In March of 2022, I was invited by an Iraqi colleague to deliver a lecture at a private university in Baghdad on a topic of my choice. My colleague assured me the audience would predominantly be students in the social sciences, as well as several faculty members and the dean, so they would be receptive to hearing about my research in political science. For weeks, I prepared an Arabic version of what had been my job talk in the United States—a presentation on the relationship between religious leaders and antigovernment protests in Iraq. I arrived an hour early with my USB drive in hand and the talk well-rehearsed. The president of the university invited us for coffee in his office where, after learning about the topic of my lecture, he politely asked me if I could deliver a different talk. Accustomed to the caprices of university administrators and unwilling to have my colleague suffer a canceled lecture, I proposed a talk on civil society and democracy in Iraq, to which he agreed. Religion was a sensitive topic, they explained to me, and many faculty members and students might be offended if I said something offensive or controversial about a particular religious leader.
That was my first experience with academic censorship in Iraq. From that moment, I became more attuned to the nuances and transformations of academic freedom in the country. The restrictions on academic freedom are not intended simply to silence antigovernment rhetoric, but also to protect cultural and religious symbols, to avoid sectarianism superficially, and to sweep any mention of historic grievances, traumas, or collective violence or complicity under the rug. In other words, academic freedoms are curtailed to uphold a sanitized yet fragile image of the Iraqi nation after 2003. Academics experience constraints differently than activists, media figures, and civil society leaders do, especially as their careers are entirely under the control of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, which lately has been run by a party affiliated with an armed group placed under sanctions by the United States. Although there is much to be written about the state of freedoms generally in Iraq, this essay focuses specifically on the experience of Iraqi academics in the humanities, social sciences, and law, as these disciplines have been subject to a high degree of governmental interference.
When discussing the violations of academic freedom in Iraq and the current climate for Iraqi academics, one might be tempted to trace the story back to the 2003 war. Without a doubt, the 2003 war reshaped Iraq and had an indelible impact on the education sector, whether through the outright disruption in education during political crises (which occurred repeatedly), the brain drain of professionals after 2003, or the physical destruction of the country’s infrastructure. But that war took place over two decades ago, and although Iraq is living with its impact, it is also a different country today.
Where Iraq Is Today
Despite the turmoil in the region, Iraq is the most stable it has been in decades.Footnote 1 Iraq went from the Iran–Iraq war (1980–88), to the invasion of Kuwait (1990), to the Gulf War (1990–91), to the sanctions (1990–2003), to the US invasion and occupation (2003–11), to the sectarian civil war (2005–8), to the ISIS war (2014–17). The newfound security in Iraq created space for local politics to unfold, whether the resumption of provincial elections or the nationwide protests of 2019. On 11 November 2025, Iraq held its sixth parliamentary elections since the ratification of the new constitution in 2005. The political system, although unpopular, is stable and is likely to remain in place for years to come. It is by no means a consolidated democracy, but it has more democratic aspects than people tend to give it credit for.Footnote 2 One can never predict the outcome of elections or government formation in Iraq, and there have been surprises, including a rise in independents and protest-based parties in the 2021 election. But Iraq is no longer an unsafe country.
There are nevertheless serious concerns about the trajectory of this democratization project: the normalization of clientelism, a politicized judiciary, non-state or para-state armed actors with political associations, and, most crucially for the purpose of this essay, a slow but certain encroachment on freedoms of speech and expression. Iraqi officials have increasingly relied on Baʿth era laws to punish critics and rivals for defamation, reflecting a perverse relationship with Baʿthism that I describe below. Civil society activists also have criticized a recent attempt by parliament to stealthily pass a law on freedom of assembly and peaceful protest.Footnote 3 The proposed amendments would make it illegal for protestors to cover their faces and would ban signs and posters that violate “public morals.” However, the proposed law is a mixed bag, because it also introduced new language to protect scientific research and the freedom to publish it.
While noting these worrisome trends, it is important to acknowledge that Iraqis enjoy significantly more freedom of speech than they did under the former Baʿthist regime, but that is not a particularly high bar. Rival branches of the Baʿth Party ruled both Iraq (1963, 1968–2003) and Syria (1963–2024) with an iron fist, professing policies of socialism and pan-Arabism while atomizing society, violently suppressing dissent, and building a “republic of fear.”Footnote 4
However, Iraqis today also have more freedom of speech than most of the citizens of other states in the region. Politics are discussed openly in Iraq, and intellectuals regularly hold conferences to discuss the political situation. I have attended conferences on democratization, youth political engagement, civil society, religious peace-building, countering violent extremism, transitional justice, and a host of other sensitive topics at research centers, think tanks, civil society organizations, and even universities. Foreign researchers can come to Iraq to conduct research and interview politicians and citizens alike. The most similar case in the region is Lebanon, where openness has contributed to a rich literature on ethnosectarian conflict, clientelism, and corruption.
However, red lines persist in Iraq, particularly when it comes to religious and cultural figures. Civil society activists and intellectuals are targets of violence, with the most recent tragedy being the assassination of feminist pioneer and activist, Yanar Mohammad, outside of her home in Baghdad. In a televised interview with a Lebanese presenter, Iraqi comedian Ahmed Wahid explained that he was able to openly parody Iraqi prime ministers, but that he could not parody figures that segments of Iraqi society strongly supported, essentially admitting that his ability to poke fun at politicians is rooted in citizen dissatisfaction with them.Footnote 5 Nevertheless, there is a concern that the ability to publicly criticize politicians will diminish, especially as these figures compare themselves to their peers in the region and see themselves as subjected to unusual scrutiny and criticism.
For many Iraqi political scientists, these restrictions on discussing sociopolitical figures are stifling from two directions. On one side, political scientists are not free to pursue research topics that are deemed politically sensitive, with the former regime being a particularly sore topic. On the other, political parties view political science departments as ideal sites to control and cultivate subservient party cadres, whose promotion and access is determined by their willingness to comply. As a result, political science professors are under pressure to perform for political parties and seek their patronage. Political parties offer professors enticing opportunities outside the ivory tower as well: they establish think tanks for them to lead, pay for them to attend conferences, and sometimes even pave the path toward policy careers, including diplomacy.
The Relics of Baʿthism
Perhaps one of the greatest ironies in Iraqi higher education is that the laws governing higher education date back to the Baʿthist era (specifically 1988, when the Iran–Iraq war ended), but Iraqi academics can face serious repercussions for attempting to study the Baʿth era with anything more than superficial condemnation. Across Iraq, Baʿth era laws continue, and are sometimes revived by politicians to silence critics, whereas accusations of Baʿthism are used to disqualify electoral candidates and besmirch the reputations of political rivals. Baʿthism, which was outlawed by the 2005 constitution, is a serious accusation in Iraq with severe consequences.
And yet Iraqi youth have no memory of pre-2003 Iraq or the war. Students entering university in 2005 (and joining the electorate) were born in 2007 or 2008, and their formative experience with politics was the ISIS war (2014–17). Their professors range from those whose experience with Baʿthism ended with elementary school (assistant professors) to those who completed their entire education under the Baʿthists, then suddenly found themselves teaching under new and uncertain political circumstances. The Baʿth party, now part of history, still looms large for both groups, as an unknown and forbidden topic. In the last two years, the Iraqi government has introduced a mandatory course titled Baʿth Party Crimes at both the high school and university levels, designed to shape how students view the past, but also likely to discourage too much additional reflection on it. This curriculum is nascent, but it is already clear that those tasked with teaching it are favored by university and ministry administrators.
The Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research
The authority of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research extends over both public and private universities in Iraq. From October 2022 until January 2026, the minister has been Naeem al-Aboudi, a member of the Sadiqoun political party, which is the political branch of the armed group, Asaib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH). As of September 2024, al-Aboudi also was elected as head of the political bureau of Sadiqoun. It is unclear whether Sadiqoun will retain the ministry when the new government is formed, but retaining ministries is always in the interests of a party. Sadiqoun and AAH’s interest in the ministry are harmful to Iraqi higher education.
AAH is designated as both a Foreign Terrorist Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity by the United States. The affiliation of an Iraqi minister of higher education with a designated terrorist group has repercussions for Iraqi academics and students and may negatively impact the higher education sector for generations to come. Collaborating with foreign researchers, applying for foreign grants, attending conferences, and other seemingly mundane academic activities now carry risks for Iraqi academics. At a time when Iraq’s education and higher education sectors are riddled by corruption and suffering from the impact of decades of violence, Iraqi students and academics do not need more doors closed in their faces. Certainly, some countries, like the UK, have chosen to overlook the American designation and collaborate with Iraqi universities, but this creates unnecessary difficulties for Iraqis.
Intellectual Suitability
Since AAH’s takeover of the ministry, they have resurrected a policy in which all academic research in the social sciences and humanities, particularly for the purposes of granting degrees or promotion, must adhere to standards of “intellectual integrity.” This is not detailed on the ministry’s website and there is very little explanation of what it entails on the websites of Iraqi universities, except for an obscure comment in a checklist for thesis writers at the University of Baghdad. Students and faculty members must submit their manuscripts to the intellectual integrity committee. Research that seems to violate intellectual integrity includes projects that examine current politics in Iraq or Iraq’s foreign relations, or that look at the former regime in any neutral or non-negative way.
Iraqi academics are therefore encouraged to study the politics of other countries if they want a career in Iraq. There is no career for those who want to study Iraqi politics in Iraq, unless they are in a think tank or have some other affiliation. Alternatively, they can publish internationally or regionally, but the committee will force them to change their language if they seek internal accreditation. In one example, a student at an elite university in Baghdad published a thesis on anti–money laundering processes in Iraq in a regional publication. Inside Iraq, the student was required to scrub the article of all names of Iraqi and foreign actors who might be complicit in illicit finance networks before being allowed to defend the thesis.
Conclusion
Iraq is at a critical juncture, when it can repair some of its policies toward academic freedom and harness the talent and intellectual curiosity of its academics by allowing them to turn inwardly and think about the issues that face the nation. Or it can continue down the path of slowly but surely establishing restraints on freedoms.
The second path is the path of least resistance. After all, Iraq’s policymakers operate within a region rife with autocrats and have no personal incentive to protect democratic principles. Moreover, the Iraqi prime ministers who lived under the Baʿth regime were often the ones who reintroduced Baʿth era laws and policies to serve their own interests. The only thing that stands between them and regression to the past is young academics and students who have grown accustomed to having a voice and are curious about how understanding their nation’s past might heal its future.
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