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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 December 2005
In this autobiographical account of labor relations on the Montreal waterfront, Alexander C. Pathy gives an insider account of the volatile relationship between shippers and longshoremen. Pathy worked as a lawyer and then official of the influential Maritime Employers Association (MEA). The MEA was in the forefront in changing employment relations to better fit the introduction of technological changes brought on by containerization. As in most ports around the world, the introduction of containerization was riven with challenge and controversy. The Port of Montreal, and the lesser ports of Quebec City and Trois-Rivieres, shared this common experience. According to Pathy up to 1960 the respective ports had seen little strife. Indeed, it would seem that the relations between the two sides had been relatively amicable. This would change once ship owners and stevedores embarked on a rationalization scheme to make the loading and unloading of cargo that much more efficient and speedier. Beginning in 1960, negotiations became increasingly heated and hostile. Not least was the problem of language. In what could be best described as mutual ignorance the employers negotiated in English, while the union representatives, reflecting the membership, spoke in French. It was no wonder that misunderstandings could occur because of poor translation. But according to Pathy more than language, the principal point of conflict was perception. Each side brought to the table mutual suspicion and hostility. The problem Pathy contends was, “Each party did not see its glass half full but half empty.”(40) Therefore, negotiations over gang size, technological improvements, hiring methods, and union jurisdiction all became major issues of contention. Adding to the complexity of the situation was the role of Canadian government. Canadian industrial relations law gave the government a vital stake in the negotiations. Just as important, as both official and wildcat strikes broke out, the government scrambled to stabilize the situation as ships were diverted to US ports. The loss of trade and thereby revenue was seen as a critical impairment to the maritime economy.
In this autobiographical account of labor relations on the Montreal waterfront, Alexander C. Pathy gives an insider account of the volatile relationship between shippers and longshoremen. Pathy worked as a lawyer and then official of the influential Maritime Employers Association (MEA). The MEA was in the forefront in changing employment relations to better fit the introduction of technological changes brought on by containerization. As in most ports around the world, the introduction of containerization was riven with challenge and controversy. The Port of Montreal, and the lesser ports of Quebec City and Trois-Rivieres, shared this common experience. According to Pathy up to 1960 the respective ports had seen little strife. Indeed, it would seem that the relations between the two sides had been relatively amicable. This would change once ship owners and stevedores embarked on a rationalization scheme to make the loading and unloading of cargo that much more efficient and speedier. Beginning in 1960, negotiations became increasingly heated and hostile. Not least was the problem of language. In what could be best described as mutual ignorance the employers negotiated in English, while the union representatives, reflecting the membership, spoke in French. It was no wonder that misunderstandings could occur because of poor translation. But according to Pathy more than language, the principal point of conflict was perception. Each side brought to the table mutual suspicion and hostility. The problem Pathy contends was, “Each party did not see its glass half full but half empty.”(40) Therefore, negotiations over gang size, technological improvements, hiring methods, and union jurisdiction all became major issues of contention. Adding to the complexity of the situation was the role of Canadian government. Canadian industrial relations law gave the government a vital stake in the negotiations. Just as important, as both official and wildcat strikes broke out, the government scrambled to stabilize the situation as ships were diverted to US ports. The loss of trade and thereby revenue was seen as a critical impairment to the maritime economy.
The negotiations took a familiar pattern of deadlocked talks, followed by government commissions suggesting how the issue could be resolved. Generally at this point the government would appoint Judge Alan B. Gold to arbitrate. Gold would become the leading figure in drawing up a new collective bargaining system. Gold had little patience either for the intransigence of the management or trade union officials. As with all good arbitrators Gold insisted that both sides keep talking. Only through a continuous exchange of ideas and demands could a resolution be found. Initially the union was supportive of Gold and grateful for his early decisions to award large pay increases. In turn, the principal union organization, ILA Local 375, embarked on an aggressive campaign of expansion in and around the Montreal port.
For the MEA, the wage concessions were seen as unnecessarily generous. It decided to counterattack. First it unified with stevedores creating a solid employer front. Second, it demanded concessions in gang size, forced retirements, and changes to job security. The scene was set for major confrontations over these demands. Throughout the late 1960s and 1970s the ILA battled to hold onto its shrinking power. Using government commissions and Gold, the MEA handily secured most of what it wanted despite strike action by the ILA membership. The changing power relations were evident by the late 1970s when the union was forced to recognize the ascendancy of management. Helping management was its close collaboration with the Canadian government. The government agreed to help finance the longshoremen's retirement costs. Just as in other ports throughout the world, the union and the men had to scramble to hold onto whatever gains they could. In the end though the ILA was forced to accept the break up of the traditional gang structure, its membership had be on call seven days a week, and the numbers of longshoremen fell precipitously.
The book provides a unique insight into employer attitudes and action. How the competing shippers and steverdores came together under the MEA umbrella says much about employer unity in the face of a strong trade union. Pathy also gives the reader biographical details of both management and union officialdom. Although at times Pathy tries extremely hard to appear fair in his appraisal, his approach is to concentrate on the managerial side of the conflict. This is both its strength and weakness. Understanding how management operates in a union dominated milieu provides a picture of contestation and struggle. Unfortunately, the approach relegates the union side of the story to the margins. Union officials who fight hard to protect their members' interests are characterized as hard-headed, or even boneheaded. Union officials are classed as simple wreckers with little forethought of what their obstructive posturing could incite. Pathy's leanings do not allow him to ask fundamental questions such as what it suggests when a managerial group does not literally speak the same language as its workers. This lack of attention to longshoremen leaves a large gap in the study. Who were these longshoremen? Other than being French-speaking, were there differences between them? What sort of cargoes were they handling? The widespread pilferage on the Montreal docks is condemned by Pathy, but what does such activity say about the longshoremen's culture of entitlement? The intimate relationship between the MEA and the government also needed to be discussed and contextualized. That is, what does it say about an industrial relations system where the employer group have ready access to government ministers? When the government agrees to financially support the employer's job security initiatives, how much does this change or shift the power relationship between the national state and employers and workers? One final problem with the study is its length. It is exceedingly long and inundated with mediation and arbitration meetings. After a while such specific details leaves the reader blurry-eyed. A better editing job would have made the reading easier and more enjoyable. Nonetheless, the book has much to commend it. It above all allows a critical view of the structure and machinations of an employer group. The MEA transformed itself from a part-time, non-French speaking group of shippers, to that of a multilingual and multi employer/stevedore organization. Its position as employer representative was assured after it began a systematic restructuring of the Port of Montreal and elsewhere. A once-strong and vibrant Local 375 was transformed in the process. Its ability to withstand employer directives made it a formidable opponent, but once the Canadian government firmly attached itself to the MEA the ILA was forced into retreat. The power shift of the government made the battle of the longshoremen that much more difficult, and resulted in fundamental changes in their working world. Gone were the work gangs, and the speed of cargo moving back and forth increased exponentially.