The pearl of the collection is the first essay on the ‘Principles which lead and direct Philosophical Enquiries; illustrated by the History of Astronomy. Nobody, I venture to say, can have an adequate idea of Smith’s intellectual stature who does not know these essays. I also venture to say that, were it not for the undeniable fact, nobody would credit the author of the Wealth of Nations with the power to write them. (Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter, Schumpeter and Perlman1954, p. 177)
[T]he fact is that the Wealth of Nations does not contain a single analytic idea, principle, or method that was entirely new in 1776. (p. 179)
His very limitations made for success. Had he been more brilliant, he would not have been taken so seriously. Had he dug more deeply, had he unearthed more recondite truth, had he used more difficult and ingenious methods, he would not have been understood. But he had no such ambitions; in fact he disliked whatever went beyond plain common sense. He never moved above the heads of even the dullest readers. He led them on gently, encouraging them by trivialities and homely observations, making them feel comfortable all along. (p. 180)
It has been held that A. Smith, far ahead of his time, braved unpopularity by giving expression to his social sympathies. This is not so. His sincerity I do not for a moment call into question. But those views were not unpopular. They were in fashion. (p. 180)
I. INTRODUCTION
Joseph Alois Schumpeter (1883–1950)Footnote 1 is generally considered one of the most influential economists of the twentieth century. Because of the wide and deep net he cast, his History of Economic Analysis (Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter, Schumpeter and Perlman1954) is seen as a, if not the, masterpiece of history of economic thought.Footnote 2 As a first approximation, Schumpeter’s stature and influence are evident in his Google scholar citations. Schumpeter (Reference Schumpeter, Schumpeter and Perlman1954), as of the writing of this article, has attracted well in excess of 10,000 citations; Schumpeter (Reference Schumpeter and Swedberg[1954] 2003)—on the laws of motion of capitalism, socialism, and democracy, a book that introduced the world to the concept of creative destruction through entrepreneurship—has amassed more than 45,000 citations. As we shall argue, he is also representative of readers of Smith’s oeuvre who do not understand how important rhetoric was to Smith, and who do not understand, for that matter, the rhetorical structure of Smith’s oeuvre in the large and small.
Schumpeter’s assessment of Adam Smith and his work was ambivalent. While he spoke highly of parts of Smith’s oeuvre, prominently the “Principles which lead and direct Philosophical Enquiries; illustrated by the History of Astronomy” (in Smith Reference Smith1980; from here on HA), he dismissed other parts, and especially the writing in, and much of the analytic content of, the Wealth of Nations (Smith Reference Smith1976a; from here on WN). In fact, Schumpeter was so taken aback by what he considered Smith’s pitiful performance in WN that he questioned Smith’s intellectual mettle, as we can see from the first three quotes that open this manuscript as well as the opening quote in the following section. Concerning The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith Reference Smith1976b; from here on TMS), he was more circumspect (e.g., Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter, Schumpeter and Perlman1954, pp. 125, 175, 177).Footnote 3 Schumpeter seemed to have a more positive view of TMS than of WN, although his claim that “plan and performance are quite similar to the plan and the performance of the Wealth of Nations” (p. 126) suggests to us that Schumpeter might have never read it carefully (if at all) and that his assessment of TMS mainly drew on secondary literature. He understood that TMS and WN were parts of a greater systematic whole (Reference Schumpeter, Schumpeter and Perlman1954, p. 137) and he knew that the TMS went through six editions but argued that “the differences between the two [the first and the sixth edition] though considerable are (apart from the Dissertation [on the Origin of Languages]) not of any great importance” (p. 125), a view that these days is heavily—and in our view persuasively—contested (see, e.g., Hanley Reference Hanley2009; Phillipson Reference Phillipson2010; Rasmussen Reference Rasmussen2017; or Kennedy Reference Kennedy2005, Reference Kennedy2017).
We argue that Schumpeter’s harsh, though not entirely negative, overall assessment of both WN Footnote 4 and its author is likely to have resulted from his failure to appreciate the rhetorical structure of WN and, ultimately, from his lack of knowledge of Smith’s rhetorical strategies, as expounded in his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (Smith Reference Smith1983; from here on LRBL), which were published after Schumpeter’s death. That Schumpeter never seems to have read TMS, which in many respects was informed by LRBL, also did not help matters.
Smith, who taught rhetoric for most of his academic career, starting with the series of private lectures to a fee-paying audience that he gave on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays from November through February from 1748 to 1751, seems to have understood each of his writings to be a strategic enterprise (Collings and Ortmann Reference Collings, Ortmann, Biddle and Samuels1997; Kennedy Reference Kennedy2017). Against Schumpeter’s unsubstantiated claim that Smith’s views were “in fashion” (Reference Schumpeter, Schumpeter and Perlman1954, p. 180), we will review the (initial) reactions to his eagerly awaited WN that show otherwise (e.g., Blair and Ferguson, see fn. 19 below) and then will argue that the structure of WN reflected the need to persuade a hostile audience.
In our view, Schumpeter’s assertions—among others, about which more below—that Smith “never moved above the heads of even the dullest readers,” and that he “led them on gently . . . making them feel comfortable all along” reflect a lack of understanding of a deliberate rhetorical device suggested in LRBL for the kind of audience that Smith anticipated for WN. Contrary to Schumpeter’s claim that Smith “disliked whatever went beyond plain common sense,” we submit that “the smooth surface on which A. Smith happily sailed his course” (Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter, Schumpeter and Perlman1954, p. 172) was strategically chosen for the audience that he anticipated would read his book, and especially for representatives of the mercantile system, of which he was highly critical in WN. For other audiences and purposes, Smith chose different styles and modes of persuasion that won him sometimes even the admiration of Schumpeter. Exhibits A, B, and C would be Schumpeter’s high praise of HA and his laudatory comments on chapter 7 of Book I and of Book IV of the WN, or for that matter on the WN as a whole, although this latter praise was quite underhanded, as we shall see.
While we take issue with his harsh assessment of Smith’s intellectual mettle and the related issue of Schumpeter’s failure to understand the importance of Smith’s rhetorical strategies (including the rhetorical structure of the WN), below we also deal with Schumpeter’s claim that the WN does not contain any single analytic idea, principle, or method that was entirely new in 1776, a claim that is, in our reading, also based on Schumpeter’s failure to understand Smith’s rhetorical strategies and ultimately the main rhetorical purpose of the book’s being an intervention in the “American Question.”
The importance of rhetoric for understanding Smith’s work has been increasingly acknowledged over the last couple of decades. Some scholars have investigated if, and how, Smith’s rhetoric shows up in his TMS (Griswold Reference Griswold1991; Brown Reference Brown1994; McKenna Reference McKenna2005; Hanley Reference Hanley2009), or in specific parts or topics of the WN (Endres Reference Endres1991; Gore Reference Gore2011; Peaucelle Reference Peaucelle2012; Herzog Reference Herzog2013; Dellemotte and Walraevens Reference Dellemotte and Walraevens2015). More general statements about the rhetoric of Smith’s WN can be found in Brown (Reference Brown1994) and Fleischacker (2004, ch. 1).
Against Vivienne Brown (1994, ch. 1), we try to show that Smith’s concepts of rhetoric, as they are presented in his LRBL, can be fruitfully applied to his own works, and especially to WN. Moreover, we show that the structure of WN was influenced by the political context of writing and publication of the book (see also Ortmann and Walraevens Reference Ortmann and Walraevens2018). Along the lines of Samuel Fleischacker (Reference Fleischacker2004), we understand the WN both as a “treatise” and a “tract,” or a happy mixture of philosophical and polemical parts, especially in Book V. Against him, though, we believe that the structure of the WN is in itself rhetorical.Footnote 5 Specifically, we argue that Smith’s critique of the commercial system was carefully and strategically presented and that Book V (Of the Revenue of the Sovereign or Commonwealth), as much as it is a treatise on optimal and just taxation and spending, as is well-known, is also a tract focused on the threat the mercantilist system posed to the future of the British Empire, the deliberate topic of the very last pages of the WN. Against the view of Schumpeter (and of many readers of the WN he is representative of), we argue that Book V of the WN should not be seen as an afterthought but rather as the intended apogee of Smith’s critique of the mercantilist system and as an innovative piece of both economic and political analysis on, respectively, incentive-compatible organization of firms and industries (see also Ortmann Reference Ortmann1999), the need for state intervention, and the constitution of Great Britain (see also Ortmann and Walraevens Reference Ortmann and Walraevens2018).
The remainder of this manuscript is organized as follows: In section II, we briefly summarize on which sources Schumpeter founded his assessment of Adam Smith and his work. Since Schumpeter’s assessment of Smith’s intellectual mettle seems to be based mainly on his negative assessment of WN, we summarize which sources Schumpeter seems to have drawn on while writing his assessment of Smith’s work and then we detail the various dismissive claims that Schumpeter made about Smith’s intellectual mettle, mostly by way of criticizing his performance in WN, which allegedly does not contain a single analytic idea, principle, or method that was entirely new in 1776, and which in Schumpeter’s view is little more than an accumulation of facts treading familiar analytic paths. In section III, to facilitate and motivate our discussion of the rhetorical structure of WN, we present the relevant ideas from LRBL. Then, in section IV, we summarize what we know about the intended audience and purpose of WN and how it naturally affected the structure of the book. We conclude by summarizing why in our view Schumpeter got his assessment of WN and Smith wrong, and what it tells us about the importance of understanding Smith’s pervasive use of rhetoric and rhetorical strategies.
II. SCHUMPETER’S ASSESSMENT OF ADAM SMITH AND HIS WORK, IN PARTICULAR WN
A. Smith’s political principles and recipes—his guarded advocacy of free trade and the rest—are but the cloak of a great analytic achievement. (Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter, Schumpeter and Perlman1954, p. 36)
The length of the [fifth and longest] book is due to the masses of material it contains: its treatment of public expenditure, revenue, and debts is primarily historical. The theory is inadequate, and does not reach much below the surface. But what there is of it is admirably worked in with the reports on general developments as well as on individual facts. Further facts have been amassed and theoretical technique has been improved but nobody has to this day succeeded in welding the two—plus a little political sociology—together as did A. Smith. The fourth Book, nearly as long, contains the famous indictment of the ‘commercial or mercantile system’—the patronizingly benevolent criticism of physiocrat doctrine in the ninth and last chapter does not call for comment—from the ashes of which rises, phoenix-like, Smith’s own political system. Again: the reader beholds masses of facts painstakingly marshalled, very little of very simple theory (no advance whatever in this over even distant ‘predecessors’), which is, however, most successfully used in lightening up the mosaic of details, in heating the facts till they glow. The facts overflow and stumble over one another. (p. 181)
He gave his best: the Wealth is the product of labor ungrudgingly bestowed during more than twenty-five years, exclusively concentrated upon it during about ten. His mental stature was up to mastering the unwieldy material that flowed from many sources and to subjecting it, with a strong hand, to the rule of a small number of coherent principles: the builder who built solidly, regardless of cost, was also a great architect. (p. 180)
Schumpeter had come to his assessment of Smith’s contributions early in his career (see also Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter, Schumpeter and Perlman1954, p. xxx).
Had he dug more deeply, he would not have been understood. His masterly presentation has been praised justifiably and yet this is not altogether a compliment. Nobody dreams of praising or blaming the style of Newton or Darwin. They stand above such merits or defects, while Smith does not. . . . Today we can be under no illusions about Smith’s intellectual dimensions since we can clearly enough distinguish between pedestal and monument. (Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter[1912] 1954, p. 65)
The last quotation is from roughly four pages of reflection on Smith’s method in Schumpeter’s Economic Doctrine and Method (originally published in 1912 as Epochen der Dogmen-und Methodengeschichte). Smith is characterized as
a man of systematic work and balanced presentation, not of great new ideas, but a man who above all carefully investigates the given data, criticizes them coolly and sensibly, and co-ordinates the judgement arrived at with others which have already been established. Thus this man with a crystal-clear mind created his magnificent life-work from existing material and by treading on familiar paths. (Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter[1912] 1954, p. 65)
This portrait of Smith as a systematic assimilator, talented synthesizer, and masterly presenter who played it safe is the essence of the assessment provided in Schumpeter (Reference Schumpeter, Schumpeter and Perlman1954). In the following decades, though, while keeping the basic drift, Schumpeter’s assessment seems on balance to have turned harsher. Since, however, it was not consistently harsh, we will next discuss in more detail Schumpeter’s assessment of Smith and his work, and its sources. We start with the latter.
Schumpeter’s Sources
Schumpeter’s assessment in Economic Doctrine and Methods was based on his reading of Edwin Cannan’s introductions to both WN and the Glasgow Lectures (respectively, Cannan 1904 and 1896), the biographies by Dugald Stewart, Emanuel Leser (who had considerable quibbles with Stewart’s facticity, in particular as regards the time Smith spent in London in the run-up to the printing of WN; see Leser Reference Leser1881, pp. 44–45), and John Rae (“altogether the most thorough work,” Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter[1912] 1954, p. 64n2); secondary literature by several German authors of the nineteenth century such as Wilhelm Roscher, Eugen Dühring (see Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter[1912] 1954, p. 3), and Wilhelm Hasbach, as well as articles on Adam Smith in Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften and Palgrave’s Dictionary (p. 64n2). Schumpeter’s assessment in History of Economic Analysis was based on his earlier assessment, prominently again Cannan’s introductions to both WN and the Glasgow LecturesFootnote 6 and assorted other references such as Marx’s Theorien über den Mehrwert (Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter, Schumpeter and Perlman1954, p. 183n15).Footnote 7
Importantly, none of the English-language references in Economic Doctrine and Method pays attention to issues of rhetoric.Footnote 8 Cannan, who also drew heavily on Stewart (Reference Stewart and Smith1980) and Rae (Reference Rae1895), did not address them at all. In fact, in his editor’s introduction to the Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms (Smith Reference Smith and Cannan1896, pp. xi–xxxiv), Cannan made it very clear that knowing the LRBL would be nice but ultimately inconsequential.Footnote 9 Moreover, he claimed, “that book—the Wealth of Nations—was of incomparably greater importance than the Moral Sentiments” (Smith Reference Smith and Cannan1896, p. xv), a view that, it seems fair to say, is now widely contested (e.g., Smith and Wilson Reference Smith and Wilson2019). It seems highly likely that Schumpeter’s decision to factually ignore TMS—given how highly he thought of him; see footnote 6—was informed by Cannan’s assessment that it would hardly matter to know the latter. It seems also likely that Schumpeter bought into Cannan’s view on the inconsequential importance of the LRBL.
As concerns Stewart, he drew heavily on John Millar’s account of Smith’s lectures while a professor at Glasgow. He mentioned that Smith read on rhetoric and belles letters, and quoted Millar as suggesting that, according to Smith, “the best method to explain and illustrate the various powers of mind, the most useful part of metaphysics arises from an examination of the several ways of communicating our thoughts by speech, and from an attention to the principles of those literary compositions which contribute to persuasion or entertainment” (Stewart Reference Stewart and Smith1980, p. 274). Stewart (e.g., 1980, pp. 275–276, 191–192, 319–320, 323) also mentions repeatedly that Smith’s presentation typically followed Smith’s own maxim of “perspicuity of stile” (Smith Reference Smith1983, Lecture 2), both in delivering lectures and in writing. Nowhere, however, did Stewart do justice to Smith’s very explicit conception of listener–speaker or reader–writer interaction as a strategic enterprise (to be discussed in more detail in section III below). Rae, drawing heavily on the words of Stewart and Millar, came to a very similar conclusion. He discussed to what extent Hugh Blair’s influential Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres drew on Smith’s (Rae Reference Rae1895, pp. 32–34). However, like others (e.g., the authors of the Palgrave’s Dictionary and Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften entries), he failed to discuss the persuasive dimension of rhetoric.
In Schumpeter (Reference Schumpeter, Schumpeter and Perlman1954) numerous additional references are mentioned and/or recommended (e.g., on p. 176n13, and p. 178, esp. n15). For example, we learn that “[o]f all the books containing supplementary material on and interpretations of Smith the man, by far the most important is Professor W.R. Scott’s Adam Smith as Student and Professor (1937), which will be referred to in the text and from which the reader will derive much instruction and, perhaps some amusement.” In footnote 15 there is considerable overlap with the cast of relevant characters that Schumpeter identified in (Reference Schumpeter[1912] 1954), although it is noteworthy that Schumpeter mentions additionally “the analyses of Smith’s work by Marx in the Theorien über den Mehrwert” and also Glenn Morrow (Reference Morrow1923). But again there is no indication that he read the latter, as it is nowhere else referenced in Schumpeter (Reference Schumpeter, Schumpeter and Perlman1954).
Nowhere, we highlight at this point once more, is there any indication to be found in (Reference Schumpeter[1912] 1954, Reference Schumpeter, Schumpeter and Perlman1954) that Schumpeter read even casually Smith’s TMS, although its existence is acknowledged (Reference Schumpeter[1912] 1954, p. 64; Reference Schumpeter, Schumpeter and Perlman1954, pp. 125, 177).Footnote 10 For example, as we previously noted, he claimed that WN and TMS were “similar” in “plan and performance” (Reference Schumpeter, Schumpeter and Perlman1954, p. 126), a claim that is far from obvious, unsubstantiated by Schumpeter, and contested by most Smith scholars today. Consequently, one could argue that Schumpeter’s failure to properly understand the true nature and significance of Smith’s WN and its place in the latter’s system of thought might also be due to his lack of attention to Smith’s moral treatise, all the more so knowing that TMS contained important references to and parallels with his principles of rhetoric.Footnote 11
Schumpeter’s Assessment of the WN
As documented so far, Schumpeter’s assessment of Smith and his work was ambivalent and drew almost exclusively on his reading of the WN and secondary literature. References to the WN are scattered all over Schumpeter (Reference Schumpeter, Schumpeter and Perlman1954), and whenever it is used as an explicit reference point, Schumpeter’s disdain can’t be felt more than in the “Reader’s Guide” on Adam Smith and the Wealth of Nations that starts on page 176 and ends abruptly, and not completed, on page 187.
This “jejune and desperately brief Reader’s Guide” (p. 182n18) follows an assessment of “Beccaria, the Italian A. Smith” (p. 175), a comparison that does not work in the Scottish C. Beccaria’s favor, as Schumpeter claims that the southern doppelganger was “almost certainly more richly endowed by nature” (p. 175). This ad hominem attack is one of many both in the Reader’s Guide (e.g., the already documented ones on page 65 of Reference Schumpeter[1912] 1954 and on pages 177 and 180 of Reference Schumpeter, Schumpeter and Perlman1954) and away from it. Later, for example, comparing the genius of Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, Beccaria, and Smith, Schumpeter claims that “Turgot was undoubtedly the most brilliant of the three” (p. 238). (This is a puzzling conclusion, be it only for Cannan’s rather more generous relative assessment of Smith in Smith [1896, p. xv], which presumably Schumpeter read with attention.) There are other places in Schumpeter (Reference Schumpeter, Schumpeter and Perlman1954) where he offers similar snide remarksFootnote 12 or where he explicitly or implicitly identifies others as more brilliant and monumental than the pedestal Mr. Smith. We note that some of these ad hominem attacks skate on pretty thin ice, using sleights of hand such as inevitably problematic claims about performance relative to opportunity. Cesare Beccaria, for example, had no published body of economic analysis to speak of (Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter, Schumpeter and Perlman1954, pp. 174–175), and Schumpeter’s assessment seems based solely on what was posthumously published, and could have been published, had he not spent the major part of his productive life in the Milanese administration.
Apart from such ad hominem attacks, Schumpeter’s major gripe, a recurrent theme in Schumpeter (Reference Schumpeter, Schumpeter and Perlman1954), and indeed the key to understanding his put-downs of Smith and the WN, is that Smith was an apologist for “laissez-faire, free trade, division of labor, and so on” (p. 397),Footnote 13 and that in general those before Smith were underrated and those after Smith (and Smith himself) were overrated (p. 359).Footnote 14 Take, for example, what Schumpeter says about the “the high level of the Italian Contribution” (p. 272) and that other representative figure of the Milanese school, Count Pietro Verri, whom Schumpeter credits with a conception of economic equilibrium, among other original contributions (and besides “a powerful synthesis,” p. 173). Or take, as yet another example, Schumpeter’s assessment of James Steuart, who “[i]n the theories of population, prices, money, and taxation … went much below the surface on which A. Smith happily sailed his course” (p. 172). Many more examples could be paraded here, too. Footnote 15
This, then, is the key for understanding Schumpeter’s assessment of Smith’s intellectual mettle and, to his mind, major opus: Smith was not enough of a theorist in Schumpeter’s superficial reading of the WN (and too much of a pamphleteer), and while he was up to mastering unwieldy material that flowed from many sources and to organizing it based on a small number of coherent principles, he was pedestal (but not monumental) in his analytic achievements, or so Schumpeter argues (Reference Schumpeter[1912] 1954, p. 12). We argue that Schumpeter is wrong (and will sketch our reasoning presently) and are of course not alone in thinking so. People like David Hume (Rasmussen Reference Rasmussen2017), Alfred Marshall (see Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter and Swedberg[1954] 2003, p. 294), Karl Marx, Lionel Robbins, and Mark Perlman have thought Smith to be monumental, and the latter two also took issues with Schumpeter’s assessment, though for reasons different from ours (see Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter, Schumpeter and Perlman1954, pp. xx and xv).
Before we explain our reasoning, it will be useful to briefly reflect on what Schumpeter understood (great) analytic achievements to be. Quoting Joan Robinson, he argues, “Economic theory is not a stock of political recipes but … a box of analytic tools. And these tools are not a heap of disconnected elements but form an engine” (1954, p. 449). And, “From the standpoint of the theorist it is always a ‘major event’ when an important concept is made explicit and workable, although it was—this is the usual case—implicitly present in previous arguments” (p. 301). One of the many examples that Schumpeter gives is “what eventually came to be recognized as the genuine law of decreasing returns [which] cannot be commended too highly. It embodies an achievement that is nothing short of brilliant and suffices in itself to place Turgot as theorist high above A. Smith” (p. 249). It was, then, formalization—he states that Léon Walras’s “system of equations, defining (static) equilibrium in a system of interdependent quantities, is the Magna Carta of economic theory” (Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter, Schumpeter and Perlman1954, p. 233)—that, for Schumpeter, constituted analytic achievement, and by this standard Smith fell short, in Schumpeter’s view. Furthermore, he saw in WN for the most part a pamphlet or tract rather than a treatise, to use Fleischacker’s (Reference Fleischacker2004) distinction.
We note that much of Schumpeter’s critique of WN is focused on books I–III, while there is essentially no reflection on what Book V is really about. Schumpeter sees it—as illustrated in the second quote opening section II—as an untheorized mess of data, overwhelmingly of historical import: “The length of the [fifth and longest] book is due to the masses of material it contains: its treatment of public expenditure, revenue, and debts is primarily historical” (Reference Schumpeter, Schumpeter and Perlman1954, p. 181). He does not understand how what is being addressed here goes way beyond laissez-faire, free trade, division of labor, and so on, both as tract and treatise, as we will show later (and have argued previously, e.g., Ortmann Reference Ortmann1999; see also Ortmann and Walraevens Reference Ortmann and Walraevens2018).
In Schumpeter’s view, then, the WN was nothing more than a nice synthesis or systematic arrangement of existing facts and ideas on political economy, containing no new analytical principles, and surfing on the wave of popular opinion at that time. Therefore, for Schumpeter, the book owed its immense success to the fact that people were already predisposed toward the ideas exposed in it.
By way of qualifying this statement, in the introduction we underlined that one can find in Schumpeter (Reference Schumpeter, Schumpeter and Perlman1954) occasional—albeit underhanded; see the first part of the sentence in the first quote that follows—praise of Smith’s WN, and more precisely of some parts of it, as in the following passages: “But though the Wealth of Nations contained no really novel ideas and though it cannot rank with Newton’s Principia or Darwin’s Origin as an intellectual achievement, it is a great performance all the same and fully deserved its success” (Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter, Schumpeter and Perlman1954, p. 180). Schumpeter also stated that “[t]he rudimentary equilibrium theory of Chapter 7 [of Book I], by far the best piece of economic theory turned out by A. Smith, in fact points toward Say and, through the latter’s work, to Walras” (p. 183). Likewise, talking about the famous chapter 7 of Book IV on colonies, he writes: “we have a masterpiece before us, a masterpiece not only of pleading but also of analysis” (p.181). And according to him, the “third Book did not attract the attention it seems to merit. In its somewhat dry and uninspired wisdom, it might have made an excellent starting point of a historical sociology of economic life that was never written” (p.181).
Moreover, we can credit Schumpeter (here following Stewart: see above) for having identified two rhetorical qualities of the WN: its systematic arrangement and its perspicuity of style. On these points we agree with Schumpeter, as Fleischacker (2004, p. 21) does too. While Schumpeter might have read in Smith’s HA the latter’s praise of systems in science, it is noteworthy that “perspicuity” is identified by Smith as a criterion for the perfection of style in his LRBL, even though Schumpeter couldn’t know it.
But notwithstanding these very occasional positive interjections, Schumpeter makes on balance clear to the reader that Smith’s performance was for the most part pedestrian and that of someone whose life experience was seriously deficient.Footnote 16 We do believe, and try to show, then, that Schumpeter’s harsh assessment of the WN might be due to his ignorance of Smith’s principles of rhetoric, principles he made use of in his works, and especially in WN, as others have noted before. To substantiate our claim, we need first to understand Smith’s intended purpose and audience for his WN as well as his views on rhetoric. We start with the latter in section III, before analyzing the former in section IV.
III. SMITH AND RHETORIC: AN INTRODUCTION
As there are two methods of proceeding in didacticall discourses, so there are two in Deliberative eloquence which are no less different, and are adapted to very conterary circumstances. The 1st may be called the Socratick method. ... In this method we keep as far from the main point to be proved as possible, bringing on the audience by slow and imperceptible degrees to the thing to be proved, and by gaining their consent to some things whose tendency they can’t discover, we force them at last either to deny what they had before agreed to, or to grant the Validity of the Conclusion. This is the smoothest and most engaging manner. The other is a harsh and unmannerly one where we affirm the thing we are to prove, boldly at the Beginning, ... this we may call the Aristotelian method. ... These 2 methods are adapted to the two conterary cases in which an orator may be circumstanced with regard to his audience, they may either have a favourable or unfavourable opinion of that which he is to prove. (Smith Reference Smith1983, pp. 146–147)
Schumpeter did not pay much attention, quite consciously, to Smith’s biography,Footnote 17 probably thinking it was of no consequence for understanding his analytical principles and works. Had he done so, it could have not escaped his attention how important rhetoric was for Smith throughout his life. Smith first taught private lectures on rhetoric and belles lettres in Edinburgh from 1748 to 1751 at a very early stage of his career: i.e., before his first professorial appointment (Phillipson Reference Phillipson2010, ch. 5; see also Kennedy Reference Kennedy2017, ch. “Adam Smith on Rhetoric and Perspicuity”). When, in January 1751, he was elected professor of Logic and Metaphysics at the University of Glasgow, his teaching continued to include large portions of his lectures on rhetoric (Stewart Reference Stewart and Smith1980, p. 274; see also Phillipson Reference Phillipson2010, ch. 6). Even though he was appointed to the more prestigious chair of Moral Philosophy within a year, Smith went on teaching rhetoric in private classes as a complement to his courses in moral philosophy (Ross Reference Ross2010, p. 128; see also Phillipson Reference Phillipson2010, p. 127; Kennedy Reference Kennedy2017, p. 37). In a letter to La Rochefoucauld, Smith even expressed his intention to publish a book in which rhetoric would have had a major place (Smith Reference Smith1987, Corr. 248, p. 287).
The notes to his lectures on rhetoric are among those manuscripts that Smith had burnt shortly before his death (Stewart Reference Stewart and Smith1980, p. 274; Rae Reference Rae1895, p. 32). In the late summer of 1958, however, John M. Lothian discovered two volumes of students’ “Notes of Dr. Smith’s Rhetorick Lectures,” which were subsequently published as LRBL (Smith Reference Smith1983). While these notes are likely “to have lost the air of originality and the distinctive character which they received from [Smith]” (Stewart Reference Stewart and Smith1980, p. 274), a convincing case has been made that the manuscript is “a continuous collaboration between two students intent on making the notes as full and accurate a record of Smith’s words as their combined resources can produce” (Bryce Reference Bryce and Smith1983, p. 4). Indeed, the LRBL documents a remarkable success in that endeavor. The great pains that these two students took (Bryce Reference Bryce and Smith1983, pp. 3–5)—including several revisions of the basic text—suggest that the notes are a fair representation of the original content, if not necessarily the original flair, of Smith’s “Rhetorick Lectures.” There are many remarkable aspects of these lectures, one of them being how complementary they are with Smith’s TMS (McKenna Reference McKenna2005; Longaker Reference Longaker2014).
Of particular note here for us is the emphasis that Smith gave to “perspicuity” (Smith Reference Smith1983, p. 3; see also pp. 6, 8, 49, and 60), reflecting a radical departure from a tradition that put a premium on tropes, figures of speech, etc., and to the importance, for the “orator,” of putting herself in the shoes of the audience: “When the sentiment of the speaker is expressed in a neat, clear, plain and clever manner, and the passion of affection he is possessed of and intends, by sympathy, to communicate to his hearer, is plainly and cleverly hit off, then and then only the expression has all the force and beauty that language can give it” (Smith Reference Smith1983, p. 25; see also pp. 26 and 96). This, as Smith made very clear, did not mean that tropes and figures of speech should never be used (for an impressive collection of them in Smith’s works, see exhibits nos. 1 and 2, pp. 62–67 in Kennedy Reference Kennedy2017); rather, their use ought to be a function of their communicative effectiveness. It did mean that for the rhetoric enterprise that we have conceptualized the WN to be (Ortmann and Walraevens Reference Ortmann and Walraevens2018), Smith had incentive to cleverly employ a neat, clear, and plain language that could take in “by sympathy” even dull readers, a point that Schumpeter himself underlined.
Communicative effectiveness, Smith (1983, p. 96) argued furthermore, was always contextual and dependent on subject matter, circumstances, character, and manner of both speaker (writer) and listener (reader), as well as the rapport they had.Footnote 18 If the crowd to be addressed was likely to be unfavorably inclined, then using the “Aristotelian method” (Smith Reference Smith1983, p. 147) of boldly affirming the thing to be proved at the beginning was a rhetorical strategy that was likely to end in failure. A more promising strategy was the “Socratick method” of keeping as far from the main point to be proved as possible, bringing on the audience slowly and imperceptibly to the thing to be proved—leading it on gently—and putting it into a position where it could not easily refuse the validity of a proposition without incurring cognitive dissonance (Smith Reference Smith1983, p. 146). It was this strategy that Smith recommended highly for rhetorical interaction with a crowd that was unfavorably inclined (Smith Reference Smith1983, p. 147). Contrary to what Schumpeter suggested without substantiation, that was indeed the kind of crowd that Smith faced.
IV. PURPOSE AND AUDIENCE OF WN
Ingrid Rima lucidly describes the circumstances that gave birth to the WN:
Like most great works, The Wealth of Nations is the product of the man and the times. With respect to the times, it may be observed that during the last quarter of the eighteenth century the English business scene was already dominated by the capitalist enterpriser who hired wage labor and frequently did business using the corporate form of organization. Agriculture was still the most important industry, and the rural classes were still well off; but the technical strides being made, particularly in the textile and metalworking industries, were soon to call forth the Industrial Revolution. England had passed through its most extreme period of protectionism, and its foreign trade was making great forward progress as the huge trading companies of bygone decades gradually lost their privileges. Nevertheless, the restraints were still numerous and onerous, especially with the colonies, and the psychological moment to revolt had now come. The Wealth of Nations is, first and foremost, an attack against the principles and practices of mercantilism. (Rima Reference Rima1972, p. 62)
Smith, in the WN, according to Rima and many others, strikes at the foundation of the mercantilist system and its propensity to regulate the economy in favor of vested interests; a point forcefully made by a number of authors (e.g., Evensky Reference Evensky1989 and Pack Reference Pack1991; see also Fleischacker Reference Fleischacker2004; Prasch and Warin Reference Prasch and Warin2009; Phillipson Reference Phillipson2010, esp. ch. 10; Ortmann and Walraevens Reference Ortmann and Walraevens2018 and references therein).Footnote 19 Jerry Evensky suggests that Smith’s arrival in London in 1773 provided him with a “new awareness of mercantilism. ... With this awareness came a growing frustration that the incentives in commerce lead merchants to behavior that is inconsistent with the social welfare” (Evensky Reference Evensky1989, p. 135). He argues that Smith’s “new awareness” explains why it took him about three years (instead of the anticipated few months) to finish WN. More specifically, we believe that Smith’s delay in the publication of the WN was due to his deep and long-lasting interest in the “American question.”
Along the lines of Fleischacker (Reference Fleischacker2002, Reference Fleischacker2004) and Phillipson (Reference Phillipson2010), we thus argue that the WN was a very American and political book—in fact, for some of Smith’s supporters, even too political a book (see Blair’s comment in Smith Reference Smith1987, Corr. 151, p. 188)—and that the sequencing of the WN’s books suggests a contextually sensitive and strategically written book, with a special emphasis on the often overlooked Book V. It is in the latter that Smith addresses the incentive-compatible organizationFootnote 20 of joint-stock, educational, and ecclesiastical organizations (Ortmann Reference Ortmann1999) as well as the ways of addressing what is now known as “externalities” and dealing with the provision of various public goods. Against Schumpeter, we see here a significant analytic contribution of Smith to economic discourse.
Moreover, Smith was motivated and alarmed by the “enormous debt of Great Britain” (WN, V.iii.61, p. 932) resulting from recent wars for acquiring new and defending its (old) colonies and, above all, for preserving the mercantile interests associated with them, especially in North America. We note parenthetically that Schumpeter downplayed the importance of this issue, which was clearly of considerable importance to both Smith and David Hume.Footnote 21 Smith saw the crisis of the British Empire as the ultimate, yet natural, consequence of the crisis of the mercantilist system. While most readers of the WN focused on Book III (e.g., most recently Kennedy Reference Kennedy2017) and Book IV’s presentation of the dire economic consequences of the mercantilist system, Book V is crucial to understanding the political consequences of that system: the ruin of the State and the downfall of the empire.
Proposing an optimal system of taxation based on “fiscal justice” by identifying “unjust,” “oppressive,” and “inconvenient” taxes, defining “proper” subjects of taxation (WN, V.iii.58, p. 928) and public expenditure, “more equal” taxes, and “distributing the weight of it more equally upon the whole” therefore became a fundamental and pressing issue for preserving the integrity, opulence, and sovereignty of the British Empire (WN, V.iii.67, p. 933); hence, Smith’s original (though utopian from his own admission; see WN, V.iii.68, p. 934) project for a new British Empire based on a union with American colonies, a project reminiscent of the Acts of Union 1707 of the two kingdoms of England and Scotland. The monopoly of the colonial trade would also be abolished (WN, IV.vii.c.44, p. 606). Smith realized that the constitutional reforms he called for were unlikely to go through. The merchants, who benefitted from the monopoly of the colonial trade, owned the greatest share of public debt, and were the principal advisors to legislators on these issues, would immediately oppose them (WN, V.iii.7, p. 910; V.iii.35, p. 918). These elements make the WN, we argue, a very American, political, and polemical book.
Along these lines, the sequencing of the WN is, for us, a rhetorical answer to the hostile audience Smith knew he would face in writing a book criticizing the powerful merchant class (not to mention the clergy and professors) and the complacent attitude of legislators towards them. In our view, Schumpeter was thus wrong in writing that Smith owed his success to his ability of surfing on the wave of popular ideas of his time (Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter, Schumpeter and Perlman1954, p.180). We also disagree with Fleischacker when he wrote that Smith “leaves out of WN discussions that he thought might irritate or lose the interest of the merchants, aristocrats, and politicians whom he hoped would read the book” (Fleischacker Reference Fleischacker2004, p. 14).
Instead, we think that Smith used what he called the “Socratick” method of presentation, which is best suited to a hostile and prejudiced readership, to make his case against this class. In doing so, his own theoretical insights on rhetoric proved essential. The reader discovers slowly the unsavory truth of the mercantilist system (Book IV), whose principles had been applied across Europe (Book III) and whose most serious threat is revealed in the final paragraph of the WN: it will “probably ruin all the great nations of Europe” (WN, V.3.10, p. 911). It is well documented that Smith’s anticipation of a hostile audience was well calibrated (Fleischacker Reference Fleischacker2004, p. 16); it did not take much, especially for someone as astutely attuned to the pervasive power of self-interest as Smith, to anticipate that —his stellar reputation as moral philosopher notwithstanding—important parts of his audience would have an unfavorable opinion of what Smith himself called “the very violent attack” (Smith Reference Smith1987, Corr. 208, p. 251) he was about to make upon the whole commercial system of Great Britain.Footnote 22 Smith therefore mustered whatever troops he could enlist. Chief among them was his experience in selling arguments to a hostile audience.Footnote 23 Specifically, Smith resorted to the Socratic method that he had previously suggested for circumstances such as this. He initially kept away from the main point to be proved: that the system of commerce of the Scotland of Smith’s time was dysfunctional and, in any case, by far inferior to a system that would not be riddled by mercantile regulations (WN, IV.1.35-45, pp. 450–451). Instead, Smith outlined in books I through III the optimality of a rigorously developed system of political economy (whose descendants still reign supreme in today’s economic textbooks), assuming away problems of public good provisions or externalities and, for the most part, asymmetric information.Footnote 24 In books I through III, Smith showed implicitly the damage done by an economic system catering to vested interests (see WN, I.viii.13, p. 84; I.x.c.25, p. 144; I.xi.p.10, p. 267), but he refrained from identifying the opponent: that is, the mercantilist system or the collusion between the merchant class and legislators. He did so only in Book IV, Of Systems of Political Economy, where he attacks the mercantile system in his own country and time frontally and relentlessly.Footnote 25 The reader, if she or he bought into the arguments mustered in books I–III, could only grant the validity of the conclusion that the system of commerce of the Great Britain of Smith’s time was dysfunctional.
In our view, Smith meant Book V to be a central book of WN and much more than an afterthought to his summary of the “didactic” and impartial system of natural liberty at the end of Book IV. In Book V Smith introduced public good provision problems (what are nowadays called “externalities”) and other incentive-alignment problems and argued persuasively for incentive-compatible solutions, anticipating modern theories of the firm, reputational enforcement, and public finance (Ortmann and Meardon Reference Ortmann, Meardon and Rima1995; Ortmann Reference Ortmann1999; Ortmann and Walraevens Reference Ortmann and Walraevens2018; see also West Reference West1990, chs. 5, 7, 8, and 9).Footnote 26 He also finished the book, quite rhetorically, on the most pressing political issue of his time, the fate of the British Empire. To argue that Smith’s treatment in Book V of public expenditure, revenue, and debts was primarily historical seems very much a misreading of it.
As we noticed before, in his History of Economic Analysis Schumpeter paid scant attention to Book V, as most economists generally seem to do, although he observed that “the fifth and longest [book]—taking 28.6 percent of total space—is a nearly self-contained treatise on Public Finance” (Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter, Schumpeter and Perlman1954, p. 186). While comparably gentle in his assessment of Book V,Footnote 27 and while indeed quantifying the attention that Smith dedicated to books IV and V—“The fourth and fifth Books account for nearly 57 percent of the total space” (p. 186n17), these two books clearly did not capture Schumpeter’s fancy or lead him to think about why Smith would structure the WN the way he did. For that matter, it did not lead him to ponder whether the plain common sense on display in the WN, and Smith’s leading his readers on gently, making them feel comfortable all along, was part of a deliberate rhetorical strategy meant to draw his readers in.
Smith’s early theories on rhetoric played a seminal role in structuring WN in that the most memorable part for the reader would be discovering the true harm of the mercantile system. It is not in Book IV but in Book V that Smith’s “violent attack” against the inadequacies and dangers of mercantilism ends. Not only does it slow growth, it also threatens the sovereignty of the State and the future of the British Empire. Book V thus mixes universal principles of public finance with pressing issues of public debt and political organization. As such, it gives a perfect illustration of Fleischacker’s (Reference Fleischacker2004) tract-treatise interpretation of WN and, against Schumpeter, it provides us with innovative economic and political principles on, respectively, incentive-compatible state intervention and the constitution of the British Empire.
V. CONCLUSION: WHY SCHUMPETER GOT IT WRONG AND WHY IT MATTERS TO UNDERSTAND IT
Had Smith had more confidence in his own thoughts on rhetoric, and his lectures published earlier, then perhaps his own use of rhetoric, and its connection with his moral philosophy, would have led to a different interpretation of his economics. (Dow Reference Dow2009, p. 18)
We have seen that Schumpeter, while somewhat ambivalent about Smith’s achievements, considered his (even by Schumpeter’s standard) masterwork, the WN, not on par with those of Isaac Newton and Charles Darwin and for that matter those of authors such as Turgot, Beccaria, Verri, and scores of others. A key assertion was that WN “does not contain a single analytic idea, principle, or method that was entirely new in 1776” (Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter, Schumpeter and Perlman1954, p. 179), although Schumpeter did acknowledge—seemingly contradicting his own assertion—that the equilibrium theory of chapter 7 of Book I was a piece of economic theory that anticipated Jean-Baptiste Say and Walras and was worth mentioning prominently (p. 183). Likewise, he did acknowledge that chapter 7 of Book IV of the WN on colonies was a masterpiece “not only of pleading but also of analysis” (p. 181). And according to him, the “third Book did not attract the attention it seems to merit. In its somewhat dry and uninspired wisdom, it might have made an excellent starting point of a historical sociology of economic life that was never written” (p. 181).
As also indicated by Schumpeter’s not including Smith into his list of Ten Great Economists (Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter and Perlman[1952] 1997), and notwithstanding Schumpeter’s unambiguous praise for Smith’s HA, we have shown in the introduction and section II of this manuscript that on balance Schumpeter’s assessment of both WN and its author was rather harsh, not shying away from questioning Smith’s intellectual mettle and occasionally even belittling him. Schumpeter’s dismissive assessment reverberates in the work of other writers such as Walter Bagehot and Robert HeilbronerFootnote 28 (as pointed out by Kellow Reference Kellow2011) and Salim Rashid (Reference Rashid1998), and it might have affected for a long time the perception of the profession on balance (Tribe Reference Tribe1999, p. 614; see also Weingast Reference Weingast2018), although this is not an issue that we have pursued here. Schumpeter’s harsh assessment poses interesting questions, such as what might account for the unevenness of analytic achievement alleged by Schumpeter (if that claim were indeed correct), or whether something else—as intimated by Sheila Dow in the opening quote to this section—is going on.
There is, and has been for a long time, agreement that the WN is not the most challenging of books ever written. In the decades following its publication, it was often “ridiculed for its simplicity” (Rae Reference Rae1895, p. 290; see also Kellow Reference Kellow2011). We have argued that Schumpeter’s harsh, though not entirely negative, overall assessment of both WN and its author most likely resulted from his failure to appreciate the rhetorical structure of WN and, ultimately, from his lack of knowledge of Smith’s rhetorical strategies, as expounded in Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (Smith Reference Smith1983), which were published after Schumpeter’s death. That Schumpeter seems never to have read TMS, which contains important references to, and parallels with, Smith’s principles of rhetoric, also did not help matters. We have made the case that Schumpeter missed in particular the importance, both as tract and treatise, of Book V of WN, which we consider the first work on incentive-compatible organization of firms and industries, and the need for state intervention (e.g., Ortmann Reference Ortmann1999; Ortmann and Walraevens Reference Ortmann and Walraevens2018).
It is tempting to engage in some conjectural history (of which Schumpeter had little good to say; see Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter, Schumpeter and Perlman1954, p. 106), which Smith often used to good effect, prominently in his LRBL and his piece—since edition 3 included in TMS—on the formation of languages. Had Schumpeter read the TMS carefully and had he known the LRBL, he might, for example, have had a different appreciation of this rhetorical strategy. Schumpeter might also have better understood the principal–agent issues that run like a red thread from LRBL, over key concepts of the TMS (see Meardon and Ortmann Reference Meardon and Ortmann1996a, Reference Meardon and Ortmann1996b), the efficiency wage arguments in Book I of WN (whose analytic novelty Schumpeter seems to completely have missed although he bestowed faint praise on Smith’s performance here),Footnote 29 all the way to asymmetric information issues so central to the many principal–agent situations that Smith discusses in Book V of WN.
The existence of LRBL was first reported in 1961 (Smith Reference Smith1983, p. 1), more than a decade after Schumpeter’s death in 1950, and more than a decade after Schumpeter worked on what later became History of Economic Analysis (Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter, Schumpeter and Perlman1954), not to mention Economic Doctrine and Method (Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter[1912] 1954). In short, it was Schumpeter’s bad luck that he did not have the opportunity to read LRBL. Knowing the lectures might have allowed Schumpeter to understand why Smith structured the WN the way he did, why Smith never moved above the heads of even the dullest readers, why he led them on gently, making them feel comfortable all along. More specifically, we have argued that, had he understood the rhetorical structure of WN, Schumpeter would have had a different opinion of the importance of Book V and of Smith as analytical innovator. In Book V, Smith indeed dug deep and provided a blueprint for incentive-compatible state intervention that foreshadows much of the modern industrial organization literature. In other words, Schumpeter not only overlooked TMS (as many economists did for long), he also did not know Smith’s LRBL. We think that neglecting both books, and especially the latter, prevented him from getting a proper understanding of WN and of its merits.
We thus argue that Schumpeter’s assessment of both WN and its author resulted from his failure to appreciate the rhetorical structure of Smith’s masterpiece and, ultimately, from his ignorance of Smith’s rhetorical strategies, which in certain situations called for leading readers on gently. For Schumpeter, in WN Smith did not go beyond plain common sense because he didn’t have ambitions. For us, it was Smith’s ambition to persuade an audience that he had good reason to believe was hostile to his ideas. And Smith wanted both to take part in the hot topic of his day, the fate of the British Empire, and to provide his readers with universal principles of economics, in the manner of an impartial spectator of the economy. This happy mix of philosophical and polemical parts in WN might have been a key of his success and makes it an exceptional book, as Fleischacker (2004, p. 16)—in our view, rightly —argued. In light of the “main points” of the WN that Barry Weingast (Reference Weingast2018) has recently identified, our explanation is novel although it is consistent with the arguments in Nicholas Phillipson (Reference Phillipson2010).
It is curious that Schumpeter did not ask why the author of works such as “Principles which lead and direct Philosophical Enquiries; illustrated by the History of Astronomy” (Smith Reference Smith1980) would structure and write WN the way he did, all the more so knowing that he was puzzled by the fact that Smith was the author of different works such as the HA, TMS, and WN. Footnote 30 We have argued that it may well be that Schumpeter—with Cannan—believed that ultimately the rhetorical structure of Smith’s tractate, or rhetorical strategies for that matter, did not matter, and that he did not understand the importance of linking the different parts of Smith’s (intended though never completed) system of social science.
The moral of our story goes beyond an explanation of the cause of Schumpeter’s questionable assessment of Adam Smith and WN. Nobody, we venture to say, can have an adequate idea of Smith’s intellectual mettle and analytic contributions if they do not take into account his rhetorical strategies and principles. Presenting bluntly—and against accepted wisdom—to his readers what he considered to be the true principles of political economy, that of the impartial and “didactic” system of natural liberty, would not be enough to be successful. He knew he would face old prejudices and powerful interests by presenting those principles, and their policy implications, so he had to find the best ways to persuade his audience. And for that task, he could count on his old reflections on rhetoric.
