Introduction
Populism and populist politics remain a constant undercurrent in contemporary European politics. Cas Mudde has even referred to a populist Zeitgeist.Reference Mudde1 Initially, interest in populism coincided with the rise of radical-right populist parties such as the Danish and the Norwegian Progress Parties, the French National Front, and the Austrian Freedom Party.Reference Betz2 However, it became quickly evident that the populist phenomenon was not confined only to the radical right. In Western Europe populist political parties appeared in the form of center-right populism (Forza Italia), left populism (the German Party of Democratic Socialism),Reference March and Mudde3 while also influencing leaders of more conventional political parties such as Tony Blair and New Labour.Reference Mair, Mény and Surel4 Central and Eastern Europe have also witnessed an increase in populist parties. Here we encounter center, radical right, left, and national populist parties.Reference Učeň5 This recent surge of populism lies in direct contrast with the immediate post-war period. Despite a few selected cases after 1945, such as the L’Uomo Qualunque in Italy, or French Poujadism, or even the populism of Franz Joseph Strauss in Bavaria, populism did not represent a significant political force until the 1990s.
The plethora of populist movements has led to a growing body of literature on populism. Importantly, these more recent studies began to challenge the assumptions of earlier work on populism.Reference Ionescu and Gellner6, Reference Canovan7 First, social scientists questioned whether populism was intrinsically linked to the radical right. As new forms of populism emerged in West, Central, and Eastern Europe it became evident that populism should not be automatically linked with right-wing political movements.Reference March and Mudde3, Reference Taguieff8–Reference Albertazzi and McDonnell11 Earlier studies by Ionescu and Gellner, Canovan, and Laclau (to name just a few) had already emphasized that populism was both a left and a right phenomenon in Latin America, the United States, and in Canada.Reference Ionescu and Gellner6, Reference Canovan7, Reference Laclau12 However, these insights were often overlooked in the European context.
Second, scholars began to question assumptions concerning whether it is possible to define the core characteristics of populism. Earlier studies by Ionescu and Gellner et al. and by Margaret Canovan emphasized the inherent inconsistencies and even the contradictions of populism.Reference Laclau12, 13 However, the discovery of populism in the 20th and the 21st centuries in Europe, separated by a continent and a century from 19th century North American populism and by a continent from Latin America populism, encouraged a growing number of social scientists to argue that populism has a core set of characteristics that transcend time and space.
Finally, populism emerged in the industrialized world, during an era in which liberal democracy had supposedly triumphed over alternative forms of political organization (Soviet Communism, authoritarian regimes). This forced scholars to question the link between populism and democracy. Whereas before it was assumed that populism was a pathological development that occurred as a reaction to late modernization, late industrialization, or limited democratization, it is now argued that populism originates from the contradictions inherent in the theory and the practice of liberal democracy.
This article proceeds in the following manner. The first section examines the existing literature on populism. Although disagreements persist about whether populism should be considered an ideology, a mentality or a political style, I argue that there is enough consensus in the literature to point to common and core characteristics that define populism. I conclude that it is possible to create an ideal type of populism, which we can use, following the Weberian tradition, to determine the extent to which a political movement should be considered populist. The second section examines the opportunity structures that give rise to populism. Here, the focus is on the political and the economic transformations of the 1970s and the 1980s that created a space for the rise of populism. I point to the end of the post-war settlement, the transition to a post-industrial economy, and the gradual erosion of post-war party politics. In Central and Eastern Europe, populism emerges from tensions and frustrations emanating from the consolidation of liberal democracy, the implementation of a market economy, the institutionalization of party systems, and from apprehensions concerning European integration.
The final section examines three examples of populist political movements. I demonstrate that radical-right populism, the center-right populism of Forza Italia, and the left populism of the German Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), all possess populist characteristics, according to the populist ideal type. However, these three populist political parties also exhibit considerable differences. They have distinct party platforms and they garner support from diverse segments of the population, highlighting that populism manifests itself in various forms, depending upon given opportunity structures and, most importantly, upon the actions (agency) of populist political parties.
Towards an ideal type of populism
Recent research places populism within the context of liberal democratic politics. Mény and Surel argue that populism feeds off of the tensions between the two pillars of liberal democracy – popular sovereignty and constitutional politics.Reference Mény and Surel9 Populism appeals to essential democratic principles such as ‘the people,’ ‘sovereignty,’ and ‘majority rule,’Reference Canovan, Mény and Surel14 while populists are highly critical of what they claim is the growing power of courts, judges, and civil servants (the constitutional realm). In other words, populists’ success is dependent on the very discourse of democracy. Contextualizing populism within the discourse of democracy represents an important step forward. It overcomes the tendency to treat populism as a ‘pejorative category with menacing connotations’ (Ref. Reference Taguieff8, p. 9). In fact, Canovan argues that populism can serve as an important corrective to the excesses of constitutional democracy, while Decker claims that populism can serve as an important outlet to subdue more extreme anti-democratic forces.Reference Canovan, Mény and Surel14, Reference Decker15
Despite the links between populism and popular sovereignty, there is no question that populist interpretations of democracy are one-dimensional, omitting crucial elements of liberal democracies. Liberal democracies are also built upon constitutional principles, individual and minority rights, procedural democracy, and forms of mediated representation, such as political parties, unions, and other forms of collective action.Reference Pasquino, Albertazzi and McDonnell16, Reference Mastropaolo, Albertazzi and McDonnell17 The danger is that the populist emphasis on popular sovereignty threatens pluralism and democratic representative institutions. Populists, thus, have an ambiguous relationship with democracy; on the one hand, populism speaks the language of democracy, while on the other it challenges the boundaries of liberal democracies. It is difficult, if not impossible, to prevent populists from participating in electoral politics, something that the 2000 Haider controversy made abundantly clear, while at the same time populist parties make liberals uncomfortable since they challenge the founding principles and defining characteristics of liberal democratic politics.
If we accept – in some cases somewhat reluctantly – that populism is part and parcel of liberal democracy; considerable disagreement still exists over where to place populism. The question is whether populism should be considered an ideology, a style of politics, and whether it possesses a specific form of organization and mobilization. Mudde,Reference Mudde1 Albertazzi and McDonnellReference Albertazzi and McDonnell11 argue that populism is a political ideology since it has a coherent set of ideas; ideas that interpret the world and are a programmatic call to action. Others such as Taguieff are more cautious, proclaiming that even if populism possesses a core set of ideas,Reference Taguieff8 its core characteristics are not substantial enough for it to exist without attaching itself to other political ideologies. Still other social scientists argue that populism cannot be described even as a thin ideology,Reference Fieschi18 instead, populism is a mentality,Reference Pasquino, Albertazzi and McDonnell16 or a style of politics.Reference Taguieff8
Despite these epistemological and methodological disagreements, there is, nevertheless, considerable agreement over the constituent elements of populism. A common starting point is the idea of the people. Defining the ‘people’ can be elusive since populists themselves are vague about the boundaries between insiders and outsiders. Mény and Surel refer to the ‘people’ as the foundation of the community.Reference Mény and Surel9 Albertazzi and McDonnell claim that the people represent the homogeneous and the virtuous.Reference Albertazzi and McDonnell11 Canovan emphasizes that populists view the people as a united ‘us’, the ordinary people (Ref. Reference Canovan, Mény and Surel14, p. 34). Taggart employs the highly creative term the heartland to convey the idea of an idealized notion of a people who romanticize the past.Reference Taggart19 In the process, they proclaim to speak on behalf of the virtuous, silent majority, and the so-called backbone of society, conjuring up metaphors and images such as Middle America, Padania, rural French life, or the Austrian Bierzelt.
Despite subtle, but important, distinctions, enough common ground exists for us to define who and what constitutes ‘the people.’ The people are non-plural, virtuous, and homogeneous groups that are part of the ‘everyday’ and the ‘normal’ core of the country, or the region in question. Thus, the people are not defined by class, by political ideology (left or right): and from the self-definition of the populists, they are not ‘radicals’ or ‘extremists’.
The next step along the path to defining populism is to situate the people within the larger polity. A common strategy is to juxtapose the people with political elites. Here once again we encounter substantial agreement. The strongest affirmation emerges from Mudde’s definition of populism. He claims that populism is ‘an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people’ (Ref. Reference Mudde1, p. 543). Thus, if the people represent the foundation and the starting point for populists, the people are subsequently juxtaposed with the elites, elites that have usurped power from the people and have contravened the basic contract of democracy – the idea that the people remain sovereign.Reference Mény and Surel9
The emphasis so far has been on the tension between the people and the elites. However, populists also point to the ‘dangerous others’ who threaten the people.Reference Albertazzi and McDonnell11 Thus, populists also juxtapose the people to those outside the heartland who threaten their homogeneity and virtue.Reference Rydgren20 The ‘dangerous others’ are classified as special interests groups. Populist on the left tend to point to the danger of large economic corporations and financial interests (Ref. Reference Taggart19, p. 93). However, these broad distinctions do not always hold. For example, the current radical and populist right also opposes international corporate interests and globalization; a discourse that is more common to the left.21 Populists on the right, on the other hand, tend to scapegoat minority groups such as immigrants, the unemployed, environmentalists, and feminists (Ref. Reference Taggart19, p. 93).
If populism possesses a specific discourse, the question is whether it also has its own form of organization and mobilization. Mudde argues that it is not possible to identify a populist mode of political mobilization or organization (Ref. Reference Mudde1, pp. 544–555). TaggartReference Taggart22 and Mény and Surel (Ref. Reference Mény and Surel9, p. 102–117) disagree. They contend that populist parties combine centralized organizational structures with populist leadership. Of course, populist parties are not the only parties with centralized political institutions and with charismatic leaders. It is, therefore, possible to have centralized and charismatic leadership and for a party not to be a populist party (see for example Alleanza Nazionale). However, in the case of populist parties, centralized leadership is essential since it dovetails with demands for an unmediated link between the leader and the people (Ref. Reference Taggart22, p. 67).
Claiming to represent the people in a direct and unmediated fashion is reflected in the populist style of politics and in the populist mode of communication. Populist leaders present themselves as political outsiders; they are portrayed as individuals who are not driven into politics because of power or money, but out of a sense of duty for their people. It is common for populist leaders to employ a language of common sense, a political message that is intended to be non-ideological, and a non-political mode of communication, conveying the sense that they are speaking for, and to the ordinary people.Reference Betz, Mény and Surel23
For the sake of this article, I sidestep the issue of whether or not populism should be considered an ideology. However, I do contend that there is enough agreement within the existing literature to construct a populist ideal type. In the Weberian tradition, the ideal type is a series of abstractions drawn from empirical and historical evidence provided by case studies. To be sure, this ideal type is found sometime in more, and sometimes in less, ideal form.Reference Roth24 I divide the populist ideal type into two parts: the discourse of populism and the institutional form of populism. The discourse of populism pits the common everyday, virtuous, and homogeneous people against both elites (politicians, intellectuals, the media), and against perceived outside threats (special interest groups, immigrants, feminists, ecologists). This dichotomy between the two is based upon an understanding of democracy that views representation as unmediated popular sovereignty. However, this populist ideal type also includes specific organizational features. Here, I include a charismatic and populist leader who claims to possess a direct and unmediated relationship with the people; he (or she) is of the people and speaks for the people. This leads to a centralization of leadership and to a low level of party institutionalization.
Both the discourse and the institutional manifestation of populism are part of the populist ideal type since both elements are intrinsic to the core ideas of populism. For the people to serve as the foundation of democracy, they must also possess a direct link with their leader in direct and in unmediated fashion in order to represent the political will of the people. To be sure, not all populist parties or movements meet all the demands of the ideal type. But in order for a populist party to be considered populist it must adhere as closely as possible to this ideal type.
Populism and populist opportunity structures
So far we have constructed an ideal type of populist political movements. But it is still necessary to examine why there has been a recent surge in populism. Although the literature on the rise of populism points to a host of causes, the underlying assumption is that a specific political and economic constellation, in the immediate post-war era (roughly 1945–73), limited the opportunities for populist mobilization. The post-war party system, the welfare state, and economic organization of society (built upon unions and employer associations), acted as both a legitimating force and as an institutionalized means by which to channel political conflict (Ref. Reference Mény and Surel9, pp. 129–175; Ref. Reference Taggart25).
The economic organization of society dovetailed with post-war political organization and party systems. The mass/catchall party coincided nicely with Fordist society when, more or less, ‘identical interests’ and demands (more often than not class demands) were filtered through the party machine.Reference Kitschelt, Kitschelt, Lange, Marks and Stephens26 During the heyday of post-war democracy, political parties were the glue that linked popular sovereignty and civil society with the state and constitutional democracy. The mandate of the party was to mobilize citizens within civil society and to act as their partisan representatives in parliament.Reference Mair, Mény and Surel4, Reference Mair27
As the post-war economic and political model began to crumble in the 1970s and the 1980s, a space for populist parties emerged. Taggart links the rise of populism with the transformation of the post-war settlement. He argues that growing demands, particularly in expansive Christian democratic and social democratic welfare states, raised expectations to such a level that government could not adequately respond to voters, particularly given declining resources (Ref. Reference Taggart25, pp. 51–55). Mény and SurelReference Mény and Surel9 argue that there is a link between globalization and declining levels of trust, emanating from the inability, real or perceived, of governments to confront effectively this new political and economic reality. This lack of trust in political institutions leads to a legitimation crisis and in some cases it has created opportunities for a populist response (Ref. Reference Mény and Surel9, pp. 155–75).
Subtle but important transformations of political parties and party systems accompany these socio-economic transformations. The tension between popular sovereignty and constitutional politics was always tenuous. However, in the post-war period the political party was the mediating force that guaranteed representative democracy. More recently, the rise of the cartel party has produced closer links between political parties and the state, it has blurred political ideologies, and it is part and parcel of the declining presence of the party within civil society. This is coupled with declining voter turnouts, increased volatility, and declining party membership.Reference Mair27, Reference Mair and van Biezen28 This changing role of the political party opens up a space for populist political parties.Reference Műller-Rommel29
Radical-right and center-right populist parties have been particularly successful at exploiting the evolving socio-economic and political opportunity structures. However, left-wing populist parties and movements, such as the anti-global movement, the girotondi 30 in Italy, and Die Linke 31 in Germany, have also successfully exploited these evolving opportunity structures. Here, of particular importance, are changing parties and party systems (especially the convergence of parties toward the center), globalization and European integration; structural changes that are part and parcel of post-industrialization, globalization, and the changing nature of state sovereignty.
These opportunity structures are particularly conducive to populism in Western Europe – to be sure, post-industrialization, globalization, and the changing nature of the nationstate figure in the rise of populism in Central and Eastern Europe. However, populism in Eastern Europe also emanates from frustrations that emerge from the transition to democracy, the consolidation of liberal democracy, and the implementation of a market economy. Initially, populism was linked with anti-communism and with the panacea of the market economy; what David Ost refers to as market populism.Reference Ost32 However, since the initial euphoria surrounding the transition to democracies has dissipated, new opportunity structures for populist movements have emerged. Populists exploit growing opposition to the excesses of market reforms,Reference Mudde33 fears and apprehension regarding European integration (Ref. Reference Mudde33, pp. 164–165; Ref. Reference Taggart and Szczerbiak34), and frustrations with the inability of parties to deliver on promises (Ref. Reference Učeň5, pp. 54, 58).
A consistent theme emerges; there is a general agreement that post-war politics had a specific economic and political organization based upon states that exerted economic sovereignty, a commitment to the welfare state, and to party systems that served both mobilization and representative functions. The breakdown of this economic and social model created a new space for populist parties to mobilize the frustrated, the disillusioned and those who claim that their demands are neglected within the emerging post-industrial socio-economic context. This is particularly acute in Western Europe. In Central and Eastern Europe, tensions from the transition and the consolidation of democracy serve as fertile grounds for populism. However, as in the West, in Central and Eastern Europe populist parties exploit declining trust in political parties as a viable mediating institution.
The real world of populist politics: radical-right, center-right, and left populism
These general economic and political trends create opportunity structures, which create a space for the potential rise of populist political parties. However, the existence of these opportunity structures is not sufficient for populism to succeed; rather, it is also imperative that political entrepreneurs mobilize voters, speaking to their demands and frustrations.Reference Pasquino, Albertazzi and McDonnell16 In this section, I examine three populist political parties: radical-right populism, center-right populism (Forza Italia), and left populism (PDS). The purpose is to highlight the common characteristics of populist parties, while emphasizing that despite these common populist traits, ideological differences and support from diverse segments of the population, distinguish radical-right populism, center-right populism, and left populism from one another.
Radical-right populist parties emerged as important political actors in the 1980s and the 1990s, becoming permanent fixtures in Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, and Switzerland. Radical-right populists need to be embedded within post-industrialization, globalization, international migration, and the restructuring of party systems.Reference Rydgren35 However, radical-right success also depends on populist political mobilization and upon a political message that speaks to fears of immigration, frustrations with political elites, growing mistrust of political institutions, and apprehension towards globalization and European integration.Reference Rydgren35
Radical-right populist parties conform to the populist ideal type. All radical-right parties claim to represent the common, hard working, everyday citizen.Reference Betz2 The actual discourse in which this common person is embedded can vary; the French National Front claims to protect France for the ordinary French man, the Freedom Party for the ordinary hard working Austrian, and the Lega Nord for the hard working Northern Italian.Reference Rydgren36–Reference Zaslove38 They portray lower middle and working class voters (the people) as the backbone of the nation and as the victims of political elites and special interests groups.
The populist leader is essential for the success of radical-right populist parties. Radical-right populist parties are often recognized in their leader: Jörg Haider and the Austrian Freedom Party, Jean-Marie Le Pen and the National Front, Umberto Bossi and the Lega Nord. It is common for the leader to claim that he (or in the rare case she) is one of the people, who speaks for the people. Thus, numerous studies highlight that supporters of radical-right populist parties proclaim that when, for example, Bossi, Le Pen, and Haider speak they see their own opinions reflected in their leaders (Ref. Reference Rydgren36, pp. 201–208; Refs Reference Biorcio39, Reference Gingrich40). This is best exemplified in the language employed by radical-right populist leaders. Radical-right populist leaders’ mode of communication is direct, crude, and to the point. They are proud to speak in an uncomplicated language and in the language of the tavern, the café and the street. This is contrasted to the over-sophisticated and the overly ideological language of the more traditional political leaders.
However, if radical-right parties are populists, they also have a specific ideology based upon nativist, nationalism, and authoritarianism (Ref. Reference Mudde33, pp. 20–23). In the process, radical-right populist parties have evolved into a new party family.Reference Rydgren35 They have similar party platforms: they are exclusionists, they target immigrants, they oppose multiculturalism, and they are critical of pluralist notions of democracy.Reference Zaslove38 There is an affirmation of an authentic and autochthonous civil society that is nostalgic for the traditional family, safe communities, and a vague notion of a ‘Christian’ Europe.Reference Betz and Johnston41 And radical-right populist parties advocate a populist political economy,Reference Rydgren20 supporting small market capitalism, while objecting to the encroachment of large global corporations and globalization.21
The success of the radical-right emanates from its ability to form coalitions from diverse segments of the population. However, radical-right parties should not be mistaken as new catch-all parties. Rather, they receive votes primarily from the self-employed, small and medium scale entrepreneurs and manual workers (in most cases they are non-unionized workers). Workers gravitate to the radical-right since they feel abandoned by social democratic parties, while the self-employed and small- and medium-scale entrepreneurs are disillusioned by center-right parties. Radical-right populists are most successful among less educated males, young voters (in their 20s) and older voters (in their 60s). These supporters demonstrate higher levels of mistrust of political institutions, while they also exhibit higher levels of xenophobia.Reference Zaslove38
Center-right populism
Forza Italia is one of the most successful populist parties in Europe. Silvio Berlusconi was Prime Minister, from 2001 to 2006, and re-elected again in 2008, while Forza is currently one of Italy’s two most voted-for political parties. Berlusconi’s populism emerged from the fall of the post-war Italian party system, the end of Christian Democratic soft hegemony,42 and by the desire, particularly among the entrepreneurial middle class, for a healthy dose of neo-liberalism. Although Forza Italia adheres to our populist ideal type, there are also important differences in ideology and in electoral support that separate Berlusconi’s center-right populism from radical-right populism.
Forza Italia’s identity is strongly influenced by Berlusconi and his populist instincts. Berlusconi makes an explicit attempt to link himself to the common person. He emphasizes that he is not a real politician, preferring to present himself as a self-made businessman who became wealthy because of hard work. Thus, he may be ‘luckier’ than the everyday working Italian, but he is one of them and understands their trials and tribulations. Berlusconi is both ‘defender and interpreter of the popular will’.Reference Tarchi, Albertazzi and McDonnell43 Although Berlusconi is not as aggressively critical of the inadequacies of the representative and the democratic institutions of liberal democracies as radical-right populist parties, he is, nevertheless, highly critical of the lack of direct democracy. He demonstrates a high degree of impatience with procedural democracy, since democracy for Berlusconi implies direct democracy, popular sovereignty, and an unmediated link between the leader and his people. According to Berlusconi, popular sovereignty and the will of the people, in a true democracy, cannot be limited by unrepresentative institutions such as civil servants or judges.Reference Tarchi, Albertazzi and McDonnell43
Although Forza Italia does not possess a strong ideology – the party is infamous for keeping its political platform short, simple, and to the point – specific policy trajectories do persist. These are contested by the liberal-conservative, the Catholic-conservative, and the former Christian Democratic wings of the party.Reference Ignazi44 From its conception there has been an emphasis on neo-liberalism, on tax reductions and the need to reduce the size of the state.Reference McCarthy45 The party emphasizes law and order issues, and it is a defender of the nation, but the nation as represented by civil society and not the state (Ref. Reference McCarthy45, p. 135). However, despite a populist defense of Italian identity and civil society, the party should not be classified as either a predominantly nationalistic or as an anti-immigrant party along the lines of a radical-right populist party.
Forza also differs from radical-right populist parties in terms of its electoral base. Unlike radical-right populist parties that receive support from a very specific constituency, Forza’s electorate is more diffuse. Its voters emanate from very different classes and even very diverse and often antagonistic parts of the country. In Northern Italy, it receives support from entrepreneurs and non-unionized workers employed in small and medium businesses. These workers and business supporters represent the wealthier segments of Italian society. They demand less fiscal pressure and they support less government intervention.Reference Diamanti46 However, Forza is also a national political party. In the South its voters are less affluent; they are often public employees, the unemployed and those who demand more state intervention and more protection for the South. Nationally, Berlusconi has successfully attracted housewives and pensioners.Reference Diamanti46
Left populism: the German Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)
Left populism has a long history in Latin America, the United States, and in Canada. However, in the current European context, populism is usually associated with center-right, or radical-right populism. Although there are fewer examples of left-wing populist movements, it would be mistaken to focus only on right populism. Examples of left-wing populism include aspect of Green politics,Reference Műller-Rommel29 the German Party of Democratic Socialism,Reference Decker, Albertazzi and McDonnell47 the girotondi movement in Italy,Reference Tarchi48 and several Central and Eastern European examples such as the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, the Communist Party of Slovakia, and the Slovak Workers Association (Ref. Reference Učeň5, p. 52). Left populist parties exhibit typical populist traits identified in the ideal type. However, they fuse populism with a political platform and political themes that are usually associated with socialist or social democratic parties. For example, they emphasize social justice, anti-capitalism, anti-globalization, and pacifism (Ref. Reference March and Mudde3, pp. 34–36). Importantly, left populism differentiates itself from traditional socialist or social democratic parties by de-emphasizing class, socialism, and socialist ideology in favor of a political platform that appeals to the ‘people’.
In the remainder of this section I examine the populism of the PDS. Emerging from a combination of Western and Eastern opportunity structures, the PDS is illustrative of the ability of left populism to fuse populism with traditional left political themes. On the one hand, the PDS has been inserted into the West German party system, while, on the other, its success has much in common with frustrations emanating from the consolidation of liberal democracy in Central and Eastern Europe.
The PDS cannot be classified as simply a populist party.Reference Decker, Albertazzi and McDonnell47 It was not founded by a single charismatic, populist figure and it is a fully institutionalized political party with strong ideological factions; especially pronounced are the tensions between the orthodox and the reformist wings.Reference Hartleb49, Reference Oswald50 However, despite the trappings of a conventional political party, the PDS also exhibits strong populist characteristics as defined in the populist ideal type. The populism of the PDS stems from both strategic decisions by party leaders (especially Gregor Gysi, Lothar Bisky, and Andre Brie) and from the difficulty of institutionalizing its socialist party identity in a post 1989 environment (Ref. Reference Hartleb49, pp. 237–254).
The PDS’s somewhat surprising political success emanates from its ability to exploit populism and protest themes associated with the economic and political problems of German reunification.51 After 1994, once the initial euphoria of German reunification dissipated, the party leadership understood the electoral potential of casting the PDS as an East German political party that opposed West German hegemony. The PDS associates Germany’s two dominant parties, the Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democratic Party, with West German interests. Creating a clear dichotomy between the East and the West was coupled with a de-emphasis on socialist ideology and class. As Brie proclaimed in 1999: ‘To gain more than 5% of the vote means that we have to appeal to voters who I have called the “common person”. They are not as politicized as we are.’ The party’s strategy was to speak to the everyday person so that the PDS would be associated with the party of protest (Ref. Reference Hartleb49, p. 240).
The populist rhetoric of the PDS positions the East German people against the dominant political parties, and against Western elites and the failures of German unification. It frames reunification as western criminalization of East German society and of the disempowerment of East German elites (Ref. Reference Hartleb49, p. 241), going so far as to claim West German colonization (Ref. Reference Hartleb49, p. 258). The PDS argues that all remnants of democracy found in the peaceful overthrow of communism were exploited by the West for its own purposes (Ref. Reference Hartleb49, pp. 240–241). The people of East Germany are, thus, juxtaposed to the dominant political parties and to West Germany, who are presented as antagonistic to the interests of East Germany.
The PDS also presents itself as the party of social protest, claiming to be the moral voice of social justice, employment for women, daycares, all day schools, more affordable living conditions, better working conditions, and affordable housing (Ref. Reference Hartleb49, p. 256). To be sure, these are typical left-wing themes that are not necessarily populist. But they become populist themes in the hands of the PDS on two accounts. The party associates its protest message within a romanticized conception of the former German Democratic Republic (Ref. Reference Hartleb49, p. 257). Social Justice is linked to a discourse that creates an ‘us’ against ‘them’ dichotomy; single external threats, such as globalization, capitalism, and Americanization, are used as single causes to explain the misfortunes of East German reunification (Ref. Reference Hartleb49, pp. 263–280). To be sure, this has a particular East German flavor, but we also see consistent themes with other Eastern populist parties, such as the objection to excessive marketization and the fear of Western hegemony.
The PDS exhibits other important populist characteristics. The party has been most successful when the highly telegenetic and populist Gregor Gysi has led it (Ref. Reference Hartleb49, pp. 250–255). The success of the PDS, until Gysi resigned in 2002 on accusations of spending irregularities, depended on his ‘wit and rhetorical skills’. In the 2001 Berlin regional elections, 49% of PDS voters voted for the party because of Gysi (Ref. Reference Gapper52, p. 74).
The PDS possesses an ideology that accompanies its populism, even though it has had difficulty institutionalizing its party identity since its foundation in 1990. Ideologically the PDS remains a socialist party, but a socialist party that is reluctant to demand a socialist society. It is anti-capitalist, opposes globalization and supports issues of social justice. It presents itself as a defender of women, the environment, and it proclaims itself to be Germany’s only truly pacifist political party (Ref. Reference Hartleb49, pp. 270–273). The ideology of the PDS wavers between socialism, social democracy, and the new left.
Support for the PDS has evolved as the party positioned itself as a people’s party. In the years immediately after reunification, the PDS received support from voters who were closely associated with the former East German regime. However, as the initial euphoria of reunification dissipated, it received higher levels of support from the economically marginalized (Ref. Reference Gapper52, pp. 66–69). In the late 1990s, the party began to appeal to voters who were resentful of reunification, perceiving it as project of western hegemony. Increasingly, voters view the PDS as a party that represents East German interests and as a party that opposes the injustices of capitalism and globalization (Ref. Reference Gapper52, pp. 66–69).
We’ve come a long way … where to now?
Cas Mudde is correct to point to a European populist Zeitgeist.Reference Mudde1 Despite the existence of populist movements in Europe and North and South America since the 19th century, the current historical conjuncture is particularly susceptible to populism. Nevertheless, it is the contention of this article that populist parties are here to stay. Radical-right populist parties are now permanent structures in European party systems. Yet, at the same time it is necessary to distinguish between degrees of populism. For this reason it is important to make a distinction between politicians who employ populist themes, such as Tony Blair and Nicolas Sarkozy, and true populists such as Jörg Haider or Silvio Berlusconi. However, if Haider and Berlusconi are both populists, it is equally important to identify different manifestation of populism. In this article I have identified three types of populism, radical-right, center-right, and left populism.
We are currently more informed about populism than we were before the rise of populism in the 1980s and the 1990s. Numerous theoretical and case studies have illuminated the opportunity structures that allow populist parties to emerge, while other studies have extrapolated the common underlying characteristics of populist parties. In this article, I have argued that the quality and the quantity of studies on populism make it possible to construct an ideal type of populism. However, in order to further the study of populism, more research is required. There is especially a need for more comparative research.
Studies need to compare and contrast left and right populism. A number of ex-communist and ex-socialist leaders in the West and East employ populist themes to mobilize voters. However, the question is: to what degree is there a convergence or divergence between the message of left and right populist movements? This article has highlighted the similarities between how populists on the left and the right organize and mobilize supporters, while at the same time it has also emphasized the degree to which issues of exclusion, tradition, and security differentiate right populism from left populist themes of social justice and exploitation. However, left and right populists also converge around issues such as opposition to globalization and European integration, while they demand continued support for the welfare state. What is not clear is the degree to which populist movements from diverse sides of the political spectrum are able to attract similar segments of the population. Moreover, it is not clear whether populism, whether of the left or the right, has a tendency to evolve towards movements of exclusion. For example, in the 2005 German elections, Oskar Lafontaine, the leader of Die Linke, employed anti-immigrant and populist language to appeal to working class voters. The question is whether this discourse of exclusion is emblematic of populism, whether of the right or the left.53
More comparative research is also required between West and Central and Eastern Europe. There are a plethora of populist movements in Central and Eastern Europe and there are also a number of studies of populism to match this populist surge. However, there are limited studies that compare and contrast populism in Western and Eastern Europe. The question is whether the opportunity structures for populism are similar in the East and in the West. And subsequently, how is this reflected in the form and the content of the populism movements in question? This article has emphasized the importance of contextualizing populist movements. Thus, Central and Eastern European populism, as in Western Europe, responds to the ‘crisis’ of the political party, globalization, and European integration. However, the specific Central and Eastern European context, such as a weaker institutionalization of party systems, the sudden appearance of a market economy, and lingering issues of nationalism and state formation, dramatically affect the nature of populist movements in the region. This speaks to the need to examine further the link between opportunity structures and the form and especially the content of populist movements.
For Max Weber the construction of the ideal type is a never-ending process. The ideal type is a heuristic device that is used to order our social and political reality.Reference Roth24 However, further research is also needed to build and to advance the ideal type and our knowledge of social and political reality. Studies of populism since the 1990s have greatly enhanced our knowledge. However, further research, especially comparative research between right and left populism and between populism in West, Central and Eastern Europe will only enhance our understanding of populism.
Acknowledgment
The author would like to thank Ingrid van Biezen for her very helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts.
Andrej Zaslove is an Adjunct Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University in the Department of Political Science. He teaches courses in Comparative and European Politics. His research focuses on political parties, populism, the radical right, and immigration. He has published articles in Comparative European Politics, the Journal of European Integration, and the Journal and Political Ideologies and is currently finishing a book on radical-right populism.
