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Chief executive officers and the pay–pension tradeoff

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 November 2009

JOSEPH GERAKOS
Affiliation:
University of Chicago Booth School of Business, Chicago, IL 60637 (e-mail: jgerakos@chicagobooth.edu)
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Abstract

The theory of equalizing differences predicts that workers trade pay for benefits, but empirical confirmation of such tradeoffs is rare. This study investigates the extent to which chief executive officers (CEOs) trade pay for pension benefits. For a sample of S&P 500 CEOs, I find that an additional dollar of pension benefits is associated with a 48 cent decrease in pay. Although the tradeoff estimate is significantly different from zero, it is also significantly less than the anticipated rate of dollar-for-dollar, especially for CEOs with relatively more bargaining power over their boards of directors. This implies that the implicit price of pension benefits decreases with the CEO's bargaining power, so pooling datasets on CEOs with varying degrees of power blurs the size of the pay–pension tradeoff.

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Articles
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009
Figure 0

Table 1.Descriptive statisticsThis table presents descriptive statistics for S&P 500 CEOs who are in office for both fiscal 2004 and fiscal 2005. Flow variables are for fiscal 2005 and level variables are measured as of fiscal year end 2005. Compensation-related variables are denominated in thousands of dollars. Salary, bonus, long-term incentive plan, restricted grants, and all other compensation are taken directly from the ExecuComp database. To estimate the value of stock option grants, I use the Black–Scholes model. Four of the six model inputs I gather from the ExecuComp database: the number of options granted; the stock price on grant date; the exercise price; the time to maturity. I estimate volatility as the standard deviation of daily returns for the last 120 trading days for the prior fiscal year. I estimate the dividend yield as cash dividends paid divided by fiscal year end stock price. To estimate the risk-free rate I use the US Treasury bond yield associated with the option's time to maturity. Restricted stock grants are the number of shares times the grant date stock price. Pay is the sum of salary, bonus, long-term incentive plan, all other compensation, stock option grants, and restricted stock grants. Methods used to estimate pension benefits are discussed in Sundardam and Yermack (2007) and Gerakos (2008). Accrued pension benefits is the present value of accrued pension benefits as of fiscal year end 2005. Annual pension accrual ($) is the change in the value of accrued pension benefits in fiscal 2005. Annual pension accrual (%) is the change in the value of accrued pension benefits divided by pay. Chair is an indicator variable for whether the CEO chairs the board of directors. Accounting data are taken from the Compustat database and stock return data are taken from the CRSP database. Sales is the total sales for the fiscal year (CS#12). Market to book is the ratio of the market value to the book value of assets as of fiscal year end ((CS#25*CS#199+CS#181)/CS#6)). Annual stock return is the continuously compounded return on common stock for the fiscal year. Stock volatility is the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns for the last 120 trading days for the prior fiscal year. ROA is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of assets (CS#18/CS#6). Standard deviation of ROA is the standard deviation for the five years starting in 2005.

Figure 1

Table 2.CorrelationsThis table presents Pearson product-moment correlations between the empirical measures. Correlations greater than 0.08 in absolute value are significant at the 0.10 level (two-sided). Variables are described in Table 1.

Figure 2

Table 3.Pay–pension tradeoffThis table presents ordinary least squares estimates of the pay–pension tradeoff. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of pay. The coefficient on annual pension accrual (%) represents the tradeoff estimate. Model variables are described in Table 1. For each coefficient the standard error is reported in parentheses. Industry indicators are based on the Barth et al. (1998) classification.

Figure 3

Note:Panel B: Tradeoff estimates based on bargaining power