Introduction
In recent debates about the distribution of healthcare resources, the notion of individual responsibility for health has received an increasing amount of attention, in philosophical discussions,Footnote 1 health policy documents,Footnote 2 and public debates.Footnote 3 On the one hand, the suggestion that individuals should be held responsible for healthcare costs that can in some way be attributed to their own choices has become a controversial aspect of the debate about health resource allocation and rationing. On the other hand, there have also been (less controversial) suggestions that individuals should be encouraged to take greater responsibility for their health so as to avoid diseases that result from, or are made more likely by, certain behaviors. In the theoretical debate on this issue, luck egalitarianism, which emphasizes the role of individual responsibility in determining fair distributions, is often drawn on.
This article considers three kinds of appeals to responsibility that feature in these debates: First, individual responsibility is sometimes taken to play a role in rationing decisions, by providing a criterion for denying treatment to, for according lower priority to, or for requiring a greater financial contribution from patients who are deemed “responsible” for a specific health need. Second, several recent policies rely on incentives of various kinds to encourage individuals to “take responsibility” for their health. Finally, a number of recent policy documents as well as contributions to the philosophical literature have included appeals to individuals to act “responsibly” with respect to their health and the healthcare system, connecting such appeals with concerns about fairness and reciprocity.
The aim of this article is twofold. First, I raise concerns about the ways in which the idea of personal responsibility has been used in debates about health policy. The use of individual responsibility as a rationing criterion has already been criticized widely in the literature. The response to health incentives, however, has been somewhat ambiguous, and reciprocity-based appeals to responsibility that are detached from the use of material incentives have, as yet, received little attention from philosophers. In attempting a first assessment of these uses of the idea of responsibility, I am particularly concerned with considerations of equality, which are a long-standing concern in health policy and are particularly salient to the issue at hand. I draw on relevant debates in egalitarian theories of distributive justice, and in particular luck egalitarian approaches to equality. In doing so, this article pursues a second objective: to reevaluate the policy implications of the luck egalitarian approach in light of recent developments in the literature. As I explain subsequently, luck egalitarianism can provide a more nuanced position on individual responsibility for health than is assumed by many of its critics. Furthermore, luck egalitarians are likely to be critical of appeals to responsibility that, within other theories of egalitarian justice, would be unproblematic, highlighting concerns about the impact of such appeals from the perspective of equality.
The article begins by setting out the main points of the luck egalitarian approach and its application to the health arena (second section). The third section sets out the luck egalitarian response to arguments that use individual responsibility as a rationing criterion. In the fourth section, I consider the use of incentives to encourage individuals to take responsibility for their health. The fifth section addresses arguments that link appeals to individual responsibility with notions of reciprocity. The sixth section moves from specific appeals to individual responsibility to a more general concern about the language of individual responsibility and its possible impact on individual well-being and health.
Luck Egalitarianism and Health
Luck egalitarianism is a recent theory of equality; different versions of this theory were first developed by Ronald Dworkin, G. A. Cohen, and Richard Arneson.Footnote 4 In recent years, the implications of this theory for the health context have also been examined, most prominently by Shlomi Segall.Footnote 5 Different theorists employ different definitions of the luck egalitarian approach;Footnote 6 for the purposes of this article, I take luck egalitarianism to stipulate that inequalities are fair if and only if they are the result of choices for which agents can reasonably be held responsible; inequalities resulting from brute luck, on the other hand, should be considered unfair. In addition to questions about responsibility, which are the focus of this article, two aspects of luck egalitarianism are particularly salient to the health context: the metric in which equality is to be measured and the scope of unfair inequality.
First, luck egalitarians must decide which metric is used to compare individuals’ positions. Much of the early literature on luck egalitarianism was devoted to this question. Two main contenders have emerged from this debate. On one account, we can compare people’s positions in terms of resources, where this notion can be understood broadly so as to include internal resources such as talents and abilities; the main proponent of this approach is Dworkin.Footnote 7 Alternatively, we can compare people’s positions in terms of welfare, which could be interpreted, for example, as preference satisfaction or in terms of an objective list account.Footnote 8 Particularly important for the present context is that the literature assumes that the relevant considerations can be captured within one metric (be it resources or some version of welfare). This means that, unlike other theories, luck egalitarianism does not attach a special role to health; rather, health is captured in terms of (its effects on) whatever currency is chosen.Footnote 9
Second, although much of the critical literature has focused on inequalities that luck egalitarians purportedly find unproblematic, in at least two respects luck egalitarianism implies a more expansive approach to inequalities in health than many other accounts of justice in health. Luck egalitarians typically reject three criteria that many other theories of justice rely on in drawing the line between fair and unfair health inequalities.
First, the luck egalitarian framework stipulates that inequalities can be unfair irrespective of whether or not the source of, or causal history leading to, the inequality is in itself unjust. This means, most prominently, that biological or “natural” sources of inequality are, from a luck egalitarian perspective, just as unfair as inequalities that are the result of social factors, such as discriminatory treatment or an unfair distribution of the social determinants of health. As Arneson notes, “disadvantage due to social arrangements has the same fundamental moral status as disadvantage due to natural causes like bad weather.”Footnote 10 For this reason, Segall argues that luck egalitarians must consider unfair the difference in life expectancy between men and women that is found, to a greater or lesser extent, in most parts of the world, even to the extent that it is the result of biological rather than environmental factors.Footnote 11 This distinguishes luck egalitarianism from, for example, Whitehead’s influential account, which emphasizes that differences due to “natural, biological variation”Footnote 12 cannot be sources of unfair inequality. This approach still informs much policy work on justice in health, such as the WHO’s.Footnote 13 Similarly, Daniels’s influential account of justice in health distinguishes fair from unfair inequalities according to whether or not they were caused by an unjust distribution of the social determinants of health.Footnote 14
Second, some theories of justice distinguish between inequalities according to whether they are controllable, in the sense that they could have been avoided and/or are amenable to intervention. Daniels, for example, notes that “to the extent that [the] social determinants [of health] are socially controllable, we clearly face questions of distributive justice.”Footnote 15 This criterion is influential in the policy world. The recent Report by the Commission on the Social Determinants of Health states that “where systematic differences in health are judged to be avoidable by reasonable action globally and within society they are, quite simply, unjust. It is this that we label health inequity.”Footnote 16 Norheim and Asada argue that “the relevant distinction is whether the institutions of society can respond adequately to a disease or not.”Footnote 17 In support of this proposal, they suggest that the availability of technology and treatment options will affect whether a particular inequality would be considered unjust: “People dying prematurely from HIV/AIDS in the early 1980s (before the aetiology of the disease was known) were suffering tremendously, but their tragically reduced life expectancy was not unfair. Given the medical advancement for HIV/AIDS treatment in recent decades, however, the same amount of suffering and premature death now is quite rightly considered inequitable.”Footnote 18 From a luck egalitarian perspective, in contrast, health inequalities can be unfair even if there is nothing that can be done to prevent or address them.Footnote 19
Unlike proponents of other approaches to justice, then, luck egalitarians do not see a normatively relevant distinction between “natural” and “social” inequalities in health, and they do not think that our ability to prevent or address specific inequalities should affect our judgment about their unfairness. Does this make luck egalitarianism a more appealing theory, or does it provide further objections to luck egalitarianism? I do not argue for either view in this article.Footnote 20 However, the discussion highlights that even though the debate has focused on health inequalities that luck egalitarians cannot regard as unfair, there are types of health inequalities that they, but not proponents of other approaches, regard as problematic.
Option Luck versus Brute Luck: Individual Responsibility as a Rationing Criterion
Luck egalitarians are often criticized for their purported harshness in responding to individuals who, as a result of choices they have made or failed to make, find themselves in desolate circumstances. Within the health context, luck egalitarians are frequently cited as supporting policies that would refuse treatment to, or hold otherwise accountable, individuals whose ill health can be traced back to their own behavior or choices. However, some recent contributions to the debate have proposed a more nuanced interpretation of the luck egalitarian approach. This section sets out the implications of the luck egalitarian approach for individual responsibility as a rationing criterion in light of this literature.
Importantly, the basic luck egalitarian proposal is no more than a framework, according to which responsibility is crucial in distinguishing fair from unfair inequalities. Depending on how the details of this framework are fleshed out, in particular with respect to the notion of responsibility that we adopt, very different interpretations of the basic theory can emerge. The early work on luck egalitarianism focused on setting out the basic framework of the approach and generally did not spell out the conditions under which people could reasonably be held responsible for inequalities resulting from their choices, even though this is, of course, a crucial issue if we are to consider the policy implications of luck egalitarianism.
Critics have argued that luck egalitarianism is too harsh in responding to inequalities that can be traced back to individuals’ choices or actions. Health needs have featured prominently in the examples used by critics of luck egalitarianism to illustrate this problematic implication of a responsibility-sensitive approach: luck egalitarians, these critics argue, are committed to denying treatment to individuals who, through their own choices, brought about particular needs, including needs for healthcare.Footnote 21 For example, a negligent driver must be left to die if she is responsible for the accident from which her injuries resulted. Whereas examples such as these are commonly presented as challenges to luck egalitarianism,Footnote 22 theorists who are sympathetic to the luck egalitarian approach have similarly implied that luck egalitarians may have to deny care to people whose choices have brought about a certain health need.Footnote 23
It is partly in response to these criticisms that the recent literature on luck egalitarianism has paid far more attention to the potential harshness of the luck egalitarian approach, attempting to clarify the luck egalitarian position on examples such as these. Perhaps the most significant problem these theorists see with the harshness objection is that the critics falsely assume that the choice component of the chance-choice distinction on which luck egalitarians rely must map neatly onto the actual choices people make in the real world. In fact, the real-word implications of the luck egalitarian approach are far from clear.Footnote 24 Importantly, luck egalitarians are not committed to taking the mere presence of choice as sufficient to justify the inequalities that may result from it; they can rely on different interpretations of the notion of individual responsibility to flesh out the distinction between chance and choice and to determine under what conditions individuals can reasonably be held responsible for the choices they make.Footnote 25 In particular, three aspects of the recent literature are relevant.
First, in fleshing out the distinction between option luck and brute luck, which is to guide the luck egalitarian in deciding whether or not specific inequalities are fair, some theorists have relied on the idea of “reasonable avoidability.”Footnote 26 This means that simple mistakes as well as the infinitesimal risks that we all need to take in leading our lives need not be regarded as option luck.Footnote 27 Further, as Arneson explains in spelling out the requirements of his interpretation of equality, it would be unfair to expect as much from a person who is extremely averse to labor as from someone who enjoys hard work:
The more difficult and painful it is for an individual to make a best choice, the less reasonable it is to expect that she will make that choice. In other words, people have equal opportunity for welfare when the cards they are dealt are such that if they play their cards as well as one could expect, they gain the same expected welfare, and if they play worse than this, their less than best options are matched in expected welfare.Footnote 28
The ability to make reasonable and prudent use of one’s talents is itself an ability that is distributed unequally across individuals; the welfare inequalities to which such inequalities in this ability may lead are, therefore, likely to be unfair. Arguably, inequalities of this kind affect individuals’ health behaviors. For example, many of us, to a greater or lesser extent, find it difficult to engage in “healthy” behaviors or to refrain from unhealthy ones due to weakness of will or because we are insufficiently sensitive to the long-term risks associated with particular choices.
Second, some commentators have emphasized that, for luck egalitarians, the influence of external background factors on the choices that people make may undermine their responsibility for those choices: when individuals face highly unequal circumstances in which they make their decisions, making it very easy for some to avoid specific risks but exceedingly difficult for others to do so, it becomes highly implausible that such choices would be sufficient to ground individuals’ responsibility for them.Footnote 29 This interpretation of the luck egalitarian approach has particular bearing on the health context, in which there has been increasing attention to social inequalities in health outcomes. Some of these inequalities appear to be the result of environmental differences, such as housing inequalities or unequal working conditions, which often accumulate over the life course. However, some of these inequalities are the result of differences in health behaviors, such as smoking rates, nutrition, or physical activity.Footnote 30 A version of luck egalitarianism that is sensitive to the influences of background conditions on the choices people make can help us account for the intuition that these health inequalities are problematic, even when they can be traced back to the choices individuals have—often voluntarily—made.Footnote 31
Third, some of the choices individuals make contribute to the fulfillment of shared social duties. Where some fulfill a greater share of such collective duties than others and suffer disadvantages as a result, luck egalitarians need not require that these are borne by the individual concerned.Footnote 32 This concern can become relevant to the health context when such duties—for example, duties to care for children or the elderly—detract from individuals’ ability to look after their own health.
These recent developments in the luck egalitarian literature suggest that proponents of the theory can take a more nuanced position than their critics have often assumed on whether or not individuals should be held responsible for health needs that are the result of their own choices. Because many real-world choices reflect brute luck, the policy implications of luck egalitarianism appear closer to traditional egalitarian positions than much of the literature has assumed. Rather than denying care to those whose choices have contributed to their health needs, luck egalitarians suggest that we need to pay close attention to the factors that make some more likely than others to make choices that involve risks to their health.
Health Promotion and Individual Choice: Incentivizing Individuals to Take Responsibility for Their Health
We can also find appeals to individual responsibility that are tied to the provision of positive or negative incentives in an attempt to encourage individuals to take responsibility for their health. Many theorists, including some who are otherwise critical of the use of individual responsibility in rationing decisions, have been supportive of such policies, citing the significant contribution incentives could make to the improvement of individual health outcomes. Moreover, it has been argued that luck egalitarianism, to its own detriment, does not have the theoretical resources to support policies of this kind. In this section, I argue that incentive policies are structurally similar to the use of responsibility as a rationing criterion; we should therefore not be too quick in welcoming these policies. Many of the concerns raised about responsibility as a rationing decision apply to incentives as well. I also clarify the position that luck egalitarians can take on this issue.
So-called positive incentives that aim to encourage individuals in adopting beneficial health behaviors have become a popular policy tool in many countries. For example, German sickness funds offer enrollees benefits ranging from kitchen scales and crockery sets to children’s toys and MP3 players if they meet conditions such as participation in cancer screening programs or checkups.Footnote 33 In the United States, employers can offer premium discounts or lower deductibles for employees who participate in weight loss or smoking cessation classes, or meet certain goals with respect to their weight or blood glucose levels.Footnote 34
The arguments for the use of incentives often draw on the idea of responsibility for health, both in describing how incentives work and in justifying their introduction. Incentives, on this argument, encourage individuals to take responsibility for their health and to make more responsible choices with respect to health behaviors, such as smoking or diet.Footnote 35
It is important to note that the structural similarities between incentive schemes and the use of individual responsibility as a rationing criterion make it difficult to draw a clear distinction between them. In the literature, distinctions are often drawn between retrospective or backward-looking notions of responsibility on the one hand and prospective, forward-looking interpretations of the concept on the other,Footnote 36 along with the suggestion that, even if we think that retrospective applications of responsibility are problematic, forward-looking ones may not be.Footnote 37 However, where prospective responsibility is linked to incentives, it is difficult to see how these two notions of responsibility could be kept distinct. Attempting to encourage individuals to change their behavior by using an incentive implies that, if the desired behavior change does not occur, individuals will not be eligible for the incentive.Footnote 38 Thus, even if policymakers promote incentives out of a genuine desire to encourage and support individuals in adopting beneficial health behaviors, the structure of incentive schemes is very similar to policies that deny benefits to those whose ill health is the result of behaviors for which they are deemed responsible.
These problems notwithstanding, incentives may be a useful instrument for the improvement of population health. However, it has been argued, luck egalitarians may lack the theoretical resources to endorse the use of instruments that improve population health. Daniels has pointed to some problems with luck egalitarian arguments when it comes to the improvement of health through schemes that aim to improve individuals’ behaviors.Footnote 39 Luck egalitarians, he argues, do not have the resources to argue for schemes that would prevent health inequalities that—because they result from individuals’ choices—would be fair: “As a matter of justice we do not owe people assistance for what they bring on themselves as a result of their choices of imprudent behaviour, so we do not owe them any effort at making them act more prudently.”Footnote 40 Thus, despite luck egalitarians’ focus on individual responsibility, their theory implies that “there is no reason for promoting [responsibility] as a matter of justice.”Footnote 41 Thus, he concludes, “I find no support for Florida’s experiment [which used incentives to encourage healthier behavior in Medicaid recipients] in the luck egalitarian framework, and this is a problem for the framework.”Footnote 42 In other words, to the extent that attempts at health promotion merely prevent health inequalities that would, because of their link to individual choices, be considered fair within the luck egalitarian framework, luck egalitarianism does not, by itself, provide an argument to support health promotion.
Daniels is right that luck egalitarians are indifferent between distributions that are equal and distributions that contain only fair inequalities; luck egalitarianism does not provide an argument for the prevention of fair inequalities. This may well point to a problematic feature of luck egalitarianism. However, we must be clear that, depending on our understanding of the choices that underpin health behaviors and the degree to which individuals can reasonably be held responsible for such choices, the scope of Daniels’s argument may be limited. Given the social inequalities that shape and constrain individuals’ “lifestyle choices,” luck egalitarians may find few health inequalities in the real world that they would consider fair. Preventing unfair health inequalities is, of course, of utmost importance for luck egalitarians; the problem Daniels highlights may therefore not apply to the context in which he considers it.
With respect to real-world incentive schemes, luck egalitarians’ concerns about the unfair inequalities to which incentives may give rise broadly fall into two groups. First, access to incentives may not be equal; second, unequal uptake of incentives may exacerbate social inequalities in health.Footnote 43 Luck egalitarians may be more supportive of incentive schemes that actively try to address the barriers that unfairly disadvantaged individuals face in adopting beneficial behaviors, for example, when low-income patients receive a financial incentive for attending a screening appointment, which allows them to defray some of the costs they face in attending. Note, however, that in such cases, incentives effectively act as compensation for existing inequalities. We would then need additional arguments as to why it is legitimate to make such compensation conditional on individuals’ meeting particular requirements, rather than simply providing it unconditionally.
Fair Reciprocity and Responsibility for Health
A number of recent policy documents have also appealed to citizens to be responsible with their health and with respect to their use of healthcare resources, without recommending the use of incentives or penalties for those who fail to act in the proposed ways. For example, the NHS constitution emphasizes the “rights and responsibilities” of both staff and patients.Footnote 44 With respect to patients, this means, foremost, that “you should recognise that you can make a significant contribution to your own, and your family’s, good health and well-being, and take some personal responsibility for it.”Footnote 45 In the theoretical literature, some proposals have tied the idea of individual responsibility to the notion of reciprocity. For example, Buyx suggests that, in solidaristic healthcare systems, reciprocity may require that individuals contribute to the healthcare system and behave responsibly within it, for example, by avoiding certain health risks or by being considerate in their use of healthcare resources.Footnote 46 Similarly, Feiring argues that, given the scarcity of resources, appeals to individual responsibility, and giving lower priority to patients whose behaviors diminish the efficacy of treatment, may be appropriate because “we owe it to each other to do what we can to make medical treatment efficacious.”Footnote 47 Thus, she argues, obese patients may be asked to commit to behavioral changes that will help them lose weight; if they refuse, it is permissible to give them lower priority vis-à-vis other patients.Footnote 48
The idea, then, is that healthcare systems work on the basis of a principle of reciprocity: individuals can expect to receive treatment for their health needs, but, in return, all those contributing to the system can expect its beneficiaries to act responsibly within it, by avoiding unnecessary health risks or making sure that they do what they can so that any treatment they receive is effective. For example, the NHS constitution emphasizes that “the NHS belongs to all of us. There are things that we can all do for ourselves and one another to help it work effectively, and to ensure resources are used responsibly.”Footnote 49 This approach does not necessarily entail sanctions for those who fail to meet the stipulated requirements of reciprocity (no sanctions are envisioned by the NHS constitution, for example), but Buyx and Feiring suggest that it may.
The idea of reciprocity can, of course, be fleshed out in very different ways. What exactly reciprocity is taken to require depends on what notion of distributive justice we adopt.Footnote 50 In the literature on reciprocity in the context of welfare requirements, egalitarian theorists have pointed out that reciprocity need not require everyone to make contributions of equal value; rather, on an egalitarian understanding of reciprocity, the contributions we can expect from any one individual may vary depending on their ability to contribute.
How might a luck egalitarian flesh out the idea that everyone should do their bit? First, as White emphasizes, differences in individuals’ ability to contribute to a cooperative scheme may be due to brute luck; such differences should therefore not affect what individuals can expect to get out of the scheme.Footnote 51 Furthermore, the reasonable expectations standard previously mentioned in the third section will also come into play here. When considering what individuals should be required to contribute to the scheme, we must adapt our expectations in light of what they can reasonably be expected to contribute. The inequalities that characterize the real-world context in which such arguments are made are again highly relevant here. For example, some may have very flexible work conditions that make it easy to attend medical appointments during the working day at little notice; for others, any absences would lead to lower pay. In such circumstances, applying a uniform standard of expectations when it comes to patients’ attendance of medical appointments would be unfair.
It might be argued that this concern is not relevant when, as is the case in the NHS constitution, no sanctions are attached to people’s failure to meet the stated expectations of reciprocity. However, the reciprocity approach implies that those who do not live up to required standards are free riding on the cooperative scheme. Thus, to apply the same expectations to everyone, regardless of brute luck differences among individuals in their ability to meet such expectations, is not consistent with an egalitarian understanding of fair reciprocity, even when no negative sanctions are involved.
The Language of Individual Responsibility
The previous sections discussed different ways in which the notion of individual responsibility has been used in debates about health resource allocation and discussed the luck egalitarian position on these different ways of appealing to individual responsibility. This section raises a more general concern about the language of responsibility and its possible effects on individuals’ well-being and, ultimately, health, which may result from the increasing prominence of this language in policy debates. Such effects also raise concerns about the application of luck egalitarianism to the real world that have received relatively less attention in the literature.
A frequently cited aim of the luck egalitarian approach has been to “incorporate[e] within [egalitarianism] the most powerful idea in the arsenal of the anti-egalitarian right: the idea of choice and responsibility.”Footnote 52 Accordingly, many luck egalitarians have tried to formulate a nuanced understanding of individual responsibility in drawing the distinction between fair and unfair inequalities. This understanding of responsibility, however, is at odds with how responsibility tends to be conceived in public debate. There, appeals to individual responsibility are generally understood in more conservative terms, emphasizing the importance of individual choice while understating the relevance of social structures that may constrain such choices. It is not clear that luck egalitarians, in formulating arguments about individual responsibility and fairness, can keep their notion of responsibility distinct from the one that dominates policy debates.Footnote 53
This is an important problem because the values and assumptions implicit in policy debates may in themselves have a significant impact on individuals. On the one hand, it has been suggested that emphasizing the importance of individual behavior could help address feelings of resignation and fatalism among disadvantaged groups, helping individuals realize that, despite the structural constraints they face, there is scope for individual actions that can improve health.Footnote 54 This could enhance individuals’ well-being directly and could also improve their health behaviors, thus leading to improvements in health outcomes.
On the other hand, because appeals to individual responsibility cannot easily acknowledge individuals’ unequal ability to adopt healthy behaviors, they risk trivializing the structural constraints that individuals, especially those from disadvantaged backgrounds, face. This could contribute to a sense of personal failure when health behaviors cannot be adopted or maintained and may lead to feelings of guilt, shame, frustration, or self-blame.Footnote 55 One empirical study finds self-blame in narratives of patients with health conditions linked to certain behaviors, and the emphasis on self-blame was more pronounced in those living in deprived areas.Footnote 56 Importantly, these feelings may also become an obstacle to the improvement of health behaviorsFootnote 57 and may deter patients from seeking treatment or support.Footnote 58
Furthermore, an emphasis in public debates on individual responsibility rather than the wider social determinants of health may contribute to the stigmatization of those who act “irresponsibly” by failing to adopt behaviors regarded as healthy.Footnote 59 Empirical studies lend support to some of these concerns. For example, a study by Chapple et al. reports that lung cancer patients feel stigmatized due to the close link between smoking and lung cancer, even if they themselves never smoked.Footnote 60
How exactly the language of individual responsibility affects individual well-being and behaviors is, of course, an empirical question. However, in moving from theory to practice, one of the considerations luck egalitarians must take into account is the effects of the language in which their arguments are couched. If that language has problematic consequences, particularly by contributing to unfair inequalities, this will necessitate greater care in attempts to apply luck egalitarianism to the real world. This, of course, is part of a more general concern that luck egalitarians need to think very carefully about how their theory can or should be implemented, as its practical implementation “can harm the very people that the theory is designed to help.”Footnote 61
Conclusion
Appeals to individual responsibility have become common in philosophical discussions about the fair distribution of healthcare resources as well as policy documents and public debate. This article distinguished between three different kinds of appeals: those that use individual responsibility as a rationing criterion, those that involve the promotion of incentives to encourage healthier behaviors, and those that tie individual responsibility to a notion of fair reciprocity. One aim of the article was to consider these arguments in light of recent developments in the literature around luck egalitarianism. Although the luck egalitarian approach is often taken to require that individuals be denied assistance with their health needs if those needs are the result of their own choices, the recent literature emphasizes a more nuanced interpretation of the luck egalitarian approach. Further, luck egalitarianism can provide insights into why the other two kinds of appeals to responsibility are problematic from the perspective of equality. The use of incentives raises concerns about equality, particularly with respect to concerns about unequal access, whereas the reciprocity-based account must be careful to spell out which duties can be imposed on individuals given important differences in what they can reasonably be expected to contribute. The discussion also raised concerns about the language of individual responsibility itself, which may have negative effects on individuals that run counter to (luck) egalitarians’ intentions.
