THE CHALLENGE
It’s no secret that pragmatists have all sorts of nasty things to say about the correspondence theory of truth.Footnote 1 What’s surprising is that perhaps the most powerful objection based in pragmatism to the correspondence theory of truth has not been addressed. In her seminal book Truth and the End of Inquiry, Cheryl Misak defends a Peircean theory of truth according to which hypothesis H is true if, and only if, if inquiry into H were pursued as far as it could fruitfully go, H would be believed (1991/2004, xvi).Footnote 2 In so doing, she poses a challenge to anyone who endorses a theory of truth that involves saying more about truth than that truth is “the property possessed by the beliefs that would be thrown up by a sufficiently resolute process of inquiry” (162). As her target, she has in mind the correspondence theory of truth. She writes,
The scientific transcendentalist wants to claim that the methodology of scientific inquiry is a guide to or leads to the truth. But, no reason is given for why this is the case. Until such a reason is given, the leap that inquirers must make from empirical adequacy and explanatory power to truth will be a leap of faith. And until such a reason is given, the inquirer cannot appeal to the ultimate aim of truth to justify any methodology.
So, if there is a gap between the best that inquiry would do and the truth, then inquiry cannot be made sense of as the attempt to fix true beliefs. Because Peirce closes the gap, he can make sense of inquiry. (166–167)
The position she unfavorably dubs “scientific transcendentalism” says that while inquiry leads us to the truth, truth is something different from what inquiry would result in. Specifically, scientific transcendentalists think truth is the correspondence of propositions or sentences to their objects. Scientific inquiry just tracks truth or leads us to true propositions, somehow. Yet, the scientific transcendentalist can give no reason for thinking that inquiry does lead to the truth. As she can give no such reason, the scientific transcendentalist is well advised to refrain from claiming that truth is something different from that in which sufficiently resolute inquiry would result.
Someone might think that Misak’s argument is obviously fallacious: Of course truth is more than what inquiry results in, for previously “established” scientific theories are sometimes overturned. However, this objection fails to be sensitive to the subjunctive conditional statement of Misak’s theory of truth. Truth is not what inquiry does result in but what inquiry would result in. Those theories proven false — for example, the theory of phlogiston — are not what would be believed were inquiry carried as far it could fruitfully go, as is obvious from the fact that we no longer believe them.
The force of Misak’s argument against scientific transcendentalism rests upon a plausible position, a pragmatic commitment. Ideas that make no practical difference, ideas that add nothing to our conceptions, are “meaningless surplusage.” They have no intellectual purport. And this is precisely the problem with scientific transcendentalism. Claiming that truth is something more than what inquiry would result in is meaningless surplusage. As Misak asks rhetorically, “What is added by wondering whether the hypothesis is really true” (166)? Peirce’s “pragmatic scruples,” she argues, “prevent him from holding that there is more to a true hypothesis than what is provided by the right-to-left conditional: if, if inquiry were pursued as far as it could fruitfully go, H would be settled upon, then H is true” (xvi).Footnote 3
Misak’s challenge becomes even more forceful once we realize that providing a justification for the claim that inquiry leads us to the truth will involve us in a viciously circular project. However, in order to see why this is so, we first need to take a closer look at what scientific transcendentalism is — or ought to be — up to.
SCIENTIFIC TRANSCENDENTALISM
“Scientific transcendentalism” is as ugly a name that a theory could have. Indeed, some people might even suspect that it’s oxymoronic: Isn’t science concerned with the objects of experience and doesn’t transcendentalism “climb above” experience?
Even though the name is ugly, scientific transcendentalism is a good-looking theory. Indeed, many philosophers I know endorse it, and I am quite certain scientific transcendentalism (henceforth ST) is the majority view among non-philosophers. So, what is it?
Minding the Name
For Misak, the “transcendental” side of ST involves endorsing a theory of truth according to which truth is something definable independently of experience. More specifically, transcendentalists adhere to a correspondence theory of truth wherein some objects, facts, or states of affairs are necessary and sufficient for the truth of our sentences or propositions. The correspondence theorist is committed to the claims that there is a difference between propositions and that which propositions represent, viz. a mind-independent reality, and that a proposition is true just in case it accurately represents that mind-independent reality.Footnote 4
The “scientific” side of ST describes a motivation to accept a correspondence (or “transcendental”) theory of truth, in contrast with a skeptical motivation. The underlying idea here — that truth transcends inquiry — may be established in one of two ways. In the skeptical way, the motivation is an appeal to the possibility that we are brains in vats (BIVs). Since this is a possibility, but inquiry would never find it out, truth must be different from what inquiry would result in. Misak rejects this position on the grounds of Peirce’s critical commonsensism. Since BIV scenarios involve mere paper doubts, they cannot serve to enliven genuine inquiry. Consequently, neither can they motivate the claim that truth transcends inquiry. More shall be said about critical commonsensism below.
In contrast, the scientific transcendentalist motivates a gap between truth and inquiry with a different sort of appeal. Misak considers just one motivation that the scientific transcendentalist has for asserting this gap between truth and inquiry, viz. an appeal to commonsense. She writes that the adherent to ST agrees that “inquirers should indeed adopt something like the methodology and aims which Peirce’s construal of truth suggests. But they should think of truth as being correspondence, because commonsense tells us that truth is correspondence” (Emphasis original, 1991/2004, 164). The adherent to ST has at least two other good motivations for maintaining a gap between truth and inquiry than the one Misak considers.
Minding the Gap
The second reason — the first being an appeal to commonsense — that a scientific transcendentalist has for affirming a gap between truth and inquiry is based upon the very nature of scientific inquiry. Scientific inquiry always utilizes induction. Yet, induction can never yield anything more than probable — even if highly probable, asymptotically approaching a limit of 1 — truths. I think the scientific transcendentalist wants and needs to maintain this gap precisely because every proposition not assumed as a postulate of the scientific enterprise itself is dubitable and fallible. Yet, if it is dubitable and fallible, then there must be a possible gap between truth and inquiry, no matter how rigorous that inquiry is and no matter how long it is carried out.
Indeed, Peirce’s theory of synechism — the tendency to regard everything as continuous — implies that there is such a gap and that it is forever uncloseable. He writes, “[E]very proposition, except so far as it relates to an unattainable limit of experience (which I call the Absolute), is to be taken with an indefinite qualification; for a proposition which has no relation whatever to experience is devoid of all meaning” (1998, 1, emphasis added). He carries this doctrine so far as to deny that we are permitted to affirm “the sum of the angles of a triangle exactly equals two right angles, but only that it equals that quantity plus or minus some quantity which is excessively small for all the triangles we can measure” (2). As Robert Almeder has dramatically stated, “If synechism is false, then so too is the justification provided for the indeterminacy of meaning which leads logically to wholesale fallibilism which in turn provides the conceptual foundation of [Peirce’s] unique view on the nature and status of truth, knowledge and common sense beliefs” (1980, 97).
From these comments, we might (and I think we should) conclude that Peirce himself is a scientific transcendentalist. Indeed, at various points Peirce endorses a correspondence theory of truth. Here are two such passages:
(1) Truth is the correspondence of a representation with its object. (1931–58, 5.553)
(2) Truth is the conformity of a representamen to its object, — its object, ITS object, mind you. (1980, 380)
Misak interprets these passages in a more platitudinous, Tarskian way, as endorsing the thesis that hypothesis H is true if and only if H (see 1991/2004, 135). She claims that “Peirce thinks that the correspondence theorist makes ‘truth’ a useless word” (41) and that such a definition, while not false, is trivial.
However, Misak’s interpretation of Peirce’s comments about the uselessness of a correspondence theory of truth is too strong. What Peirce states is (a) that “if by truth and falsity you mean something not definable in terms of doubt and belief in any way, then you are talking of entities of whose existence you can know nothing” (1931–58, 5.416, emphasis added) and (b) that if the correspondence theorist says human thought cannot understand the correspondence relation or ascertain whether the correspondence relation obtains in any given case, then “‘truth,’ in this sense, is a useless word, which never can express a human thought” (1998, 380). However, a Peircean correspondence theorist may claim (a) that truth has more than one definition (or, perhaps, kind of definition) and (b) that we can ascertain that there is a correspondence relationship even if the relationship is basic in the sense that it is logically unanalyzable.Footnote 5
Aside from an appeal to commonsense, we now have a second, theoretical, reason to believe that there is a gap between truth and inquiry, viz. the nature of induction and scientific inquiry. Here is a third reason for asserting a gap between truth and inquiry; a practical reason. Assuming there is such a gap between truth and inquiry permits us to continue to pursue inquiry into a topic even when it appears that we have carried our inquiries as far as they could fruitfully go.
In saying this, I do not wish to claim that scientists should keep treading over well-trodden ground. What I am claiming is that maintaining a gap between truth and inquiry always leaves the inquirer in a position to reject well-established, rigorously demonstrated beliefs in order to solve future problems. As Peirce claims, “[T]he scientific spirit requires a man to be at all times ready to dump his whole cartload of beliefs, the moment experience is against them” (1931–58, 1.55). Closing the gap in the way that Misak proposes would put an inquirer who wishes to dump the whole cartload into an uncomfortable position. It would put such an inquirer into the position of rejecting truths, but no reasonable inquirer would want to exchange truths for falsehoods. In other words, closing the gap blocks the road of inquiry, the cardinal sin of all science according to Peirce.
Misak might respond that if an inquirer finds it useful or fruitful to drop the whole cartload of beliefs, then it must be the case that inquiry has not been pursued as far as it could fruitfully go and so those propositions are not true. However, it puts the cart before the horse to claim that an inquirer must find it useful or fruitful to drop the whole cartload of beliefs before dropping it. It ought to remain open to an inquirer to drop the cartload of beliefs even if it may not prove useful or fruitful to do so.
These three considerations bring us some way in addressing Misak’s objection. To her rhetorical question — what is added by wondering whether the hypothesis is really true? — we now have an answer. What is added, theoretically, is a recognition of the dubitability and fallibility of all of our scientific beliefs. What is added, with respect to our practices, is the option to reject well-established hypotheses even when doing so will not ultimately prove fruitful. No hypothesis is so dear that it is off the table, even if we are inclined to sacrifice many other beliefs to preserve it. Yet, if we could not ask whether a hypothesis is really true, some hypotheses would be off of the table. And herein lies the practical difference between Misak’s theory of truth and scientific transcendentalism.
Minding the Truth
We have seen that adherents to ST are committed to two theses:
(1) There is a gap between truth and the results of inquiry, even if that inquiry were continued indefinitely using the best methods we could have.
(2) Truth is the correspondence of a proposition to its object.
However, the problem Misak raises concerns how truth and inquiry can be connected when there is forever a gap between them. Such a connection, she says, must be no more than a leap of faith. If she is right, perhaps scientific transcendentalism ought to be rejected.
What ST must offer us is a way to connect truth to inquiry such that we can make an inference from the results of our inquiries to the truth of our conclusions. To do so, the scientific transcendentalist should endorse a relationship of concomitance between truth and the results of sufficiently rigorous inquiry. Roughly speaking, X is a concomitant of Y if, and only if, X reliably accompanies Y. “X reliably accompanies Y” means that X would mostly accompany Y in a sufficiently large and varied set of cases in situations of the sorts we typically encounter.
For example, regret is a concomitant of guilt because regret mostly accompanies guilt in a sufficiently large and varied set of cases of the sorts we typically encounter. However, feelings of regret do not always accompany feelings of guilt, as with some unrepentant murderers who confess to the crime. Also, one can feel regret without feeling guilt, as when we are powerless to change the outcome of a situation and so feel no guilt that it happened although we regret it did happen. Yet, in spite of these cases, regret does reliably accompany guilt.
The scientific transcendentalist wishes to claim that what would be and are the results of sufficiently rigorous inquiry are concomitants of the truth. For example, if after sufficiently rigorous inquiry, the scientific community reaches the conclusion that gravity is a property of space-time geometry, the community has reached this conclusion because the results of scientific inquiry reliably accompany what is actually, truly the case. Let us call this third thesis of ST the Principle of Concomitance (PC):
(3) The Principle of Concomitance (PC): What would be and are the results of sufficiently rigorous inquiry are concomitants of truth.Footnote 6
PC acknowledges that there are times, rare though they be, when the results of sufficiently rigorous inquiry will not accompany the truth even if inquiry’s results do reliably accompany the truth. For example, we might have a really good theory well established by the evidence though it is (unbeknownst to us) false.Footnote 7 Also, a sentence or proposition might be true even though no inquiry will ever establish its truth, as might happen with respect to buried secrets like how many times William the Conqueror picked his nose.Footnote 8 These cases are akin to the times that regret does not in fact accompany guilt, but they are of no concern to the scientific transcendentalist’s third thesis. The results of sufficiently rigorous inquiry still are concomitants of truth.
The payoff of PC is that it justifies the scientific transcendentalist in the following inference to the best explanation, an induction:
(1) H is a result of sufficiently rigorous inquiry.
(2) The results of sufficiently rigorous inquiry are concomitants of truth.
(3) Therefore, H is (likely to be) true.
This is directly analogous to how we can justifiably infer from the fact that a person feels regret that she likely also feels guilt. To this extent, adherents to ST will hold that the results of scientific inquiry are all fallible, just as Almeder’s quotation with respect to synechism above suggests they should be. The scientific transcendentalist will deny that any scientific result is absolutely, indubitably, infallibly true. As already noted, it is precisely this recognition that motivates the scientific transcendentalist to claim that truth is something different from would be or is the result of sufficiently rigorous inquiry.
Unfortunately, an ugly problem, The Circularity Problem, rears its head precisely at this point. Indeed, I believe it is the very problem that Misak thinks the scientific transcendentalist cannot solve. Let us turn to it now.
THE CIRCULARITY PROBLEM
The circularity problem arises for ST when we ask, “How do we know that the Principle of Concomitance is true?” As soon as we start offering an answer to this question, we begin running in circles. To see why, let’s consider one argument for PC.
The Transcendental Argument for PC runs as follows:
(1) We can have knowledge about the world.
(2) A precondition for the possibility of knowledge is that our capacities, when properly refined by sound methods of inquiry, reliably track the truth.
(3) If our capacities reliably track the truth, then the results of sufficiently rigorous inquiry must be concomitants of truth, for the exercise of our capacities — when rightly employed — will lead us to the discovery of truth.
(4) Therefore, the results of sufficiently rigorous inquiry are concomitants of truth.
At one point Peirce seems to have something like this argument in mind. He notes that we would never be able to detect the regularity of Nature (and hence engage in the scientific enterprise) “if there were not an affinity between our mind and Nature’s” (1998, 24). Peirce later articulates this same point in terms of il lume naturale: “[U]nless man have a natural bent in accordance with nature’s, he has no chance of understanding nature, at all” (1998, 444).
However, there is a significant objection to trying to justify PC at all. Let us suppose that we inquire into the Transcendental Argument and find that it is sound. Or, let us suppose that we come to universal agreement that some other argument in favour of PC is sound. If so, then the conclusion of the argument — the Principle of Concomitance — is the result of sufficiently rigorous inquiry. But, is there a reason to think PC is true?
Using the inference to the best explanation from above, we would arrive at the following:
(1) PC is a result of sufficiently rigorous inquiry.
(2) The results of sufficiently rigorous inquiry are concomitants of truth.
(3) Therefore, PC is true.
Premise (1) is true ex hypothesi, but what about (2)? We saw above that PC justifies (2). Thus, the only reason we have to believe PC is true is PC itself. The argument is viciously circular, as would be any such argument for PC. The Principle of Concomitance, it seems, is indefensible. As Misak says, it appears to be a mere article of faith.
In the next section, I shall defend ST against this charge by arguing that PC is warranted or entitled, even by Misak’s own lights, in spite of the fact that it cannot be justified.
DEFENSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF CONCOMITANCE
We have three reasons to side with the scientific transcendentalist in maintaining a gap between inquiry and truth, but we are no closer to a defense of PC. Above, I claimed that every proposition not assumed as a postulate of the scientific enterprise itself is dubitable and fallible. In this section, I will argue that PC is a postulate of the scientific enterprise and that we must accept it as true. In short, I believe that we are warranted on the grounds of commonsense to believe PC and entitled to believe PC — even though it is unjustified.
Critical Commonsensism
As already noted, Misak rejects BIV scenarios on the grounds of critical commonsensism. Peirce’s critical commonsensism is a methodological position concerning beliefs or belief formation practices we may take for granted. Although commentators frequently introduce it in the interest of responding to BIV scenarios, Peirce introduces it as a fusion of Reidian and Kantian responses to Hume’s Problem of Induction (1931–58, 5.505) and as entailed by pragmatism (1931–58, 5.439).
On the one hand, critical commonsensism is Reidian insofar as it holds that some beliefs and inferences
(a) are indubitable insofar as they are basic premises we find impossible to genuinely doubt,
(b) are original (that is to say, basic or at the origins of inquiry), and
(c) are instinctual.
On the other hand, critical commonsensism is critical in that these basic inferences and beliefs
(d) are vague (and so we are left to render them more determinate) and
(e) may be brought into doubt provided that the reason for doubt is not mere paper doubt (like a BIV scenario).
Moreover,
(f) the very theory of critical commonsensism itself may be criticized.
Critical commonsensism provides a way to support PC. It does so by affirming that the Principle of Concomitance is one of these original and indubitable (though not infallible) beliefs. Let us examine why.
For a critical commonsensist, an indubitable belief is a belief that will not come into doubt in an ordinary process of inquiry. This is to be distinguished from a belief that we can doubt but only by a force of our own will. We can be brought into doubt in one of two ways. In the first way, we are surprised by experiences that do not satisfy our expectations. In the second way, we bring ourselves into doubt by an effort of our own will and imagination.
Consider, for example, the belief that sense perception is reliable. That is a belief that will not be upset in an ordinary process of inquiry. In order for it to be upset, our perceptions would have to be frequently mistaken. If that were so, humanity would swiftly come to an end. Nonetheless, we are able to bring ourselves to a state of doubt with respect to the reliability of sense perception by imagining that we are BIVs or deceived by an evil genius.
All that is required for a belief to be indubitable for a critical commonsensist is that it will not be doubted in an ordinary process of inquiry. (Probably no belief is indubitable if we demand Cartesian standards of certainty.) This is precisely the case with PC. In an ordinary process of inquiry, we will never find that the results of sufficiently resolute inquiry are not concomitants of truth. Of course, we may bring ourselves to doubt PC by virtue of Cartesian means. Yet such doubts will never enliven genuine inquiry. Hence, PC satisfies (a).
None of that, however, is to deny that PC could be brought into doubt by way of extraordinary circumstances. We can concede that PC may be false, and so endorsing the indubitably of PC does not require denying (e), that PC could conceivably be brought into doubt. Nevertheless, to doubt PC at present and given our ordinary processes of inquiry would be but a feigned, paper doubt.
Our belief in PC is also original. It is at the foundations of inquiry. It would be pointless for us to undertake a process of inquiry in order to ascertain the truth if we did not already assume that inquiry will lead us to the truth. Consequently, PC satisfies (b).
Moreover, our belief in PC is instinctual. We instinctually infer from the fact that our inquiries have reached a particular conclusion that the conclusion is true. This is evident from straightforward reflection on the sorts of commitments that people actually make after they have completed their inquiries. After our inquiries, we have a tendency to think that whatever we conclude is the case. Consequently, (c) is satisfied.
However, that instinct does and will need alteration and refinement as we improve our methods of inquiry. Most notably, this refinement is accomplished through the study of logic, which hones our reasoning. By improving our methods of inquiry, we are able to more carefully ascertain which conclusions of inquiry are more likely reliably to accompany the truth and which are not. Hence, our understanding of how the results of our inquires follow the truth will be made more determinate. This satisfies condition (d).
As we can see, belief in PC fits the characteristics of critical commonsensist beliefs. Moreover, it is precisely in endorsing PC that Peirce’s critical commonsensism offers a response to Hume’s Problem of Induction. We are justly permitted to infer from the fact that all of our inquiries and experiences justify us in the belief that the sun will rise tomorrow to the fact that the sun will rise tomorrow in part because the results of sufficiently rigorous inquiries are concomitants of truth.
Hume’s Problem of Induction is really a two-pronged problem. The first prong of the problem is that we cannot know that the results of inquiry or the way things appear are reliable indicators of the way things are. Consequently, we are not justified in inferring from the fact that things appear to be thus-and-so, that they are thus-and-so. The second prong is that even if we grant, without justification, that the way things appear is a reliable indicator of the way things are, we still do not have knowledge. This is because beliefs based on assumptions that are not known cannot constitute knowledge.
To see how the two prongs fork together, consider John Greco’s statement of Hume’s Problem of Induction:
(1) All of our beliefs about the external world depend for their evidence on the way things seem to be via the senses, together with the assumption (A) that the way things seem to be is a reliable indication of the way things are.
(2) But (A) is itself a belief about the external world.
(3) Therefore, (A) depends for its evidence on itself.
(4) Circular reasoning cannot give rise to knowledge.
(5) Therefore, (A) is not known.
(6) All of our beliefs about the world depend on an assumption (A) that is not known.
(7) Beliefs that depend on unknown assumptions are themselves not known.
(8) Therefore, no one knows anything about external reality (2000, 33).
The first prong of the problem is what we find expressed in (1)–(5). We don’t know that the way things seem to be is a reliable indicator of the way things are. Consequently, we cannot justifiably infer from the way that things appear to the way that things are. The worry that arises here is Misak’s worry: Assumption (A) is a mere article of faith. The second prong of the problem is what we find expressed in (6)–(8). Even if we grant assumption (A) on the grounds that it is entitled or warranted, we still don’t have knowledge.
PC is a variant of assumption (A) that the way things seem to be is a reliable indication of the way things are (in other words, the way things seem to be — after sufficiently rigorous inquiry — are concomitants of the way things are). Critical commonsensism involves the denial that PC is a belief about the external world, premise (2). PC is not a belief about external reality but a postulate of inquiry itself, a belief about what must be assumed for inquiry to make sense as a basic practice at all. We cannot make sense of our basic practice of inquiring without PC. Indeed, acting on the basis of PC and believing PC are instinctual and original.
The person who endorses PC will concede that PC is not known. However, she will deny that PC is not certain. She will maintain that PC is warranted as a critical commonsensist belief. Herein lies our response to the other half of Misak’s concern,Footnote 9 viz. that PC is a mere article of faith. PC isn’t a mere article of faith but an original, instinctual, and indubitable — though not infallible — belief. Moreover, Misak must permit this appeal to critical commonsensism as a defense of PC as she permits an appeal to critical commonsensism to deny skeptical transcendentalism. Denying PC is itself a mere feigned doubt, a paper doubt. Denying PC cannot serve to enliven genuine inquiry. In Socrates’s words, denying PC would make us faint-hearted seekers of truth.
Denying premise (2) of Hume’s problem permits us to infer from the fact that the sun has always risen in the morning, the belief that the sun will rise tomorrow morning without the worry of circularity. This addresses the first prong of Hume’s problem. However, this does not license the claim that our belief that the sun will rise tomorrow amounts to knowledge, the second prong of Hume’s problem. For that, we will also need to deny (7) so that our beliefs that are based on warranted but unjustified postulates can rise to the level of knowledge. This is why I have said the denial of (2) only partly solves Hume’s Problem of Induction; to fully solve the problem we must also deny premise (7). However, denying (7) alone would address neither the circularity worry at the heart of Misak’s criticism nor the first prong of Hume’s problem.
As we have seen, critical commonsensism is the first way to lend credence to the Principle of Concomitance. The second way is to endorse a project of entitlement. I shall draw upon Crispin Wright’s insights with respect to this method.
Entitlement
As we have seen, critical commonsensism is the first way to lend credence to the Principle of Concomitance. The second way is to endorse a project of entitlement. Wright (Reference Wright2004) argues for three ways in which a person is entitled to beliefs without justification for those beliefs, though only two kinds of entitlement interest us here.
The first kind of entitlement is strategic entitlement. Strategic entitlement comes in two varieties, contextual and absolute. We will focus on absolute strategic entitlement. Wright explains, “A thinker X is absolutely strategically entitled to accept [belief] P just in case (i) X has no sufficient reason to believe that P is untrue; and (ii) in all contexts, it is a dominant strategy for X to act exactly as if he had a justified belief that P” (Emphasis original, 2004, 183).
Is acting as if PC is justified strategically entitled? There is no sufficient reason to disbelieve the Principle of Concomitance. Hence, condition (i) for strategic entitlement is met.
Yet, is it a dominant strategy for us to act as if PC is true? In order for it to be a dominant strategy, it must be the case that our belief in PC, even if PC is false, will result in no worse a position for us than if we had not believed PC in the first place. If we proceed on the assumption that the results of sufficiently rigorous inquiry are concomitants of truth, and if they are, then we will have acquired and be justified in believing truths. If we proceed on the assumption that PC is true, but PC is in fact false, we may still have acquired truths by way of inquiry but not be justified in believing that they are truths based upon PC. But this is no worse than if we had not believed PC in the first place, for we seem to have no other way to acquire truths than by inquiry. Therefore, believing PC is a dominant strategy. It follows that we are entitled to act as if we are justified to believe PC even without justification for it.
Admittedly, acknowledging that we are strategically entitled to act as if PC is justified is a far cry from claiming that we know PC. So, for the person who thinks strategic entitlement is theft over honest toil, merely strategic entitlement will not be particularly satisfying.
There is another kind of entitlement that may have more force than strategic entitlement. Wright calls it entitlement of cognitive project, and according to him we are entitled to a belief P when:
(i) We have no sufficient reason to believe that P is untrue, and (ii) The attempt to justify P would involve further presuppositions in turn of no more secure a prior standing . . . and so on without limit; so that someone pursuing the relevant enquiry who accepted that there is nevertheless an onus to justify P would implicitly undertake a commitment to an infinite regress of justificatory projects, each concerned to vindicate the presuppositions of its predecessor. (2004, 191–192)
The idea operating behind entitlement of cognitive project is like the following. We have no reason to think that sense perception is reliable. However, neither do we have a reason to think that it is unreliable. Attempting to justify the reliability of sense perception would rest on no more secure a set of premises than belief in the reliability of sense perception itself. Therefore, we are entitled to believe that sense perception is reliable even though we have no justification for the belief.
The question now is whether the Principle of Concomitance is like the reliability of sense perception. There are two possibilities. The first is that we can secure truth only by virtue of PC. The second is that we can secure truth by some way other than PC.
Suppose that we can secure truth only through PC. We have already noted that we have no sufficient reason to think that PC is false. But what would justifying the Principle of Concomitance require? In order to demonstrate PC it will be necessary to provide some argument in favour of it. However, providing an argument for PC will require proving that inquiry secures a way to truth. But proving that inquiry secures a way to truth will require a justification of the claim that inquiry can lead to truth, and so on ad infinitum. Hence, justifying PC would require an infinite regress of justificatory projects.
Alternatively, suppose that there were some way to correspondence truth other than through the Principle of Concomitance. For example, suppose the archangel Gabriel were to descend from Heaven and communicate these truths into our very souls. Even that would require the presupposition that the procedures of inquiry — such as relying on what information the archangel Gabriel communicates directly to our souls — guide us to the truth. Consequently, it will entail accepting PC at least implicitly. It is impossible to escape accepting PC without also abandoning the cognitive project of inquiry altogether.
So, PC does meet the second condition for entitlement by cognitive project. If the Principle of Concomitance were not true, we would (so far as we can tell at present) have no way to judge that sentences are probably true. Moreover, even if we did have some other way to secure truth, that way would have to be justified by inquiry. Such an inquiry would have to assume PC. Thus, any cognitive project of inquiry requires that we accept and trust in PC. As inquiry is an “indispensable” and “sufficiently valuable” project, we “may help ourselves to, take for granted” the Principle of Concomitance (2004, 192).
Once again, the stickler for a justification of PC will be unmoved. However, in this case, the stickler for justification comes off looking like a hardened skeptic. Surely we want to admit that we are entitled to believe some claims — such as that sense perception is reliable — even though we have no non-circular justification for them. Why should PC be any different?
And this is my response to Misak’s challenge to show how inquiry can lead us to truth. Although I can provide no justification for the claim that it does, I believe we are entitled to believe PC, both on the basis of the dictates of Peirce’s critical commonsensism and on the basis of Wrightian entitlement. This is no more an article of “faith” than is the belief that we are not brains in vats, a worry Misak shaves off using Peirce’s critical commonsensism, or that sense perception is reliable, a belief I assume Misak would grant even though there is no non-circular justification for it. Indeed, if Misak should reject my position, I should very much like to know on which grounds. For, whichever grounds she offers, they must assume that inquiry — sound inquiry — follows the truth. Yet, in this very admission the Principle of Concomitance is assumed.
