BACKGROUND: ETHNIC FEDERALISM AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF POLITICAL POWER

After assuming power in Addis Ababa, the EPRDF quickly had to tackle contentious issues of nationalism. The capture of the state required new strategies to demonstrate that all the disparate components of the ethnically diverse country, not just the Tigrayans, would be represented. One way the EPRDF sought to address this challenge was through a far-reaching approach to ethnic federalism and by recognizing the right to self-determination for all major ethnic groups. This policy was first reflected in the Transitional Charter of 1991 and subsequently in Ethiopia's Constitution of 1995.Footnote ⁴ The TPLF was steeped in Marxist-Leninist ideology during the guerrilla struggle and this experience, along with the approach the Soviet Union adopted to address issues of ethnicity and “nations and nationalities”, is apparent. However, it is with some irony that this system was adopted just as the Soviet Union was disintegrating in the early 1990s, with its various federalist states pursuing separation.

The right to secession was entrenched in article 39 of Ethiopia's Constitution as part of a broader federalist system in which the ethnic regions would be given greater autonomy and take responsibility for economic development, education and security. From a cultural point of view, the new constitution represented relief for many groups that were now able to express their traditions openly, for example by using their own language in schools. Politically the situation was more complicated. While the constitution provided for self-determination up to succession, it made it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to do so without the support of the central government.Footnote ⁵ Despite a number of long-running campaigns and insurgencies that had been fighting (and continue to fight) for independence, including the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), among others, it was only Eritrea that was granted independence in 1992. Many Ethiopians viewed the process that led to Eritrea's separation as lacking transparency and resulting from a pre-determined arrangement that was decided at the time of the guerrilla insurgency when the TPLF fought alongside the Eritrean People's Liberation Front.

As with all attempts to generalize a particularistic view across a national polity, the EPRDF's vision has clashed with competing versions of history and imaginings of the future. The very concept of basing a state on different ethnic groups was perceived by the party's adversaries as antithetical to the nation-building project of a single, unified Ethiopia that had been promoted by previous regimes. Since the mid-1800s, successive governments sought to consolidate power through privileging the Amhara ethnic group over others and by defining Ethiopian identity through Amhara culture. This process was initiated by Emperors Tewodros II and Menelik II; the former ended a long period of competition between feudal princes and the latter annexed the regions in the south to the Abyssinian empire, creating Ethiopia as it is today.Footnote ⁶ Subsequently, during his lengthy reign, Emperor Haile Selassie further consolidated the “Amharaziation” of Ethiopia, also extending it to Eritrea, which was annexed after the defeat of the Italians in World War II.Footnote ⁷ The process of Amharaziation and creating “unity” across Ethiopia did not stop with the deposition of Haile Selassie and the end of the empire and the feudal system that had supported it. While the subsequent Soviet-backed communist Derg regime refused, in theory, to distinguish between different ethnicities, in practice Amhara domination was perceived to have continued. Amharic was chosen as the national language, the use of vernacular language in schools was prohibited and Amhara urban elites were favoured as representatives of the government across Ethiopia.

The EPRDF's approach to ethnic federalism represented a radical departure from previous policies. As it sought to implement constitutional reform in line with ethnic and federalist objectives, it also worked to consolidate the power of both the TPLF as the dominant political party and of the government to control a vast and populous country of more than 70 million people, second only to Nigeria in terms of population in sub-Saharan Africa.Footnote ⁸ On a practical level, to establish the ethnic federalist discourse at the political and social levels, and to fulfil the constitutional guarantee for ethnic groups to have “equitable representation in state and federal governments”,Footnote ⁹ the country was divided into nine regional states,Footnote ¹⁰ each intended to represent “a group of people who have, or share, a large measure of a common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related identities, a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory”.Footnote ¹¹ The states were split into woredas, units of approximately 100,000 people, governed by administrations modelled on baitos, the councils created by the TPLF in Tigray during the war. The woredas were in turn divided in kebeles, village councils representing grassroots units of government.Footnote ¹²

In theory, ethnic movements and groups were to be freely elected and have a strong role in the administration of the country. After decades of war, the TPLF was aware how divided and fragile the country was, but it did not anticipate the extent of the resistance to its political and economic vision and the difficulties in winning the country's support. Not all opposition groups were eager to join the coalition and many groups became disenchanted quickly. The OLF, for example, was a strong partner that initially joined the EPRDF's alliance, but soon felt marginalized and left the EPRDF. To ensure Oromo representation, the EPRDF created the Oromo People's Democratic Organization, which in practice simply served as an extension of the EPRDF in the region. Such organizations were created so the EPRDF could avoid real competition and create a de facto single party system, while maintaining some semblance or façade of democracy though elections and a multi-ethnic coalition.

The newly created ethnic parties have largely been dismissed as puppet organizations, while long-standing groups such as the ONLF and the OLF have retained legitimacy among their followers.Footnote ¹³ Ethnic federalism has been at odds with the vision and desire for self-determination for which these nationalist organizations have pressed, and which the Eritreans successfully obtained. The rapid expansion of the modern Ethiopian state, and the history of feudalism, forcibly and unlawfully incorporated many on Ethiopia's peripheries into the “empire”, and secession is the only means for freeing them from the “oppression” of the highland (namely the Amhara and Tigrayan) “colonisers”.Footnote ¹⁴

There has, of course, been a rational basis of governance that shaped the EPRDF's policies in seeking to implement a federal arrangement: since Tigrayans are a small minority who fought a centralized government in part in an effort to overcome Amhara domination, a state with multiple ethnically based components would help justify control by a minority and shift the emphasis away from the Amhara character and influence.Footnote ¹⁵ There are also significant contradictions in which the EPRDF became embroiled as a result of this complex negotiation. Decentralization has become an essential political tenant but the party also desperately needs to exert central control and is reliant on an ideology such as ethnic federalism to stay in power.

The first elections that were held in 1992 were intended to legitimize the political order by providing a popular mandate for the government and signalling to the population that a new era had begun. The only two genuine opposition parties that were initially willing to participate, the OLF and the All Amhara Peoples' Organization,Footnote ¹⁶ withdrew due to harassment and intimidation.Footnote ¹⁷ Subsequent elections, for the constitutional assembly in 1994 and for the regional and federal governments in 1995, were similarly uncontested. The elections primarily served as a means of providing the new leadership with a symbolic mandate, which, even if it did not emerge from genuine competition, could support their arguments for national and international legitimacy.

THE EPRDF'S LEGITIMACY PROBLEM

The EPRDF came to power with the use of arms, which provided the legitimacy of force but not the backing and support of all Ethiopians. While many were relieved that the Derg was defeated, the EPRDF was unfamiliar and untested. The EPRDF had a serious legitimacy problem, both domestically and as a member of the international community, which, at the turn of the Cold War, was increasingly dominated by democratic states. The new government sought to gain legitimacy through multiple means, including dramatically restructuring the civil service, creating new administrative structures and by adopting some of the characteristics of liberal democracies including multiparty elections and a “free” media. Elections and the media share similar roles. They allow for controlled political conflict, they ostensibly provide a space for participation and for a variety of voices to be expressed and, most importantly from the EPRDF's perspective, they help legitimize a hold on power and ambitious policies, such as those that the EPRDF was seeking to implement. In 1992 the EPRDF both moved towards multi-party elections and passed a press law that allowed for substantial and significant new freedoms for the media.

From a domestic perspective, the EPRDF was motivated by a desire to demonstrate that it was different from the Derg military government. It needed to earn the confidence of a nation that had endured decades of guerrilla war, government clampdowns and targeted assassinations.

The EPRDF also recognized that, if it wanted to press for limited democratic reforms and decentralization while retaining and consolidating control over the centre of the state, space for dissent would help legitimize it in what was envisioned as a possible single party democracy.Footnote ²⁵ Bereket Simon, the former minister of information, argued that the government wanted to show that it was “tolerant” and that press freedom would provide a forum for people to “feel free”.Footnote ²⁶

International pressure to liberalize the media was also significant. Tolerance of a free media is a highly symbolic gesture towards democracy and openness, and signals good governance and a respect for human rights. Weak governments, or fragile post-war states such as Ethiopia, have also been under pressure to demonstrate that the government is confident enough to tolerate criticism and that there are viable institutions able to foster a free media. While the underlying commitment varied among the ERPDF leadership, on the surface they espoused these values.Footnote ²⁷ In 1992, Dima Noggo Sarbo, the first minister of information for the transitional government, noted that “a country's democratic tradition, and a government's democratic credentials, are today being measured by how much the press and the media in general are free”.Footnote ²⁸ Dima appeared acutely aware that press standards are key indicators of democracy for rich countries, and provide acceptance and legitimacy.

International assistance from western countries was also forthcoming to support the development of a “democratic media”. This marked a shift from the Derg period when the Soviet Union trained journalists in the elements of a socialist media that would serve the ruling party. Organizations such as the Broadcasting Board of Governors in the United States, which runs the Voice of America, have been active in post-war media development, often promoting agendas such as the one Bruce Sherman, head of Global Strategy and Research, describes here: “[w]e try to promote the values that characterize journalism in the US, a Jeffersonian idea of what the media are and should do. So, in conflict scenarios, we try to help covering abuses, corruption and providing reliable information to those who cannot access it otherwise.”Footnote ²⁹

Another indicator of success in liberal media development is the number of publications or outlets available. In recent years, foreign governments and aid agencies have invested heavily in either establishing or supporting media outlets and programmes, often emphasizing plurality and quantity. While this approach assumes a very specific and normative view of the media, with significant amounts of international aid tied to projects such as media development, this discourse and the media interventions placed pressure on the EPRDF to move towards a liberal media system.

The ERPDF appears to have believed that liberalizing the press and allowing freedom of expression would allow for the requisite “participation”.Footnote ³⁰ At the very least they could point to it as an example and claim greater legitimacy. After opening the media space to the private sector, the degree of enthusiasm with which the media was embraced was unexpected and unprecedented in Ethiopian history. More than 200 newspapers and 87 magazines were started between 1992 and 1997, frequently founded by journalists and editors who had experience in journalism under the Derg but lost their jobs when they were replaced by individuals more sympathetic to the EPRDF.Footnote ³¹ Not surprisingly, many of these newly launched publications became deeply critical of the EPRDF's ambitious political project, and the constitution in particular.

In comparison with other countries that were similarly emerging from violent conflict at the time the Cold War was ending, Ethiopia's media were relatively open during the constitution-making process and throughout much of the 1990s. President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda also liberalized the press after a long guerrilla struggle, but he approached the private newspapers with a significantly different strategy, engaging in a systematic effort to co-opt or defeat the arguments critics were putting forward in the media. While other countries attempted a more gradual liberalization process, or continued to restrict the press altogether, Ethiopia's print media seemed comparatively untethered, although arrests of journalists and government harassment continued. As discussed in the next section, the EPRDF did not anticipate the response it received after liberalizing the press and it made little effort to engage with these new fora for elite and opposition arguments.

A SPACE FOR ELITE NEGOTIATION

The press quickly became a central forum for the elite to express their significant reservations about the constitution and it provided space for opposition parties to project alternative visions of Ethiopia.Footnote ³² In theory, a liberalized media is supposed to allow opponent voices to express grievances and could provide a forum for negotiation and debate. However, the Ethiopian press did not come to function in that way. One reason was that the press was polarized from the outset. The EPRDF's approach to replacing journalists at the Ministry of Information and in government agencies seemed to affirm the suspicions of some that the EPRDF was pursuing ethnic politics that favoured certain groups over others. In other words, what for decades had been characterized as Amhara domination was simply being replaced by a preference for Tigrayans and other aligned minority groups. The EPRDF also failed to engage the substantive arguments and respond to critics who were using the press as the primary platform for criticizing the ERPDF's core beliefs and political ideology.

The refusal to engage with the arguments, or the journalists and publications that were putting them forward, characterized much of the ERPDF's approach to the constitution-making process. Opposition groups repeatedly called on the government for more inclusive dialogues that also had an element of reconciliation, only to be ignored. One such initiative was the Conference on Peace and Reconciliation. The government responded by arguing that the individuals were “anti-peace” and there was no need for a “peace” conference in a country that was already at peace. As the editorial in the private and popular newspaper Waqt noted: “the head of the conference's host country, and the main participant at that, is behaving like the head of a household who doesn't wish to be disturbed at mealtimes”.Footnote ³³

The conference proceeded as planned, with significant domestic and international participation. It reached a number of recommendations and conclusions and established the Council of Alternative Forces for Peace and Democracy in Ethiopia, which was the first opposition coalition. In addition to critiques that the EPRDF was weakening the unity and integrity of the country, and calls for a new transitional government to engage in dialogues on the process of reconciliation and constitution-making, conference delegates ominously argued they were:

The government was not willing to recognize the conference or its recommendations and dismissed it as a demand by a limited number of intellectuals.Footnote ³⁵

The government's approach to potential input from critics on the constitutional dialogue, and its response to calls for reconciliation in the press or demands for additional conferences, reflect the EPRDF's view of the “elites” as remnants of the previous regimes, discredited ideologues from the student movement. After a long struggle, the EPRDF felt little need to justify its policies and certainly not to those who had opposed it in Addis Ababa. The government only engaged in reconciliation to the extent it deemed necessary and on its own terms. In a 1991 interview, Prime Minister Meles stated his views in these terms: “[w]e believe in a democratic and peaceful transition. But the WPE [Workers Party of Ethiopia]Footnote ³⁶ rejected peace until the last minute and suffered a defeat in the end. I don't think there is any reason why we should extend an invitation to a party, which, after fighting against peace and democracy … to come out of the grave and make an attempt to participate in restoring peace and democracy.”Footnote ³⁷

The EPRDF appeared to assume that those who opposed them would dissipate and the majority of critics would eventually come to support the EPRDF's nation and state-building vision. The unwillingness to tolerate dissent and debate among intellectuals and those in Addis Ababa also stemmed from a belief that this was not their constituency in any case, so there was little need to expend political capital either repressing or engaging them. Ahmed Hassan, an MP and chair of the Information and Cultural Affairs Standing Committee, dismissed the need to engage with these opposing voices because “there is no middle ground in Ethiopia” and “the culture of dialogue is not there”.Footnote ³⁸ The EPRDF and Meles, who were on the receiving end of many of the attacks, made a clear decision to “just ignore” the adversarial media.Footnote ³⁹

Tolerating criticism within the media was further rationalized as part of the political project. It both legitimized the ruling party and supported the EPRDF's aspirations to have a ruling coalition that could operate within the framework of single party rule. As Meles noted, Scandinavian countries and others, including Japan, have had long-lasting dominant parties:

Consolidating single party rule with the TPLF as the core of the EPRDF has been part of the EPRDF's democratic vision. Meles argued that “there is every reason to suggest that if a developmental state were to also be democratic the ‘hegemonic’ nature of its development project would be achieved faster and held more deeply because it would emerge from free debate and dialogue”.Footnote ⁴¹ However, it is also clear through his arguments on defining “fundamental policies” that debates were to centre around issues of development, not the constitution or issues of secession, federalism or land that had the potential significantly to derail the EPRDF's political project.Footnote ⁴² The EPRDF primarily focused on mobilizing and gaining legitimacy through the peasantry, a tactic that increasingly became a priority as the government gradually realized that the urban elite would be difficult to win over.

A POLICY OF AGGRESSIVE IMPLEMENTATION

Since the EPRDF's attempts to gain legitimacy through adopting a liberal approach to the press have been problematic, and negotiation with opposition voices has been absent or unsuccessful, the EPRDF has pursued a policy of aggressive implementation of the constitution and ethnic federalism. Information communication technology (ICT) has had a role in this process but implementation itself has also been a powerful communicator, expressing the new national project, particularly targeted at the “masses” or “peasantry”. This approach has also reflected the TPLF's needs to consolidate power and the EPRDF's attempts to bring the “peripheries” fully under control of the “centre” of the state. With more than 70 million people, almost all rural and living in highly varied and mountainous terrain, state and nation-building has been a challenge.

The approach taken by the EPRDF towards the peasantry can be understood through the prism of its political ideology of “revolutionary democracy”, which emphasizes the role of the central party to set policies and agendas. The masses may be “consulted”, and are free to express their views, but the centre is not necessarily obliged to change policy or address their comments and concerns. Revolutionary democracy both refuses the focus on the individual that characterizes liberal democracy, preferring to stress group rights and consensus, and similarly favours a populist discourse, claiming a direct connection between the leadership and the masses, reducing the need to negotiate with other elites. This conceptualization had concrete repercussions for how priorities were set and resources allocated. As described in the previous section on negotiation, very little was invested to increase and improve the channels to communicate with dissenting voices, but substantial efforts were made to consolidate and reinforce relationships with those who were perceived to be the base of political power.

If the EPRDF ignored the elite in drafting the constitution, engaging and communicating with the peasantry in realizing the implementation was a key political strategy. Bereket Simon, the former minister of information, described the contrasting approaches:

As is typical of populist discourses, the culture of “doing” pursued by the EPRDF was opposed to a culture of just “talking”, of which the opposition and elites have been accused.

This strategy of prioritizing engagement and communication with the masses was developed in the bush in the 1970s and 1980s for convincing the population to join the struggle. The approach emphasized economic development rather than political ideology. Local organizations were established to focus on disseminating best practices; experts in agriculture, education or medicine would explain how villages could improve standards in these areas. The dissemination of ideology was one component, but priority was given to the delivery of clear, tangible and concrete benefits and reforms. This approach was seen as a central tool for communicating and convincing the peasantry that they had more to gain by joining the struggle than not.

The experience of engaging and mobilizing Ethiopians during the struggle contributes to an understanding of why the EPRDF chose to communicate the constitution-making process through “doing” or implementation, rather than explaining the new and different vision of Ethiopia that it was seeking to advance. When the EPRDF did try to use media or technology for communication, it often had the political project of ethnic federalism at its core. Examples of this are Woredanet and Schoolnet, two systems set up in Ethiopia between 2002 and 2004.Footnote ⁴⁴ WoredanetFootnote ⁴⁵ is a large-scale project which, on one level, links the prime minister's office (the servers are even physically located) with the regional governments through plasma television and conferencing facilities. It is indicative of the larger process of state reform aimed at implementing ethnic federalism and increasing the government's presence in the peripheries of the country. This is one of the most ambitious ICT projects on the continent and has parallels with the Chinese efforts to establish a closed, national and sovereign internet.Footnote ⁴⁶

Closely related to the approach taken by Woredanet was the Schoolnet project, where every secondary school had plasma television screens, similar to those used for Woredanet, installed in classrooms to disseminate standardized lessons. While this had the laudable goal of providing equal access and standards of education across the country and to all ethnic groups, correcting the historical negligence of some communities, it also had the consequence of limiting the active role of teachers, who have been some of the more politicized members of their communities. Schoolnet has been highly controversial and the results and impact on the quality of teaching to which students have access have been mixed.Footnote ⁴⁷

Projects like Woredanet and Schoolnet represent an evolution of the efforts to increase the government's ability to communicate with, and receive information from, the peripheries of the state while preventing other actors from doing so. Woredanet was designed to offer a privileged channel for key figures in the government to be in contact with local administrators, in ways that could reassert the power of the centre over the decentralized nodes of the state.

Woredanet, but also Schoolnet, have essentially functioned as intranets, offering communication channels for the government that are partially invisible to a large component of Ethiopian society. Woredanet has allowed exclusive and routine communication between nodes of the state, while Schoolnet has ensured that new generations are exposed to messages decided at the centre, without the mediation of possibly critical teachers, allowing the EPRDF to reach wider constituencies discretely. The use of these new channels has provided the government with a strong competitive advantage over opposition forces and has limited opportunities for the populace to engage with them.