number of profiles stored does not correlate with improved efficacy in crime-solving.Footnote 170 Third, several recent analyses have debunked the belief that unauthorized immigration is linked with criminality.Footnote 171 From an immigration policy perspective, it is important to push back on every new policy that is based on false and dehumanizing information about immigrants.
VI. CONCLUSION
DHS's new piloted DNA collection from immigration detainees represents a significant expansion of DNA surveillance in the United States. The new policy will have the practical effect of adding millions of DNA profiles of noncitizens to CODIS.Footnote 172 More fundamentally, it is contributing to a transformation of the norms around collection and retention of genetic information by the government—namely those that justified retention of genetic profiles in CODIS based on an individual's connection to criminal activity. It can be expected that norm shifting around DNA surveillance of noncitizens will spill over to citizens as well.
As this administration engages in unprecedented uses of DNA collection from immigrants, it must anticipate and address ethical concerns that arise from its actions. So far, DHS and DOJ have failed to engage in careful, deliberative, and measured policymaking around recent expansions of DNA testing in the immigration context—whether it involves DNA testing for family reunification purposes or for broader “public safety” purposes.Footnote 173 More robust privacy protections around DNA collection from immigrants would not only better protect the interests of participants, but would also establish the legitimacy of DNA analysis in immigration processes by improving transparency, efficiency, and accessibility.Footnote 174 As we become increasingly aware of the limits of our knowledge with respect to future uses of DNA information, it is crucial to take a measured, proportional approach to the use of DNA tests in immigration contexts.
This Article has described the most ethically troubling privacy harms arising from widespread DNA surveillance of immigrants. It amounts to a call for action to advocates, policymakers, and scholars with expertise in genetic privacy, bioethics, or immigration to ensure that regulation of DNA collection and analysis in the immigration context is guided by the principles of necessity and proportionality.
