Introduction
The fundamental aim in this article is to consider whether the Theistic Compatibilist's typical understanding of explanation concerning why an agent chose, say, X over not X is consistent with the affirmation that God is free, particularly with his freedom to create or not to create. The crux of the problem is this: the Theistic Compatibilist's typical assertion that an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice demands a full explanation seems to entail that God was not free not to create. However, if this is the case, then God must of necessity create and is thus less free than in a metaphysic where the demand for a full explanation is much less of a concern.
I will first define the terms which are essential to the conversation, namely, divine freedom, contingency, and Theistic Compatibilism. Then, after highlighting the general structure of the objection, I will consider how some contemporary Theistic Compatibilists typically account for an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice. After arguing that this account fails to be in harmony with God's freedom, I will consider various responses open to Theistic Compatibilists concerning this objection. I will close with discussion of a possible way for Theistic Compatibilists to avoid this objection.
The general argument: the incompatibility between theistic compatibilism and divine freedom
Divine freedom and contingency
While the nature and attributes of God are some of the most contentious topics in contemporary philosophy of religion, there is widespread agreement that God is a metaphysically independent, perfect being. Because of this, there is nothing metaphysically external to God which could function as a possible explanation for his choice to create.Footnote 1 As Psalm 135:6 says: ‘Whatever the Lord pleases, he does, in heaven and on earth, in the seas and all deeps’.
These characteristics underscore what is often called the ‘sourcehood condition’ for God to be free.Footnote 2 Given this condition, God creates freely if nothing outside himself functions as the ultimate explanation of his choice. It is a necessary condition of God's freedom, in other words, so long as he is the ultimate source of his choice to create. The Puritan theologian Stephen Charnock puts it this way:
God was free in his first purpose; and purposing this or that by an infallible and unerring wisdom, it would be a weakness to change the purpose. But, indeed, the liberty of God's will doth not seem so much to consist in an indifferency to this or that, as an independency on anything without himself: his will was free, because it did not depend upon the objects about which his will was conversant. (Charnock (Reference Charnock1996), I, 328, emphasis added)Footnote 3
Accordingly, there is a link between understanding God as a metaphysically independent, perfect being and God as the ultimate source of his choices. That is, since God is an independent perfect being, God is not constrained, coerced, determined, or even influenced by anything outside himself.Footnote 4
However, while many would agree that the sourcehood condition is a necessary constituent of God's freedom, they also maintain that such a condition is not sufficient. God, it is said, must also be able to choose otherwise if he is to be free. For example, God has the freedom to create this particular world only if he could have created a different world instead or even refrained from creating at all. These characteristics underscore what is often called the ‘alternative possibilities condition’ in order for God to be free.Footnote 5 Consider the contemporary philosophical theologian (and Theistic Compatibilist), John Frame:
[T]he whole world is, we say, a free creation of God, not one in which he was constrained, even by his own nature. The same may be said of providence and especially redemption, for the very idea of grace seems to imply that God might have chosen to do otherwise. God's nature, it seems, does not force him to create or to redeem. For if he must create or redeem, even if the necessity comes from his own nature, it would seem that he owes something to the creation, that the creation has a claim on him. (Frame (Reference Frame2002), 232, emphasis added)
Consequently, for Frame, the alternative possibilities condition is employed in order to preclude the thought of God necessarily creating. God is, therefore, equally as free not to create as he is/was free to create.Footnote 6 Of course, the ‘might have chosen otherwise’ here is not merely to be understood in a subjunctive or conditional sense, where God might have chosen otherwise if some condition C had been fulfilled. Rather, since nothing in God's nature prevents him from choosing otherwise, then surely choosing otherwise is just as free as what was actually chosen. As Frame further states, ‘I know of nothing in God's nature that prevented him from not creating or not redeeming … there is nothing in God's nature that required him to create and redeem’ (ibid., 235).
Divine freedom, thus expressed, requires that God's choice to create be contingent, where ‘contingent’ here is to be understood in the metaphysical sense, not merely in the logical sense. And because of the metaphysical contingency of the existence of creation, the central question at hand is as follows: if nothing prevented God from not creating, and nothing in God's nature necessitates him to create, then why did God choose to create rather than not create? What sort of explanation can be given for his choice in order to avoid sheer arbitrariness? My argument is that there is an incompatibility between God's freedom outlined above and the typical Theistic Compatibilist account of an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice to which I have drawn attention. Affirming the latter seems to require the denial of, or perhaps a modification of, the former. The reasoning for such a conclusion is as follows: if an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice is one that must be fully explained, then it seems that God was not free not to create. It stands to reason, then, that if a Theistic Compatibilist's conception of divine freedom requires that God be able to choose otherwise, then the typical Theistic Compatibilist understanding of an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice is called into question.
Before I develop this incompatibility, however, I need to make it clear what I am not arguing. First, there is no incompatibility between God's freedom and Theistic Compatibilism per se. One can affirm the essentials of Theistic Compatibilism (whatever they may be) and consistently hold to the alternative possibilities condition with respect to God's freedom. (This point will further come to light in the final section, ‘A way forward’.) Therefore, my argument should not be understood as a refutation of Theistic Compatibilism but rather of one variety of it. Second, there is no incompatibility between what God's freedom is like and the nature of human freedom. One can consistently hold to different or similar views with respect to divine and human freedom. The incompatibility, rather, arises between God's freedom and a particular argument against a certain type of freedom, that is, the freedom to choose otherwise. Finally, I do not claim that there is incompatibility between a Theistic Compatibilist account of an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice and the sourcehood condition of divine freedom. Again, the incompatibility arises between God's freedom and the Theistic Compatibilist understanding that the alternative possibilities condition leads to an unintelligible, arbitrary free choice.
Let me summarize the argument in the form of modus tollens, thus having a more succinct goal in mind.
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(1) If an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice must be fully explained, then it is not the case that God is free to categorically choose otherwise.
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(2) God is free to categorically choose otherwise.
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(3) Therefore, it is not the case that an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice must be fully explained.
Because (2), that is, the assertion of God's freedom to categorically choose otherwise, will be supposed throughout the rest of this article, I will not only focus my attention toward exploring the truth of premise (1) but also its consequences for Theistic Compatibilism.
Theistic Compatibilism
Before plunging into the argument, however, I must pause to acknowledge that I have been speaking quite loosely up to this point of Theistic Compatibilism. Theistic Compatibilism is unsurprisingly the conjunct of Theism and Compatibilism, where the latter asserts that human freedom and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism. The theism aspect, on the other hand, highlights a certain variation of theism where the focus is on the exhaustive, meticulous sovereignty of God above all else. On this account of sovereignty, God plans, decrees, ordains, or determines all things to come to pass from the least of things to the greatest. Theistic Compatibilists frequently align themselves with the Westminster Confession of Faith as it says, ‘God from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely, and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass’ (Westminster Confession, ‘Of God's eternal decree’). So we might say, then, that Theistic Compatibilism holds that human freedom and moral responsibility are compatible with God's exhaustive and meticulous determinism, that is, God is the ultimate determiner of human choices but that human beings are nonetheless free and morally responsible for those choices.
However, it will be important for our discussion briefly to differentiate Theistic Compatibilism from another form of compatibilism which I will call ‘Motive Compatibilism’.Footnote 7 Motive Compatibilism is the view that human free choices are the necessary by-product of what the human intellect judges to be most desirable or is most inclined to choose. I take my cue from Jonathan Edwards in Freedom of the Will, as he says, ‘With respect to that grand inquiry, What determines the will? … It is sufficient to my present purpose to say, It is that motive which, as it stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest, that determines the will’ (Edwards (Reference Edwards and Ramsey1957), 141). Further, by ‘strongest motive’ Edwards means ‘that which appears most inviting … the greatest degree of previous tendency to excite and induce the choice’ (ibid., 142). Or, as he later puts it, ‘the will always is as the greatest apparent good is’ (ibid.). Therefore, on Motive Compatibilism, it is an agent's highest desire or strongest inclination which determines the choice, and thus precludes the agent from being able to choose otherwise.Footnote 8 In short, an agent is simply free to choose what he or she most wants to choose.
Now the reason for this important distinction between Theistic Compatibilism and Motive Compatibilism is because, as we will shortly see, it is typical of Theistic Compatibilists to affirm also Motive Compatibilism. Parsing this out in Thomistic fashion, we might say, then, that compatibilism functions at the primary level of causation (where God is the cause of human choices) and compatibilism functions at the secondary level of causation (where a human's strongest desire is the cause of human choices). So, regardless of whether or not the emphasis is put on the primary or secondary level of causation, an agent could not have chosen otherwise – human freedom and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism on both levels. We can see how the Thomistic distinction between primary and secondary causation functions in the work of Frame, as he states the following:
In a well-wrought story, there is a causal nexus within the world that the author creates. Events can be explained, not only by the author's intention, but also by the structure of ‘secondary causes’ within the world of the story … In Shakespeare's play Macbeth, Macbeth kills King Duncan for his own reasons, using resources that are available to him. Duncan's death can be described entirely by the causes and effects within the world of the play. But the author, Shakespeare, is the ultimate cause of everything. Furthermore, although Duncan's death can be explained by causes within the drama, the author is not just the ‘primary cause’ who sets in motion a chain of causes and effects that unfold without his further involvement. Rather, he writes every detail of the narrative and dialogue; as author, he is involved in everything that happens. So there are two complete causal chains. Every event in Macbeth has two causes, two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions: the causes within the play itself, and the intentions of Shakespeare. (Frame (Reference Frame2002), 156–157)Footnote 9
Theistic Compatibilist Bruce Ware speaks similarly when elaborating on God's asymmetrical relation to good and evil. With respect to God causing good in the world, he says the following:
Perhaps we should speak, then, of God's relation to goodness as being through a kind of direct and immediate divine agency in which there is a necessary correspondence between the character and agency of God and the goodness that is produced in the world. We might call this kind of divine agency ‘direct-causative’ divine action, since it is strictly impossible for any goodness to come to expression apart from God's direct causation and as the outgrowth of his own infinitely good nature. Goodness, then, is controlled by God as he controls the very manifestation and expression of his own nature, causing all the various expressions of goodness to be brought into our world, whether goodness in nature or goodness revealed through human (secondary) agency. (Ware (Reference Ware2004a), 103, emphasis in original)Footnote 10
According to Frame and Ware, the primary/secondary distinction allows the Theistic Compatibilist to affirm determinism at both the primary level (where God is the cause of human choices) and at the secondary level (where human reasons, motives, or desires are the cause of human choices). The motivation is clear: affirming compatibilism at both the primary and secondary level preserves the exhaustive and meticulous sovereignty of God – God determines all things. To be clear, then, according to Theistic Compatibilists (such as Frame and Ware), human free choices are similarly necessitated in terms of primary causation and in terms of secondary causation.Footnote 11
Considering the implications of my argument as it affects Theistic Compatibilism, however, cannot be undertaken given the mere affirmation of God's exhaustive and meticulous determinism. There needs to be, in other words, a more concrete target. Therefore, I will investigate the writings of some contemporary Theistic Compatibilist theologians, John Frame and Bruce Ware, on what according to them it means for an agent to exercise an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice in light of their commitment to the exhaustive and meticulous determinism of God.
Theistic compatibilists on the intelligibility of a free choice
While articulating their account of an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice, Theistic Compatibilists typically propound what is called the intelligibility problem, arguing that undetermined choices, that is, choices that could have been otherwise in a categorical sense, inevitably reduce to random, irrational, arbitrary, nonsensical, chance events; that is, they are unintelligible.Footnote 12 The problem which Theistic Compatibilists seem to be addressing can be summarized as follows: if the alternative possibilities condition is a necessary condition for freedom, then there does not seem to be an adequate explanation of any sort for why one choice was made over another, and thus any choice which categorically could have been otherwise results in sheer randomness. What exactly is the Theistic Compatibilist's solution for avoiding the intelligibility problem? In response, the Theistic Compatibilists seem to focus on two metaphysical claims which begin to formulate their understanding of an intelligible free choice: (1) an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice must have a choice-specific explanation, and (2) an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice must be chosen upon one's highest desire. Let us now look at these two metaphysical claims.
Metaphysical claim 1 (MC1): An intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice must have a choice-specific explanation
First, such Theistic Compatibilists argue that an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice is one that must have a choice-specific reason, or set of reasons, for why the choice was made over another. That is, the explanation why one particular choice was made could not possibly be the same explanation as that of a contrary choice. There is a one-to-one correspondence, in other words, between the explanation and the choice that was made. Consider Ware, as he appeals to the intelligibility problem in arguing against the coherence of the alternative possibilities condition:
[I]f at the moment that an agent chooses A, with all things being just what they are when the choice is made, he could have chosen B, or not-A, then it follows that any reason or set of reasons for why the agent chooses A would be the identical reason or set of reasons for why instead the agent might have chosen B, or not-A. That is, since at the moment of choice, all factors contributing to why a choice is made are present and true regardless of which choice is made (i.e., recall that the agent has the power of contrary choice), this means that the factors that lead to one choice being made must, by necessity, also be able to lead just as well to the opposite choice. But the effect of this is to say that there can be no choice-specific reason or set of reasons for why the agent chose A instead of B, or not-A. It rather is the case … that every reason or set of reasons must be equally explanatory for why the agent might choose A, or B, or not-A. As a result, our choosing reduces, strictly speaking, to arbitrariness. We can give no reason or set of reasons for why we make the choices we make that wouldn't be the identical reason or set of reasons we would invoke had we made the opposite choice! Hence, our choosing A over its opposite is arbitrary. (Ware (Reference Ware2004a), 85–86, emphases in original)Footnote 13
In summary, the first step in the Theistic Compatibilist's argument is to assert that an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice must be one that consists of a choice-specific explanation. There is a dependence relation between the choice and the explanation, where the choice is dependent upon a specific or particular explanation. To think that the same explanation could be given for two possible choices is simply to succumb to the intelligibility problem. So, to reiterate, a choice-specific explanation is a necessary condition for an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice.
Metaphysical claim 2 (MC2): An intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice must be chosen upon one's highest desire
The second line of argument in accounting for an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice is to claim that an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice is one that is chosen based upon one's highest desire. Agents, accordingly, always choose what they most want to choose. Theistic Compatibilists, when explaining why one choice was made over another, frequently echo the sentiments of Jonathan Edwards and speak of one's ‘strongest desires’ and ‘character traits’.Footnote 14 Here we have a straightforward appeal to what I earlier called Motive Compatibilism. As Frame says:
We act and speak, then, according to our character. We follow the deepest desires of our heart … In everyday life, we regularly think of freedom as doing what we want to do. When we don't do what we want, we are either acting irrationality or being forced to act against our will by someone or something outside ourselves. This kind of freedom is sometimes called compatibilism, because it is compatible with determinism. (Frame (Reference Frame2002), 136)
And again, Ware adds:
We are free when we choose and act and behave in accordance with our strongest desires, since those desires are the expressions of our hearts and characters. In a word, we are free when we choose to do what we want. But it stands to reason that if we choose to do what we want, then at the moment of that choice, we are not ‘free’ to do otherwise. That is, if I want an apple, not an orange, and if my freedom consists in choosing to do what I want, then I'm free to choose the apple but I'm not free to choose the orange. Freedom, then, is not freedom of contrary of choice but freedom to choose and act in accordance with what I most want. (Ware (Reference Ware2004a), 79–80)
Therefore, an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice is one that is chosen based upon one's highest desire, and such a desire rules out any possibility to choose otherwise. An agent's freedom is simply the freedom to choose whatever he or she most wants to have, to do, possess, or achieve. The possibility that one could have chosen otherwise is not a necessary condition in order for one to be considered free. Accordingly, choosing upon one's highest desire is a necessary condition to account for an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice.
Now before considering the problematic implications of MC1 and MC2, there seems to be an oddity at work in how these Theistic Compatibilists explain the compatibility between God's exhaustive, meticulous determinism and human freedom. Notice, above, how both Frame and Ware appeal to a human's highest desire when accounting for compatibility between determinism and human freedom. That is, they appeal to Motive Compatibilism. Apparently, the highest desire is what necessitates the human choice, and thus the agent could not have chosen otherwise. But how does an appeal to Motive Compatibilism, that is, a human's highest desire, even begin to clarify how human freedom is compatible with God's exhaustive and meticulous determinism? There seems to be a shift of emphasis by Frame and Ware in respect of what does the necessitating from God to human desires, that is, from the primary to the secondary cause. It seems reasonable to think, for example, that a non-theist could also appeal to Motive Compatibilism in order to account for compatibility between, say, (physical) determinism and human freedom. If such a non-theist could do so, then the appeal to Motive Compatibilism by Frame and Ware to account for the compatibility between God determining all things and human choices loses credibility. So, in light of God's exhaustive and meticulous determinism, it seems odd to explain the compatibility between determinism and human freedom by appealing to a human's highest desire since such an appeal puts all the weight on (or perhaps collapses into) secondary causation.Footnote 15
Nevertheless, despite this oddity it is clear that what these Theistic Compatibilists deny with respect to human choice, they seem to require of God if he is to be free. But how could this hold given their understanding of an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice? Can one consistently employ the intelligibility problem with respect to human free choices and at the same time assert the alternative possibilities condition with respect to God's freedom? It will be the burden of the next section to consider these questions.
Does the Theistic Compatibilist's account of an intelligible free choice undermine divine freedom?
As we have seen, it is without question that Theistic Compatibilists such as Frame and Ware frequently propound the intelligibility problem in order to account for their understanding of the compatibility between human freedom and God's exhaustive, meticulous determinism. However, does this position successfully hold together divine freedom and their understanding of an intelligible non-arbitrary free choice? I will now argue that it does not. The problem with the Theistic Compatibilist's defence of an intelligible non-arbitrary free choice can be seen by considering two problematic implications which undermine God's freedom.
Problematic implication 1
The first problematic implication of the Theistic Compatibilist's reasoning can be recognized by more closely examining the nature of explanation. Just what sort of explanation does the Theistic Compatibilist have in mind when speaking of a choice-specific explanation? It is typical within the metaphysics of explanation to distinguish between what is called a ‘full explanation’ and a ‘partial explanation’, or similarly between a ‘complete explanation’ and an ‘incomplete explanation’. Richard Swinburne puts the distinction this way:
[I]f there is a full cause C of [event] E and a reason R that guarantees C's efficacy, there will be what I shall call a full explanation of E. For, given R and C, there will be nothing unexplained about the occurrence of E. In this case, the ‘what’ and ‘why’ together will deductively entail the occurrence of E. But, if there is no full cause of E … or no reason that ensured that the cause would have the effect that it did, there will be at most what I shall call a partial explanation. (Swinburne (Reference Swinburne2004), 137, emphasis in original)Footnote 16
Given this distinction, I think it is safe to say that what the Theistic Compatibilist has in mind with respect to an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice is a full explanation, since a choice-specific explanation ‘can and does account fully for why we make the choices we make’ (Ware (Reference Ware2004a), 87, emphasis added). There is simply nothing whatever left unexplained. Therefore, to apply Swinburne's reasoning, we might say that the agent (i.e. the ‘what’) in conjunction with the highest desire (i.e. the ‘why’) deductively entail the occurrence of some particular event, that is, the choice. To think otherwise would inevitably reduce a choice to an unintelligible, arbitrary decision.
This is not to confuse an epistemic issue with a metaphysical issue. The Theistic Compatibilist is making a metaphysical claim about what an intelligible free choice amounts to, namely, that there needs to be a full explanation in order for it to be non-arbitrary. Nevertheless, this metaphysical assertion is perfectly consistent with the claim that we do not know the explanation in its entirety – that is, all the conditions at hand which entail the choice. With that caveat in mind, the first implication for the Theistic Compatibilist is that a full explanation is a necessary condition for an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice.
Problematic implication 2
The second problematic implication of the Theistic Compatibilist's argument is associated with the claim that an agent chooses according to his or her highest desire. In virtue of one's highest desire, ‘we always do what we most want to do, and hence there always is an explanation (i.e. a choice-specific explanation) for the particular choices’ (Ware (Reference Ware2004a), 87). We might say, then, that the highest desire here functions as the full explanation. That is, when one chooses what he or she most wants to choose, there not only is an explanation, there is a full explanation – one that fully accounts for why one choice was made over the other. The highest desire, in other words, entails the particular choice.Footnote 17
However, if one's highest desire functions as the full explanation, then there is no possible way in which one could have chosen otherwise, given that particular highest desire. The highest desire fully explains why one choice was made over another, and thus why, when one chooses, one must choose. Therefore, a full explanation on this understanding necessitates the choice. As Swinburne further says, ‘An explanation of E by F is a full one if F includes both a cause, C, and a reason, R, which together necessitated the occurrence of E’ (Swinburne (Reference Swinburne2004), 76, emphasis added). Therefore, the second problematic implication is that a necessitated choice is a necessary condition for an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice.
Here is a summary of the argument so far. The burden of the Theistic Compatibilist is to try to harmonize his account of an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice with:
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(i) Divine freedom and the contingency of creation.
The implications of his account are as follows:
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(ii) An intelligible free choice has a full explanation.
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(iii) A choice that has a full explanation is a necessitated choice.
The Theistic Compatibilist's ability to hold together divine freedom and his account of an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice, therefore, depends on the consistency of (i), (ii), and (iii). But how could this be? How can the Theistic Compatibilist successfully hold together divine freedom and his account of an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice? If the Theistic Compatibilist asserts that God is free such that God could have chosen otherwise, then this results in an unintelligible, arbitrary free choice, based on the Theistic Compatibilist's account of explanation. Furthermore, if the Theistic Compatibilist tries to retain his account of an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice, then God is not free such that he could have chosen otherwise with respect to creating. That is, God's choice must be necessitated if it is to have an explanation and thus count as an intelligible choice. Therefore, the Theistic Compatibilist is caught in a dilemma: either God is free such that he could have chosen otherwise or God exercises an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice such that the choice was fully explained and hence necessitated.Footnote 18
In summary, if only a full explanation necessitates a choice and a full explanation is required for an intelligible free choice, then it follows that to have a full explanation, that is, according to the Theistic Compatibilist, to have an intelligible free choice, it follows that creation is necessary.Footnote 19
Possible responses
Let us suppose that what I have argued for is essentially correct, namely, that the Theistic Compatibilist's typical understanding of what amounts to an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice undermines God's freedom. Must all Theistic Compatibilists, however, go down such a trail? Perhaps it is possible for the Theistic Compatibilist to think that some of their brethren start off on the wrong foot, and their stance consequently needs to be amended. In other words, one might assert that this variation of Theistic Compatibilism under scrutiny is a problem not because of Theistic Compatibilism per se but rather by virtue of certain metaphysical commitments with respect to either explanation or divine freedom.
What, then, are the possible responses which are available to the Theistic Compatibilist? There seem to be, as far as I can see, at least four general avenues of response. First, one might simply admit that God's free choices are indeed arbitrary. Second, it could be argued that the intelligibility problem can only be applied to human and not divine freedom with respect to choosing otherwise. Third, one might simply say that we do not know how to account for a divine intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice. God's freedom is utterly mysterious. Lastly, one might deny that the alternative possibilities condition is a necessary part of the metaphysical makeup of divine freedom. Perhaps there is some other sense in which God's freedom is to be construed. Let us look at each of these possible responses.
Response 1: conceding the point response
A first line of response could be to concede the point and admit that even God's free choices are indeed unintelligible. That is, his choices are random and arbitrary in light of his being able to choose otherwise. According to this response, the Theistic Compatibilist is unwilling to relinquish his understanding of an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice while holding to the alternative possibilities condition with respect to God's freedom. Although I know of no Theistic Compatibilist who affirms God's choices as random, such a position is not unheard of in contemporary philosophy of religion. Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder, for example, think that the alternative possibilities condition can be preserved by claiming there is possibly an infinite hierarchy of better choices (i.e. worlds) for God from which he can choose.Footnote 20 God, then, chooses arbitrarily from the hierarchy. Here is their thought experiment:
Imagine that there exists a good, essentially omniscient and omnipotent being named Jove, and that there exists nothing else. No possible being is more powerful or knowledgeable. Out of his goodness, Jove decides to create … [H]e holds before his mind a host of worlds, Jove sees that for each there is a better one. Although he can create any of them, he can't create the best of them because there is no best … [Jove] creates a very intricate device that, at the push of a button, will randomly select a number and produce the corresponding world. Jove pushes the button; the device hums and whirs and, finally, its digital display reads ‘777’: world no. 777 comes into being. (Howard-Snyder & Howard-Snyder (Reference Howard-Snyder and Howard-Snyder1994), 260)Footnote 21
Accordingly, God does not need to have a full explanation for choosing as he did – God chooses randomly. Others, similarly, appeal to the idea in economic theory known as satisficing. According to this view, there is an infinite number of good choices (or perhaps many unsurpassable good choices) for God to select from and God made a choice that will secure an outcome which is good enough.Footnote 22 The problem with this response is that there is a strong consensus within the Theistic Compatibilist tradition to hold that God does not make choices arbitrarily, especially in light of a soteriology where God unconditionally elects individuals to be saved. Would the Theistic Compatibilist appeal to a conception of God where God blindly elects a people for himself? Apparently not since God's ‘decisions [e.g. electing] are not libertarian random accidents’ (Frame (Reference Frame2002), 236). So, while this is a possible response, it is not likely to be warmly embraced by the Theistic Compatibilist.
Response 2: no divine application response
A second possible response could be to say that while the intelligibility problem holds true for human choices, it cannot be applied to divine choices. In other words, there is something about human choices that renders them unintelligible when one is able to choose otherwise. When God's choices are brought into the picture, however, the intelligibility problem quickly vanishes. I think the obvious problem with this response is that the distinction between human and divine choices introduces an ad hoc selectivity with respect to what free choices are or are not intelligible. In order to avoid this contrived hypothesis, the Theistic Compatibilist would have to come up with some good reason for why the intelligibility problem cannot apply to God but only to human choices. However, what sort of reason could there be? One might appeal to the Thomistic doctrine of analogical predication, arguing that the intelligibility problem cannot apply to God since God's freedom is not much like ours.Footnote 23 Admittedly, as far I can tell, Ware is silent on how one ought to predicate attributes to God. Frame, however, is quite critical of analogical predication claiming it to be ‘inconsistent’, thus opting instead for univocal predication. Here is what he says:
[I]f goodness applies to God analogously by a causal relation, what about the word cause? Does that require another analogous relation, and another, ad infinitum? Somewhere, it would seem, we must be able to say something about God univocally, for there must be some univocal attribute on which to hang the analogies, whether that be cause, being, or something else. But if cause can be univocal, why can't goodness be? This inconsistency can be pressed either toward global agnosticism or toward some level of literal knowledge about God. (ibid., 208, emphases in original)
Frame concludes by opting for the second horn of the dilemma:
We need not be afraid of saying that some of our language about God is univocal or literal. God has given us language that literally applies to him. When one says negatively that ‘God is not a liar,’ no word in that sentence is analogous or figurative. The sentence distinguishes God from literal liars, not analogous ones. Similarly, the statement that ‘God is good’ uses the term good univocally. (ibid., 209, emphasis in original)
Accordingly, because of Frame's insistence upon univocity, the appeal to analogical predication is not a good reason (for him) to avoid the ad hocness of the ‘no divine application response’. Therefore, the ‘no divine application response’ is not a response the Theistic Compatibilist should look to embrace.
Response 3: agnosticism response
Another line of response, similar to the ‘no divine application response’, could be to claim that, while God does indeed exercise the sort of freedom where he could have chosen otherwise, it is simply beyond our ken to understand or know just how God's choice is to be intelligible and non-arbitrary. That is, although God's free choices to do otherwise are not unintelligible, one simply does not know how to account for their intelligibility. This sort of agnosticism response is indeed what Frame appeals to when he elaborates on God's freedom to choose otherwise. He begins by asking, ‘[I]f God's free decisions are not determined by any of his attributes, then where do they come from? If these decisions are not libertarian random accidents, then what accounts for them?’ He concludes by answering, ‘I can only reply, with [the apostle] Paul, “Oh the depth of the riches of wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable his judgments, and his paths beyond tracing out!” (Rom. 11.33)’ (Frame (Reference Frame2002), 236).
Given the application of this biblical text to God's freedom, accounting for a divine intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice, where God could have chosen otherwise, is, according to Frame, ‘unsearchable’ and ‘beyond tracing out’ (ibid.). The problem with this response, however, is that it does not seem to be any different from the typical response to the intelligibility problem as regards to human free choices. Is it not the case that some of those who hold to the alternative possibilities condition with respect to human freedom also frequently appeal to agnosticism and ‘mystery’ when accounting for intelligibility?Footnote 24 If the Theistic Compatibilist wants to sustain this agnosticism response, then he will have to concede that the agnosticism response with respect to human choices is just as plausible. Further, if the agnosticism response is indeed just as plausible, then the initial employment by the Theistic Compatibilist of the intelligibility problem loses its force. In addition to this, if the Theistic Compatibilist thinks that the agnosticism response can only be applied to the intelligibility of divine choices but not to human choices, then the ad hoc problem rears its head once again. For these reasons, the agnosticism response is not something the Theistic Compatibilist should embrace.
Response 4: no freedom to choose otherwise response
Perhaps there is one final response available to the Theistic Compatibilist. The version of divine freedom under consideration is the freedom to choose otherwise, where the alternative possibilities condition is a necessary condition for God to be free. However, why should we think that such a condition is necessary in order for God to be free? Perhaps the sourcehood condition is sufficient for God to be free. I think this is the most promising response for the Theistic Compatibilist in order to retain his account of an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice. Indeed, this is exactly what some thinkers have done. For example, Paul Helm, when critiquing Thomas Aquinas's model of creation participating in God's perfection in an infinite number of possible ways, states,
The problem with such a position is that … it is hard to see how divine caprice can be avoided. For God is portrayed as actualizing one of a number of co-optimific goals. If we suppose this makes sense, on what grounds could God decide in favour of one rather than another? (Helm (Reference Helm2011a), 180)
According to Helm, there simply are no grounds for why God chose as he did, and thus the choice is a result of ‘pure whimsy’ (ibid.).
Similarly, Anselmian scholar (and non-compatibilist concerning human freedom) Katherin Rogers claims:
But if God has freedom of indifference with regard to creation, then this is no explanation at all, since there is absolutely no reason why God chose our world over some other creation or over none at all. His wisdom and love might equally have issued in a creation containing only well-ordered cosmic dust, or in no creation at all … Ascribing freedom of indifference to God posits radical arbitrariness at the heart of creation such that there is no ultimate meaning or purpose to the world – at least no meaning or purpose that would not be equally fulfilled by a creation of cosmic dust or a lack of any creation at all. (Rogers (Reference Rogers2008), 198–199)
What we see here from both Helm and Rogers are echoes of the intelligibility problem applied to God's freedom. However, in remaining consistent, they both affirm that the alternative possibilities condition is not necessary in order for God to be free. Helm and Rogers, we might say, opt instead for a type of compatibilism applied to the divine will, where necessity and freedom are compatible. In this context, however, it is the necessity of choosing to create which is compatible with God's freedom. The fundamental reason why this sort of necessity does not jeopardize God's freedom is because the necessity in question finds its source within God's very nature. There is something about God's essential perfection that precludes him from being able to choose otherwise. Accordingly, divine freedom is primarily a function of God being the ultimate source of his choices. He freely chooses if nothing metaphysically outside of him is the ultimate explanation for why he chooses one thing over another.Footnote 25 While such a position is consistent, it does not seem to be a position which Theistic Compatibilists such as Frame and Ware would want to adopt in light of their commitment to the alternative possibilities condition with respect to God's freedom and the metaphysical contingency of creation.Footnote 26
A way forward
So, what is the Theistic Compatibilist to do? Is there a constructive side to this problem if the possible responses that I have considered are found wanting? To put it simply, I think the most plausible thing for the Theistic Compatibilist to do is to jettison the intelligibility problem from his arsenal of arguments for why he thinks the alternative possibilities condition is false, or at least implausible. In other words, the Theistic Compatibilist, contra Frame and Ware, simply needs to admit the intelligibility of human free choices that could have been otherwise. Perhaps one could endorse the work by Robert Kane with respect to the intelligibility problem where he illustrates a business woman confronting an assault taking place in an alley on her way to a meeting. Here, there is a struggle between her conscience and her career ambitions – the former tells her to stop and call for help, while the latter tells her she cannot miss the meeting. Such a struggle, Kane argues, does not result in an unintelligible, arbitrary choice once the choice is made. Here is what he says:
[U]nder such conditions, the choice the woman might make either way will not be ‘inadvertent,’ ‘accidental,’ ‘capricious,’ or ‘merely random’ (as critics of indeterminism say) because the choice will be willed by the woman either way when it is made, and it will be done for reasons either way – reasons that she then and there endorses … So when she decides, she endorses one set of competing reasons over the other as the one she will act on. But willing what you do in this way, and doing it for reasons that you endorse, are conditions usually required to say something is done ‘on purpose,’ rather than accidentally, capriciously, or merely by chance. (Kane (Reference Kane, Fischer, Kane, Pereboom and Vargas2007), 29, emphases in original)
Similarly, Alexander Pruss seeks to avoid the intelligibility problem by recently defending the position ‘that a choice of A can be explained in terms of a state that was compatible with choosing B’. Pruss begins his defence by offering a hypothesis about how human freedom may plausibly work, where ‘free choices are made on the basis of reasons that one is “impressed by,” that is, that one takes into consideration in making the decision’ (Pruss (Reference Pruss, Craig and Moreland2012), 55). The following is the essence of his hypothesis:
[S]uppose that when the agent x chooses A, there is a subset S of reasons that favor A over B that the agent is impressed by, such that x freely chooses A on account of S. My explanatory hypothesis, then, is that x freely chooses A because x is making a free choice between A and B while impressed by the reasons in S. On my hypothesis, further, had the agent chosen B, the agent would still have been impressed by the reasons in S, but the choice of B would have been explained by x's freely choosing between A and B while impressed by the reasons in T, where T is a set of reasons that favor B over A. Moreover, in the actual world where A is chosen, the agent is also impressed by T. However, in the actual world, the agent does not act on the impressive reasons in T, but on the reasons in S. (ibid., 55)
What we see from both Kane and Pruss is that the fundamental motivation to avoid the intelligibility problem, and thus preserve the coherence of the alternative possibilities condition, is to try to provide a sufficient explanation without that explanation being interpreted as a causal explanation. In other words, the explanans (i.e. that which does the explaining) is sufficient but does not entail the explanandum (i.e. that which is explained). So, to be clear, neither thinker is claiming that the same thing would possibly explain one particular choice over a contrary choice.
Nevertheless, whether or not one is convinced of Kane's or Pruss's answer to the intelligibility problem, does abandoning this argument (i.e. the intelligibility problem) commit the Theistic Compatibilist to asserting that the alternative possibilities condition with respect to human freedom is indeed true? Certainly not! The reason is because the Theistic Compatibilist can argue for the falsity of the alternative possibilities condition for other reasons unrelated to intelligibility. For instance, supposing that God's exhaustive and meticulous determinism entails human compatibilistic freedom, it could be argued exegetically that the sort of divine sovereignty which Frame and Ware affirm is to be found in the Bible.Footnote 27 Therefore, if that sort of divine sovereignty is to be found in the Bible, then it would follow, on our supposition, that the alternative possibilities condition is indeed false.Footnote 28 Second, one could argue that if the saints in heaven exercise human compatibilistic freedom, then it would not seem any less implausible for humans on this side of death to do the same either.Footnote 29 Lastly, one could argue for the falsity of the alternative possibilities condition given a certain understanding of divine biblical inspiration, that is, verbal plenary inspiration.Footnote 30 Here it could be thought that the only plausible way to account for every word and every grammatical construction as divinely inspired while also being written by human beings is to appeal to human compatibilistic freedom. It would seem utterly unreasonable to some that God could inspire exactly what he wanted the biblical authors to write if the authors could have chosen different words and grammatical constructions than they actually did. So, given divine verbal plenary inspiration, the alternative possibilities condition is false.
Therefore, if these other reasons for why the alternative possibilities condition is false are found reasonable, then it is perfectly consistent for the Theistic Compatibilist to claim that free choices, which could have been otherwise, are indeed intelligible, but that this type of human freedom is still false or at least less plausible than its rivals. What this consistency shows, consequently, is that the door is open for the Theistic Compatibilist to retain the alternative possibilities condition with respect to divine freedom while at the same time asserting that the alternative possibilities condition is not necessary with respect to human freedom. This, I suggest, is a way forward for the Theistic Compatibilist.
Conclusion
The Theistic Compatibilist's employment of the intelligibility problem has been influential in theological and philosophical writings, thus arguing against the coherence of the freedom to choose otherwise. Nevertheless, I have argued that the typical Theistic Compatibilist position is problematic because it implies the denial of divine freedom, understood as the freedom to choose otherwise. What I have suggested in light of this problem is that the Theistic Compatibilist admit the intelligibility of free choices which could have been otherwise, but realize that such an assertion does not commit him to claim that the alternative possibilities condition is a necessary condition for human freedom.Footnote 31
