Alexander Hamilton's legacy as one of America's founders has been examined from many different angles. His role at the Constitutional Convention; his part in the Constitution's ratification, as the initiator and chief author of The Federalist and at the New York ratifying convention; his relationship with George Washington and his activities in the first president's cabinet; his seminal thinking on the energetic executive, on war and foreign affairs, and on the fashioning of a commercial republic with an integrated national economy; his contribution to the justification of an independent judiciary and the theoretical case for judicial review—all these and more have been extensively studied in the Hamilton literature.
Kate Elizabeth Brown has made an important new contribution to the study of Hamilton and his legacy, by focusing our attention on hitherto underappreciated aspects of Hamilton's legal career, both in theory and more importantly in practice, both in public office and in private advocacy for clients. If she sometimes overstates her case for Hamilton's achievements or importance—and she does—her book is still a fresh and instructive examination of his place in American legal history.
On the evidence presented here, Alexander Hamilton was one of the most learned, astute, adaptive, and far-seeing legal thinkers and practitioners in American history. As treasury secretary, he not only devised the young nation's formative fiscal and economic policies; he also staked out the legal responsibilities and discretionary scope of the executive branch, both vertically (in the secretary's relations with his subordinates) and horizontally (in the executive's relations with Congress and the courts). His leadership in the fashioning of tax policy—and in one instance his own appearance before the Supreme Court after leaving the treasury—helped to settle contested questions of constitutional meaning and congressional power. And his advocacy of the property rights of loyalists, and of the claims of truth in libel law, advanced the cause of reforms in equity and common law suitable for a free republic.
Brown assembles a wealth of examples to support her case, many of them little-known before now. In choosing to organize her book around large themes, however, she has attempted to capture Hamilton's legal thought and practice within frames too artificial to persuade us that they adequately represent her man's own thinking. The idea of “concurrence,” for instance, gets a double workout, appearing in the context of both the separation of powers and federalism. So two chapters are devoted to “functional concurrence,” by which Brown means the cooperative interplay of national executive and judicial officers in carrying out acts of Congress; and two are devoted to “federal concurrence,” meaning the sometimes coexisting, sometimes conflicting, governing authorities of the national government and the states. But this double use of “concurrence” for very different ideas tends to rob it of its distinctiveness. It becomes shaggy and ill-defined, an amorphous “concurrent constitutionalism” (206), whereas each of its variants could properly be sharpened into clearer focus in its own right.
Even taking each form of concurrence in turn, the author's way with the evidence sometimes seems too forced. Brown's thesis regarding the “functional concurrence” of the national executive and judiciary, so cooperative that she sees a common “federal magistracy” comprising both branches, is strongly evident only in one instance, namely the Remitting Act of 1790. This statute charged federal district judges, when petitioned by merchants facing fine or forfeiture for nonpayment of duties, with conducting an inquiry into whether such penalties ought to be remitted or mitigated, and—here is the crucial part—transmitting the results of such inquiries to the treasury secretary, who could authorize such remission at his own discretion. Whether this act was inconsistent with the judicial power's constitutional limitation to truly adversarial “cases” or “controversies” is an interesting question; as Brown notes, another act in this period that put judges in the position of reporting to the executive branch was regarded by the judges as unconstitutional. But whatever we make of this business, it is the author's one truly straightforward example of the separation of powers looking more like a blending into a single magistracy. All her other examples evince a sharper role differentiation, notwithstanding Brown's characterization of a “symbiotic relationship” (60) or her claim that Hamilton “recruited the federal courts” (70) for this or that purpose of his own.
Likewise, when Brown discusses “federal concurrence” between the national and state governments, she works too hard to attribute to Hamilton certain developments with which he had little to do. The Constitution had given the new federal courts cognizance of admiralty cases, but state common-law courts continued to hear cases touching on maritime commerce, such as marine insurance litigation. When President Washington proclaimed American neutrality in the Anglo-French war of the 1790s, the nation's foreign policy had a profound impact on its foreign commerce, with consequent legal effects that rippled through both state and federal courts. “Neutrality,” Brown explains, also “revolutionized the business of marine insurance” (110). A decade after Hamilton's death, Justice Joseph Story (on circuit) held that federal admiralty jurisdiction “encompassed maritime torts and contract disputes too” (111), including marine insurance litigation, thus generating a new jurisdiction concurrent with that of the state courts. But what exactly had Hamilton had to do with all this? He was deeply interested in the emergence of a commercial republic; he assisted Washington in the creation and defense of American neutrality; and in private practice he had litigated a great many marine insurance cases in state courts. But he had never so much as suggested, in Brown's own account, the jurisprudential development for which Story was responsible. The dots simply do not connect in a way that makes this particular “federal concurrence” here into a Hamiltonian achievement.
So too, Brown devotes a good deal of space to the enduring influence of a few lines by Hamilton in Federalist, No. 32, on a limiting principle of concurrent legislative power in Congress and the state. That limit is the “repugnancy” principle, which invalidates any state law whose operation is “contradictory and repugnant” (The Federalist, ed. J. R. Pole [Hackett, 2005], 169) to a valid act of Congress. This principle, as John Marshall explained in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), arises as a necessary inference from the supremacy clause of Article VI. But in Brown's account, Hamilton's having devoted less than a sentence to it in the Federalist is enough to make it “his repugnancy caveat” (144, my emphasis), as though American law owed the inner logic of the Constitution itself to his legal acumen.
Brown's final two substantive chapters make a stronger case for Hamilton's durable impact as a lawyer, and, rather interestingly, the setting of these chapters is his private practice in New York state courts. As an attorney for Dutch land investors in the state, Hamilton succeeded in infusing the common law governing mortgages with innovations developed in equity jurisdiction, moving the law in pro-development, pro-investment directions that opened the American land market to foreign capital. And in his last notable case, People v. Croswell (1804), Hamilton not only reformed the state's law of criminal libel with a successful argument. He also pioneered a capacious understanding of the common law as “the expansive, constitutive law of the land” (204), an understanding with effects that rippled out to touch the treatment of precedent, the distinction between legislation that declared and legislation that modified the common law, and the broad but constrained authority of the judiciary itself. These developments in the law are very well explained—and are eminently creditable to Hamilton.
The author occasionally stumbles over her own evidence (there are a couple of instances in which interpolations radically change the meaning of quotations, for instance), and she is also a bit too confident that Hamilton—and Marshall, for that matter—envisioned “the federal courts as the final expositors of constitutionality for the national government” (58). But Alexander Hamilton and the Development of American Law, for all its eagerness to credit Hamilton too much for a large, coherent contribution to our legal order, is a book full of fascinating evidence of the many small, discrete contributions he made to the rule of law, administrative practice, and American constitutionalism.
