Defining quasi-anarchical system

The most important assumption in international relations theory is that the international system is anarchic. This implies that among the sovereign states that make up the international system, there is no central authority with a monopoly on the use of violent force. As such, under a system of anarchy, sovereign states have the equivalent basic function: relying on their own capabilities to ensure national survival. In other words, sovereign states in the international system are all self-help actors. As a result, security relations among states are extremely competitive.Footnote ¹⁴ States may choose to form alliances with other states to collectively respond to major external security threats, but external allies generally can only be a supplementary force in response to these security threats, and the duration of an alliance often does not surpass one generation (20–30 years). Alliances shift and change regularly in their focus, and after a common threat is exterminated, they tend to dissolve.Footnote ¹⁵ One classic example is the dissolution after the end of World War II of the alliance against fascism.

However, under a quasi-anarchical system, a group of sovereign states largely give up their autonomy in the provision of security, either because they are so weak or to save on the costs of maintaining security, and this illustrates the characteristics of a client state. A client state refers to a state which depends on support and protection from a great power when it comes to responding to core strategic threats.Footnote ¹⁶ In other words, in a quasi-anarchical system, there is a security guarantor to ensure the national survival of the client states. The security guarantor extends its security protection through military alliances, the establishment of military bases, and an integrated military command system. The client states provide all necessary support within their capabilities to the security guarantor so that it can achieve its security mission.

It is not difficult to see that a hierarchical relationship exists between states the security guarantor and the client states. While the security guarantor is in a position of leadership, the client states are in a position of subordination.Footnote ¹⁷ For this reason, alliances between the security guarantor and client states tend to be long term, and even should the security threat which first prompted the creation of an alliance disappear, the parties to the alliance will work to identify a new threat to maintain it because neither state desires to leave the alliance. For the client states, many years of receiving security increases the level of dependency on the security guarantor; for the security guarantor, it can take advantage of the dependency of the client states in order to maintain its privileged place in the hierarchy, and can utilize the resources of the client states to decrease its security burden. Since World War II, the relationship between the United States and other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) represent a classical case of the security hierarchy, with the United States as the security guarantor and the European countries as the client states.

In addition to the security guarantor and the client states, in the quasi-anarchical system there is another group of states (including both great powers and small and medium sized states) which rely on their own capabilities to maintain their security. Together with the sub-hierarchy system led by the security guarantor, these self-help states collectively form a classical anarchic system with rather intense security competition among them. If the power of one self-help state within the system grows quickly, security competition within the system will be particularly intense.

For self-help states, they are mainly concerned that a rising self-help state will damage their capacity to self-preservation and pose a serious threat to their security. In order to respond to a threat from a rising state, in addition to increasing their own capacity, these states also seek strategic cooperation with the security guarantor. It is important to recognize that such cooperation between self-help states and the security guarantor does not imply that they join the hierarchical sub-system led by the security guarantor. As for the security guarantor, its key concern is that its power advantage will be diluted or reversed, and that the security hierarchy will gradually loosen and ultimately dissolve, causing the loss of its dominant position over the long term. For this reason, it uses its hierarchical system and the worries of other self-help states to check the expanding power of rising powers. As for the states within the hierarchy, they can take advantage of the security guarantor's protection to compete with rising powers, especially with respect to territorial disputes with great powers, where they can gain an advantage and realize core security interests while at the same time creating more space for the security guarantor to offer support.

In sum, the quasi-anarchical system is an anarchical system within which there exists a hierarchical sub-system in terms of security relations among related states. As such, the quasi-anarchic system illustrates the characteristics of both anarchy and hierarchy. States within such a quasi-anarchical system can be divided into three different types according to the means by which they seek security: (1) the security guarantor which not only are capable of self-defense, but which can also provide security guarantees to the client states; (2) client states which have difficulty responding to major security threats, and must depend on protection from the security guarantor; (3) self-help states which rely on their own capacity to deter threats, but are not able to provide security to other states. In terms of the security relations between states, there are two types of relations which predominate in quasi-anarchy: the first is competitive security relations, which are between two self-help states and between self-help states and the security guarantor or the client states; the second is relations of security dependence, which are found between the client states and the security guarantor within the hierachical subsystem.

The quasi-anarchical order in East Asia

During the Cold War, Asian allies and most ASEAN states relied primarily on US military assistance and security protection,Footnote ¹⁸ and their security dependency was quite apparent. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the situation changed slightly, but soon returned to the Cold War status quo, with United States’ East Asian allies or strategic partners (including Japan, Korea, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia) trending towards increased security dependence on the United States, increasingly constituting a hierarchical sub-system, with the East Asian states subordinate to the United States. The security alliance between these states and the United States is still evident, and has tended towards deepening; the United States maintains a visible, large-scale military presence in these countries, or has military bases on their soil. Further, the significance of the US security guarantee has become more evident, as these countries are increasingly dependent on US strategic protection from threats by great powers, from small and medium sized states, or even from internal threats.

For example, in October 2009, when then Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio proposed the concept of the East Asian Community, he especially emphasized that as Japan deepened its relations with Asian states (especially China) that it must depend on the Japanese–US alliance.Footnote ¹⁹ In August of 2011, the Japanese government issued the Self-Defense White Paper, which emphasized even more that the Japanese–US alliance is critical for maintaining peace and stability for Japan and the Asia Pacific Region, and that it would deepen its alliance with the United States in the future.Footnote ²⁰

To offer another example, facing concerns related to North Korean nuclear missiles, South Korea continues to depend on the ROC-US military alliance. In June of 2009, during his visit to the United States, Lee Myung-bak noted that the ROK-US alliance is critical for resolving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) nuclear and missile threats. He is expected to seek a written promise of continued US nuclear protection.Footnote ²¹ In November of 2011, the ROK government announced that the ROK Army planned to construct a new military facility at Paekyong Island, west of DPRK territorial waters in order to accommodate an US military deployment in the event of an emergency situation or a military exercise.Footnote ²²

To offer a further example, at the Nuclear Security Summit held in April 2010, President Arroyo of the Philippines expressed her desire for a US guarantee to prevent a recurrence of the 2009 post-electoral violence that left 46 people dead.Footnote ²³ On 2 July 2012, the Philippine President Aquino told Reuters in an interview that the Philippines may ask the United States to deploy spy planes over the South China Sea to help monitor the disputed waters because the Philippines does not have aircraft with those capabilities. Aquino also said he would not object to an increased ‘rotational tempo’ for US military forces in his country to help train their Filipino counterparts.Footnote ²⁴

Figure 1.

The quasi-anarchical system in East Asia

In addition to the security guarantor and client states, there are a number of self-help states in the East Asia that depend on their own capabilities for security, including China, North Korea, and Vietnam. There is obvious security competition both between these states and the US dominated hierarchy, with the most traditional form of competition being between the US and China, the self-help state rising most rapidly and the primary security guarantor to the region. In the face of increasing Chinese power, the United States is worried that its leadership position in the region will be weakened.Footnote ²⁵ These strategic concerns have caused the United States to become more actively involved in security disputes between China and US allies, and to work to contain expanding Chinese influence by directly providing security or advocating for cooperation between its allies. This has increased security competition in the East Asia.

The self-help states in East Asia have regular security competition with the client states that are dependent on an external security umbrella. For example, China and the Philippines face security conflicts over the South China Sea; China and Japan over the East Sea; and China, the ROK, and Japan over security conflicts related to DPRK efforts to develop nuclear weapons. In the face of these major security threats, the client states look primarily to the United States for support and protection.

There are also obvious security conflicts between the self-help states in East Asia. A classical example of this is China and Vietnam, whose security relations have deteriorated as a result of the dispute over the South China Sea. At the same time, China and the DPRK are also at odds with one another over the DPRK's efforts to obtain nuclear weapons. These security disputes will result in self-help small states (such as Vietnam) taking steps to cooperate with the regional security guarantor (the United States) or with the states under the security guarantor's protection in order to respond to their external security threats. Such cooperation does not imply though that these states (i.e. Vietnam) necessarily lose their self-help and become integrated into US-led hierarchal sub-system.

In sum, the regional security framework in East Asia clearly exhibits the characteristics of quasi-anarchy. Based on the ways in which they seek security, the states of East Asia can be divided into three categories: the United States is the regional security guarantor; the East Asian allies of the United States are client states; the other states, such as China, are self-help. In terms of security relations between states in the region, East Asia continues to face security competition, while dependencies also continue to exist in the region (between the United States and its allies). In other words, the East Asian framework exhibits both characteristics of anarchy and hierarchy, and is a classical example of a quasi-anarchical system.

Dependency

As China's reassurance policy ease its security contradictions with the client states, these client states within the US security hierarchy seek to rely on support and guarantees from the United States to demonstrate their power to China and gain a position of advantage in the security competetion with China. They do so, as improvement in disputes with China does not imply the resolution of deeper security contradictions, while the US fundamentally can provide an effective security guarantee. For example, just three months after China joined the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (January 2004), the United States and the Philippines staged their first joint exercise in the South China Sea, identifying the objective of the exercises as preventing a foreign invasion. President Arroyo of the Philippines publically acknowledged that the US army was training Filipino troops to defend against China and protect the Spratly Islands.Footnote ²⁷

In addition, as China takes advantage of regional economic cooperation to reassure its neighbors, commercial and trade ties between China and other Asian states deepen, and economic dependence on China gradually increases. As long as security contradictions have not been completely resolved, economic dependence will deepen the concerns of these states. They worry their continued complicity with China's reassurance policy will have negative impacts on their ability to maintain their core interests in the future. This encourages these states to take advantage of the US security guarantee to shape a more favorable environment for their security competition with China, ultimately preventing China from using its comparative power advantage to damage their core security interests.

The provocative behaviors of the client states also weakens China's determination to adhere to its reassurance policy. On the one hand, with the serious security competition that prevails under the quasi-anarchical East Asian system, it is hard for China, which seeks security independently, not to respond to challenges to its core security interests (especially with respect to territorial disputes). On the other hand, the declining efficiency of the reassurance policy also increase domestic pressures to take more efficient policies. From China's perspective, the reassurance policy is fundamentally incapable of changing the provocative policies of the client states in Taking this as a given, China assumes that if it does not respond in a timely fashion, not only will its sovereign interests be excessively encroached upon, but its national dignity will be damaged, provoking massive societal pressures domestically. As a result, China will adopt necessary measures to respond in turn to competitive actions taken by the client states in the region.

However, a targeted response by China is not able to compel those client states to halt challenging China's core interests, and will only result in deepening tensions in China's security relations with these states. The reason for this is that in the end the United States will ultimately provide robust security guarantees to these states which allow them to continue to resist China. As for the United States, its incentive to support its allies in the region is to maintain its leadership within the security hierarchy of the region.Footnote ²⁸ Just as the US naval commander Admiral Carney noted on the South China Sea, the US has already dispatched forces to the Western Pacific and the South China Sea for 50 to 60 years. The United States still wants to maintain its military power in the region as before, and has no desire to step back from such military actions.Footnote ²⁹ It is important to recognize that the hard response of the US towards China will embolden the client states under the US security umbrella to implement policies of resistance vis-à-vis China in support of the US policy shift, deepening their reliance on US security, and thereby creating more favorable conditions to obtain the US protection in future times of need.Footnote ³⁰ It should be clear that the existence of the US-led hierarchy seriously weakens the otherwise positive effects of China's reassurance policy.

Reliance on support

With improvement in their security contradictions with China, the self-help states in East Asia which have a direct contradiction with China will be concerned that the long-term improvement in the contradiction will ultimately place China in a favorable position (this is especially the case with territorial disputes). As Chinese power gradually expands and its position of advantage deepens, these self-help will be incapable of finding an effective security guarantee, and to the greatest extent possible will look for ways to enhance their capabilities. For instance, in December of 2009, the Vietnamese General Secretary Nguyen Minh Triet demanded that the Vietnamese army rapidly modernize, and protect the state as the situation in the South China Sea becomes more and more tense.Footnote ³¹

However, the relative gap that these states face vis-à-vis China in terms of national power determines that they must find external assistance. For example, in October of 2011, Vietnam and India signed an agreement for cooperation in the joint development of offshore oil resources in disputed waters in the South China Sea.Footnote ³² More importantly, these self-help states will also leverage the security contradictions between China and the client states in the hierarchical subsystem to check the expansion of Chinese influence. For example, in January of 2004, three months after the US–Philippines Joint Military Exercises, Vietnam organized a group of 60 tourists and 40 ‘invited’ government officials to tour the Spratly Islands to illustrate its ‘effective application of sovereignty’ over the islands.Footnote ³³ It also invited oil companies from the United States and other countries to participate in the joint development of disputed parts of the South China Sea. It is not difficult to see that such actions which exploit deep contradictions can lessen the extent of China's attention to security competition with these self-help states, while weakening the legitimacy of a hard-line response on the part of China. If China adopts a hard-line towards these states, it will give the international community the negative impression that China does not dare stand up against the US-led hierarchy.

Even though it may be difficult to adopt measures which can transcend the US alliance, in the face of security challenges from these self-help states, China will inevitably move to check any actions which will damage its core security interests, and, as a result, bilateral security contradictions will flare up once again and China's reassurance policy will fail. However, it is important to observe that as other self-help states can only lean on the United States, but cannot obtain an effective US security guarantee, they will not enjoy long-term improvement in the security situation. So they must adopt measures to prevent the complete deterioration of security relations with China, which could inflict unbearable harm on their security.

Imitation

For self-help states in East Asia which have security contradictions with China, but face the greatest challenge from the US-led hierarchical system, they will look to China for assistance in alleviating their core security threats. They especially hope that China will imitate the United States by offering an effective security guarantee to them. China's reassurance policy generally can only ensure that there is not a sharp rise in the security threats faced by these states, and is incapable of effectively reducing the major external threats they face. The reason for this is that not only do China and these states face a serious common external threat, but there are also security contradictions between China and these states. As such, it is difficult for China to intimate the United States to extend security guarantee to these states. As a result, it is only natural that these countries become increasingly certain that China's reassurance policy will ultimately damage their core security interests, and as a result are not willing to support China's reassurance policy over the long term.

It should be observed that the primary adversary that these countries face, namely the United States and the self-help states within the US-led hierarchy, are all dissatisfied with China's reassurance policy, which they see as a barrier to their adversaries abandoning provocative policies. As a result, the United States and its allies demand that China abandon its reassurance policy, and adopt even more hard-line policies to force their adversaries to change their provocative policies. Under these two kinds of pressures, not only does it become difficult for China's reassurance policy to provide long-term results, the policy itself is further rendered untenable. China's failed attempts to respond to the North Korea nuclear issue through the Six Party Talks from 2006 to 2008 is a perfect example of this.Footnote ³⁴

Initial success

The dispute over the sovereignty of the islands in the South China Sea represents the first multi-lateral territorial dispute faced by China. In February of 1995, the Mischief Reef incident brought tensions to a climax.Footnote ³⁶ Following the incident, the government of the Philippines demanded that the issue be referred to the United Nations Security Council and the International Court of Justice. Vietnam also issued a statement which claimed that China's actions were extremely serious, and had made the situation in the Spratly Islands even more problematic. On 18 March 1995, ASEAN issued a Statement on Recent Developments in the South China Sea, which expressed the concern of ASEAN regarding the matter, and urged the parties involved not to take any actions which would undermine regional stability.Footnote ³⁷

The emergence of the dispute between China and several ASEAN states over the South China Sea caused the ‘China threat theory’ to become quite popular among ASEAN countries. In order to reduce the security pressures from the ASEAN states, China started to experiment with adjusting its East Asian regional policy to reassure its neighboring states and stabilize the dispute over the South China Sea.

In July of 1997, following the outbreak of the Asian Financial Crisis, China provided over 4 billion US dollars of assistance to Thailand and other impacted countries through the International Monetary Fund and bilateral channels. It also provided Indonesia with export credit and emergency medical assistance. At the same time, with a view towards maintaining regional stability and peace, China resolved not to depreciate its currency, a major contribution to fiscal and economic stability in Asia.Footnote ³⁸ Some years later, the Ambassador of Malaysia to the PRC, Datuk Syed Zaman expressed thanks on behalf of Malaysia to the Chinese government for not depreciating its currency after the 1997 Financial Crisis, noting that this played a critical role in helping the Malaysian economy recover.Footnote ³⁹

However, it was not long before some ASEAN states began to worry that China's entry into the World Trade Organization would result in a shock for the economies of Southeast Asia.Footnote ⁴⁰ In response, China proposed the establishment of the China–ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, and at the end of 2002 it signed the Framework Agreement for Economic Cooperation between China and ASEAN. The official signing of the Framework Agreement greatly stimulated the growth of the total amount of trade between China and ASEAN. By 2005, trade between China and ASEAN increased from 54.77 billion US dollars in 2002 to 113.4 billion US dollars.Footnote ⁴¹ This also helped promote industrial development in ASEAN (for example, the electronics industry in the Philippines.)Footnote ⁴²

As it promoted economic cooperation with ASEAN, China also adopted positive measures to advance resolution of the dispute over the South China Sea. This helped to improve China's image among ASEAN states, which responded quite positively.Footnote ⁴³ In March of 1999, China and the Philippines established a ‘Working Meeting to Build Trust between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea’, opening a significant channel for the two sides to discuss the South China Sea dispute.Footnote ⁴⁴ In December of 2000, China and Vietnam signed the China-Vietnam Beibu Gulf Demarcation Agreement and the China-Vietnam Beibu Gulf Fishery Cooperation Agreement. In addition, Chinese and Vietnamese maritime experts also engaged in several rounds of small group discussions on the South China Sea.Footnote ⁴⁵

Related to this, China also took a number of concrete steps to increase the level of political trust with ASEAN states. First, in November 2002, China and ASEAN signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Footnote ⁴⁶ The Declaration emphasized that the Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force.Footnote ⁴⁷ The General Secretary of ASEAN Rodolfo Severino noted that the Declaration marked the emergence of the new code of conduct for the parties, which would help prevent the dispute over the South China Sea from spiraling into open conflict.Footnote ⁴⁸ In addition, in October 2003, China became the first major non-ASEAN state to enter the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). China and ASEAN went on to sign the China-ASEAN Joint Statement on Strategic Partnership, declaring the establishment of a strategic partnership relationship towards building peace and prosperity.Footnote ⁴⁹

From success to failure

It is important to note that this period represented a comprehensive improvement in relations, but not a more fundamental resolution of the issue of concern to the parties to the dispute. As Chinese power continued to rise, the concerns of some claimant states to the South China Sea began to change, and they started to depend on or look to the United States for support to secure their sovereignty over the South China Sea. For example, in January of 2004, President Arroyo of the Philippines publicly acknowledged that the US army was training Filipino troops how to resist China.Footnote ⁵⁰ At the same time, Vietnam took advantage of the moment to strengthen its sovereign presence in the South China Sea.Footnote ⁵¹ These actions created conditions for an escalation of the South China Sea dispute.Footnote ⁵²

In July of 2008, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi said at the China–ASEAN Minister's meeting that in order to implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea that all parties to the South China Sea dispute would need to engage in dialogue, and advance concrete cooperation and joint development of the South China Sea.Footnote ⁵³ However, according to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the principles determined by states bound by the Convention, 13 May 2009 was the deadline for maritime states to submit information on the 200 nautical mile boundary of their continental shelf to the United Nations Commission for the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf. As they were concerned that they would be at a disadvantage vis-à-vis China in the future with respect to the dispute over delimitation of the South China Sea, beginning from 2009, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia declared their sovereign by issuing the domestic laws on their territorial sea baseline.

On 10 March the President of the Philippines officially signed the Territorial Baseline Law, which identified some of China's Spratly Islands and Huangyan Islands as territory of the Philippines.Footnote ⁵⁴ At the same time, the government of the Philippines also noted that six states (or territories) maintained sovereignty over the Spratly Islands, and that it must inform these other countries of its intent to maintain its sovereignty, as doing so is only proper.Footnote ⁵⁵ On 25 April Vietnam appointed a Chairperson to the governmental organization with authority over the Spratly Islands.Footnote ⁵⁶

China responded with resolute diplomatic action. On 11 March 2009, the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines issued a statement expressing strong opposition and serious protest against ‘Territorial Baseline Law’ signed by Arroyo, and reaffirmed China's historical sovereignty over the Huangyan and Spratly Islands.Footnote ⁵⁷ On 12 May, in responding to the call to submit to the United Nations information about the exclusive economic zone and the boundary of the continental shelf, Speaker of the Foreign Ministry Mr Ma Chaoxu noted that China had submitted documents regarding the 200 nautical mile outer limit of its continental shelf in the East Sea. However, as China has indisputable sovereignty, sovereign rights and administrative rights over the islands of the South China Sea and their nearby waters, it did not submit such documentation for these islands. China did reserve the right to submit information and data regarding the 200 nautical mile outer limit of its continental shelf in other areas in the future.Footnote ⁵⁸ Ten days later, China dispatched a fleet of four fisheries patrol boats to the Beibu Gulf to monitor the moratorium on fishing in the South China Sea, and to demonstrate China's sovereign claim over the South China Sea.Footnote ⁵⁹

During this same period, friction developed between China and the United States around the issue of whether US intelligence-gathering vessels were entering Chinese territorial waters illegally in the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea. However, because the dispute between China and ASEAN remained at the diplomatic level, frictions between China and the United States were insignificant compared to the incident involving a collision in the South China Sea. This was due in part to the fact that China and the United States were cooperating in response to the financial crisis.Footnote ⁶⁰ As a result, the US was cautious with respect to the South China Sea, and avoided taking steps to become involved in the dispute. On 18 March 2009, US President Barak Obama told Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi that it was extremely important for China and the United States to engage in enhanced military dialogue in order to avoid accidental catastrophes in the future. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed her hope that China and the United States might enhance military ties, to guarantee that an unexpected incident would not result in an unpredictable outcome.Footnote ⁶¹ On 4 June, during a visit to the Philippines, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates publically declared that the United States would not become involved in the dispute over sovereignty of the South China Sea.Footnote ⁶²

The soft stance of the US helped to gradually alleviate the dispute over the South China Sea, but one year later, the US suddenly became involved in the South China Sea in a very high profile manner, causing conflict to break out once again. On 24 July 2010, Hillary Clinton attended the ASEAN Regional Forum in Vietnam, where she announced that the US was willing to support multi-lateral talks to resolve the dispute over the South China Sea. This statement was seen as the ‘internationalization’ of the dispute over the South China Sea, which was a major victory for Vietnam's foreign policy.Footnote ⁶³ On 24 September, at the second US–ASEAN Leadership Summit, a joint statement was released which claimed that ‘to guarantee regional peace and stability, maritime security and freedom of navigation must be guaranteed’.Footnote ⁶⁴ On 4 October 2010, the US Ambassador to the Philippines Harry Thomas publically stated that in order to resolve territorial disputes between ASEAN member states and China with respect to the South China Sea, the United States was willing to assist with the determination of a legally binding set of codes of conduct for the region.Footnote ⁶⁵ Before releasing this statement, the US aircraft carrier the George Washington completed a joint US–ROK military exercise, after which it visited Danang, Vietnam, where the US and Vietnam engaged in a week-long joint military exercise in the South China Sea.Footnote ⁶⁶

The change in US attitude was primarily a result of fears that the financial crisis might weaken the US dominant position in East Asia. First, the pace of development of China's navy and air force had picked up.Footnote ⁶⁷ As the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen pointed out, China's military focus had gradually shifted from its army to its navy and air force, and as the Asia Pacific is the most important trade and economic zone, his view of the direction of China's development had already changed from curiosity into concern.Footnote ⁶⁸

Second was the statement of China's core interests in the South China Sea. In March of 2010, the Japanese media report that during a visit to China, Jeffrey Bader, the Senior Director for Asia of the National Security Council, and James Steinburg, Assistant Secretary of State, were told by Chinese officials that the South China Sea represents China's core interests, similar to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang. The Chinese government has never issued a policy to clarify this.Footnote ⁶⁹ Regardless of whether the ‘South China Sea is a core interest’, this incident heightened US suspicions of China's East Asian security policy, and worries that US freedom of navigation in the South China Sea might be threatened. On 24 July 2010, Hillary Clinton publically stated at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Vietnam that the US would remain neutral with respect to the dispute over the islands of the South China Sea, but that maintaining freedom of navigation in the South China Sea related to US interests.Footnote ⁷⁰ Analysts argue that Hillary Clinton's statement illustrated US concerns that if China is not contained, it might change the strategic status quo in the region.Footnote ⁷¹

The deep involvement by the United States made China realize the severity of the situation it faced in the South China Sea, and in late May 2011 the dispute between China and Vietnam and China and the Philippines became tense once again.Footnote ⁷² From 28 to 30 July, China's largest and most advanced patrol boat carried out a three-day patrol mission, which had deep implications with respect to illustrating sovereignty.Footnote ⁷³ Just a little bit more than one month before this, Vietnam engaged in a live-fire military exercise with various types of weaponry off of its central coast.Footnote ⁷⁴ At an ASEAN Foreign Minister's Meeting, the Philippines Foreign Minister Albert del Rosario publically called on all states to maintain a common position on disputes over sovereignty in order that they might hedge against China.Footnote ⁷⁵

This action by the Philippines obtained strong support from the United States and other client states in East Asia. On 23 June, Hillary Clinton publically expressed that the US was committed to supporting the Philippines national defense, and that it would implement the defense agreement signed with the Philippines. According to the Mutual Defense Agreement between the two states, if the Philippines is attacked in the Pacific region, the US will come to the defense of the Philippines. In this agreement, ‘Pacific’ includes the South China Sea.Footnote ⁷⁶ On 9 July the US, Japan, and Australia held a joint military exercise in the territorial waters of Brunei in the South China Sea, and from 2007 to 2010, joint naval exercises among these three states were held to the west of Kyushu and in waters off of Okinawa, locations with obvious implications for China.Footnote ⁷⁷

At the same time, the United States responded positively to Vietnam's effort to lean on its military power to advance its interests in the dispute over the South China Sea. On 17 June, the US and Vietnam held a diplomatic, security and military dialogue in Washington, DC. In the joint statement released after the meeting, the US emphasized that in recent months accidents in the Sea (the South China Sea) were not helpful for regional peace and stability. With respect to maritime security, and especially the right of freedom of navigation, the United States expressed concerns.Footnote ⁷⁸ On 15 July, despite strong opposition from China, three US warships arrived at Danang to participate in the US–Vietnamese maritime military exercises.Footnote ⁷⁹

In order to support East Asian countries, the US has gradually shifted from its policy of maintaining a neutral position with respect to the dispute over sovereignty of the South China Sea. In July 2011, at the ASEAN Regional Forum, Hillary Clinton publically called on all parties to use expressions which are consistent with international law in order to support resolution of conflicts in the South China Sea, and emphasized the need to raise legal claims related to the South China Sea.Footnote ⁸⁰ Clinton's claims clearly run counter to those made by China, while other voices remain close to this position, implying that the US is already beginning to run counter to its principle of neutrality with respect to sovereignty over the South China Sea.

US involvement promoted the deepening of cooperation among the client states protected by the US. around the South China Sea. On 28 September 2011, Japan and the Philippines released a joint statement to strengthen military and security cooperation, contain China's maritime activities. At the same time, both parties expressed that as US allies the two would cooperate closely in November at the East Asian Summit in Indonesia to purposely exaggerate the China threat.Footnote ⁸¹ Vietnam, on the other hand, which is outside of the hierarchal sub system led by the US, took steps to adjust its confrontational attitude towards China, as it feared that uncertainty over the US support would led to serious damages to its core security interests. In October of 2011, China and Vietnam signed the China–Vietnam Agreement on Basic Principles to Guide Resolution of Maritime Issues, illustrating that the two parties would increase efforts to negotiate maritime issues and search for a universally acceptable, long-term solution, while positively discussing temporary measures which would not harm the respective positions and claims of either party. This includes research and discussions around the issue of joint development.Footnote ⁸²