The distinguishing line between indirect expropriation and regulatory takings has perplexed scholars for a long time.Footnote 5 A state is not responsible to pay compensation for regulatory takings, but must do so in the case of indirect expropriation. Investment treaties, designed to protect investors, do not define indirect expropriation or suggest any formula for distinguishing indirect expropriation from regulatory takings. It is difficult to draw a “bright and easily distinguishable line”Footnote 6 between these two controversial concepts. Any effort in that direction is welcome – and so is this book by Sebastian Escarcena.
The book is divided into eight chapters. The Introduction (chapter 1) is followed by an historic account of the law (chapter 2); the treatment of indirect expropriation in specific subject areas: human rights (chapter 3), Iran-US Claims Tribunal (chapter 4), Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) (chapters 5), and Multilateral Investment Treaties (chapter 6). Chapter 7 touches upon the current academic debate relating to the proportionality test, Global Administrative Law, and the rule of law. This is followed by Conclusions (chapter 8).
Escarcena’s original contribution relates to the American attempt to export their municipal law jurisprudence on indirect expropriation to international investment law. The US and Canada Model BIT and some Free Trade Agreements have achieved this through the new expropriation clause. Escarcena vividly describes this effort through a robust and impressive critique (pp. 186–90).
The claim in the introductory chapter is to establish “good governance” as a criterion to delineate non-compensable regulatory measures from indirect expropriation (pp. 10–11). The quest is, however, lost in the following chapters. In other chapters, where the connection could have been obvious (chapters 5–7), inadequate effort is made to elaborate. The discussion only superficially resurfaces in the Conclusion (pp. 208–11).
Escarcena often refers to the international minimum standard (IMS) as a component of indirect expropriation. IMS is inherently bound to fair and equitable treatment (FET). Indirect expropriation is an independent standard. This conflating of ideas is rather confusing. No one can stop the author from arguing confluence, but he would first have to discredit the overwhelming consensus and then establish the nexus between IMS and indirect expropriation. The consequential suggestion that the US has abandoned IMS is also incorrect (p. 147). IMS continues to be a part of FET in current treaty practice.Footnote 7 It was never a part of indirect expropriation, hence there could be no question of abandoning it.
Most portions of this book are a narration of cases and a reproduction of extant scholarship, with little effort to present a critique. Escarcena relies on scholars insisting on liberal investor protection, but ignores other scholarship taking a balanced and development oriented approach. For example, he discusses the literature insisting that the objective of investment treaties is investor protection, without bothering to mention the literature arguing that investment treaties were after all a commitment of contribution to the development of the recipient state. The reading of development into the definition of “investment” by tribunals is also ignored. Likewise, the relevance of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal for investment arbitrations is under challenge due to its lex specialis character.Footnote 8 It is suggested that the Iran-US Claims Tribunal applied the “margin of appreciation”—a principle from the European Court of Human Rights (p. 102) to save governmental measures. But in reality the position was contrary and intention to expropriate was always presumed.Footnote 9
Overall, not all chapters seem to aid the objective of the book, and the objective itself gets lost along the way. While the book has a few ideas scattered disparately, a more focused approach elucidating one or more of them could have made for a more noteworthy contribution.
