Sectarianism in Iraq seeks to scrutinize a topic that has been in the media spotlight ever since the 2003 Iraq war. It is very ambitious in scope; although much of the text covers events since the 1991 Gulf War, the author argues that his theory on sectarianism holds true more universally. He seeks to counter two prevalent conceptions: the “Western” view that “sectarianism” is an all-encompassing prism that can explain most, if not all, social and political relations in Iraq and the Iraqi nationalist view that denies the very existence of sectarianism (summed up as “we're all brothers”). In their place, Haddad suggests a middle ground where sectarian relations and politicized sectarianism are carefully contextualized and understood as fluid identities that change over time. It is a commendable but not very innovative approach.

The author argues that a true understanding of sectarian relations in Iraq can only be gained by going beyond the elitist narrative that most academics rely on when analyzing Iraqi politics. The reason why sectarianism has been downplayed by academics, according to the author, is because they have not sought out the views of the ordinary man on the street. As Haddad notes, all of the various disparate regimes that have held power in Iraq since the creation of the state in 1920 have condemned sectarianism and have stressed Iraqi national identity over communal interests. But for Haddad this is merely political spin, and academics need to incorporate “low” culture in order to formulate a “truer” view of opinions in society. This is all very admirable, and there is no doubt that if done in a balanced and considered way, a “history from below” perspective can add important dimensions to a historical narrative, enabling it to convey a more complete representation of a society. What such a perspective cannot do, however, is to completely rewrite or replace “normal” political history, and this is something that this book at times seems to be attempting.

The main problem with Haddad's approach is that he is trying to reinvent the wheel. The book's chief thesis—that sectarianism needs to be contextualized and that it is a group identity like ethnicity or race and not primarily a religious identity—is very much an accepted axiom within academia. This is only a novel idea for a nonacademic audience—the lay reader or the Western journalist unfamiliar with the Arab world.

Another problematic issue is the author's use of YouTube clips as primary sources, alongside a limited number of interviews and a selection of political writings in Arabic (most of which appear to be published by various Shiʿi political groups). Such limited source material further highlights the book's overambitious scope. Despite the fact, acknowledged by Haddad, that these sources are unrepresentative of the views of the “common Iraqi man” (if such a person exists), there is a persistent sense throughout the book that what it is trying to convey is not merely the views of highly politicized individuals and/or political groups but also the view of “the Shiʿis” (or for that matter “the Sunnis”). It is this aspect of the book that is especially worrying. Although the author goes to great lengths at the outset to assure the reader that sectarian identity is fluid and changes through time and space and according to socioeconomic class and political circumstances, this caveat is lost in the remainder of the text. On page 21, for example, we are told—without any supporting evidence—that the intifada of 1991 was a “glorious rebellion” and a “chosen trauma” for “most Shiʿa,” whereas for “most Sunnis” it was a “foreign incursion of Iranians and their Iraqi lackeys.” Such trite stereotyping is in stark contrast to the lofty ideals stated at the outset.

What this type of reasoning does is to paint “Sunnis” and “Shiʿis” as monolithic blocs that somehow can be said to have common views on political events by virtue of their religious affiliation. But this kind of lazy generalization, far from providing an academic basis from which to analyze Iraqi society, merely replicates the kind of media language that Haddad set out to counter. A similar argument is repeated later (p. 39), where the author once again talks in very general terms about how “Sunnis” viewed Saddam Husayn's regime as legitimate, while “Shiʿis” opposed it. To back up the claim, he cites figures from the 2005 elections that ostensibly show “Shiʿis” (it is unclear how this category was defined in the opinion poll referred to) considered those elections to be fair, something that in Haddad's view somehow confirms a Sunni/Shiʿi split in attitudes toward Saddam's regime! This is a rather dangerous way of constructing an argument and rests on a very flimsy basis to say the least. The truth is that we simply cannot know what the “average Sunni” or the “average Shiʿi”—disregarding that no such hypothetical person really exists—might have thought of Saddam's regime at the height of its power, for the simple reason that no objective studies or polls could be carried out back then. In addition, to infer from the 2005 election figures that there was either a Sunni or a Shiʿi view of the regime is simply to resort to the very sectarian language the author supposedly is trying to counter.

One of the book's stronger arguments, and perhaps its main contribution to the debate about sectarianism in Iraq, is that sectarian identity is not locked in a zero-sum game against Iraqi nationalism but that both of these ideologies (for that is what sectarianism is) can coexist. Or, to put it in Haddad's words, there is both a “Shiʿi” and a “Sunni” Iraqi nationalism, which in their own ways have incorporated specific “myth–symbol complexes.” This is the book's most interesting insight into contemporary Iraqi politics.

But although the author presents an elaborate model on how much these “myth–symbol complexes” overlap, the implied assumption seems to be that these outlooks are somehow immutable. This is a serious flaw in the book's argument, because although the author acknowledges that there is no innate contradiction between a sectarian identity and a national one, he nevertheless blames the Iraqi state (in its many 20th-century incarnations) for having attempted to bridge the divide. In his view, it is the “Sunni” state that, by insisting on depicting a unified “we're all brothers” society and failing to address sectarian issues on the state level, has actually created the sectarian problem. What it should have done was to foster an ecumenical dialogue between the sects. Yet this line of reasoning contradicts the author's earlier assertion that sectarianism is not primarily a religious matter but rather a political one. To put it simply, there is no hope of achieving unity between Sunnis and Shi'is on the basis of religious dogma because the historical and religious narratives of these two sects are diametrically opposed (for basic doctrinal reasons) and thus can never be reconciled.

The book, moreover, fails to answer the most interesting question that arose during the political chaos that afflicted Iraq after the 2003 invasion: why, given the “sectarian” identity that ostensibly guided the two opposing sides, did none (apart from some American experts in Washington) call for a breakup of the country and the creation of a “Shiʿastan”? Haddad's rather cynical, and somewhat simplistic, explanation is that such a notion had been “hard to sell” to the Iraqi public. He thus implies that the lack of vigorously advocated secessionism was only a political calculation in a game of realpolitik on the part of the sectarian extremists and not, as most of the evidence (his own included) seems to suggest, that these groups and individuals (at least those of Iraqi descent) were ideologically committed to Iraqi nationalism and to the incontrovertible idea of the Iraqi nation–state, notwithstanding Western arguments about its “artificiality.”

Another major, and rather inexplicable, flaw is the total lack of any Kurdish voices in the book. It is amazing that the Kurds, who constitute a significant minority of the Iraqi population, and who have played a major role in the country's modern political history, are mentioned on only five occasions. Thus, the book's claim to be about “Sectarianism in Iraq” seems rather hollow. It would have been most useful if the author had followed up on his own assertion at the beginning of the book where sectarianism was defined as a group identity on par with ethnicity and race. I would have liked to see a much more thorough discussion of how the Kurds fit into the picture in light of recent theories on nationalism and national identity, such as Anthony D. Smith's “ethno-history,” Benedict Anderson's “imagined communities,” or Eric Hobsbawm's “invented traditions.” Instead, despite a brief reference to said authors, who all view nationalism and national identities essentially as products of modernity that are manufactured by elites and shaped by socioeconomic factors, it is clear that the author views sectarian identity, at least “Shiʿi” political identity, as being somehow perennial. Thus Haddad explains (p. 40) the fact that “Shiʿis” did not seek to redress the imbalance in political representation throughout the 20th century (as if such representation were apportioned on a sectarian basis at any rate) by arguing that “Shiʿis” did not question the validity of the Iraqi nation–state. But a more plausible explanation is that being Shiʿi in the 1920s through the 1960s was not a highly politicized identity but rather a personal one with little bearing on the individual's views of the legitimacy of the state. Shiʿi identity became politicized from the 1970s onward because of political repression, a key factor not sufficiently elaborated upon in the book.

In conclusion, Sectarianism in Iraq is an interesting book containing much new material that will offer fresh insights into the formation of identity and political ideology in modern Iraq. It is, however, far too ambitious. Certainly, the theory section is the book's weakest part. In addition, although the book is generally well written and coherently (if illogically) argued, the reader encounters far too many mistransliterations of Arabic words for a work published by a reputable academic press. All in all, though, the book ought to find a receptive audience among nonacademic readers, undergraduate students, and Western political commentators.