Although Necla Geyikdağı is neither a trained economic historian nor an Ottoman historian, her book is generously praised by Feroz Ahmad in his foreword (pp. x–xi), which claims that it “fills a huge gap” in understanding the political economy of the late Ottoman Empire (p. xi). The author herself assertively stresses that this book does not “limit itself to a systematic economic study of foreign direct investment in the Ottoman Empire. Rather, its aim is to examine causes and results within a wider framework” (p. xiv). As a specialist in “economics and international business” (p. xi) Geyikdağı's book on the history of foreign investment in the late Ottoman Empire, despite some controversial and problematic points indicated below, can be regarded as a useful introduction to late Ottoman economic history, especially for undergraduate students and for general readers.
The book is divided into six chapters. In the first, “The pre-nineteenth-century Ottoman economy”, in addition to the Ottoman economic mentality the author deals with a crucial question: “Why could the Ottoman economy not industrialize?” (pp. 8–17). In describing the failure of Ottoman industrialization she provides an overview of potential explanations by referring to previous works, but it is difficult to see the author's own approach to this critical question. Further, there is a clear inconsistency between the chapter title and the period around which the discussion centres: while the title states pre-nineteenth century, most of information given relates to the nineteenth and even the twentieth centuries.
The second chapter deals with Ottoman borrowing history, starting with the “first attempt at borrowing” (p. 30) to “the Ottoman Public Debt Administration” (p. 41). The treatment is relatively well organized, but the lack of references to any archival documents, while using lengthy quotations from contemporary European newspapers such as The Times, The Manchester Guardian and The Economist seriously weakens the force of the chapter. In order to measure the impact of political events on British investors' expectations of Ottoman financial capabilities, such editorial commentaries are crucial, but referring solely to the newspapers is not an effective way of illuminating “The road to bankruptcy” of the late nineteenth-century Ottoman economy (pp. 35–41). A book whose aim is “to examine causes and results within a wider framework” (p. xiv) should refer to published reports, diplomatic correspondence and multinational archival documents; these are not evaluated here. Archival documents offer far more instructive evidence for understanding Ottoman finances in the late nineteenth century than that presented in other sources.
The third chapter discusses foreign direct investments (FDI) in the Ottoman Empire based on investors' country of origin: British, French, German, Belgian, Italian, and American direct investments are examined rather superficially (pp. 53–73). Following this country-specific analysis, the fourth chapter (pp. 74–134) is dedicated to “the distribution of foreign direct investment by sector”. Much of the chapter, which addresses “railways, banks and insurance companies, ports and docks, urban services, mining, industry and trade”, is devoted to the railways (pp. 75–100), on which substantial sources exist in Turkish, English, French and German. Regrettably, however, few of these were used by Geyikdağı. Donald Quataert's article (“Limited revolution: the impact of the Anatolian railway on Turkish transportation and the provisioning of Istanbul, 1890–1908”, The Business History Review 51/2, 1977, 139–60), which masterfully deals with the multi-dimensional impact of the German-built Anatolian railway on Ottoman socio-economic circumstances, should have been mentioned among the references.
Political risk and its effect on investors' decisions is an important part of the international business/trade literature. While there are different conceptualizations of political risk, it is broadly defined as international companies' risk expectations that are shaped by the consequences of the interventions of non-market factors and manipulations originating from both the host country and the international environment. All international trade, business and investment involve some degree of risk. However, foreign direct investments, especially infrastructure projects, carry additional risks and are more vulnerable to political risk than other types of investment. In chapter 5, after discussing “the Ottoman attitude towards foreign capital” (p. 137) and concluding that “there was no serious animosity towards foreign investment in the Ottoman Empire” (p. 146) the author deals with the “political risk” that existed for foreign investors in the late Ottoman Empire (pp. 146–58). Geyikdağı argues that: “The wars, rebellions, a change of government or ideology … constitute political risk” (p. 146). The boycotts of Austrian and Bulgarian goods supported by the Ottoman government are also discussed within the concept of political risk (pp. 151–3). The author argues that “political risk may even be initiated by companies themselves” (pp. 155–6). In order to gain a clearer picture of the political risk for foreigners who invested in the Ottoman Empire, a clear distinction between political risk and country risk is essential: this can be difficult to identify. In terms of the bilateral effectiveness of foreign investment, the political risk and its multi-dimensional consequences in the late Ottoman Empire should be reconsidered and evaluated more carefully and deeply.
In general the book is clearly organized, but it relies exclusively on secondary sources to shape its main framework and feed its argument. From this point of view, it can be argued that it is too late to write a history book about foreign investments in the late Ottoman Empire; at the same time, however, it is too early to assert, as does Feroz Ahmad, that “this book fills a huge gap”.
