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Confucianism and Democracy: A Review of the Opposing Conceptualizations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 February 2011

NICHOLAS SPINA,
DOH C. SHIN and
DANA CHA
NICHOLAS SPINA
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Missouri, United Statesnjsxc5@mail.missouri.edu
DOH C. SHIN
Affiliation:
Professor of Political Science, University of Missouri, United Statesshind@mail.missouri.edu
DANA CHA
Affiliation:
missambassador@gmail.com
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Abstract

The debate over the future of East Asian democracy centers largely on the fit between democratic values and the Confucian way of life. Some interpret Confucianism's hierarchical, communitarian, and anti-pluralistic values as a roadblock to democratic consolidation. Others interpret the Confucian traditions of dissent and accountability as comparable to liberal institutions. This article surveys this scholarly debate by dividing the literature into three theoretical camps: compatibility, incompatibility, and convergence. Additionally, the few available empirical works on the Confucian-democratic dynamic are discussed and the findings are applied to the three categorizations. This review article maintains that a consensus on the relationship between Confucianism and democracy remains elusive due to the divergent conceptualizations and operationalizations of the two doctrines.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Japanese Journal of Political Science , Volume 12 , Issue 1 , April 2011, pp. 143 - 160
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

Over two decades have past since the Philippines's ‘People's Power Revolution’ initiated a wave of democratic movements throughout East Asia. Today, however, the fate of East Asian democracy remains uncertain. The 2009 Freedom in the World report by Freedom House identifies only five countries (36%) in the region as free: Japan, South Korea, Mongolia, Indonesia, and Taiwan.Footnote 1 Two ‘third wave’ democracies – Cambodia and Thailand – have reverted back toward authoritarian rule, while corruption and political violence plague democratic progress in the Philippines. Of the various factors attributed to East Asia's democratic struggles, Confucianism constitutes the most unique contextual force.Footnote 2 Consequently, the debate over the future of East Asian democracy centers largely on the fit between democratic values and the Confucian way of life. Some interpret Confucianism's hierarchical, communitarian, and anti-pluralistic values as a roadblock to democratic consolidation.Footnote 3 Others interpret the Confucian traditions of dissent and accountability as comparable to liberal institutions.Footnote 4

Modern Confucianism derives from the teachings of Confucius in the Fifth Century BC. The most important works on classical Confucianism include The Analects of Confucius and the seven books of Mencius (371–289 BC), considered the principal interpreter and defender of Confucianism. Both works have significantly influenced the organization of government and the formation of social values in the East Asian countries of Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Korea, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Burma, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam.5

Although scholars vigorously debate the compatibility of Confucianism and democracy as political systems, there is no general agreement about the relationship in either principle or practice. This article discusses the interpretive and empirical challenges that fuel that lack of consensus. It begins by grouping the debate into three theoretical camps. The first camp interprets the principles of Confucianism as analogous to democratic values. In contrast, the second camp argues that the principles of Confucianism are incompatible with those of democracy. The third camp suggests that Confucianism and democracy can be reformulated as a hybrid system within East Asian societies.

The next five sections delve into these opposing interpretations in greater detail. Section 1 discusses how conceptual differences of democracy and Confucianism underlie the compatibility debate. The next three sections review the divergent theoretical and philosophical interpretations regarding the relationship between Confucianism and democracy. Section 2 highlights research that considers Confucianism and democracy to be compatible systems. It focuses on the overlap in traditions of political accountability, participation, equality, and dissent. Section 3 reviews literature that opposes the notion of compatibility. It underscores the contradictions between social hierarchy and equality, individuality and community, and the rule of law and morality. Section 4 reviews work that suggests Confucianism and democracy can be reformulated to form unique hybrid systems within East Asian societies. The fifth and final section surveys the few available empirical studies on Confucian–democratic compatibility in East Asia.

1. Conceptualizations of democracy and Confucianism

Confucianism advocates a system of ethics intended to build a moral community of datong (grand harmony or unity). The source of this unity is a social hierarchy that honors the authority of leaders and aims to strengthen the greater community. Alternatively, classical interpretations of democracy emphasize the protection of individual liberty and participation in the political process. A democratic system is legitimized through free and fair elections and operates under formal political institutions. Leaders abide by a constitution or legal tradition that promotes transparency and accountability.

Despite these apparent distinctions, however, there is considerable scholarly division over how to interpret the fundamental principles of the two doctrines. This division originates over the opposing conceptualizations of Confucianism and democracy.Footnote 5 Specifically, democracy is conceptualized procedurally as government by the people or substantively as government for the people. Confucianism is conceptualized liberally in terms of benevolence, reciprocity, and other humanistic values, or illiberally in terms of conformity, duty, and other authoritarian values. Those who define democracy substantively and Confucianism liberally tend to promote the compatibility argument.Footnote 6 Those who conceptualize democracy procedurally and Confucianism illiberally tend to advocate the incompatibility argument.Footnote 7 Those who define democracy procedurally and Confucianism liberally or democracy substantively and Confucianism illiberally are likely to subscribe to the convergence argument.

A procedural democratic interpretation presumes a self-deterministic, pluralistic, and adversarial polity. The core values associated with Confucianism in East Asia, however, include a focus on conformism, collectivism, and social harmony.Footnote 8 The concept of ‘self’ in the Confucian ethos, for example, is defined as a person's obligatory role in the greater society. Indeed, ‘rights’ are not a distinguishing feature in the Confucian value system. Individuality comes second to the preservation of the group. This is particularly emphasized with regard to the family. The family unit is the ‘microcosm of society and politics and idealized as the prototype of good governance’.Footnote 9 In brief, illiberal Confucian values stress social commitments that contrast sharply with the individualistic and adversarial nature of Western-style government, designed, and operated by the people.

A substantive democratic interpretation presumes that government exists primarily to protect and improve the lives of the people. This is characteristic of both the Western and liberal Confucian moral traditions. Confucian governance is guided by the notion of minben, which means treating ‘people’ (min) as ‘roots’ (ben). To govern by this principle, therefore, is to protect the people's (min) economic prosperity and physical security just as the roots of trees (ben) should be cared for.Footnote 10 When government fails to protect the prosperity and welfare of the people, it loses the ‘mandate of heaven’ (pinyin) and becomes subject to removal by rebellion.Footnote 11 In a democratic system, leaders are also expected to govern morally and selflessly. The difference is that a democratic polity places more weight on institutions designed to ensure accountability and transparency, while Confucianism stresses virtuous leadership over the rule of law and institutional checks and balances.Footnote 12 But both a liberal interpretation of Confucianism and a substantive interpretation of democracy embody principles of responsibility, accountability, and morality.

There is also an argument that Confucianism and democracy can converge to create a hybrid political system. As scholars such as Yung-Myung Kim and Daniel Bell have suggested, there are authoritarian qualities within Confucianism that may strengthen certain aspects of democratic society. East Asian societies need not discard traditions emphasizing the common good and social harmony in order to sustain a democratic polity. Instead, these features may bolster nascent democratic societies by stressing order and decreasing instances of ramped individualism at the cost of a stronger community. These Confucian traditions can exist within a democratic system that protects the rights and liberties of its people. Democracy may also adjust to a prevailing Confucian culture and yield to traditions that stress a paternalistic state and the public good. Thus, the convergence relationship may mean that Confucianism no longer exists as an obstacle to democratization but is instead an established way of life that democracy can learn from and develop around.

The challenge for new research on the relationship between Confucianism and democracy is to determine which conceptualization best fits the reality of East Asian societies. When scholars are able to determine how the mass public and elites perceive the Confucian tradition in their communities, they will be able to discern how it relates to a democratic system of government. Further, recognizing how democracy is perceived among East Asian societies is also crucial to determining its place within the Confucian tradition. Opposing conceptualizations are at the heart of the compatibility debate and have spurred conflicting perspectives in political and philosophical research.

2. The compatibility interpretation

In the mid-1980s, Confucian East Asia was pulled into the global wave of democratic reforms. This infusion of democracy, however, has not necessarily been problematic. Former South Korean president Kim Dae Jung, for example, has written optimistically about the potential for democratization in Asia, claiming the region possesses the necessary conditions to expand democracy even beyond the level of the West.Footnote 13 Young Whan Kihl credits Confucian ideals with the transformation of South Korea in recent decades into a resilient political and economic system.Footnote 14 Philosopher Keqian Xu goes even further, suggesting that Confucian principles are not only compatible with democracy, but may also become the theoretical foundation of modern democracy in East Asia.Footnote 15

These and other researchers reject the portrayal of democracy and Confucianism as antithetical doctrines. Instead, their interpretations reveal numerous shared values and traditions. This section highlights aspects of Confucianism that are hospitable to the democratic values of political accountability, participation, equality, and dissent.

Political accountability

Does Confucianism legitimize unregulated state authority? While it is true that Confucianism values order, this does not denote government superiority. Mencius wrote, ‘The people are the most important element in a nation; the spirits of the land and grain are the next; the sovereign is the lightest.’Footnote 16 Modern scholars have raised similar doubts about state dominance in Confucian societies. Francis Fukuyama, for example, maintains that the emphasis placed on hierarchicalism in family life can actually serve to constrain the reach and authority of the state. Moreover, equal access to education produces subjects that challenge authority instead of acquiescing to the regime.Footnote 17 According to Confucian philosopher Wei-Ming Tu, political authority in Confucianism is secondary to the ‘Confucian personal ethic’, which structures daily life in families, workplaces, schools, and other social venues separate from state influence. The personal ethic is also the foundation from which to judge the conduct of state officials.Footnote 18

Political constraint is in fact present in both Confucianism and democracy. Although the Confucian belief in the ‘mandate of heaven’ grants leaders considerable authority, it is contingent on ethical leadership. For example, Leonard Hsu conceives Confucian leadership as a form of political stewardship. After being deemed wise and virtuous, a leader becomes God's steward on Earth. However, this position is contingent on (1) respecting public opinion; (2) the consent of the people; (3) governing for the people's welfare; and (4) maintaining liberty, equality, and impartiality.Footnote 19 These traits are similar to the values associated with democratic societies. For instance, Shaohua Hu points out that both Confucianism and democracy oppose despotism, and support the right to terminate the rule of malevolent leaders.Footnote 20 Just as citizens of a democratic polity are entitled to ‘throw the rascals out’, people in a Confucian society are entitled to oust their government if it is not fulfilling its role as dictated by the ‘mandate of heaven’. Keqian Xu adds that the people's will, embodied in the notion of minben, constitutes the only legitimate source of political authority in Confucianism.Footnote 21 Tongdong Bai notes that ‘Mencius suggests that is it justified to kill a tyrannical ruler, because he is not – despite his title – king any more due to his failure to serve the people.’Footnote 22

Accountability is also a major component of the hierarchicalism found in Confucian societies. As Michael Collins writes:

Ritual forms of deference toward those in superior positions, for example, is not simply for the superior's personal gratification, but has the communicative function of recognizing the authority of those positions and thereby subjecting the occupants to evaluation by making them more visible to others.Footnote 23

In fact, the tradition of remonstrance, in which the people maintain an open dialogue with leaders on pressing issues, is a prominent feature of the Confucian system. It generates a semblance of accountability, limiting partisan leadership. This leads Brooke Ackerly to conclude that ‘Confucian history demonstrates practices which can constrain the abuse of authority and institutions that might be redesigned and redeployed to democratic ends in the present.’Footnote 24 In effect, such interpretations of Confucian doctrine recognize the divine obligations of leaders as a proxy for the rule of law.

Political participation

Even with an emphasis on maintaining social order, Confucian values can promote a robust civil society. Mencius wrote of the state's responsibility in promoting public participation through the equality of education. Tongdong Bai interprets this as an obligation by the government to ‘offer education and other necessary means for each individual to develop himself or herself fully in a moral and intellectual sense’.Footnote 25 Education is thus seen as a means by which to facilitate political mobilization, give the people a voice in political decisions, and place demands on state leaders. The formation of such civic mentality is a critical element of liberal political systems.Footnote 26 Historians who have studied patterns of civic associationalism in Korea, for example, find that civil society formation began as early as the nineteenth century during the Chosun dynasty.Footnote 27 That period witnessed a growing threat to Korean national identity from Chinese and Japanese mercantilists. In response, progressive and reformist intellectuals formed independent associations in 1896 as a way to detract foreign influences from altering traditional Confucian norms.

The Korean civil society movement relied on remonstrance in the Confucian tradition, offering an avenue for Korean citizens to confer with political elites. In fact, Korean historian Cho Hein has argued that the civic movement during the Chosun dynasty was the first time that the state capitulated to the people, while maintaining its hierarchical dominance.Footnote 28 The consultative role of independent associations continues to this day in South Korea – which, as it happens, is also one of the few consolidated democracies in East Asia.

Equality and dissent

Scholars have interpreted Confucianism as comprising elements of equality similar to those in a democracy.Footnote 29 The upshot of this interpretation is a community of benevolent individuals who respect the rights and personal sovereignty of others. In Confucianism, this perspective bequeaths every citizen equal opportunities. Although Michael Collins recognizes that the notion of differentiated order in Confucian society may manifest itself as a form of inequality, he notes that:

inequality need not be so complete that if one is superior, one is superior always and in all things; it need not be so inflexible that one is born into a fixed place in a rigid social order and must live one's life as proscribed by one's position with no possibility of change.Footnote 30

The opportunity to improve one's standing in Confucian society parallels the democratic emphasis on equality. Moreover, tolerance toward diverse ideas and opinions are encouraged and require compromise from elites. A. T. Nuyen points out in Analects 9:2 that there is even an endorsement of free and independent will. Mencius believed that a good subject should follow his innate conscience and remonstrate with his or her ruler rather than obey unconditionally. Nuyen also suggests that it is unnecessary to sacrifice pluralism for the sake of social harmony. Harmony, he writes, differs from conformity in that it presupposes the existence of diverse interests and views, and requires the ‘blending’ of those differences.Footnote 31 For Michael Collins, ‘A harmonious community does not suppress the individuality of its members; instead it flourishes only when individuality and harmony enhance each other.’Footnote 32 Such rights, sacrosanct in Confucian philosophy, are congruent to the Western liberal tradition of democratic citizenship.

On the surface there appears to be a discordant match between Confucianism's pacifist tradition and liberal democracy's political contestation.Footnote 33 Ackerly, however, rejects this contradiction, suggesting that dissent is fundamental to Confucian hierarchical structures.Footnote 34 The notion that contestation is customary in Confucian society is shared by other prominent Confucian scholars. Tan, for instance, notes that implicit in the teaching of Confucianism is the tradition of dao (ethical way of living), which compels people to speak out against injustice that transgresses basic human values.Footnote 35 Michael Collins points out that in order ‘to realize the way rather than merely following it, there must be democratic participation in social inquiry to solve the shared problems of the community’.Footnote 36 Hall and Ames also interpret Confucianism, even within the context of rigid hierarchicalism, as permitting citizen opposition so long as it does not incite political mayhem or rebellion.Footnote 37 Indeed, the emergence of a Korean civil society forged the way for many non-governmental organizations in post-authoritarian politics. These bodies have served as checks on state institutions.Footnote 38 True to Confucian traditions, however, most civic groups still preserve the tradition of holding the state accountable without weakening its authority and capacity to govern.

3. The incompatibility interpretation

Democratization in East Asia has been arduous and, at times, unstable. The region's uneven success with democracy is often attributed to a communitarian emphasis on political centralization, collectivist public policy, belief in the state as a virtuous entity, and aversion to political change.

East Asia's difficult transition has led some scholars and politicians to conclude that Confucianism is hindering democratization. As Samuel Huntington argues:

There is no causal relationship between the Confucian tradition and democratization. Confucian heritage, with its emphasis on authority, order, hierarchy, and supremacy of the collectivity over the individual, creates obstacles to democratization.Footnote 39

Some East Asian political leaders, such as Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew and Malaysia's Mahathir Mohamed, have publically stated that the dominance of ‘Asian values’ make Western liberal democracy unrealistic for the region.Footnote 40 Critics maintain, however, that state leaders use the malleability of Confucius's words as justification for illiberal policies in practice. Brennan and Fan argue, for example, that the unwillingness to abandon authoritarian Confucian traditions impedes societies from progressing democratically.Footnote 41

This section reviews interpretations of Confucian values opposed to fundamental tenets of democratic societies. Much of the literature presumes that those who are highly committed to the Confucian value system respect the social hierarchy, and view pluralism, civil activism, and adversarial politics as disruptive of the state's paternalistic duties. As a result, East Asian societies with a Confucian orientation are seen as less likely to support liberal democracy.

Social hierarchy

Confucius perceived the state as an organic institution that paralleled the family structure.Footnote 42 Like a family, the state reflects the superior–inferior relationship between a parent and child. The child (citizen) must exhibit proper conduct and filial piety, while the father (leader) has a duty to rectify the flawed behavior of his child through principled leadership. As a result, Confucian society stresses obedience to authority and discourages behavior that delegitimizes the authority structure. Yet deference to authority leaves little room to cultivate a tradition of political activism and social mobilization.Footnote 43 In a liberal polity, citizens are encouraged to formulate opinions based on individual well-being, while in a Confucian society subjects defer to the state without placing checks on the behavior of state officials.

Some presume that suspicion toward political decentralization and the separation of powers are endemic to the Asian value system.Footnote 44 These convictions contradict Western ideals of democratic governance. The Confucian state instead limits pluralism to harness national cohesiveness. For example, East Asian presidents and prime ministers are often granted inordinate amounts of power with little opposition from other branches of government. Some leaders legitimize their oppressive rule by invoking Confucian values of national unity and patriarchalism. These arrangements reflect Guillermo O'Donnell's concept of delegative democracy, where political power is concentrated in the executive and rarely challenged.Footnote 45 The use of ren from the Confucian tradition in contemporary Chinese society has been argued to sustain a ‘benevolent authoritarian polity’.Footnote 46

Group primacy

Confucian societies rarely pursue the advancement of individual rights – effectively placing the primacy of the group above the individual.Footnote 47 A fundamental reason that Confucianism does not value the struggle for individual liberties is that if the state is fulfilling its duty to promote the public welfare, such efforts are considered unnecessary. Individuals expect to be provided the opportunities needed to fulfill their societal role. In fact, the Western concepts of partisanship and interest groups are believed to incite political inefficiency and instability. East Asians are thus inclined to give preference to efficiency and order, rather than implementing a more transparent system of infighting and uncertainty

Research also suggests that East Asia's traditional family systems may be impeding the growth of formal democracy. For example, Roger Ames argues that Confucian traditions have been slow in producing the formal and objective institutions necessary to sustain a Confucian version of democracy.Footnote 48 When Confucian societies have produced these institutions, they are often compromised and ultimately eroded by the excessive intervention of personal relationships. With so much investment in the intimate familial relationship, attempts to project the norm to other venues handicaps the need for regulative ideals, such as fairness and justice. Because East Asia is fairly homogenous, pluralistic ideas that reflect post-materialist concerns (such as more individual freedoms) are often shunned for being disruptive to national unity. This is evident in the region's strongest democratic holdout, China. Chinese autocratic rule is partially attributed to the high degree of Confucian ‘attendant’ values, which posit that the free discussion of ideas will put the larger political community at risk of disintegration.

A moral state

Confucianism deems virtue to be the guiding principle of government instead of formal political institutions. In The Analects, Confucius states that ‘He who exercises government by means of his virtue may be compared to the north polar star, which keeps its place and all the stars turn towards it.’Footnote 49 Yet, as Shaohua Hu points out, Confucian doctrine fails to address what should be done if morality fails, and conflicts occur in the process and implementation of legislation.Footnote 50 Confucianism's optimistic notion of virtue does not point to any clear institutional mechanism for resolving conflicts.Footnote 51 Small agrarian communities, where Confucius and Mencius once lived, no longer exist, and morality alone cannot teach what is right and wrong. In large urbanized and industrialized communities, moral values constantly change, and the same values do not always mean the same thing in different segments of the population. Consequently, values often conflict. Rule by morality alone, therefore, cannot promote a harmonious community. Moreover, without an appreciation for the rule of law on the part of political leaders, democracy cannot survive.

4. The convergence interpretation

The tendency in much scholarly work is to evaluate the relationship between democracy and Confucianism as dichotomous; democracy is either compatible or incompatible with Confucian values. In reality, the relationship is more complex and conditional on a multitude of factors. By focusing solely on Confucianism's undemocratic values, for example, scholars such as Samuel Huntington offer only a partial account of the possible linkage between Confucianism and democracy. On the other hand, scholars who stress the shared elements in democracy and Confucianism overlook the unbalanced democratic transitions in East Asia since the third wave of democratization.

An increasing number of scholars claim that Confucianism and democracy can be reformulated in the context of Confucian Asia.Footnote 52 A convergence of democratic and Confucian values could result in a new, hybrid system. Proponents of this perspective consider the traditional strengths of Asian cultures, such as order and efficiency, as helpful to building stronger democracies. Likewise, the fusion of democracy into East Asia can encourage liberal thought and self-reliance, while still respecting traditional ideals. This final theoretical section surveys scholarship that evaluates how democracy and traditional East Asian Confucian values might serve to improve each other.

Democratic and Confucian values in a convergent system

Although democracy and Confucianism clash on significant points, scholars have identified elements that might benefit both doctrines. For instance, some have noted the connection between Confucianism and human rights.Footnote 53 Chaibong Hahm discusses the link between Confucianism and East Asia's remarkable economic development in recent years.Footnote 54

Others have questioned whether the clash between democracy and Confucianism, as interpreted in scholarly and journalistic works, is overstated. Russell Dalton and Nhu-Ngoc Ong suggest that although political elites use cultural arguments to sustain their rule and reject liberal social norms, mass citizenries in non-democratic East Asian nations do not necessarily hold similar interpretations of Confucianism. Late twentieth-century modernization, they maintain, has bolstered the prevalence of mass participation.Footnote 55 Yung-Myung Kim notes that East Asian culture is changing drastically, especially between generations. Confucian values may not be the predominant lifestyle among certain segments of the population. Like it or not, Western culture is finding a way to merge with Confucian societies.Footnote 56 Nor is East Asian culture time invariant. Cultures can change. Kim concludes, ‘If paternalistic political elites can promote a Confucian culture, there is no reason why democratic elites, politicians, or intellectuals cannot promote democratic values in East Asian societies.’Footnote 57

It is also possible that Confucian values can emend the less positive features of Western-style democracy, such as rampant individualism and the lack of commitment to family and community. Democracy, when forged with Confucian ideals, could result in a system of individualism, participation, consensus, and authority. In Confucian Democracy, for example, Sor-Hoon Tan proposes an alternative to liberal democracy. Tan argues that unlike a liberal democracy that operates under the constraints of interest groups, Confucian democracy is capable of promoting both individual freedom and the common good.Footnote 58 Confucianism may also be capable of strengthening democracy. For example, Yung-Myung Kim writes that the Confucian emphasis on social order and respect for authority, harmony, and consensus may aid in the survival of burgeoning democracies. Fetzer and Soper contend that, like other religions, Confucianism can bend to emerging democratic trends. Conversely, Confucianism can ‘temper the excesses’ of individualism and promote more consideration of past generations.Footnote 59

What would the fusion of Confucian and democratic government look like? Daniel Bell argues that democratic representatives elected by the people are not necessarily ‘wise and broad-minded decision makers’ capable of weighing ‘the long-term consequences of present-day decisions’.Footnote 60 Bell believes that government solely by the people is not appropriate for East Asian societies with a Confucian heritage. For Confucian China, he proposes a model that reconciles meritocratic rule with the minimal practice of representative democracy. Specifically, his model of Confucian democracy consists of two chambers of policymakers. As in most liberal democracies, members of the lower chamber will be elected by the people. Those in the upper chamber, on the other hand, will be selected on the basis of competitive examinations. Shielded from the demands of voters concerned with their short-term interest, the upper chamber, as an institution of talented and public-spirited policymakers, will be able to serve the long-term interests of the people as a whole. This chamber, called the Xianshiyuan, will also be able to ‘protect unpopular individuals and vulnerable minorities from the decisions of democratic majorities’ in the lower house.Footnote 61

Democracy can also be made to fit within the Confucian tradition. As Baogang He writes, too often ‘democracy is the judge and final truth while Confucianism is deemed as passive: either it should be abandoned for the sake of democracy, or it ought to be modified to make it compatible with democracy’. Rather, he notes that ‘Democracy itself needs to be opened up and subjected to criticism from different cultures. In this context, Confucianism is presented as a counterbalance to excessive individualism and narrowly defined electoral democracy.’Footnote 62 While Baogang He develops this perspective into a separate interpretive model he labels ‘critical’, we retain this relationship dynamic within a convergence perspective. We do so recognizing that both democracy and Confucian may require adjustment to fit within each other's system, but that it will inevitably produce a unique, hybrid outcome. But we agree with Baogang He that ‘electoral democracy is full of deficiencies and flaws’ and that Confucian practice may not violate humanistic and moral principles.Footnote 63 For example, Confucian tradition justifies the interference and imposition of the state on citizen's lives and this is not necessarily a hindrance to moral principles. Sor-Hoon Tan's formulation of a Confucian democracy and Daniel Bell's hybrid legislative system based on both democratic principles of representation and Confucian principles of experienced leaders are important theoretical steps in elucidating how such a system may exist.

5. Empirical studies

As the previous sections illustrate, the preponderance of work on the relationship between Confucianism and democracy is theoretical. These are important contributions because they help identify the components that underlie the relationship. However, theoretical arguments become particularly powerful when combined with empirical evidence. More to the point, theoretical interpretations of Confucian and democratic values need to be tested against the opinions of East Asian citizens.

Scholars have only recently begun to use public opinion data from East Asia to assess the significance of Confucian values on the democratization process. The World Values Survey, the Asian Barometer, and other national-based surveys have queried public opinion on traditional Confucian values such as the importance of family, deference to authority, as well as democratic values. To date, only a handful of empirical studies have been published about this relationship, and no general consensus has been reached.

Results of empirical studies have been conflicting for a number of reasons. First, country and regional studies produce different conclusions due to the considerable structural variation that exists between East Asian countries. Dalton and Ong, for example, rightly acknowledge that ‘there is not a single East Asian political culture. Diverse value patterns exist across the publics of these nations’.Footnote 64 As a result, the impact of ‘Asian values’ on democratization may appear stronger or weaker in different countries and country studies may vary from trends identified in cross-national analyses. Second, Confucianism does not necessarily have a blanket influence over all values and opinions. Thus, the components of Confucianism that scholars choose to measure or not measure, as well as their operationalization of democracy, may result in significantly different outcomes. This is especially true in cross-country analyses where certain traditions take on varying levels of significance depending on the country.

Two recent publications by Park and ShinFootnote 65 and Fetzer and SoperFootnote 66 illustrate these inconsistencies. Fetzer and Soper use the 1995 World Values Survey and the 2001 Asian Barometer Survey to analyze the Confucian–democratic relationship in Taiwan. They look at Confucianism's impact on the support for democracy and human rights and find that it does not consistently decrease support for democracy, freedom of speech, or women's rights. In fact, contrary to conventional wisdom, valuing family loyalty actually increases support for democracy and women's rights. Fetzer and Soper conclude that, although Taiwan's Confucian tradition is strong and enduring, it does not appear to be negatively impacting democratization or the acceptance of human rights.

Park and Shin arrive at different conclusions in their study of South Korea. Using the 2003 East Asian Barometer Survey, they categorize Confucian values as either political or social. Their initial tests indicate that most Koreans at least partially embrace the Confucian norms of hierarchicalism, collectivism, and paternalism. Unlike Fetzer and Soper, they use both the support of democracy and the rejection of authoritarianism as dependent variables. Park and Shin conclude that adherence to political Confucian values make citizens less likely to reject authoritarianism. The only variable that significantly affects support for democracy is the approval of anti-adversarial politics, and it is a negative relationship. Thus, while detachment from Asian values may decrease support for authoritarian government, it does not necessarily move people toward democratic support.

This comparison illustrates how country variations and differences in operationalization generate varied results. Other comparative case studies confirm this problem. For example, using Asian Barometer data from 2001, Chang, Chu, and Tsai conclude that democratization in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong is hindered by Confucian values.Footnote 67 However, as Fetzer and Soper note, Chang et al. compile an index of Confucian values as their key independent variable, which deflates the potential impact of specific Confucian orientations. Moreover, Fetzer and Soper indicate that there is an overemphasis on what Park and Shin indentify as ‘group primacy’ questions, with little weight given to social harmony questions.Footnote 68 Thus, we see the challenge of capturing Confucianism empirically. Scholars risk overemphasizing specific characteristics of Confucianism and excluding others.

To date, there is a lack of cross-country empirical research on the relationship between Confucianism and democracy. The most notable effort in this area is by Dalton and Ong, who test how social authority orientations in six East Asian countries affect democratic support. Specifically, they investigate the presence of congruency, which posits that opinions about the family carry over to opinions about democracy. For example, a belief in parental respect, obedience, and deference to authority should translate as a rejection of liberal ideals. Additionally, they compare results in East Asia with trends found in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. Combining data from the 1995–1999 and 2000–2002 World Values Surveys, they find that the projection of authority orientations to opinions on democracy is small and not systematically different between East Asia and the West. Dalton and Ong attribute these findings to a worldwide pattern of social modernization that is eclipsing cultural traditions.

Despite the impressive scope of the study, however, Dalton and Ong fall into the same trap as Chang et al., by compiling authority orientation values into a single index for their multivariate analysis. This tells us little about the impact of specific values on democratic support. Moreover, as important as the test of congruence theory is, a general conclusion on the Confucian–democratic relationship cannot be determined from their choice of variables. While factors such as parental authority and obedience to leadership are certainly components of Confucian society, the absence of measures on moral leadership, anti-pluralism, and social harmony prevent Dalton and Ong from any comprehensive conclusion on the relationship between democracy and Confucianism in East Asia.

While a consensus is still elusive, each of the empirical studies discussed here has advanced our understanding of the Confucian–democratic dynamic in important ways. Fetzer and Soper and Park and Shin implement conceptually and methodologically sound tests despite the limited generalizability of their country studies. Fetzer and Soper in particular have drawn attention to the support of human rights. As was mentioned in the convergence interpretation section, Fetzer and Soper have a theoretical base from which to suggest that Confucianism strengthens support for human rights. They conclude that Confucianism and democracy have the potential to work together in Taiwanese society.

Park and Shin, on the other hand, offer a comprehensive conceptualization of Confucian-based opinions by categorizing them as either social values or political values. Additionally, they distinguish between the support of democracy and the rejection of authoritarianism, both of which are critical for the consolidation of a democratic regime. Park and Shin find some evidence for the incompatibility interpretation, although this is only in regard to the rejection of authoritarianism, and each value does not have an equal impact.

Finally, Chang et al. and Dalton and Ong extend empirical tests to cross-country studies and produce conflicting results. It is important to note that they use different questions from different years and from different surveys. Nevertheless, the fact that their results differ so drastically in China and Taiwan points to the immense variation that exists between East Asian countries. Despite the difficulty in operationalizing Confucianism, cross-country comparative works move the debate in the right direction. Dalton and Ong's application of congruence theory is a useful way of conceptualizing the influence of Confucianism on democratic support, and their inclusion of Western nations for comparison provides a deeper perspective than past studies. Moreover, the conclusion reached by Dalton and Ong that Confucianism has little connection to the support of democracy in East Asia points to a potential fourth interpretation, that there is no significant relationship between Confucianism and democracy.

6. Conclusion

This article surveyed the debate on the role of Confucianism in East Asian democratic development. There is still no consensus on the relationship. The conceptualization of democracy as either procedural or substantive and the conceptualization of Confucians as either liberal or illiberal have spurred three interpretations. The compatibility interpretation construes democracy substantively and Confucian traditions as liberal. It posits that modern Confucian societies hold values that are compatible with liberal democracies. Among these values are an adherence to elite accountability, citizen equality, the formation of civic groups, and dissent. The incompatibility interpretation construes democracy as procedural and Confucian traditions as illiberal. It posits that deference to authority and obedience to social hierarchies are not outwardly compatible with the democratic norms of equality and political participation. Democracy in a Confucian society seems possible only with the weakening of Confucian values. Scholars point out that East Asia's proclivity toward one-party or one-man rule reveals strong Confucian tendencies that make the prospect for genuine democracy unlikely. Lastly, the convergence interpretation encompasses both conceptualizations of democracy and Confucianism. It suggests that the reformulation of Confucianism and democracy can yield social and political systems that are more appropriate for East Asian countries. Democratic values can infuse strong institutions of transparency and accountability, while Confucian values can decrease rampant individualism, interest group domination, strengthen community and family ties, and provide a degree of stability to burgeoning democratic regimes.

Only a few empirical studies have examined these theories, and results vary due to the structural variation in East Asia. Confucianism is a multifaceted philosophy that has seeped into many aspects of the East Asian way of life. Thus, future studies should be mindful of the different ways in which democracy and Confucianism are operationalized, being careful not to limit analyses to one particular feature such as deference to authority or social harmony. Researchers should offer a balanced assessment on the explicit impact of democratic and Confucian values. Likewise, the conceptualization of democratization is complex. Using support for democracy as a dependent variable ignores the other, equally important aspects of democratization such as the rejection of authoritarianism and the acceptance of human rights. Finally, there is a need for more cross-country studies that can identify the specific Confucian orientations that are the most influential in East Asia's democratic transformation.

7. About the authors

Nicholas Spina is a doctoral candidate in political science at the University of Missouri. In addition to democratization, his research interests include presidential powers and the development of civil society and executive–legislative relations in post-communist countries.

Doh C. Shin Doh C. Shin is a professor of political science at the University of Missouri and the founder of the Korea Barometer and a co-founder of the Asian Barometer. For the past two decades, he has conducted comparative research on the democratization of authoritarian politics and cultures in East Asia and other regions. He has also conducted public opinion research on the quality of life among the mass publics of Korea and other Confucian countries in East Asia.

Dana Cha Dana Cha is a recent graduate of American University in Washington, D.C. and a former intern at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Footnotes

Ibid.
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid

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