In this highly detailed new work, Joseph Nevo analyzes Jordanian diplomacy during the transitional years between the Six Day War and the outbreak of the first intifada. Nevo sets an ambitious goal: he attempts to uncover a connection between King Hussein's public rhetoric and his private approach to negotiations with Israel. He argues that with regard to Jordanian policymakers, “the frequency with which certain arguments were asserted publicly is also an essential indicator of political intentions” (p. 2). If demonstrably true, this thesis would prove utilitarian to politicians, diplomats, and academics, who often find the public declarations of Middle Eastern leaders exaggerated at best and deceptive at worst. Public statements are commonly perceived to be the “will-'o-the-wisps” of Middle East negotiations: distracting and enchanting while they steadily lead unsuspecting victims in the wrong direction.
To prove his thesis, Nevo offers a detailed and comprehensive analysis of Jordanian–Israeli diplomacy, with particular focus on the territorial issues of the West Bank and the status of the Palestinian refugees. The book is divided into three distinct parts: a general political narrative, a discussion of Jordanian territorial and conceptual demands, and Jordan's options for a peaceful settlement with Israel. It is unfortunate that this highly analytical format is somewhat disjointed and distracting. Although I sympathize with the temptation to untangle the snarled narrative of Middle East politics, Nevo's method isolates related issues into categories, making it nearly impossible for the reader to comprehend events in their full context.
Nevo's work is strongest in the area of rhetorical analysis and deconstructing the language of Jordanian leaders. In particular, he argues convincingly that “the selection of different adjectives by Jordanian spokespersons to define the territories from which Israel should withdraw (Jordanian, Palestinian, Arab) reflected Jordan's view of the question of the ownership of these lands” (pp. 71–72). For example, King Hussein often demanded that Israel respect “Palestinian rights” in the West Bank while calling for “Arab rights” in Jerusalem. Nevo's emphasis on the connection between rhetoric and policy seems to work best when applied to inter-Arab relations as opposed to negotiations with Israel. Specifically, the author's examination of the complex, problematic relationship among Hussein, the PLO, and the large Palestinian population in Jordan is thorough and noteworthy. Nevo demonstrates convincingly that Hussein's transforming attitude toward the West Bank was intrinsically linked to his precarious relationship with the Palestinian population and PLO rather than his dialogue with Israel.
The book suffers from a number of problems, the most notable of which is the failure to utilize significant, newly available sources that would add dimension to the narrative. Nevo relies primarily on Israeli documents, neglecting to mine numerous declassified documents in United States archives, an omission that seems particularly jarring when the author attempts to discuss the American role in Jordanian–Israeli negotiations. The inclusion of additional sources would provide a fuller, more nuanced picture of events. For instance, Nevo either neglects or is unaware of the fact that King Hussein threatened to abandon the West Bank prior to the Six Day War. Given the limited scope of Nevo's book, it seems he would want to include this information and how it may have influenced Hussein's policies following the actual loss of that territory. The Israeli political sphere also appears to be somewhat one-dimensional in Nevo's work, which is surprising given the author's ready access to Israeli archives.
In addition, Nevo often reverts to an overly simplistic, monolithic depiction of relations between Israel and proximal Arab states. Failing to discuss the significant differences in approach that distinguished Jordanian policy from that of its Arab neighbors, Nevo characterizes Hussein's pre-war policy as “the traditional pre-1967 attitude towards the Arab–Israeli conflict” (p. 36). Thus, by failing to acknowledge Jordan's unique relationship with Israel prior to the war, Nevo does not contextualize Hussein's actions following the conflict. Other errors and omissions in the pre-1967 narrative—such as referring to Hussein's image in 1958 as that of “an ardent Arab nationalist” (p. 19) and ignoring secret Israeli–Jordanian contact via the Israel–Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission—detract from the authority of this work.
Although the author's thesis is intriguing and unique—that “Hussein's views, presented to the Israelis in private, were very similar, if not almost identical, in principle, from his public statements” (p. 3)—he consistently fails to support this thesis with evidence. The reader is expected to trust the author's conclusions without specific quotations or references that compare private assertions to those made in public. At times the author completely ignores the difference between the two, asserting that “Jordan's declared views regarding Israel and the Arab–Israeli conflict were not basically different from those of the Arab consensus,” yet “the loss of the West Bank and the sense of an urgent need to retrieve it, brought about a change in King Hussein's political and ideological thinking” (emphasis mine) (p. 166).
Despite these criticisms, Nevo's book gives significant and much needed attention to Jordan's unique relationship with both Palestinians and Israelis during the post-1967 period. As the author states, “King Hussein also contributed to the de-demonization of Israel in the Arab world and also, to a certain degree, to the ‘normalization’ of the conflict” (p. 169). In an era when obstacles to a peaceful settlement of Middle East issues appear to be proliferating and when “normalization” seems to be a nearly unachievable goal, we look for guidance in the incremental successes of the past.
