In 2003, Japan's dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) committed to the goal of 30% female representation in management and political positions by 2020 to conform with the international norm to promote women's leadership. This nonbinding commitment received widespread media attention. In 2012, Prime Minister Shinzō Abe reemphasized this goal before the lower house election. Yet, in his first cabinet, Abe appointed only two women. Moreover, in the 2013 upper house election, the LDP fielded only 9 women out of 79 candidates, nowhere near the 30% candidate goal (Torres Reference Torres2013). In September 2014, Abe appointed five new women in his cabinet reshuffle, two of whom were forced to resign a month later due to scandals. Four women currently sit on the cabinet due to one female replacement (Flackler Reference Flackler2014). Despite Abe's attempts to increase women in his cabinet, most agree that Japan is not on target to meet the 30% benchmark (Gender Equality Bureau 2012).
Why has the country with the longest history of democracy and development in East Asia failed to adopt a legislative gender quota to address the persistent underrepresentation of women? This piece argues that quota nonadoption can be explained by a fragmented women's movement and the weakness of the Left. Unlike in South Korea, the women's movement in Japan is fragmented, and quota adoption has not been a mainstream priority. Without pressure from the women's movement, the LDP continues to marginalize women in the party. Additionally, the LDP has not faced sustained pressure from other parties to increase female representation. In fact, both the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP), the largest opposition party until the 1990s with progressive stances on women and strong ties to labor unions and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the party of the Center Left and dominant opposition party since electoral reform, have failed to implement quotas to institutionalize their initial successes of increasing female representation in 1989 and 2009. Thus far, only the DPJ has adopted some non-quota strategies to increase female representation, including modest financial support and a party-level commitment to support selected women in upper house electoral districts. Absent quotas, women in both the LDP and the DPJ have been successful only when leaders prioritized the selection of female candidates to show their commitment to change. Moreover, in contrast to South Korea, the proportional representation (PR) component in Japan's mixed electoral system has not resulted in the promotion of female politicians. Dominant parties, such as the LDP, remain the key gatekeepers to Parliament.
Theories of Quota Adoption and Nonadoption
The absence of party quotas for women candidates has contributed to the low and fluctuating number of women in the Japanese Parliament, or the Diet. While female representation in Japan has been on a marginal upward trend since electoral reform in 1994, it is still low in comparative terms and far from the United Nation's goal of 30% female representation. Since electoral reform in 1994, female representation has increased from 23 seats (4.6%) in 1996 to a peak of 54 seats (11.25%) in the lower house in 2009. In the 2012 lower house election, female representation actually declined to 38 women (7.9%).
Why has Japan failed to adopt a quota to address women's underrepresentation? Explanations for quota adoption include the role of women's movements (Beckwith and Cowell-Myers Reference Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers2012; Weldon Reference Weldon2002), political elites (Davidson-Schmich Reference Davidson-Schmich2006), political parties (Caul Reference Caul2001), and diffusion effects of international norms (Krook Reference Krook2006). Additionally, effects of electoral systems (Matland Reference Matland, Ballington and Karam2002; Norris Reference Norris2004; Rule Reference Rule1987, Reference Rule, Rule and Zimmerman1994) and contagion theory with an emphasis on the role of parties on the Left (Matland and Studlar Reference Matland and Studlar1996) are prominent explanations for the increase in the number of women more broadly (not exclusively through the adoption of quotas).
I argue that in the case of Japan, a weak women's movement and the weakness of the Left have reduced the pressure to legislate quotas to increase the number of women candidates. Opposition parties of the Left (the JSP) and the Center Left (the DPJ) have each elected a substantial number of women in one election. Despite the election of 10 women from the JSP to the upper house in 1989 and the DPJ's successful support of 40 women in 2009, neither party adopted formal rules to secure the future nomination of women, thereby failing to institutionalize the support for female candidates. Both parties did not sustain their efforts to support women's political participation. Consequently, the LDP also failed to respond with similar efforts.
The Women's Movement in Japan
The absence of a strong women's movement combined with low female representation in Japan confirms the literature that suggests this is critical for quota adoption. Legislative quotas are often a strategy used for women seeking substantive representation. Numerous studies suggest that a strong women's movement is critical for the passage of policies related to women's issues. Some argue that women's movements along with women's bureaus have more influence over policy than the number of women in Parliament (Weldon Reference Weldon2002). Others suggest that 15% female representation plus a stable left-wing parliamentary majority and a strong autonomous feminist movement present the most favorable circumstances for women friendly policies, which include policies, such as quotas, aimed at increasing the status of women in society (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers Reference Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers2012).
Unlike the South Korean case considered by Shin and Yoon in this volume, women's movements in Japan have been small, grassroots, decentralized, and thus often invisible (Shin Reference Shin and Gaunder2011, 175). This largely has been the result of two competing strands of female activism that emerged in the postwar period. One set of women's groups, including the National Housewives' Association and the Seikatsu (New Life) Club, focused on women as wives and mothers and targeted issues such as education and the environment, especially at the local level (Shin Reference Shin and Gaunder2011). As second-wave feminism reached Japan, new feminist groups emerged with a focus on ūman ribu (women's liberation), advocating for liberation in marriage, sexuality, labor, and politics (Mackie Reference Mackie2003). While the women who participated in these activities supported equality, their interests conflicted with the middle-class housewives. As a result, the women's movement in Japan has remained fragmented and weak.
Nevertheless, women's groups have had some success in influencing policy in two areas—gender equality in the workplace and domestic violence. Feminist scholars and women movement's activists have participated on government advisory councils and influenced the Equal Employment Opportunity Law (EEOL) and its subsequent revisions. Other groups, such as the Women's Shelter Movement, played an active role in hearings regarding domestic violence legislation by focusing on women's rights as human rights (Shin Reference Shin and Gaunder2011, 182). These groups overcame the general weakness of the women's movement by partnering with politicians within and outside the dominant LDP who felt pressure to respond to societal demands in these areas. Despite the 30% by 2020 rhetoric, no such grassroots pressure has emerged around the issue of female representation. A small subset of women's groups are working on this issue—most notably Q no kai, a group created with the goal of educating politicians on the importance of gender quotas and female representation. It was created by 9 women's organizations, and 30 additional organizations have a loose affiliation with it.Footnote 1 Yet, in the absence of broader societal pressure for increased female political representation, these numbers have not translated into unity, strength, or political influence on politicians unlike the critical alliance between women activists and politicians from both the Left and Right seen in South Korea.
Weakness of the Left
Japan's case illustrates the importance of a strong Left committed to women's issues for quota adoption. Scholarship on contagion theory suggests that parties are more likely to support women for office in response to other parties that have successfully done so. In general, parties of the Left are more likely to support and elect women (Norris Reference Norris1985; Rule Reference Rule1987). Matland and Studlar (Reference Matland and Studlar1996, 712) contend a large party on the Left will respond to a competitive fringe party relatively close to it ideologically that has successfully supported women by copying its approach. The larger party supports women because it has been reassured that there are no negative consequences for supporting women and because it wishes to minimize the risk of losing support from voters attracted to female candidates. It is more difficult to respond to pressure from the Left under single-member district (SMD) systems, which foster incumbency; it is easier to respond in pure party list proportional representation (PR) (1996, 713). The strength and level of resources of women's groups within the larger party will also facilitate its ability to respond to this type of contagion from the Left (1996, 729). A variation of this contagion dynamic can be seen in the Japanese case. Instead of a fringe party, however, large parties of the Left (the JSP) and Center Left (the DPJ) have failed to adopt internal party quotas and thereby significantly lessened the pressure on the LDP to increase its support of women.
The JSP and Women
Party ideology, party organization, and the electoral system impeded party quota adoption in the JSP. In the wake of an extensive money politics scandal, which implicated several high ranking LDP politicians, the JSP elected a record number of women in the 1989 upper house election by emphasizing their “clean” outsider status. The high number of female politicians was not sustained, however, because the party did not institutionalize the support of women by adopting an internal quota.
The JSP's ideological commitment to defending Article 9 and opposing the U.S.-Japan Security treaty overshadowed its support for women and undermined its efforts to adopt a party quota. Women were active within the Socialist movement even prior to the Second World War, and the party has had a stronger commitment to gender issues than LDP in the postwar period (Mackie Reference Mackie1997). Under the leadership of female party head Takako Doi in 1989, the JSP selected several middle-aged housewives to run in the upper house election. The media labeled these candidates “Madonnas” to highlight their clean, outsider status. When 10 of the 12 female candidates won office, it was dubbed the “Madonna Boom.” Interestingly, the party's commitment to supporting women actually weakened the internal debate on the need for quotas (Miura Reference Miura and Miura2014). That is, the success of the “Madonnas” in 1989 made the argument for a party quota seem less necessary.
Factionalism and ineffective organization also weakened the party's ability to expand its support of women. The factional groupings were based on personal ties and ideology, although these groupings became more fluid over time (Stockwin Reference Stockwin and Hrebenar2000, 239). The differing priorities of factions and the inability to reach a consensus on party direction inhibited the party's ability to take a strong stance on gender equality in the party through quota adoption.
Matland and Studlar would point out that Japan's multiple-member district (MMD)/single nontransferable vote (SNTV) electoral system increases the costs of switching to supporting women, as the MMD/SNTV system tends to favor incumbents. Indeed, Japan's MMD/SNTV system presented constraints on female candidacy and limited the options for positive action strategies by the JSP (Christensen Reference Christensen, Lee and Clark2000). However, the upper house does have a PR element that would lend itself to quota adoption. Yet, the JSP did not capitalize on the momentum of the 1989 “Madonna boom” to institutionalize party quotas. In the end, the JSP's ideological commitments to the peace constitution and factionalized organization prevented the party from institutionalizing the support of women.
The DPJ and Women
Similarly, the DPJ's ideology and weak party organization also precluded quota adoption even after its successful election of women in 2009 and despite an electoral system that is amendable to quotas. The DPJ emerged as the dominant opposition party in the late 1990s. While, it began as a center-left party, it has moved more to the center (Miura, Lee, and Weiner Reference Miura, Lee and Weiner2005). The DPJ supported a larger number of female candidates for the Diet than the LDP in most election cycles. In 2005, the LDP, however, ran and elected more women to the lower house due to Prime Minister Koizumi's electoral strategy, which included the support of women to indicate change. Realizing the opportunities of appealing to the median voter by tapping into the valence issue of change through female candidates, the DPJ mimicked the LDP's strategy in 2009 and was successful in having 40 of 46 DPJ female candidates elected (Scheiner Reference Scheiner2012). Of these, 26 were newcomers to the Diet. However, none of the new women won reelection in 2012. The nomination of women was driven by leadership in 2009 (Gaunder Reference Gaunder, Reed, McElwain and Shimizu2009), and the success of women candidates was a result of the DPJ's overall popularity (Reed, Scheiner, and Thies Reference Reed, Scheiner and Thies2012).
However, the DPJ's lack of clear ideology hindered the adoption of affirmative action for women. The DPJ has struggled to define itself on women's issues. For example, while in office, the DPJ either abandoned or failed to pursue issues of concern to women, such as child allowances, daycare, and dual surname legislation (Gaunder Reference Gaunder2012). While the DPJ Gender Equality Committee has submitted recommendations to the party on how to better support female candidates, the party never seriously considered quotas. Frequent shifts in party leadership undermined efforts by quota supporters within the party.Footnote 2
The DPJ also failed to capitalize on the new set of electoral rules that were favorable to quota adoption. In 1994, the lower house adopted a mixed SMD/PR system with 300 SMD seats and 180 PR seats. LDP Prime Minister Junichirō Koizumi first exploited the new rules by appointing women to the top position in 7 of the 11 PR blocs in 2005. The DPJ replicated this strategy by placing women who ran in competitive SMDs high on the PR list. While the rules lowered the barriers to female nomination, neither the DPJ nor the LDP adopted a gender quota. Instead, the new electoral rules provided parties with incentives to appeal to the median voter by supporting women to indicate “change” and “reform” (Gaunder Reference Gaunder2012). The switch to a single-member district system, which relies heavily on the popularity of party leaders, also produced more volatile elections (McElwain Reference McElwain2012). The partisan shifts resulted in the failed reelection of several new female politicians.
The DPJ has adopted a few non-quota strategies, including the “Water and Seeds” program of financial support, open recruitment, and its upper house election policy in 2007 and 2010 (Gaunder Reference Gaunder2012). The Water and Seeds program provides female candidates a modest sum of money (¥2 million) to start their campaign. The upper house policy committed the party to support at least one female candidate in all upper house districts with more than three seats.Footnote 3 Furthermore, the open recruitment program, which is available to both men and women, indirectly supports women by allowing them to apply for candidacy, thereby bypassing the bottom-up old boys' network. Overall, however, these strategies have been relatively modest, and none has significantly impacted the number of women in the party.
Implications: LDP Party Organization and Women
With neither pressure from the women's movement nor a sustained threat from the Left, the LDP has only made minimal changes in its promotion of female candidates. These changes have come in response to incentives that emerged after the adoption of the SMD/PR mixed electoral system. The LDP supports women as symbols to tap into the public's desire for change. However, the LDP's party organization does not contain any institutional mechanisms to nominate women candidates.
The LDP is a decentralized party with internal party rules and institutions that do not favor female candidacy. With the exception of Koizumi's selection of candidates in 2005, candidate selection in the LDP has been a bottom-up process. It seeks candidates with experience in the bureaucracy, local politics, or as a politician's assistant, areas less inhabited by women (Ogai Reference Ogai2001, 208). Moreover, the local party branch offices, which are dominated by old boys' networks, make the initial nominations. Under Koizumi's leadership, the LDP employed a top-down nomination strategy. In 2005 he hand-picked female candidates to run at the top of the PR lists in 7 of the 11 PR blocs. Party officials confirmed that this policy was an aberration and that the bottom-up nomination process has been reinstated since Koizumi's departure.Footnote 4 Moreover, Koizumi's motivation for selecting these women was strategic and symbolic, not policy based (Gaunder Reference Gaunder2012).
The potential positive effects of an electoral system with a PR element have not been fully realized due to the LDP's failure to implement a quota. As predicted in the gender and politics literature, the switch to a mixed SMD/PR electoral system for the lower house in 1994 positively impacted the number of female politicians in the LDP. Until 1993, when Seiko Noda was elected to the lower house, the LDP did not have any women politicians in the lower house for several decades. In 1996, the first election after electoral reform, the LDP successfully saw four women elected to the lower house, constituting 1.7% of the LDP's lower house membership. In the 2012 election, the LDP increased its number of women from 8 to 23, representing 7.8% of its membership. Female representation in the LDP hit its peak in 2005 when 26 LDP women were elected, 8.9% of the LDP's total seats. Despite these increases, the LDP has done little to institutionalize support for female candidates. Women were widely viewed as effective symbols of change and a response to take advantage of the SMD portion of the electoral system. The LDP has not created party rules to support women. Koizumi's support of women in 2005 was not connected to policy goals; it was simply a strategic response to incentives of the SMD portion of the electoral system that rewards parties for appealing to the median voter. The push of women as symbols continues in both the DPJ and the LDP; neither party, however, appears interested in implementing quotas to support women for the long term.
Conclusion
Both the JSP and the DPJ have missed opportunities to implement a gender quota to sustain support for female candidates within their parties. Nominating more women does not necessarily increase the number of seats for women. For example, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) fielded 80 female candidates in 2012, and only one woman won because the JCP does not enjoy a broad base of support. In 1989 and 2009, however, the JSP and DPJ were the largest opposition parties well positioned to influence Japanese politics. In both cases the party's interpretation of its success was not consistent, and no attempt was made to institutionalize the successful support of women through quotas. This missed opportunity allowed the LDP to maintain the status quo at the time. The LDP has supported more women since electoral reform, but it is unlikely to implement a quota without pressure from the opposition given its more conservative stance toward women.
With its failure to adopt a gender quota, Japan remains anomalous in the East Asian region. The Japanese case illustrates the importance of an active women's movement and pressure from a strong opposition. The international norm of 30% critical mass could pressure political parties to adopt quotas, but it is unlikely to receive much traction without support from domestic actors. The weakness of the women's movement decreases the likelihood that any party will be pressured into meeting this goal. For the short term, it appears that Japan will continue to treat women as symbols in elections, insuring continued volatility in the number of women elected from election to election. This circumstance prevents women from gaining seniority in the party and influencing internal party policies, such as the adoption of party quotas.
