Albanians, Slavs, and the Macedonian Question According to the National Historiography Approach

In order to explore the ways in which national narratives evaluate the impact of nationalism, it is necessary to consider their epistemological background. The merging of early Romanticism and Marxist thought within these historiographies makes it difficult to locate them in the categories elaborated by the main theories on nationalism. Macedonian and Albanian historians consider their respective nations as cultural communities defined by a common language and tradition. According to Albanian historiography, Albanians as a distinct ethno-national group descend from the ancient Illyrians (Frashëri Reference Frashëri2013; Prifti et al. Reference Prifti, Gjeçovi, Korkuti and Shpuza2002a, 199–209). Macedonian historians trace back the formation of modern Macedonians to the settlement of the Slavic populations in the region during the Middle Ages (Apostolski et al. Reference Apostolski1972, 28–33; Ristovski et al. Reference Ristovski2009, 823–824). While these ideas reflect the perennialist and the neo-perennialist arguments on the origins of nations (Smith Reference Smith2009, 3–10), Balkan scholars also claim that, despite the links between present nations and their archetypes, the acquisition of national self-awareness could only occur after the instauration of the capitalist relationships of production, which led to the progressive demise of the “feudal” structure of the Ottoman Empire (Apostolski et al. Reference Apostolski1972, 31–33; Pollo et al. Reference Pollo1984, 110–113). The latter argument recalls the views of the modernist critique of nationalism, which relates the phenomenon to the advent of the industrial revolution and capitalism (Gellner Reference Gellner1983; Hobsbawm Reference Hobsbawm1990).

The combination of Marxist and early Romanticist thoughts in the study of nationalism has generated contradictory interpretations because it does not allow historians to clearly determine the periodization of the phenomenon.Footnote ¹ However, this combination of different insights has defined a coherent framework for the study of “inter-national” relations in the late Ottoman Balkans. Albanian and Macedonian national histories evolve, respectively, around the concepts of popull and komb, narod, and more seldom nacija. Using the words popull/komb and narod/nacija, Albanian and Macedonian historians define cultural entities that are similar to those described by the German word Volk. But the words popull and narod (more than komb and nacija) also indicate a group of people defined by its socioeconomic conditions, which precludes the formation of the proletariat. The double property of narod/nacija and komb/popull functions as a mediator for the evaluation of the effects generated by the affirmation of nationalism. Relations between “peoples” (komb/narod) are portrayed according to the philosophy of Herder, who believed that relations between nations were naturally peaceful.Footnote ² Instead, the influence of Marxist thought has led historians to emphasize the propensity of the Balkan “peoples”—intended more as a class than as nations—to join their efforts against their common oppressors.Footnote ³

An intertextual reconstruction of the way nationalism impacted Albanian–Slav relations in the late Ottoman Macedonian context shows that the political exploits that characterized the dissolution of Yugoslavia did not produce radical changes in the work of historians. National historiographies analyze relations between Albanians and Macedonian-Slavs in the light of different conditioning factors: the Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers, the Balkan states, and the affirmation of national movements. In broad terms, it might be stated that the first three factors appear to have worsened their relations, while the third contributed to their improvement.

The first of the above-mentioned factors is particularly relevant to the narrative of North Macedonian historiography, which describes the character of the mercenary-bandit Albanian who torments the Slavic-Christian peasant. This character does not represent the entire nation, but rather a peculiar type of Albanian that has a precise historical origin. Albanians and Slavs are presented as resisting the Ottoman conquest together under the lead of Skanderbeg. North Macedonian historiography highlights the events that involved the region of Debar/Dibra, which is situated in the actual states of Albania and present-day Republic of North Macedonia. According to Skopje-based scholars, Skanderbeg organized the anti-Ottoman revolt in this area with the support of the Macedonian, Albanian, and Vlach population (Apostolski et al. Reference Apostolski1972, 95–98). In a more recent book, it is stated that after Skanderbeg’s death and the definitive conquest of the region by the Ottomans, not only Albanians but also Macedonians (in a lesser number) emigrated to Southern Italy (Čepreganov et al. Reference Čepreganov2008, 154). According to North Macedonian historiography, Skanderbeg’s death also produced other long-lasting effects on Albanian–Slav relations in the area. The progressive conversion of the majority of Albanians into Muslims, turned many of them into tools of imperial power and they were henceforth perceived by Christians as Turkey’s “whip.” The unequal relationship between Albanians and Macedonian-Slavs generated a reciprocal hatred that was deliberately fostered by Constantinople (Naumoska Reference Naumoska1995b, 17–18; Todoroska Reference Todoroska2002, 18–19).

North Macedonian historians affirm that the activities of Muslim Albanian and Turkish bandits considerably increased toward the end of the 18th century due to the weakening of the central authority. At the time, the Ottoman territories of present-day Albania, Republic of North Macedonia, and Greece were ruled by Albanian despots such as Ali Pasha of Ioannina. The latter extended his domain on present South-Western Republic of North Macedonia, while the regions of Seres, Skopje, Tetovo, and Gostivar were governed by less influential rulers with the support of Albanian mercenaries who terrorized the local (Christian Slav) population (Apostolski et al. Reference Apostolski1972, 104–105; Čepreganov et al. Reference Čepreganov2008, 150–151). North Macedonian scholars report that banditry against Christian Slavs was not only an individual enterprise, but also a regular economic resource for entire Albanian villages (Naumoska Reference Naumoska1995b, 14; Todoroska Reference Todoroska2002, 14). Historians assert that during this period of “feudal anarchy,” the present day Western part of the Republic of North Macedonia and Eastern Albania underwent demographical changes that led to the substitution of the local Christian Slav population by Albanian settlers (Apostolski et al. Reference Apostolski1983, 111). In order to avoid persecution, some Macedonians adopted the custom of converting one member of their family to the Muslim faith. This practice determined the formation of Crypto-Christian communities whose members would use two names and celebrate the festivities of both religions (Todoroska Reference Todoroska2008, 31).

Although these texts emphasize Albanians’ aggressiveness, the authors implicitly acknowledge that such behavior was not an original trait. Christian Slavs were only being persecuted by Muslim Albanians, while Christian Albanians behaved rather differently. Katerina Todoroska (Reference Todoroska2008, 109) remarks that the general state of corruption in Turkey deteriorated relations between Muslim Albanians and Christian Macedonians, and improved those between the latter and Christian Albanians. The conversion to Islam thus represents a moment of alteration of, so to speak, “pure” Albanians who opposed the Ottomans into a tool in the hands of the foreign conqueror.Footnote ⁴ From these remarks, it can be inferred that, according to North Macedonian historiography, Albanians were not animated by an instinctive enmity toward their neighbors. The aggressiveness that characterized the Albanian attitude toward Macedonians was determined by an extrinsic factor. The affirmation of national ideas is presented as a process through which Albanians can recover from this alteration. Albanians and Macedonians realized that they were facing equal challenges in relation to their poor economic, social, and political status. Moreover, since their territories were equally threatened by the Balkan states, they felt the need to cooperate (Todoroska Reference Todoroska2008, 112). One of the earliest and most cited examples of Albanian–Macedonian collaboration is the Albanian-Macedonian Revolutionary League of 1887 (Naumoska Reference Naumoska1995b, 66–71).Footnote ⁵ Historians also pinpoint that external agents such as the Ottoman government and the Great Powers tried to spoil their attempts at collaboration by instigating religious and national resentment between Albanians and Slavs (Naumoska Reference Naumoska1995b, 27, 47–49). However, their propaganda could not prevent the two peoples from trying to cooperate in the common struggle against the “yoke” (Todoroska Reference Todoroska2002, 27–28).

According to North Macedonian historiography, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), especially after the adoption of the 1897 statute, fought for the liberation and emancipation of the whole population, no matter their nationality (Apostolski et al. Reference Apostolski1972, 188; Čepreganov et al. Reference Čepreganov2008, 190). In the latest edition of the Istorija na Makedosnkiot Narod, edited by the Institute of National History of Skopje, in comparison to the ones printed before the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the authors make limited references to Albanians when they describe the exploits of the IMRO. The book reports that other nationalities supported the revolutionary activities and participated in the Ilinden revolt. However, according to the sources that the authors chose to cite, it is clear that they wanted to highlight the fundamental Christian and Slavic-Macedonian character of the revolt (Čepreganov et al. Reference Čepreganov2008, 200). The tendency to emphasize the Albanian and Macedonian-Slav collaboration in revolutionary activities represents a regular trope of North Macedonian historiography produced before and after the end of the Cold War, as it emerges in various articles and monographs dedicated to the subject (Josifova Reference Josifova1982, 151–164; Naumoska Reference Naumoska1995b, 42; Todoroska Reference Todoroska2002, 84). Skopje scholars affirm that both Muslim and Christian Albanians supported the Ilinden revolt by providing weapons to the IMRO, giving shelter to its members, sharing logistical information with them, and fighting together against Turkish forces (Mihajlov Reference Mihajlov1988, 45–49; Todoroska Reference Todoroska2002, 85–87). Albanian–Slav collaboration took place in the 10-days-long Kruševo republic, in August 1903. The insurgents formed democratic institutions in which people from all nationalities were equally represented (Apostolski et al. Reference Apostolski1972, 156; Čepreganov et al. Reference Čepreganov2008, 199). The cooperation between exponents of the two national movements continued after 1903 through joined attempts to form an association for advancing political and cultural claims (Todoroska Reference Todoroska2008, 113–115). After the Young Turk revolution, Macedonians led by Jane Sandanski and Albanians participated in the military expedition to Istanbul in order to suppress the coup of April 13, 1909 (Čepreganov et al. Reference Čepreganov2008, 208).

Although Albanian historiography firmly rejects the claim that Albanians exercised demographic or political pressure on their neighbors,Footnote ⁶ it has produced a similar evaluation of the impact of nationalism on Albanian–Slav relations in North Macedonia. In the first edition of the Albanian history book dedicated to the late Ottoman period, the Albanian scholars did not refer to the presumed major Slavic component of the Macedonian region simply as “Macedonians", but rather as “Bulgarians” or “Bulgarian-Macedonians” (Pollo and Buda Reference Pollo and Buda1965, 234–240). Albanian historians would eventually adopt the term “Macedonians” to refer to the major Slavic component of the Ottoman Macedonian region in the second edition of the book (Pollo et al. Reference Pollo1984, 325–328). The use of different names to define the populations does not alter the interpretation of Albanian-Slav relations. Scholars affirm that the Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers, and the chauvinist policies of the Balkan states constituted a common challenge for the struggle of the Balkan peoples (Kodra Reference Kodra1968; Puto Reference Puto1970). They underline that many Albanians participated in the Ilinden revolt and that the nationalist press supported the “liberation war” that Macedonian-Slavs fought against the “Ottoman yoke” (Prifti et al. Reference Prifti2002b, 311–312). The relations between Albanians and Slavs in Macedonia have been investigated in more detail by Prishtina- and Skopje-based Albanian historians in the Yugoslav period. They sustain that Turkey, Austria, and Russia tried to repress the struggle conducted by the two peoples, but they did not manage to impose their will (Dërmaku Reference Dërmaku1982, 283; Pllana Reference Pllana1978, 167; Rahimi Reference Rahimi1980, 111). In accordance with more recent descriptions of events by Tirana-based historians, they have asserted that Macedonian and Albanian national goals were also threatened by agents of the Balkan states who used violence, statistics, and maps to distort the demographic reality of the region (Dërmaku 1983, 300; Pllana Reference Pllana1978, 223; Prifti et al. Reference Prifti2002b, 316). According to the narrative of Yugoslav–Albanian historiography, national awareness determined a reordering of political alliances. The religious difference that separated the two communities was eroded by the common national agenda. Masar Kodra (Reference Kodra1968, 393) affirms that Macedonian “patriots” sought Albanians’ support (both Muslims and Orthodox) because they knew that they had rejected the illusions of religion. Moreover, many Albanians refused to serve in the Ottoman army and joined the Macedonian revolutionary bands (Kodra Reference Kodra1968, 389).

Albanian scholars, in accordance with their Macedonian colleagues, portray the rise of national movements as a decisive step for making the two people aware that they could only obtain freedom through reciprocal help, without expecting support from abroad (Dërmaku 1983, 294). Their connections were founded on family bonds and traditional friendship. These links enabled the creation of political organizations such as the above-mentioned Albanian-Macedonian Revolutionary League of 1887 and other associations with similar names (Dërmaku 1983, 283–285; Kodra Reference Kodra1968, 386–389).Footnote ⁷ Besides the domestic milieu, Macedonians and Albanians also established contacts with each other in institutional environments such as schools and prisons (Kodra Reference Kodra1968, 389–391). Historiography often tends to represent the so-called “Albanian revolt” that took place in Kosovo at the beginning of 1903 and the Ilinden revolt as a continuous process, since they were generated by similar claims for social and national rights of Albanians and Macedonian Slavs (Rahimi Reference Rahimi1969, 109–110). The collaboration that they carried out during the Ilinden revolts was based on mutual trust. Albanians sold weapons to Macedonians illegally, and if they were caught, they would not betray their neighbors, even under torture (Kodra Reference Kodra1968, 393). Finally, many Albanians fought side by side with Macedonians during the revolt, but their cooperation continued well after 1903 (Dërmaku 1983, 294). In November 1905, under the lead of Bajo Topulli, a group of Albanians from Monastir formed a secret committee that turned into an illegal çeta the following year. Their organization was inspired by the Macedonian revolutionary movement, and they fought with their neighbors against common enemies, which were above all the Greek bands. The areas of Korça, Prespa, and Kostur were presumably the major centers of Albanian–Macedonian conjoint activities (Kodra Reference Kodra1968, 397–399; Prifti et al. Reference Prifti2002b, 316–317). Historians also believe that the threat of new revolts that could be triggered by Albanian and Macedonian activists (either separately or together) accelerated the preparation of the 1908 Young Turk revolution (Pllana Reference Pllana1978, 230; Prifti et al. Reference Prifti2002b, 373; Rahimi Reference Rahimi1980, 139).

The historiographies of Albania, Kosovo, and present day Republic of North Macedonia often show different perceptions of peculiar events, but they all draw on the assumption that the spread of nationalism produced beneficial effects on Albanian–Slav relationships since it enabled the communities to strive together against the tyranny of the Ottoman government, the Great Powers, and the Balkan states. This narrative mirrors the combined Herderian–Marxist conception of relations between “peoples” or “nations” as being peaceful and collaborative against common oppressors. According to national historiographies, the affirmation of national movements determined the progressive “liberation” of the Balkan populations from “feudal” constraints and represented a step toward the democratization of political and social life. Such a view is indebted to an idealistic perception of social phenomena, and the arguments advanced by national historiographies have been quite radically challenged by more recent studies that I define as “postnationalist approach.” Nonetheless, as the next section demonstrates, the two approaches present some analogies.

The Postnationalist Approach

The authors that I group under the term postnationalist approach do not constitute a cohort historiographical trend or current of thought. However, they share the assumption that traditional historiographies are biased by ideological and methodological constraints (Clayer Reference Clayer2007, 9–10; Marinov Reference Marinov and Mishkova2009, 108) and have obscured or mystified historical events in order to legitimize modern nation-states (Blumi Reference Blumi2011, XV; Brown Reference Brown2013, 16). These scholars tend to investigate nationalism through a comparative method and borrow theoretical insights from modernist and postcolonial critiques. The affirmation of national identity is shown as a process that has generated difference by constructing ideological barriers between Albanians and Slavs who consequently become “others” (Brown Reference Brown2013, 72; Clayer Reference Clayer2007, 528–529; Halili, Pavloviq, Hysa, and Zaharijeviq Reference Halili, Pavloviq, Hysa and Zaharijeviq2016; Müller Reference Müller2009; Sulstarova [Reference Sulstarova2003] Reference Sulstarova2015, 37–43). One of the major breaks between the new scholarship and national historiographies consists in the way the former regards the effects of Ottoman rule in the Balkans. Postnationalist scholars reject the idea that the Ottoman period represented an obstacle for the historical progress of the Balkan society (Blumi Reference Blumi2003, 10). They affirm that the empire allowed local communities to preserve their autonomy and enjoy a relative state of peace that lasted until the advent of modernity (Barkey and Gavrilis Reference Barkey and Gavrilis2016; Blumi Reference Blumi2011, 33; Yosmaoglu Reference Yosmaoglu2012, 1). In their views, the Ottoman context appears as a space of continuous cultural and political interaction where identities were blurred or hybrid (Blumi Reference Blumi2003, 14; Dragostinova and Hashamova Reference Dragostinova and Hashamova2016). Moreover, historians have highlighted the continuity of the cultural and political trends that characterized the center and the peripheries of the empire and have claimed that Albanian and Macedonian activism was institutionally and ideologically indebted to Ottomanist discourses (Blumi Reference Blumi2011; Marinov Reference Marinov, Daskalov and Marinov2013, 128).

Nationalism is portrayed as one of the main causes of the social fragmentation of the Macedonian region at the turn of the 20th century (Karakasidou 1997). The affirmation of ethno-national identities is deemed to have led to campaigns of ethnic cleansing carried out by the Balkan states between the 19th and the 20th centuries (Yosmaoglu Reference Yosmaoglu2012, 2). However, postnationalist historians rarely blame local communities for the violent conflict in the region. In analogy to traditional historiographies, the late Ottoman Balkan communities, be they Slavic-speaking, Albanian-speaking, or hybrid, are represented as victims of a sociopolitical situation that was imposed on them from above, by foreign agents with the complicity of few local elites. Scholars affirm that the transformation of Ottoman subjects into Bulgarian, Greek, Serbian, Albanian, or Turkish citizens required the implementation of demographic policies by the agents of Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, and the Ottoman Empire. Maps, censuses, and schools were used by elites before and after the Balkan wars in order to homogenize the population and facilitate assimilation in the respective states (Blumi Reference Blumi2003, 26; Dragostinova and Hashamova Reference Dragostinova and Hashamova2016, 1651–1877Footnote ⁸; Yosmaoglu Reference Yosmaoglu2012, 91).

Although postnationalist scholars criticize nationalism, their opinion concerning the way it conditioned Albanian–Slav relations at the turn of the 20th century is more complex than might be assumed. The new scholarship strives to dismantle traditional research by demonstrating that national aspirations were not the main strings of political and social mobilization in the late Ottoman Balkans. Ypek Yosmaoglu (Reference Yosmaoglu, Dragostinova and Hashamova2016, 1107Footnote ⁹) asserts that nationalism was one of the popular ideologies among the educated classes of the Ottoman Empire, but this was hardly the case for the vast majority of the population. Unlike traditional histories, which claim that national ideas curbed the religious division between Albanians and Christian Slavs, Yosmaoglu’s research shows that in the case of the Slavic- and Greek-speaking populations, religion and nationalism were combined in order to construct boundaries between communities (2016, 1155–1161). But according to Yosmaoglu, religious separatism was not sufficient for bringing the conflict to the boiling point. Violence played a fundamental role in defining ethnic/national divisions but not in the commonly assumed sense: it was not nationalism that led to violence, but quite the opposite. The attacks carried out by bands against individuals and villages before and after the Ilinden uprising of 1903 were aimed at intimidating possible spies, enforcing collaboration, and punishing those who strayed. In that period, violence became a tool for delineating ethno-national separatism, especially between 1903 and 1908, when more agents from Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria were involved in the conflict (Yosmaoglu Reference Yosmaoglu, Dragostinova and Hashamova2016, 1216). The permanent situation of threat and terror in which individuals were caught made it impossible for them to remain neutral. They progressively began to feel connected with communities that transcended their immediate vicinity (Yosmaoglu Reference Yosmaoglu2012, 217).

Tchavdar Marinov has criticized the tendency displayed by Yosmaoglu (although he does not refer to her directly) and by other scholars to de-locate the question of nationalism in late Ottoman Macedonia from the local to the foreign “propagandists.” However, his judgment on the effects of nationalism on relations between the local communities is quite similar to that of Yosmaoglu’s, as he also thinks that individuals switched national allegiance in consequence of the violence between the supporters of different nationalisms to which they were exposed (Marinov Reference Marinov and Mishkova2009, 109–111). Marinov, differently from Yosmaoglu, sustains a more classical argument entailing that it was nationalism that led to violence at the local level and not the opposite. In a more recent essay, Marinov, like national and postnational historians, recognizes that the propaganda of the Balkan states generated ethnic-building effects in the Macedonian milieu. But in opposition to Skopje-based historians and in a slight contradiction with his own former work, he affirms that the Macedonian identity was produced not so much from local actors as from Bulgarian, Serbian, and Greek propagandists that, in the attempt to disenfranchise the region from each other’s claimed heritage, accredited the idea of the existence of a separated Macedonian national entity (Marinov Reference Marinov, Daskalov and Marinov2013, 273–330).

Yosmaoglu’s work is mainly concerned with the area of Salonica vilayet where Albanian–Slav interaction was rather poor. Marinov’s research does not really concern the way in which nationalism impacted relations between local communities or how such processes related specifically to Albanians. However, some of the general assumptions gleaned from the deductions of the two authors are mirrored in the works of Keith Brown and Isa Blumi, who have both dealt in a manner more straightforward with Albanian–Slav relations. Brown and Blumi are equally committed to undermining the whole theoretical and methodological framework deployed by national historians. Brown (Reference Brown2013, 16–18) affirms that activists in late Ottoman Macedonia were not that concerned with the formation of national identity. Instead he believes that they were involved in “a process of creation, interaction, and conscious reordering of diverse loyalties” (Brown Reference Brown2013, 18). Similarly, Blumi’s (Reference Blumi2003, 15–16) analysis focuses on the interaction between local communities on one hand and the agents of the Ottoman government and foreign states on the other. Like Brown, Blumi asserts that the relationship between local actors and the state determined the emergence of ever-shifting forms of identification and claims that “did not necessarily stress a national, universal, identity as their goal” (2003, 20–21).

The two authors provide an alternative reading of events that involved the territories of present-day Republic of North Macedonia and Albania. Brown maintains that the region became an evolving context of political, cultural, and social transformation after the Berlin Congress. The native populations’ response to such changes does not fit the model of national awakening that is propagated by traditional historiographies (Brown Reference Brown2013, 22–25). The communities of “Geeks/Patriarchists,” “Bulgars/Bulgarians/Exarchists,” “Arnauts/Albanians,” or “Wallachian/Roumanists/Kutzo-Vlachs” were works in progress (Brown Reference Brown2013, 72). Likewise, the MROFootnote ¹⁰ was ideologically, programmatically, and organically fluid (Brown Reference Brown2013, 144). The sense of belonging to the organization was not determined by a primordial attachment to nation, but by an oath that each member had to take (Brown Reference Brown2013, 75). Like Yosmaoglu (Reference Yosmaoglu2012) and national historiography (Čepreganov et al. Reference Čepreganov2008, 193), Brown considers Macedonian revolutionaries as competitors of government prerogatives. By means of “social banditry,” tax collection, and violence, the MRO functioned as a parallel state (Brown Reference Brown2013, 119–120).

The idea that the goals of Macedonian activists were not stable but defined by contingencies also emerges in the work of Tchavdar Marinov. However, while showing that the IMRO pursued a “supra-national” political agenda (that was not taken into consideration during the days of the Kruševo republic), he also stresses that activists self-identified as ethnic Bulgarians (Marinov Reference Marinov and Mishkova2009, 114–116). With regard to this topic, Marinov’s opinion does not detach from traditional historical narratives. On one hand, he clearly reflects the claims of Sofia-based historians who insist on the Bulgarian character of the Macedonian people. On the other, the argument of the supra-national political agenda of the IMRO, even if not expressed by these precise terms, was always part of the repertoire of North Macedonian and Albanian national historiographies that I investigated in the previous paragraph and that Marinov does not take into account.

Blumi’s critique of national historiography regarding the Albanian national movement is more radical than Brown’s reinterpretation of the history of the Macedonian revolutionary organization. He challenges the common assumptions on nationalist movements by highlighting the relation between the Ottoman reforms and the progressive affirmation of national claims. According to Blumi, the native generation of Albanian, Bulgarian, or Greek-speaking employees was charged to extend the reforms in the peripheral areas of the empire from where they came. In the attempt to legitimize their policies, they used colonial derogatory terms such as “savage” or “religious fanatic” to define local subjects (Blumi Reference Blumi2011, 70). This was particularly the case of the (Southern Albanian) tosk bureaucrats who, in the Tanzimat era, justified the expansion of the Ottoman state power to the (Nothern Albanian) geg lands by claiming that they were tribal people and needed to be civilized (Blumi Reference Blumi2011, 25). In a similar way, the narratives about each single “people” or narod were then adopted by the Balkan intelligentsia in order to think of their homelands as objects of state reform (Blumi Reference Blumi2011, 70). Their endeavors found the complicity of local communities who “directly connected” to the new categories used by outside visitors and Balkan Ottoman reformers alike (Blumi Reference Blumi2011, 72). “Identity” claims were shaped and framed in geographical terms in order to express a set of local interests for the immediate community (like Hoti, Gruda, Kelmendi), larger confederations (Malësore, Gegë, Bjelopavelić), or entire regions like Albania/Arnavutluk or Macedonia (72). However, the author underlines that such claims were in no way coherent or stable and retrospectively cannot be associated to the quest for national emancipation. For instance, the idea of constituting an Albanian political entity or “Arnautluk” was conceived by Ottoman administrators in order to find an effective way to introduce reforms in a highly diversified area (Blumi Reference Blumi2011, 77–78).

Brown’s and Blumi’s investigations of national movements and national identities seem to dismantle the former categories used by national historiographies in order to investigate the relations between Albanians and Slavs. If identities were not fixed and if nationalism was not a major cause of political action, a discourse on inter-national relations between Albanians and Slavs in late Ottoman Macedonia would be senseless. However, when they dedicate attention to Albanian–Slav interactions, differences and similarities with national historiographies simultaneously emerge from their works. Although Brown rejects the assumption that the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization purported a national agenda, and claims that identities were “works in progress,” he represents the MRO–Albanian relationship as a dialectical confrontation in which the two groups appear as clearly distinct entities. The author affirms that, since its inception, the MRO was at odds with the Ottoman government; the neighboring states of Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria; and “a popular Albanian movement for statehood on overlapping territories …” (Brown Reference Brown2013, 4). Brown mirrors the opinions of national historians by acknowledging that there were early attempts of Macedonians to establish ties with other revolutionary movements in the Ottoman Empire, including movements operating in the Albanian territory (Brown Reference Brown2013, 62). Since both groups were facing the common “Turkish” challenge, they often expressed solidarity and called each other friends, more than they do in the contemporary world (Brown Reference Brown2013, 164). However, cooperation appears to have been motivated by direct economic/political interests, while conflictual relations prevailed because they were involved in a mutual competition for regional supremacy. According to Brown, the MRO was buying weapons from Albanian smugglers with the purpose of obtaining a double advantage. On one hand, they displaced the power asymmetry between Albanians (who owned weapons) and Macedonian-Slavs (who did not) “with a calculated claim to equality, unlicensed by the Ottoman state” (2013, 166). On the other, Albanian (and Turkish) smugglers became complicit in the Macedonian activities and were thereby discouraged to betray them (Brown Reference Brown2013, 153). In line with Yosmaoglu (Reference Yosmaoglu2012, 220), who claims that violence was “selective” rather than “indiscriminate” until 1903, Brown affirms that Macedonians’ goal was to build a capacity for violence that was only to be deployed when necessary (Brown Reference Brown2013, 167). The MRO did not attack Albanian (nor Turkish, nor Greek) communities indiscriminately, but they targeted those individuals who committed abuses against the property and honor of the Christian population (Brown Reference Brown2013, 168–169). Brown believes that the way the MRO managed violence could have been inspired by the Albanian “blood feud” custom (2013, 146). In analogy to North Macedonian historiography, he claims that killing Albanians was meant to discourage possible offenders, but at the same time it fostered a sense of security for the Christian population (Brown Reference Brown2013, 169).

Like national historians, Blumi considers the violence that affected the late Ottoman Balkans as the outcome of the activity of external agents rather than a result of internal conflicts. He acknowledges that the affirmation of Albanian nationalism was based on the Albanian–Slav distinction (2011, 37). However, he states that such division only concerned a small elite while local communities were unaffected by national ideology. Slavs and Albanians lived side by side and protected their resources from outsiders (Blumi Reference Blumi2003, 93–94). According to Blumi, the formation of armed groups, known as çeta, was not due to nationalism, but to the penetration of capitalism in the Ottoman economy. If we set aside the “national” question, his opinion in this case is not dissimilar to Albanian historiography at the time of communism. The authors of the 1984 history book printed by the Academy of Sciences affirm that the spread of the Albanian movement that led to the formation of the nationalist çeta was to a large extent due to Turkish political and economic oppression and to the penetration of Italian and Austrian-Hungarian imperialism, which introduced foreign capitals in the Ottoman Balkans (Pollo et al. Reference Pollo1984, 352–366). Blumi goes on to affirm that capitalism disrupted the social milieu and generated clashes among neighbors (2011, 13–14). The relations between local communities worsened around 1903 in Kosovo and Macedonian regions as a consequence of the identity policies that were introduced by external agents. By elaborating projects that would allow communities to self-administer themselves along ethnic lines, the Great Powers “distorted local relations by adapting an ethnic understanding of conflict” (Blumi Reference Blumi2003, 97). Despite such policies, Blumi continues, locals still resisted the efforts of outsiders to instigate strife within their communities. Among such outsiders, in complete contradiction with national historians, he mentions the IMRO (Blumi Reference Blumi2011, 75). In accordance with Brown and national historians, Blumi affirms that the çeta provided security to local communities, although he denies that they were separated along ethnic lines. In his view, the çeta that were active between 1903 and 1908 did not fight for national objectives or ethnic hatred, but to provide a “safe home for their families and community members” (Blumi Reference Blumi2011, 185).

The confrontation between Brown’s and Blumi’s works has shown that the two scholars, to a different degree, represent a break with the way traditional narratives consider the effects of nationalism on Albanian–Slav relations in the Balkans. These studies are the product of research studies conducted on solid theoretical grounds and a great variety of sources. The object of this article is not to discuss the quality of the historical reconstruction, but the evaluation of the weight that these authors attribute to nationalism in the frame of the Balkan affairs. They both insist on denying its importance in conditioning political mobilization, and they affirm that Balkan communities possessed undefined ethno-national identities. Nonetheless, some themes that belong to the national discourse still survive in their analyses. The intra-Albanian geg–tosk divide that Blumi (Reference Blumi2011, 19–25), Brown (Reference Brown2013), and others (Dragostinova and Hashamova Reference Dragostinova and Hashamova2016; Vezenkov Reference Vezenkov, Daskalov and Marinov2013, 489–522) currently assume in order to provide a seemingly more sophisticated representation of the relations between the communities of the late Ottoman Balkans is based on putative linguistic, cultural, sociological, geographical, and even attitudinal differences that separated the two communities. The problem with these claims is that they adopt the same ethnic-building logic that they criticize. In the attempt to “localize” Balkan relations, the authors confound the reader by asserting that Ottoman communities did not relate to each other according to ethnic feelings, but that Albanians who appear separated between geg and tosk do manifest this kind of relation.

Blumi has rightly pointed out that in emphasizing the conflictual relationship between Albanians and Christian Slavs, Brown brings back the stereotyped perception of Muslim Albanians (Blumi Reference Blumi2014) by Macedonian Slavs that the author himself had noticed in his former book (Brown Reference Brown2003, 40). As Skopje historians did before him, Brown represents Albanians as elements that were “altered” by contact with Turks and converted to Islam before becoming either brigands or puppets of the regime who vexed the Christian Slav population in late Ottoman Macedonia (2013, 158). Moreover, he purports the idea—equally hailed by Macedonian historians—that Albanians were organized according to tribal units which obeyed an “unwritten law” (it is a reference to the so-called Kanun), and that the possession of guns placed them in a position of superiority in respect to other regional groups (Brown Reference Brown2013, 161). Certainly, many Albanians followed the prescription of the unwritten law, but it is difficult to know exactly what kind of advantage they gained by virtue of their guns. The idea that they were organized in “tribes” could be criticized not only because this type of organization does not fit the Albanian case (Young Reference Young2000, 14), but also because the concept itself is the legacy of a highly biased anthropology (Fabian 1984, 17). Blumi is more radical in his critique of national historiographies and aims to completely eradicate the use of pre-assumed categories such as “Albanian” or “Bulgarian” as distinctive factors for political mobilization. However, in so doing, he places too much emphasis on the foreign vs. local relationship and makes the former appear with the heroic vestige of the resistance fighters who were forced to take arms to defend their families and honor (Clayer Reference Clayer2013). The author introduces his work in a Homeric vein by stating, “I will speak especially about the kind of characters Albanians call burrë/burra (pl.)…. These burra diligently served as guardians of their community’s dignity; the nature of their sacrifice became the source of local legend and constantly filled the pages of consular reports that can still be found in European archives” (Blumi Reference Blumi2011, XVI). By proposing this argument, it seems that he is affirming that locals were animated by a patriotic feeling which was neither Albanian nor Slav, but Ottoman, although not in a national, but in a local, sense. However, the line that separates nationalism from patriotism is not so thick, and it often varies according to the perspective of the narrator. As Blumi remarks in his works, groups—as big or small as they might be—are not distinct entities, and neither are they animated by a unique agenda. They are rather, to paraphrase his thought, constantly transformed in the process of relations with others, and their agenda might shift according to necessities and opportunities. This means that just as one should be suspicious of categories such as “Albanian,” “Bulgarian,” or “Serb,” one should also keep in mind that the designation “guardians of the community’s dignity” might hide or justify the same prerogatives that are legitimated for the sake of nations, which are communities as well.