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The geography of climate migration

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 March 2021

Michał Burzyński
Affiliation:
LISER, Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research, Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg
Frédéric Docquier*
Affiliation:
LISER, Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research, Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg
Hendrik Scheewel
Affiliation:
Université de Liège and IRES, UCLouvain, Liège, Belgium
*
*Corresponding author. E-mail: frederic.docquier@liser.lu

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the long-term effects of climate change on the mobility of working-age people. We use a world economy model that covers almost all the countries around the world, and distinguishes between rural and urban regions as well as between flooded and unflooded areas. The model is calibrated to match international and internal mobility data by education level for the last 30 years, and is then simulated under climate change variants. We endogenize the size, dyadic, and skill structure of climate migration. When considering moderate climate scenarios, we predict mobility responses in the range of 70–108 million workers over the course of the twenty-first century. Most of these movements are local or inter-regional. South–South international migration responses are smaller, while the South–North migration response is of the “brain drain” type and induces a permanent increase in the number of foreigners in OECD countries in the range of 6–9% only. Changes in the sea level mainly translate into forced local movements. By contrast, inter-regional and international movements are sensitive to temperature-related changes in productivity. Lastly, we show that relaxing international migration restrictions may exacerbate the poverty effect of climate change at origin if policymakers are unable to select/screen individuals in extreme poverty.

Information

Type
Research Paper
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press in association with Université catholique de Louvain
Figure 0

Figure 1. RCP-4.5 scenario and its effects on TFP and forced displacement.Notes: Own calculations based on climate data by Giorgetta et al. (2012). Subfigures (a) and (b) represent deviations from the baseline situation in 2010 at the pixel level. Subfigures (c)–(f) represent relative deviations from the NoCLC scenario in the year 2100 and at the region level.

Figure 1

Figure 2. Convergence vs. divergence in TFP under alternative climate scenarios.Notes: Mean annual growth rates of TFP levels over the period 2010–2100 are represented on the vertical axes. The 2010 levels of TFP (in logs) are represented on the horizontal axes. The trends correspond to the quadratic relationship between the two variables. A negative slope indicates a convergence process; a positive slope indicates divergence.

Figure 2

Table 1. Aggregate effects of climate change by world region

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Figure 3. Climate migration worldwide.

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Table 2. Climate migration worldwide (in millions)

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Table 3. Effect of climate change on migration rates

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Figure 4. Urbanization due to climate change.Notes: Figure 4 depicts the percentage point changes in the proportion of urban population that is due to climate change (RCP 4.5). It distinguishes between low-skilled and high-skilled populations. ΔUrbanization ≙ Urban share(2100, RCP 4.5) − Urban Share(2100, No CLC).

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Figure 5. Self-selection in climate migration.Notes: Figure 5 compares the proportion of college graduates among climate migrants (Y-axes) and natives (X-axes). It distinguishes between three categories of migrants (local, internal, and South–North) and two climate scenarios [RCP-4.5 in (a)–(c), and Higher T in (d)–(f)]. Bubble sizes are proportional to the square root of the number of movers.

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Figure 6. Effect of climate change on income distribution in 2100 (under RCP-4.5).Notes: Figure 6 depicts smoothed predicted distributions of income in 2100 under the No CLC (black solid curve), and RCP-4.5 (gray dashed curve) scenarios. The gray vertical line represents the relative poverty threshold (2% of average income).

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Figure 7. Climate change and inequality without migration (under RCP-4.5).Notes: Figure 7 depicts smoothed predicted distributions of income in 2100 under the RCP-4.5 climate scenario and alternative migration policies. The gray vertical dashed line represents the relative poverty threshold (2% of average income). The black solid curve gives the inequality responses under current migration costs and policies. The dark gray dashed curve gives the effects obtained after closing all borders. The light gray dotted curve shows the effects obtained after preventing people from migrating between regions/sectors within their country.

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Table A1. Top 30 changes in urban share due to climate change

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Table A2. Countries included in our model and their ISO codes