Plato has five principal philosophic interlocutors in his dialogues: Socrates, Parmenides, Timaeus, the Eleatic Stranger (in the Sophist and the Statesman), and the Athenian Stranger (in the Laws). The views and approaches these characters present are not identical, and not, on the surface, consistent with one another. Nor, it seems plausible, are their views intended to be consistent—even Plato's Socrates appears to change his views from dialogue to dialogue. To contrast and combine the views of these fictionalized philosophers, many scholars contend, is the best method for discovering the intention of Plato in creating them.
Since Friedrich Schleiermacher at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the standard mode of addressing this divergence among the statements of Plato's principal interlocutors was the “developmental” approach. The developmental approach uses external and internal evidence, primarily stylistic, to try to date when Plato wrote each dialogue. It assumes that the principal interlocutor of each dialogue is indeed a spokesman for Plato's own views, and assumes that differences in the views represented development throughout his life. At the beginning of his activity as a writer, Plato, influenced by the “historical Socrates,” was skeptical of far-reaching claims about being, the gods, and the cosmos and was motivated primarily by ethical concerns. By the time Plato reached what on external evidence is his last dialogue, the Laws, he was dogmatic, metaphysical, and religious. Readers of “developmental” Plato scholarship are cautioned to pay no attention to any resemblance between the Plato narrative and the textbook account of the development of the mainstream of Western philosophy from Hume to Hegel.
Catherine Zuckert's alternative to attempts to work out the development of Plato's views is to see the dialogues as a retelling of the philosophic education of Socrates (p. 25). Instead of trying to order the dialogues by date of composition, she attempts to fix the dramatic date, the date when the action of the dialogue is hinted to have occurred. Socrates' philosophic life as depicted by Plato begins with the youthful Socrates' encounter with the aged Parmenides, around 450 b.c.e., and ends with Socrates' trial and death in 399 b.c.e. Zuckert's picture is complicated by two dialogues that, as it were, bookend Socrates' life. First, in a radical departure both from developmental scholarship and from others who work with the dramatic dates, she puts the Laws first. Virtually all scholars consider the Laws to be Plato's last dialogue, but Zuckert assigns it a dramatic date well prior to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in 431. In the Laws, Socrates does not appear: The principal interlocutor, the Athenian Stranger, is, she argues, a non-Socratic or even pre-Socratic philosopher (who is nonetheless fascinated by the Socratic paradox that no one willingly does wrong). Last in dramatic date the author puts the Menexenus, in which Socrates appears and refers to events down to the end of the Corinthian war in 394, several years after the historical Socrates drank the hemlock.
What is the big picture one gets from this massive book? Here I can give only a taste. Zuckert's fundamental lesson from Plato is that “to explain the whole one has to explain the interrelation of things essentially different in kind” (p. 179). Big as this book is, by focusing on Plato's philosophers, it studies only the interrelations of people who are essentially the same in kind. One could write an equally big book on Plato's non-philosophers: generals, sophists, poets, physicians, politicians, pretty boys, eunuchs, professional Homer declaimers, and priestesses (not by any means an exhaustive list).
In elucidating Plato's life of Socrates, Zuckert emphasizes Socrates' own philosophical autobiography offered on the very day of his death in the Phaedo (96a ff.) Socrates there describes his turn from that wisdom called “inquiry into nature”—usually translated “natural science”—toward the inquiry into the good and the beautiful by means of examinations of our judgments of the good and the beautiful.
Zuckert understands this Socratic turn according to the modern notion that different kinds of causes are posited in the natural and human sciences, for “natural and human things” (see p. 186 n. 13). “The presuppositions of the study of the human good,” she writes, “appear to contradict the presuppositions of the observed, intelligible characteristics of the universe” (p. 145). Yet as the author herself notes, Socrates' claim in the Phaedo is that those who inquire into nature have not come up with any satisfactory causal explanations whatsoever. The true cause that Socrates sits in jail, as he says, is that the Athenians decided it was best so, and that Socrates thought it best not to escape. The correct causal account cannot be found in physiological facts about his bones and ligaments (Phaedo 98b–99a).
Modern science has observed and classified a great deal, but little of it is genuinely intelligible by Socrates' standard, because little of it provides intelligible causal explanations (see my “How Joseph de Maistre Read Plato's Laws,” Polis 19 [2002]: 29–43, 33–36). Consider that scientific biology has no adequate explanation, even according to its own standards, of the origin of life, and that scientific linguistics has no adequate explanation of the origin of language. Socrates turns away from “what is called the inquiry into nature” in favor of the genuine causal inquiry into nature because he wants to understand causes, not because he wants to understand the human things.
Zuckert accepts Socrates' description of himself as highly erotic (p. 21), and she also accepts his claim to exercise peculiar care for Athens and Athenians. Given that Athenians were not peculiarly beautiful, wise, or virtuous, we need a more thorough exploration of Socrates' reasons for caring about them and preferring, say, death in Athens to life in exile. If Socrates is interested in human things only because they offer the most promising material for the inquiry into causes, his professions of erotic interest and of caring for the Athenians cannot be taken at face value. Even Plato's stories of Socrates' military service may be “stolen valor” (p. 249 n. 64).
Plato's Philosophers is scholastic. It never explains why we should care about Plato, why we cannot leave his dialogues on the shelf rather than sort out the literary issues with which she engages. It also does not grapple at length with the political context in which Plato himself wrote—on this, a good starting point is Josiah Ober's Political Dissent in Democratic Athens (1999). Zuckert's decision to exclude from systematic treatment Plato's other philosophic spokesman, Plato himself in the Seventh Letter (which Zuckert accepts as authentic), appears unfortunate, since it means excluding Plato's own presentation of the ways in which his thinking was influenced by events (see pp. 53, 363 n. 153).
In sum, Zuckert reshuffles the dialogues with a unique twist, in a way that no other book has tried to carry through as comprehensively, along the way making sense of much that is difficult in the dialogues. I should add that the utility of the book for teachers and students would have been greatly enhanced with a more complete and accurate index of topics, and with an index of passages cited. By emphasizing Socrates' professed failure to attain what he calls wisdom, certain knowledge of the true causes of the most important things, Zuckert sends her reader to conduct his or her own examination of the self-appointed purveyors of wisdom. Socrates went to the politicians, the poets, and the craftsmen, he says in Plato's Apology, but we are confronted by so many and so various: Aristotle, Confucius, Sayyid Qutb, Hegel, Madonna, Paul Krugman, Steven Pinker, or my current favorite candidate, Fichte. One of them might be right!
