In this volume on Saudi Arabia, Madawi Al-Rasheed extends her research focus on Islamism to capture some of the intellectual and political positions of a small number of leading intellectuals and scholars (Mufakir Islami) who, in their demands for democracy, civil society, and human rights, are challenging the Al-Saud government. Al-Rasheed notes that recent developments in Saudi Arabia, such as the fallout from 9/11, have obscured the accurate conceptualization of Islamists in the West as simply being good or bad, radical or liberal, depending on their penchant and appetite for violence. She charts the return of some Islamists to public life in the early 2000s, having been co-opted by state authorities to undermine the intellectual and religious foundations of terrorist groups operating in the Kingdom.
Al-Rasheed writes about a nuanced process going on within Islamism, having observed a rift between Islamists returning to public life and a new generation of jihadists who perceive the old guard as sell-outs and/or hypocrites (ulama munafiqin). She also sees an evolution going on more broadly surrounding the interpretation and reinterpretation of Qurʾan, hadith, and Islamic tradition (Sunnah) within new and emerging contexts, especially during the Arab Uprisings when themes such as dignity, freedom, and representation became crystallized.
Chapter 1 deals with petitions and protest from the periods 2003 to 2008 and then 2008 to the Arab Uprisings, but since the “petition industry” coincided with domestic terrorism, by 2008 it had failed to build a social base and achieve constitutional reform. King Abdullah's accession to the throne in 2005 and his subsequent pardoning of several constitutional reformers was dependent on them not engaging in such activities again (34). The Al-Saud is shown to have deployed familiar resources: religious, security, and economic, in order to avoid further protest in the Kingdom.
Chapter 2 looks at the Saudi Association for Civil and Political Rights (Jamiyyat al-Huquq al-Siyasiyya wa al-Madaniyya or HASM) and its support for a constitutional monarchy as well as sharp criticism of Prince Nayif, (the interior minister from 1975–2012) for human rights abuses. The trials against HASM figures such as Abdullah al-Hamid, Muhammad al-Qahtani, and Suleiman al-Rushoudi were labeled variously as trials of civil society activists or trials of constitutional activists between 2009 and 2013, clearly delineating them as a civil society group rather than an Islamist opposition group (57). HASM, through its high profile court cases with the judiciary and brief advocacy before the long prison sentences handed down to its members, has elevated the debate surrounding the Saudi monarchy which may yet resurface.
Chapter 3 looks at other Saudi Islamists invigorated by the Arab Uprisings. In particular, figures such as Salman al-Awdah who, from roots in Sahwa (Islamic Awakening) after the Saudi Islamists were spurred on by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, renounced violence and now has an MBC program called Hajar al-zawiyya (Cornerstone). It is one of the few alternative sources to jihadism and Salafi acquiescence (rooted in concepts such as avoiding chaos (fitna)) expounded by Saudi Mufti Sheikh Abd al-Aziz al-Sheikh. He offers an innovative fusion of western political thinkers such as Marx and de Tocqueville and Islam, grounded in the concept of consultation (shura). Chapter 4 discusses the shariʿa in a civil society, with reference to the writings of Abdullah al-Maliki, a young Saudi Islamist intellectual, belonging to what is known as the enlightenment trend (al tayar al-tanwiri). Chapter 5 looks at the roots of authoritarianism and the short lived opening of the public sphere after 9/11. It discusses the arrest of university student Al-Abd al-Karim and his certainty that the roots of his arrest lay, quite uniquely, in Salafi religious interpretation and heritage (turath) (119). Chapter 6 talks of democracy and the work of Muhammad al-Ahmari, an Islamist defender of democracy who uses reason (al-aql) in his arguments. The conclusion emphasizes key points about avoiding western concepts of modernization, illustrating that there is space for reinterpretation of Islamic concepts and meanings, and the ongoing divide between mainstream Salafis and modernist Islamists.
Immediately, when reading this work and taking into account the lack of traction of constitutional reformers thus far, one wonders as to the extent to which the views of Saudi Islamists have filtered into broader Saudi society, or may do in future. Al-Rasheed states that any form of modernity is perceived to be deviant from the conservative Wahhabi branch of Islam that is widely practiced in the Kingdom, but that doesn't mean that there are not more reformist-minded views or private exhibitions of discontent. The effect of fresh attempts at constitutional reform led by a new figure(s) who is able to bridge the gap between Sunni and Shiʿa and secure mass appeal through TV and online media and/or those able to widen the debate about the reinterpretation of Islamic texts and tradition, could facilitate substantive change. So too could further international education exchange, greater socialization in international society (an opening up in the tourism industry for example), and changes to other government measures (religious discourse, repression, economic largesse), all potentially alter the dynamics of social and religious activism and possibly enhance the shift towards a civil state (dawla madaniyya).
Al-Rasheed says that the state focus remains firmly on civic duty over civic rights, emphasizing the pledge of allegiance (bayʾah) in particular (an element reinforced by my own encounters with the Saudi elite). She is convincing when arguing that Islamism is not a unitary form of dogmatic politics permanently tied to Islam, but often a series of interpretations and reinterpretations inherently targeted at the reconciliation of divine and domestic politics. Fundamentally, Islam does not equal authoritarianism, so the question of political representation, civil society, and constitutionalism that Al-Rasheed raises will remain pertinent. Expect Saudi eyes to be on the political trajectories of other Sunni states and on any emerging domestic consensus on political imperatives informed by Salafism in the twenty-first century.
