In this volume, Brooke A. Ackerly develops a provocative and seemingly counterintuitive argument that human rights can be simultaneously “local, universal, and contested” (p. 1). In making this argument, Ackerly is seeking to stake out new philosophical territory in the long-standing debate between universalists and relativists. She accepts the claim that human rights are universal. However, she rejects the standard universalist argument that human rights are derived from transcendent moral values. Although she rejects relativist claims that universal human rights do not exist, she shares the relativist view that a focus on local context and cultural difference is essential. Indeed, she suggests that the foundation for universal human rights can be found in contestation over these rights at the local level. In this way, she seeks to bridge the universalist-relativist divide in a productive, innovative way.

This is primarily a philosophical work, and the majority of the text is devoted to careful development of the philosophical approach to universal human rights that Ackerly is advocating. One of her central philosophical arguments is that universal human rights are immanent rather than transcendent. For many universalists, the ultimate source for human rights is located in a moral framework (either religious or secular) that is presumed to transcend cultural, historical, social, and other forms of difference. Ackerly rejects this form of theorizing in which philosophers seek to divorce human rights from the real-world context in which human rights violations occur. Transcendent theorizing about universal human rights, in the author's view, not only risks distorting empirical reality but also constitutes a form of cultural imperialism. Instead, she argues that the fundamental source of universal human rights is knowledge that comes from “within the experiences of human rights violations and the experience of working against human rights violations” (p. 22). Thus, she argues that the perspectives of human rights activists who work against human rights violations in particular contexts are especially valuable sources of knowledge about universal human rights.

Ackerly also grounds her work in what she describes as a feminist “curb-cutting” epistemology. The curb-cutting metaphor makes reference to the cuts made in sidewalk curbs in order to make them accessible to the disabled. In this sense, a feminist curb-cutting epistemology is intended to approach the construction of knowledge in an accessible, inclusive manner. Her work applies curb-cut feminism by prioritizing the voices of the marginalized in an effort to ensure that discussions of universal human rights are as inclusive and comprehensive as possible, and that they are attentive to the perspectives and needs of individuals who have experienced human rights violations. In particular, the author believes that it is essential to listen to the voices of activists who work for women's rights and gender equality because it is these voices that have so commonly been silenced in prior debates over fundamental human rights. In this way, her adoption of this feminist epistemological approach is directly related to her immanent theory of universal human rights: by bringing the voices of the marginalized to the center of the debate, she believes that human rights scholars and activists will be most effective in making progress toward successfully identifying and implementing human rights in a world of difference.

Given the emphasis that Ackerly places on the importance of listening to activists and marginalized people, her work is strangely abstract. The majority of the book is devoted almost exclusively to philosophical, epistemological, and methodological discussions. In the end, she devotes only limited space to the stories and insights of the women's rights/ human rights activists whom she wants to empower. The inclusion of direct quotations from activists in the text is sporadic, and there is no systematic incorporation or analysis of activist voices. Thus, there is a gap between the feminist epistemology that she proposes and the extent to which she actually employs this epistemology in practice, at least in this particular work.

Another weakness of Ackerly's work is that her primary focus on activists may limit the importance of her immanent theory of human rights. She suggests that scholars and activists need to engage on what she calls a “terrain of difficulty” in order to make genuine progress toward universal human rights. To this end, she believes that acknowledging that human rights are contested is an important starting point. However, if the ultimate goal is to work through contested visions of human rights in an effort to move toward more inclusive and genuinely universal constructions of human rights, then the real terrain of difficulty might be much larger and more difficult to navigate than Ackerly acknowledges. If universal commitment to human rights is to be constructed out of particular contexts, it likely will have to include not only scholars and activists already committed to human rights but also individuals and groups who are more resistant to the idea of human rights. This task does not diminish the importance of her argument; rather, it simply suggests that implementing her approach in practice may be even more difficult than she suggests.

Despite these weaknesses, Human Rights in a World of Difference is a highly valuable, provocative work that contributes a new way of thinking and talking about universal human rights. Ackerly's effort to bridge the gap between universalists and relativists is useful and may provide a new set of tools for identifying universal human rights that are sensitive to local particularities and cultural context. In this way, her approach might generate less resistance to discussions of universal human rights among peoples who have experienced universalism largely as imperialism. This work should be widely read and discussed by scholars in the fields of human rights and feminist international relations.