This work represents a tremendous accomplishment of careful and forceful political science. In it, Tom Clark manages to demonstrate 1) a significant limitation on the hegemonic attitudinal model of judicial decision making, 2) a theoretical and empirical connection between public opinion and Supreme Court rulings, and 3) that formal modeling, quantitative analysis, and historical new institutionalism can mutually reinforce and enhance the ability to answer research questions. This is an important book that will undoubtedly be widely read in graduate seminars on judicial process and by researchers studying the interaction between legislatures and courts.
The Limits of Judicial Independence falls within the areas of separation of powers and judicial independence. Most separation-of-powers models examine the strategic moves of political institutions in reaction to, and anticipation of, the actions of other actors and institutions. Judicial independence, which Clark defines as “a court's ability to make decisions unaffected by political pressure from outside the judiciary,” is at sharp odds with this notion of strategic moves (p. 5). Yet there has been very little quantitative support for strategic behavior. The author identifies one of the missteps of the strategic model—which has enjoyed strong formal support—by correcting an assumption about judicial motivation: Rather than linking strategy solely to long-term policy outcomes, he suggests that the Court is also motivated by its own institutional integrity. The Court is not particularly focused on public approval of specific cases but instead on diffuse support—or judicial legitimacy. That is, it interprets congressional Court-curbing proposals (e.g., jurisdiction stripping, procedural hurdles, limitations on judicial review) as signaling the lack of public faith in the Court's legitimacy. Clark supports this thesis with an impressive data set, capturing the full range of Court-curbing proposals since Reconstruction.
As Clark points out, congressional Court-curbing proposals need not have a serious chance of enactment in order for the Court to take notice. Such congressional actions, which he describes as “position taking,” are instances in which members of Congress stake out positions in line with their constituents, and thus the proposals themselves—rather than the likelihood of enactment—can provide valuable information to the Court (and others) about public perceptions of the Court. To be sure, he does not back away from well-known literature establishing that the Court's motivations are in line with its members' ideological preferences; he, however, provides both interview, theoretical, and quantitative evidence suggestive of the notion that the Court is constrained by concerns over institutional legitimacy. It is these “congressional attacks [that] politicize the Court in a way that the justices believe undermines the Court's integrity and legitimacy” (p. 73).
Clark's theory for the politicization of the Court revolves around the conditionality of its responses to Court curbing. The author finds that both who the Court curbers are and how much Court curbing occurs depend in part on the public mood and the ideological composition of the Court. While Congress largely responds to an electorate ideologically opposed to the Court, Congress will also occasionally “bluff” the Court, that is, introduce Court-curbing legislation independent of the public mood. Having demonstrated the causal side of the equation, Clark then turns to the outcomes. He finds that when Congress introduces bills to restrain the Court, the Court invalidates fewer pieces of legislation. He estimates that had it not been for Court-curbing proposals, the Court would have struck down an additional 81 pieces of legislation (not just the 284 Acts of Congress that it did during the time period in this study). Clark accounts for a bevy of alternative explanations, including the Court's own case selection. In the end, the conclusion is pretty stark: Congressional position taking hostile to the Court nets a more restrained Court.
One of the more interesting but ultimately unsatisfying parts of the book is Clark's discussion of how individual justices respond to Court-curbing proposals. He shows how some justices, including Justices Earl Warren and John Paul Stevens voted in response to the congressional anti-Court machinations, whereas there was some, but very little, evidence of such voting for Justices Felix Frankfurter and John Marshall Harlan. Clark suggests that the differences are idiosyncratic, and effectively a matter of degree—as the point estimates of Frankfurter and Harlan suggest some effect (albeit indistinguishable from zero effect, accounting for error). The book does not engage in a systematic sorting of the justices to assess why some respond to these threats more so than others, but the variation here is important to his larger point. First, we would not expect each justice to pay the same level of attention to what is occurring in Congress. Certainly the justices who themselves have been legislators (Sandra Day O'Connor) or who have worked in the legislature (Stephen Breyer) might be thought to pay more attention. Second, we might expect some variation among those who pay attention and feel the need to respond. And third, there may be varying levels of the magnitude of the response. Clark does focus on this third issue (arguing that Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's voting under threat can resemble that of Justice Antonin Scalia)—but it seems that his point about the lack of independence of the judiciary would benefit from determining those preliminary issues prior to investigating this one so that those who do not move from their preferred positions because they are independent are distinguishable from those who do not move from their preferred positions because they are clueless. It should be noted that the failure to include this point actually reinforces Clark's argument, rather than detracting from it, because the lack of independent effect would certainly be greater if we culled out those who were clueless from those who exercised independence.
Finally, Clark addresses some of the larger significance of his study and the normative concerns raised by his empirical work. Notably, he suggests that if the Courts are constrained by public opinion, some of the taint of the antimajoritarian issues wears thin. Here, he astutely identifies what he calls the “politics-legitimacy paradox” (p. 263), that the Court's legitimacy largely rests on its nonpolitical approach to constitutional and legal issues, but that it may have to act more politically (responsive to public demands) at times so as not to damage its legitimacy.
Throughout the book, Clark uses two different historical examples to give life to his analysis: the New Deal and the Court-packing plan of Franklin Roosevelt, and school busing post–Brown v. Board. He could have done more here, not so much in terms of history but in terms of illustrating his points. To show why Court-curbing proposals from more moderate congressional members may be different in kind from those of the ideological extreme, it may have helped to discuss how, say, Justice Ginsburg would likely interpret in different ways a Court-curbing proposal from Senator Olympia Snowe (R-ME) as opposed to one from Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK). Further, Clark acknowledges that there may be other relevant signals to the Court, especially coming from the Executive. One would certainly also think that the politically astute members of the Court would look to things like whether a midterm election had a larger share of turnover than expected, or whether a number of high-profile gubernatorial seats went to the opposition party.
Clark acknowledges that there are plenty of fruitful avenues of research remaining for other scholars. But standing on its own, The Limits of Judicial Independence pays attention to the real world of politics, and both theoretically and empirically, historically and contemporaneously, demonstrates its effect on judicial decision making. This is one of the more important books for both judicial politics students and scholars alike.
