In this book, the culmination of many years' work, David Edgerton sets out to write a new history of the British state, one that ‘does not rest on existing historiography’ (p. 8), but one that requires a massive revision of our current ‘accounts of British science, technology, industry and warfare’. This new history will afford us, we are told, an insight into modern Britain that, he says, historians of both right and left have overlooked or misread. The emphasis given by historians to the emergence of the ‘welfare state’ has, he believes, contributed to an image of Britain in ‘decline’ during most of the twentieth century (and perhaps since). However, this image overlooks the emergence of a British ‘warfare state’, ‘long before the Second World War’; one that was by no means ‘a late, reluctant respondent to a new scientific revolution’ (p. 13). Turning received wisdom on its head, Edgerton argues that the way Britain has dealt with science and the military has become a central feature of British national life. The ensuing text pursues the argument with a revisionist analysis of the history of military, industrial and academic research; investment in innovation; and economic growth (p. 14).
All this is a tall order, and the broader implications of Edgerton's thesis lie beyond the scope of a short review. But between the lines of his complex narrative, there seems both more and less than meets the eye. Few would deny that science and technology have always been central to the exercise of power – a theme familiar to Western readers since Homer sang of Minerva's role at the siege of Troy – or that Britain, as the first industrializing nation, inevitably called upon the applied sciences to produce the means of modern warfare. Whilst some historians may have promoted the wishful, if well-intentioned, view that ‘the sciences were never at war’, these are the exception. What is debatable, perhaps, is the question of relative speed, discipline and direction, and whether and when Britain enjoyed a comparative advantage. But the fact itself is not in dispute. On at least one level, therefore, Edgerton may be knocking on an open door. In which case, he offers not so much an ‘alternative’ account, as a telling reminder of a relationship that many Britons would prefer to overlook, and some, to do without.
Such reflections meet the beginning of the book, but more follows, as in eight chapters Edgerton charts the history of the military–industrial complex in the interwar and postwar years, and introduces the ‘new men’ who came to exemplify its leadership in Britain. In passing, he delivers a powerful critique of the mythical ‘white hot’ revolution of Wilson's Labour government, and untangles the vexed history of defence technology spending through the 1970s. At times, however, a contrarian approach seems to get the better of the argument. It is, for example, one thing to say that Britain is an interventionist state, led by (defence) supply departments (p. 296); indeed, it would be a brave historian who would deny the importance of defence spending to the wider economy. But it is quite another thing to criticize economists for emphasizing the positive role that R & D can play in economic development (p. 300). What is at issue, surely, is the comparative diffusion of marketable innovations arising from spending on military relative to those flowing from civilian (‘bread-and-butter’) research, the individual consequences of which are necessarily a matter for empirical investigation, over time, industry-by-industry, country-by-country, and case-by-case.
Edgerton rightly criticizes familiar accounts of Britain's military and economic performance – from Martin Wiener to Correlli Barnett – which have painted an overly negative picture of Britain's history of wartime and postwar innovation. But this will never be uncontested territory. The comparative history of military versus civilian innovation – or the question of ‘which came first’, as Merritt Roe Smith once put it – is notoriously difficult. And in this respect, Edgerton's book must be read with care and caution. Taking a long view, the historiographical issues at stake are not limited to the quixotic postures of technocrats, or even of those ‘anti-historians’ – a remarkable coinage – whom Edgerton accuses of ‘denying the strength of technocracy and overestimating the significance of opposition to them’ (p. 193). That a generation of British historians has focused on the welfare state is surely laudable, not lamentable, and in no way depends upon an anti-technological bias, or indeed demonstrates that such a bias actually exists.
What is certainly clear is that mainstream British history has done little to dispel public ignorance of the military–industrial complex and the social and political institutions that serve it. Leaving aside a tradition that draws both inspiration and suspicion from the interwar writings of Philip Noel-Baker and J. D. Bernal, the history of Britain's war industries is yet to be written. In this sense, Edgerton valuably builds upon his pioneering studies of aeronautical research and aircraft production, which make his point without exaggeration. His future agenda might well tackle more complex issues in the context of multinational, corporate defence research and the international arms trade.
That said, for most readers, the ‘take-away’ message of this book will be that, rather than chase the ghosts of ‘declinism’, we should seek the goals of transparency. British historians have long enjoyed less access than their American cousins to the archives of military research and development, let alone to the business history of military–commercial spin-offs. Perhaps Edgerton's book will inspire more interest in Freedom of Information applications. In the meantime, however, there is abundant evidence that the ‘warfare state’ he describes is not ‘disappearing’, as he puts it, even if public spending on health and welfare today dominate the nation's budget. Ironically, this makes the historical neglect of the ‘warfare state’ all the more regrettable, given that Britain's defence industries rank alongside its pharmaceutical and biomedical industries on the front line of innovation.
As Edgerton reminds us, industrial nations have proved unwilling to choose between ‘guns’ and ‘butter’, and have done their best to have both. But to know how this has come about, and to decide what we must learn from it, does not require us to choose between ‘welfare’ and ‘warfare’ as interpretative alternatives. What it does require is an understanding of military science and industry as fundamental to the history of Britain and British science, just as military history is fundamental to British history in general. Edgerton's passing description of national museums of technology that fail to display tanks and guns alongside ‘civilian’ technologies makes a telling point (p. 308). Whatever we may think of his wider generalizations, Edgerton has given us a salutary shaking; his approach will be influential, not so much because of its particular timing, but because it belongs to all time.
