In Heidegger & the Measure of Truth: Themes from his Early Philosophy, Denis McManus raises anew the question of how we are to make sense of the unique understanding of truth found in Heidegger’s early work. Granted, Heidegger would likely say that the discussion of truth found primarily in Being and Time is not ‘his’, per se, but the point is nevertheless taken. The way in which he understands truth is one that goes largely against the grain, and instead of seeing it as problematic, McManus offers a fresh way of making sense of it. But if we are to properly assess McManus’ explication of the Heideggerian notion of truth, it is imperative to quickly outline the notion itself.
Heidegger’s understanding of truth comes from a combination of looking back to how the ancient Greeks understood it, and carefully examining the way in which we, as human beings, are. In ancient Greece, the word for truth was aletheia, which, properly translated, means ‘uncovered’ or ‘unconcealed.’ For them, something is true insofar as it is uncovered, showing itself as it really is. Conversely, something is not true when it is covered up, or not showing itself just as it actually is. Keeping this in mind, Heidegger provides what he calls the “analytic of Dasein.” Dasein is his word for human-being, and it literally translates as “being-there.” When he provides the analytic of Dasein, he gives us an explanation of how human beings are in their day-to-day lives. As human beings, we go about our days, engaging with the world in a very practical way. We take up entities and use them toward some end. But as we take things up and use them, just by taking them up, we disclose them in a particular way; the object we take up can be shown, uncovered, as it really is. When I walk into a room and throw my coat over the back of a chair, the chair gets uncovered as a thing on which I can throw my coat. Or perhaps I simply walk in and sit down on the chair, thereby disclosing the chair as a thing on which to sit. Either way, as I go about my day, I am a being that uncovers things through my practical engagement with the world. And this is what truth is for Heidegger in its most primordial sense.
What interests McManus, and indeed many people, is the claim that the most primordial sense of truth is a practical one, rather than the traditional ‘theoretical’ one. Truth, after all, is typically understood as a theory of correspondence. I make an assertion, and that assertion correctly corresponds to something in the world about which the assertion is made, so the assertion is therefore ‘true.’ But this asserotic form of truth is ‘founded’ in our practical engagement with the world. Only because we are first in the world, going about our days and comporting ourselves toward possibilities, taking things up and using them, can we then go ahead and make something like a ‘true assertion’ about the world. The practical, in a sense, precedes the theoretical. As Heidegger famously said, theory limps along behind practice. One of the main goals of McManus’ book is to make sense of this ‘founding’ of the theoretical in the practical.
McManus’ view stems from the ambiguity of what ‘the practical’ is. Saying that assertions and propositions are founded on the practical could be seen as ambiguous, and even nebulous. The view McManus puts forth is that making assertions is founded on what he calls “the mastery of a measure” (pp. 103-114). In order to make sense of assertions and propositions, we must hold them up against an intimate understanding of the world, and this understanding is what constitutes the “measure” about which McManus is talking. However, having such an understanding of the world requires what McManus calls a “recognizably worldly subject,” i.e., us.
Before providing an argument to support his main thesis, McManus makes a good move by laying out the necessary groundwork in order to make sense of it. He spends the first two chapters of the book discussing the initially Husserlian conception of ‘constitution,’ though it was taken up by Heidegger as well. In short, constitution deals with the kind of subjects we, as human beings, are, and how we must be in order that we can be intentionally related to objects in the world. This is important because, in having a certain measure of the world against which we can hold assertions in order to determine their truth, that measure is determined by how we are related to the objects we find in the world. Intentional relation is absolutely essential in understanding how we come to have a grasp of the world, and though there are some problems with McManus’ exposition of constitution (mentioned below), he generally does a good job of setting up the main discussion of the text. For instance, following his look at constitution, he then turns to an important, thorough discussion of Vorhandenheit, or the “present-at-hand,” Zuhandenheit, or the “ready-to-hand,” and how the former is supposedly founded on the latter. In short, objects are ready-to-hand when we are taking them up and using them, and they are present-at-hand when we are merely holding them in front of us and thinking about them ‘theoretically.’ Given what McManus is trying to make sense of, one can see why it’s important to put these concepts under the microscope. In a sense, presence-at-hand involves a theoretical attitude, while ready-to-hand involves a practical relating to the world. His discussion of Vorhandenheit, in particular, has a high level of clarity uncommon in much of the literature.
Though the book is an interesting take on Heidegger’s understanding of truth and the founded character of the theoretical in the practical, there are three parts of the discussion which are problematic, though perhaps not largely so. First, in his explanation of constitution, the way in which he talks about humans as subjects, and the entities toward which we are intentionally related as objects, he falls back into a view from which Heidegger made a point of distancing himself, a view made famous by Descartes: that of the subject-object relationship we have to the world. To view us as subjects, and that toward which we comport ourselves as objects, is to already miss how we are most closely related to the world: as involved in it, and not distanced from it, looking at it and ourselves from a third-person point of view. Second, in the third and fourth chapters, where he most explicitly brings up presence-at-hand and ready-to-hand, he talks about objects in the world as though they are either one or the other. However, it is not that a certain object can ‘be’ present-at-hand, while others can ‘be’ ready-to-hand. Rather, presence-at-hand and ready-to-hand are modes of comportment; they are ways in which we relate ourselves toward entities. Finally, the crux of McManus’ argument, his solution that there is a measure of the world against which we hold propositions and assertions in order to determine their truth, though correct, is already found in Heidegger. The understanding we have of the world, or, to use McManus’ expression, the “mastery of a measure,” is something Heidegger discusses when he speaks of “understanding,” “interpretation,” and “sense.” McManus brings up these concepts briefly in a footnote in chapter 5, the chapter entitled “The Measure of Truth,” but merely mentions them in passing. The “measure” we have of the world comes from an understanding that we always already have of the world in which we find ourselves. And founded on that understanding is the ability to interpret something as something. But the ‘as’ Heidegger associates with interpretation is not describing x as y, but is rather the more intimate taking up x and using it as y. The chair example above shows two ways that a chair can be interpreted, but being able to interpret the chair as a thing to sit on or as a thing over which one can throw one’s coat is only possible because, in every moment in which we find ourselves, we arrive on the scene already with an understanding of the world. McManus’ use of the word “mastery” is slightly misleading, since it implies having to work toward having a measure of the world against which we can hold propositions or assertions in order to test them for truth. For Heidegger, Dasein does not have to work in order to have its understanding of a world. Rather, such an understanding is a constitutive feature of Dasein.
Overall, Heidegger & the Measure of Truth: Themes from his Early Philosophy is a fresh look at Heidegger’s interpretation of truth, and gives us an understanding that is accessible, clear, extremely well thought out, and original. Most importantly, upon reading it, one who is not very familiar with Heidegger can come away with a fairly good understanding of what Heidegger was doing with his philosophy, and how essential his take on truth is in everyday life.
