I want to begin my remarks by steaming, as a philatelist would a coveted stamp, a single word off the envelope of Catherine Gallagher's Telling It Like It Wasn't. The word occurs in the introduction, where Gallagher is establishing the boundaries of her subject by offering a sample counterfactual-historical premise: “If John F. Kennedy had not been assassinated in 1963 and had lived to be a two-term president, the war in Vietnam would have been over by 1968.” The Kennedy premise, Gallagher goes on to say, “is not attempting to call the assassination into question or to imply that we should look into it more deeply; it is simply asserting that but for the assassination, history would likely have taken a different path. Insisting on this definition of ‘historical counterfactual’ at the outset should not only clarify the topic but also emphasize that the works under discussion are hinged onto the actual historical record, usually at a juncture that is widely recognized to have been both crucial and underdetermined.”Footnote 1
The word I want to lift up is underdetermined. Although it occurs only once in the book, it occupies an important role as one of two criteria for the alternate-history “nexus”—the hinge moment where a counterfactual work's narrated history forks away from Our Timeline along an invented Alternate Timeline. Such junctures, again, are “widely recognized to have been both crucial and underdetermined.” Crucial as in decisive, critical, evoking (by way of Francis Bacon's notion of the instantia crucis) the fingerpost at a crossroads, indicating one path over the rest. Underdetermined as in not-overdetermined, lacking the condition of being so multiply or redundantly determined that the outcome would remain the same despite the subtraction of any one contributing force or event.Footnote 2 And if you imagine a two-by-two matrix of these criteria you begin to see why a counterfactual nexus tends to be both crucial and underdetermined. Not crucial and underdetermined: I am choosing between three equally appealing, equally plentiful breakfast cereals in my kitchen; regardless of my choice, the world goes on as before. Not crucial and overdetermined: I am choosing between what I believe to be three equally appealing, equally plentiful breakfast cereals in my kitchen but it turns out that someone has finished two of them and put the empty boxes back on the shelf, so regardless of my preference I'll be having Heritage Flakes and the world will go on as before. Crucial and overdetermined: the president is deciding whether or not to initiate a nuclear strike against an adversary but the wise and faceless archons who run the deep state have given him a dummy nuclear button and anyway the nuclear weapons infrastructure is so antiquated that no missiles would fly even if a legitimate launch command were given. Crucial and underdetermined: a presidential nuclear decision with a legit button and responsive missiles. It's only the final kind of nexus, crucial and underdetermined, that produces an outcome consequential enough to bother undoing and reimagining through the technology of counterfactual narrative. (I note in passing that it would be interesting to consider what narrative genres, if any, correlate with the other three kinds of moment in this matrix.)
But let's tarry a little longer with underdetermined. I've been treating that term a bit blithely as the simple obverse of overdetermined, but as Gallagher elsewhere makes clear, an event may be not-overdetermined in several degrees. At the most extreme is an entirely indeterminate event with zero discernable causes, the kind of event that if generalized would, in her words, “preclude the predictable continuity of new sequences” (63), effectively emptying the world of causality and hence of narratability. At the nearer end of things, an event might be nonredundantly determined by having exactly one cause, in which case we might consider it simply determined. I take underdetermined to denote the region between 0 and 1 causes, as it were—between indeterminate and determined—where it takes an exercise of volition, a chance operation, or some combination of the two, to get us over the threshold of an event's occurrence. And indeed this is confirmed by the hinge-moments of alternate-history novels: for every nexus borne of a counterfactual decision—Charles Lindbergh's decision to run for president in Philip Roth's The Plot Against America (2004), for example—we find one arising from an alternate outcome to some chance-informed event. Thus in Philip K. Dick's The Man in the High Castle (1962), the nexus is a historical assassination attempt in 1933 whose outcome is altered not by a different decision on the part of the gunman, Giuseppe Zangara, but by a chance variation, fatal for president-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt, in the course of Zangara's bullet.
I want to set the underdetermined quality of the nexus in conversation with another trait of alternate-historical novels that Gallagher identifies, a reversal of the figure and ground of most other fictional genres. Via this reversal, individual characters in alternate-historical novels recede in importance while collectivities, typically nation-states, emerge as protagonists. It's worth noting what a weak model of protagonism this is. As the examples of Dick and Roth illustrate, collectivities become protagonists of alternate-historical novels by a process the collectivity didn't initiate and typically cannot reverse. In Dick's novel there's no question of getting “back” to Our Timeline from the Alternate Timeline initiated by Zangara's bullet. In Roth's, it's an alloy of chance and individual acts—Lindbergh's plane crash and Anne Morrow Lindbergh's broadcast to the nation—rather than some kind of collective act or decision, that returns the diegetic world to something like Our Timeline. Even an alternate-history narrative manifestly interested in the possibility of collective moral agency—Charles Renouvier's Uchronia is Gallagher's main example of this type—depends structurally on consequential individual acts in a way that finally deepens rather than crosses the scalar gulf between individual and collective action. The inverted, demotic protagonism of alternate-historical novels may be able to scale individual character up to national character, but it typically can't scale individual agency up to collective agency.
This opens up a series of fresh questions about whether the weakness of the collective protagonism offered by alternate-history novels is an expression of the novel's individualist DNA or might be understood in other ways—as, for instance, an attempt to stimulate collective agency and practices toward freedom by making their possibility a structural premise of the subgenre only to withhold the diegetic realization of that possibility. By activating questions of agency's scalability in the context of alternate-history fiction, Telling It Like It Wasn't also gives us new juxtapositions to ponder—for instance, of counterfactual narrative with the bildungsroman, which deploys the soul–nation allegory to cross the gulf between the individual and the social totality. In promoting nation states to the status of protagonist, the alternate-history novel would seem to be premised on a refusal, even a negation, of allegory. Yet far from being absent, allegory crops up frequently in Gallagher's readings, typically where a counterfactual past is said to allegorize some unfinished business or isomorphism in the present of the novel's writing. Thus the alternative Confederate States of America in Harry Turtledove's The Guns of the South (1992) seems, among other things, “an allegory of the post–Cold War places (Somalia, for example) where national liberation had left people struggling to bring sovereign states out of loose coalitions of armed groups” (183). Ward Moore's Bring the Jubilee (1953) is similarly “an allegory for its time,” drawings its counterfactual portrait of the 1870s alongside the postwar rise of the Dixiecrats in order to “[ask] readers to get back on the right path and resume the struggle that was left unfinished” by the turn from Reconstruction to Jim Crow (189). It's possible that analogy would be a better term than allegory for these attempts to irritate the present into action by asserting a comparable past's nonidentity with itself. In either case, Gallagher's readings pose a fascinating question to readers of her primary texts: How, going forward, might we think about the widescreen, politically hortatory address of novels that forbear, despite the liberties they take with history, to represent collective protagonism?
These are just a few of the formal and literary historical inquiries opened up by Telling It Like It Wasn't, without which we would still be stranded in a state of near-ignorance about the history and narrative mechanics of the counterfactual imagination. There but for the grace of Gallagher go we.
