Jordan Branch urges a revision of traditional periodizations and causal models in the history of the post-Westphalian territorial state. On a standard reading, the resolution of territorial conflict and land-based warfare in Europe in the mid-seventeenth century consolidated territorial conceptions of state sovereignty as well as consensus about the actual boundaries between states. Branch complicates this story in two ways. First, he identifies the recovery of Ptolemy's Geography and its translation into Latin ca. 1406 as impelling a revolution in the depiction and understanding of space. Second, he urges that the temporality of this revolution differed significantly from that posited by histories of sovereignty that are indexed to diplomatic relations. Branch's transformation commences in the sixteenth century, with the printing of maps based on Ptolemaic principles; it embraces Europe's extra-European adventures, insofar as Ptolemaic celestial coordinates allowed one to “map” (read: “divide and claim”) New World territories whose topographic features were unknown; and it reaches its apex only in the nineteenth century, when the linear boundaries of European states were encoded both in maps and practice in the years after Napoleon. The underlying idea is a powerful one, and the methodological ambitions of the book are admirable. Its substance is somewhat more problematic.
The introduction lays out Branch's theoretical claim: “A mutually constitutive relationship exists among three relevant factors: representations of political space, the ideas held by actors about the organization of political authority, and actors' authoritative political practices manifesting those ideas” (9). Branch then argues that what he terms “the cartographic revolution” should be understood as an exogenous force acting upon this system, altering both notions of authority and the practices that manifested them. Chapters 2 and 3 unfold the historical-interpretive argument that justifies what follows: late medieval polities lacked a unitary and depersonalized notion of sovereignty, and likewise lacked maps of political spaces based on astronomic or absolute grids. Rather, social power in the medieval world was understood as organized in networks of personal dependency; and units of rule were centers of population connected linearly (hence, not in a landscape), with little thought given to the spaces between them. Alongside linear thinking, Roman and medieval mapping practices were dominated by itineraries: “space was understood in terms of lines of travel, not planar expanses” (63).
Chapters 4–7 offer historical surveys of four areas of early modern political action wherein, Branch argues, the influence of the cartographic revolution can be detected either in notions of territoriality or state power, or in practices undergirded by such notions. These include the developing interest of early modern states in employing and controlling cartographic technologies, as opposed to exploiting maps produced by private parties (chap. 4); the rapid exploitation of new cartographic technologies for settling disputes in extra-European contexts, even earlier than their use within Europe (chap. 5); a shift in the ways in which the territorial limits of states are specified in diplomatic instruments, especially treaties, under the influence of astronomic geography (chap. 6); and a study of the intense interest taken by the French state in particular in organizing practices of governance around a scientific assessment of its spatial extent (chap. 7). The final chapter reflects on the hyperawareness of one's political and graticular position that contemporary technologies grant to private individuals (via, e.g., personal use of GPS), and poses questions about whether related technologies offer the possibility of forms of sociability that transcend such concerns.
The Cartographic State makes its case economically; the writing is clear; and the argument has a prima facie plausibility. Many narratives have been constructed around the recovery for Western Latinate or vernacular culture of Aristotelian logic, for example, or Roman law. Branch's narrative, however, is far too tidy. The worlds of cartography both before and after his “revolution” are far more diverse than he allows. In particular, ancient maps exhibited many of the features that he regards as exclusively modern, even as many modern maps deploy schematic and iconographic conventions analogous to those Branch deems medieval. Nor does his chronological account of the forms of state authority strike me as plausible. Let me focus on two points where these deficiencies intersect with topics of salience to political theory.
Branch has almost nothing to say about cadastral maps or private property (62, 76 contain the only substantive remarks). He adopts, rather, the bird's-eye perspective of the (sovereign) state, and so focuses on the boundaries between states and assumes that notions of territoriality derive from the drawing of such boundaries, hence, from the outside in. But the Romans produced graticular cadastral maps of private property holdings, city by city, and likewise mapped many varieties of nonagricultural land in the hinterland of cities. They also produced spatially organized catalogs of the cities (with their hinterlands) that made up each province, and likewise knew what provinces constituted the empire. Furthermore, a corpus of illustrated Roman land-surveying manuals survives and was recopied in the Middle Ages.
My points are three. First, Roman traditions emphatically did not issue solely “in a ‘linear’ conception of space” (63). Second, one can describe the object of one's sovereignty as the aggregate of administrative units and nevertheless have a detailed conception of their geographic situation (contra chap. 6). Third, and most crucially, cadastral maps allow for a very different nexus of sovereignty and territoriality, one in which a sovereign's political territory is an aggregate of private landholdings, and the boundaries of the territory are constructed from the inside out. In Branch's period, this is the view of John Locke (among others), but neither Locke nor any other contemporaneous theorist of the state impinges on the argument.
Branch urges that medieval theorists conceptualized social power as flowing through networks of persons and not through territories. This is correct, up to a point. But there exists abundant discursive evidence that travelers knew when they crossed the boundaries between polities. The difference is rather one of practice: many premodern states lacked the infrastructural power to police borders. If Branch had considered practice as regards taxation and not simply diplomacy, he would see that many premodern states claimed the power to tax goods entering their borders but conceded that customs duties should be paid at customs houses located at the first town inside the border, however far inside that might be.
This raises a final concern. Branch describes France as in the vanguard of the revolution he charts. Many a historian and theorist of government have done likewise, not least Foucault. Branch engages none of this literature, nor the contextual factors that made étatisme a preoccupation of French theory and unitary sovereignty an ambition of the centralizing French state. Had he turned his gaze elsewhere in Europe, France might have appeared not so much a leader but an outlier, and the great explanandum not how mapping changed sovereignty, but why territorialized notions of state authority so often waited three hundred years to take root elsewhere. The forcelessness of Branch's exogenous force is something his tidy narrative cannot explain.
