The use and alleged abuse of so-called policy czars received substantial media attention during the Obama administration, as many Republicans criticized the number of special advisors appointed by the president. Scholarly analysis of these oft-controversial advisors, however, has been somewhat limited, partly because the term lacks an accepted definition. In Czars in the White House, Justin S. Vaughn and José D, Villalobos provide a welcome contribution to this area of study through a rich description and analysis of selected czars spanning the Nixon through the Obama presidencies.

Among the primary challenges of conducting research on this topic is the lack of a consensus regarding what actually constitutes a “czar” position. The director of the Office of National AIDS Policy (ONAP) was commonly referred to as the “AIDS czar” during the Clinton administration, but George W. Bush never referred to the ONAP director as a czar (p.113). In response to objections from the Right, the Obama administration likewise sought to minimize references to czars in the administration as such in order to forestall future criticism. Addressing the term’s imprecision, Vaughn and Villalobos propose a definition of czars as “members of an administration tasked with coordination responsibilities over a particular policy problem that an administration is intent on either solving or at least addressing symbolically” (p. 2). This definition is broader than alternatives proposed by other scholars who have additionally considered the specific authorities exercised by czars or whether such advisors require Senate confirmation.

Many on Capitol Hill have objected to the use of czars because they are in some cases exempt from the oversight reach of Congress. Some political scientists have therefore included Senate confirmation as a principal factor in defining what constitutes a czar. Vaughn and Villalobos depart from this approach by arguing that the coordinative role of czars serves as their most fundamental quality. As a case in point, the Office of Management and Budget estimated that the homeland security czar would coordinate counterterrorism actions across 70 different agencies following the creation of the position in 2001 (p.126). While not always to this extreme, all czars encounter collective-action problems to varying degrees. The authors accordingly emphasize the importance of coordination as these appointees work to address a specific policy problem.

Because it is at times unclear which advisors should rightly be labeled as czars, a list of all appointed czars in American history does not presently exist. Using a relatively broad definition, a 2009 Politico report identified nearly 30 czar positions within the Obama administration. Scholars applying a more nuanced definition have placed the number of modern czars closer to 20. The total number of czar positions is unclear, according to Vaughn and Villalobos, since the authors unfortunately do not apply their preferred definition to catalog czar positions over time. However, the proliferation of czars in the modern era clearly serves as one of the central justifications for the study.

Following the introduction of the authors’ preferred definition, Chapter 2 chronicles the rise of czars over the course of the twentieth century as a response to the widening gap between the public’s expectations of the president and the president’s capacity to govern. Although the czar moniker dates back to the Coolidge administration, it was the Franklin D. Roosevelt presidency that created “unprecedented expectations for presidential leadership” (p. 24). Given the institutional and political obstacles that hinder effective presidential leadership, Vaughn and Villalobos argue that presidents of both parties have appointed czars out of necessity. Understanding the fragmented nature of overlapping jurisdictions within the executive branch, presidents have empowered czars not only to coordinate government action in policy areas deemed high priority but also to embody the government’s commitment to addressing a salient policy. Serving in this regard, czars represent a potentially beneficial “new avenue for leadership” as a resource for presidents who may struggle to meet public expectations on a range of issues (p. 29).

Chapters 3 through 5 chronicle the actions of the energy czar (1973–79), drug czar (1930–present), and AIDS czar (1993–present). Save for designating the case studies as “high-profile,” the authors do not provide much justification regarding the selection of the czars evaluated in the text (p. 7). The subsequent two chapters examine multiple czars during the Bush and Obama administrations, including the homeland security czar, intelligence czar, war czar, climate czar, urban affairs czar, and health czar. These chapters provide impressive chronological descriptions of notable actions of numerous officials serving in these capacities.

Every chapter concludes with a brief section evaluating the degree to which each czar was successful. The authors characterize the energy czar as among the most successful czars and the AIDS czar as one of the largest failures. In order to judge whether czars are successful, Vaughn and Villalobos ask two primary questions. First, how effective was the czar in coordinating the executive branch’s ability to address policy problems? Second, to what degree did the czar produce positive impressions among the public? Based upon their examination of several case studies, the authors argue that the most important factors that determine whether czars ultimately achieve their policy goals include: 1) mission clarity and authority, 2) individual skills and expertise, 3) access to the president, 4) political context, and 5) policy analysis and strategic response development (pp. 166–72). In assessing these factors expected to affect czar success, the authors conclude that most czars are likely to fail.

Finally, opponents of czars have critiqued these advisors as the establishment of a “shadow government” that largely evades legislative or judicial oversight. Considering the controversy surrounding czars, the authors unfortunately devote little attention to discussing ways in which external institutions or interests could check the alleged abuse of czars. A limitation rider included in a 2011 omnibus appropriations act, for example, prohibited the expenditure of funds for the salaries of four existing czar positions. A signing statement issued by Barack Obama argued that this provision unconstitutionally infringed upon the prerogatives of the president. The suggestion that the administration would not comply with the law earned further rebuke from Republican lawmakers. This interbranch conflict is only mentioned in passing in the introductory chapter.

Although one may expect greater discussion of the contemporary controversies surrounding czars, Czars in the White House is a book that principally aims to advance our understanding of “what [czars] really are and what they really do” (p. 4; emphasis in original). In this effort, Vaughn and Villalobos are by and large successful.