Robert Sinnerbrink comes to the subject of film's experiential effects with a broader study in hand, his New Philosophies of Film: Thinking Images (2011), and a handful of articles, some of which have been revised and included in Cinematic Ethics. Also relevant is Sinnerbrink's editorship of a special issue of the journal Film-Philosophy devoted to the work of Stanley Cavell (2014), where he contributes to the expansive literature on Cavell's pertinence to the study of film, especially in its ethical and political significance. Cinematic Ethics, therefore, reads like the aggregation of several strains of earlier research and an attempt to theorize the findings into a narrower and more coherent formal thesis: namely, that “cinema has the potential to be understood as a medium of ethical experience” (185). Moreover, though more diffusely, Sinnerbrink contends that “this ethical potential is important to recognize if we are to appreciate why cinema matters today.”
The book is divided into three parts. In part 1, Sinnerbrink details what he means by “cinema and/as ethics.” He asks: “How should we conceptualize cinema's power not only to reflect social, cultural, and moral values but to exercise our moral imaginations and deepen our ethical experience? How might film contribute to philosophy, indeed to ethical understanding, via cinematic means?” (5). Sinnerbrink's reply is meant to address a troubling undertheorizing in the secondary literature on the “relationship between ethics and cinema” (5). His emphasis on “cinematic ethics” is aimed to “bring film and philosophy together in order to cultivate an experiential approach to ethical understanding and philosophical reflection” (6). I add the italics to signal how Sinnerbrink's work might be said to reach back to Cavell's preoccupations and achievements and also to press forward into new inquiries.
The notion of an “ethics of cinema” emerges from D. N. Rodowick's description of Cavell's many distinctive, field-defining interventions into the philosophical reading of films. A “Cavellian approach” is the first of four dominant approaches to cinematic ethics, along with a “Deleuzian perspective,” “phenomenological and post-phenomenological film theory,” and lastly, “cognitivist film theory” (15). Acknowledging these varied theoretical pathways, Sinnerbrink aims to offer a “more comprehensive way of thinking through the different but related dimensions of ethics in cinema.” Such work would seem to require consideration of the “transformative potential” of film “to sharpen our moral perception, challenge our beliefs through experiential means, and thus [to] enhance our understanding of moral-social complexity” (16). The seventh art, Sinnerbrink argues, is perhaps uniquely situated to “engage our emotions, exercise our moral imaginations, and question our beliefs” (17). Studying the effects of our cinematic encounters on our moral lives would appear to lie at the heart of cinematic ethics.
Part 2 offers an interactive study of “philosophical approaches to cinematic ethics” by unpacking some of the distinctive contours of these “four dominant approaches.” Thus, we find a chapter that traces Cavell's sense that film is a “moving image of skepticism,” drawing viewers ever onward toward the new yet unapproachable selves that we experience through our dedicated, desirous, delirious movie-watching. Cavell describes this project as partaking in “Emersonian moral perfectionism,” in itself a potent challenge to the broad strokes of Kantian deontology, on the one hand, and utilitarian ethics on the other. Sinnerbrink figures Cavell's project as finding kinship with Aristotelian virtue ethics, but that affiliation doesn't forestall Sinnerbrink's concern that Cavell's attention to the “care of the self” (à la the Stoics, Hadot, and Foucault) exposes “the limitations of Cavell's moral-perfectionist approach,” namely, that it is guilty of an “eschewal of collective action,” and as such “Emersonian moral perfectionism tends to overlook the relationship between ethics and politics” (48). This complaint is familiar and could be summarized in the opening question of Cavell's Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome (1990), “Is Moral Perfectionism inherently elitist?” The charge of such dislocation was evident to Cavell more than a quarter century ago, and that book, along with Emerson's Transcendental Etudes (2003) and Cities of Words (2005), could be cited as Cavell's sedulous pursuit of a fitting reply to doubters.
Sinnerbrink does not articulate how we might “navigate this difficult passage from ethics to politics” as we find it in Cavell, but shifts to “Deleuze's cinematic philosophy, setting it in critical dialogue with Cavell's, in order to explore a complementary but contrasting view of cinematic ethics and its dialectical relationship with aesthetics and politics” (49). Sinnerbrink turns our attention to the “crisis of belief” familiar to modernity, and to Deleuze's sense that cinema offers us a response to nihilism—meant here to be an analog term for Cavell's understanding of skepticism (55). Sinnerbrink works through Deleuze's account of the “crisis,” offering along the way a salve in the form of a “cinema of belief”; an extended study of some films of Italian neorealism is meant to supply illustrations of the shift from doubt to conviction. The crescendo of the lesson is the claim that Deleuze provides “a more collective, political dimension in his cinematic ethics, arguing that cinema has the capacity to constitute a missing community, to create a ‘people to come,’ without recourse to historical teleology or political totality (73). (Whereof, then, Cavell's next or “onward” self that must contend with the majoritarian realm of the social and political—viz., “the world”—that “whips [us] with its displeasure” for our nonconformity? In this regard, see Andrew Norris's edited volume The Claim to Community [2006]).
If Cavell's “therapeutic-aesthetic response to skepticism” was insufficiently political (at least at the level of the group or other social mappings), then Deleuze offers an “existential affirmation of belief and the possibility of a collective ‘minoritarian’ becoming through cinema” (76). Still, in Deleuze, other lacunae become apparent: “there is no account of the role of emotion either in relation to perception or action,” and we need, according to Sinnerbrink, to look still further to phenomenologies of film and the work of cognitivist film theory. “We need to consider… not just ‘what cinema can do’ (as Deleuzians might put it) but how cinema does what it does, and thus, more concretely, how it might serve as a medium of ethical experience” (76–77). Sinnerbrink explores the “affective turn” in film theorizing, unpacks some key arguments of cognitivism (along with a sense of its limits), and perhaps most consequentially, advances a brief history of empathy and sympathy that culminates in a proposed neologism: cinempathy. Sinnerbrink defines the term as “a cinematic/kinetic expression of the synergy between affective attunement, emotional engagement, and moral evaluation that captures more fully the ethical potential of the cinematic experience” (95).
The third part of the book involves what Sinnerbrink calls “performing cinematic ethics,” which might also be described as close readings of films in order to test the merits of cinematic ethics (and cinempathy). These films include Stella Dallas with Barbara Stanwyk and Pedro Almodóvar's Talk to Her (chap. 5); double Oscar-winning director Iñárritu's Biutiful and the Dardenne brothers’ La promesse (chap. 6); and Joshua Oppenheimer's documentary The Act of Killing (chap. 7). Such attentiveness to the “aesthetic power” of cinema to “evoke ethical experience,” might be taken as evidence that Sinnerbrink's aspiration to make cinematic ethics “a form of cultural practice” would be worthwhile as (pace Hadot) “a way of life” (185, 188). In the end, cinephilia—our emotional connection to movies, our passion for them—may be the pretext for our capacity to articulate their ethical effects upon us. In this scenario, moral imagination becomes the ground for social action and political articulation.
After a succinct conclusion that aims to remind readers—and viewers—of the social and political questions that are tied up with the ethical lives of people onscreen (and those who view them), Sinnerbrink presents an extensive bibliography of further readings on cinematic ethics. The long list suggests that his belief that the question of ethics and film has received “scant attention” may be unfounded, and that he might be better off describing how he serves as a guide and interpreter to these varied and capacious offerings in the wide-raging critical inheritance of film—a service we surely are in need of (5). A second appendix adduces a “filmography for teaching and research” in cinematic ethics.
