REFERENDA AND CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

Legislatures in Africa are often weak and ineffective in challenging the executive, and this raises important questions for constitutional reform. How can legislatures in Africa be gatekeepers to constitutional reform when they are so often weak institutions that serve to rubber stamp executive decisions? In Mali the gap between parchment and practice is wide and yet the 1992 Constitution is deeply respected as the foundation of democracy. The underlying political context in which constitutional reforms were proposed in Mali was one of deep suspicion and a lack of faith that the National Assembly, delegated to be ‘guardian of the constitution’, could be trusted to deliberate effectively over proposed reforms. The lack of political opposition in the National Assembly at the time gave the institution a reputation as a rubber stamp legislature.

Referenda are a legitimate way to ensure popular support for constitutional amendments or for the creation of a new constitution and a new state (as was the case in South Sudan). Constitutions that cannot be changed risk complete failure. Referenda have the potential to contribute to popular deliberation on constitutional reforms and as such they ought to engage the people, encourage their full participation and generate public discussion and publicity (Hatchard Reference Hatchard1995: 25). However, in order for the deliberative component of a referendum to have any saliency, the propositions included in the referendum must be clear and this is often a challenge. As Stephen Tierney argues

Referenda are particularly prone to manipulation by elites (Tierney Reference Tierney2012: 148). If people do not understand what they are voting for or what the effect of the changes being made to a constitution are then their vote has little relevance. Voters must have enough information to make informed decisions.

Legislatures often play a central role in constitutional change. The Westminster model for constitutional amendment includes a specially enhanced parliamentary majority (often two-thirds majority vote of legislators) and the publication of the Bill in the Government Gazette at least thirty days prior to a final parliamentary vote (Hatchard et al. Reference Hatchard, Ndulo and Slinn2004: 45). The reliance on parliaments as the primary mechanism for constitutional change is based on the view that legislatures are sometimes seen as safeguards to human rights. Legislators as elected representatives are given the responsibility of representing the interests of the people and protecting their rights when constitutional reforms are considered. In this sense, parliamentarians are ‘guardians of the constitution’. However this is misplaced faith. As John Hatchard, Muna Ndulo and Peter Slinn argue, ‘it is the people themselves who are the “guardians of the constitution” and it is they who must consent to any proposed amendment of their constitution’ (Hatchard et al. Reference Hatchard, Ndulo and Slinn2004: 56). This can be done through a special parliamentary majority or approved by a fully representative constituent assembly and a national referendum (Hatchard et al. Reference Hatchard, Ndulo and Slinn2004: 56). The rubber stamp nature of many African legislatures undermines their role (Hatchard Reference Hatchard1995: 34). If the executive has the ability to obfuscate issues addressed in a referendum then these safeguards do not function. Neither representatives nor constituents can adequately protect people's rights. Therefore, while it is generally agreed that constitutions should be able to change, the method used for change can vary considerably. Ultimately a legislature must be effectively independent and legitimate in order to safeguard constitutional rights throughout constitutional reform. In cases in which a referendum is brought to the people the referendum itself must be clear and understandable to those citizens voting for or against it. Awareness campaigns become critical for spreading knowledge about the referendum and also an opportunity for elite manipulation of what citizens learn about proposed reforms themselves. In Mali the referendum was never published and thus contributed to rumours regarding ATT's intentions.

There are multiple cases in Africa in recent years alone in which constitutional reforms were proposed and challenged by citizens. Across West Africa movements called Touche pas à ma constitution (Hands off my Constitution) were created in response to proposed constitutional reforms. A group by this name was organised in Benin to protest President Yayi Boni from reforming the constitution in that country, including, it is rumoured, an attempt to do away with term limits (Teiga Reference Teiga2012). There was a similar movement in Senegal as protestors challenged then President Abdoulaye Wade.

The Senegalese movement became known as the June 23rd Movement and was one of the continent's largest and most effective citizen movements against constitutional reform.

Constitutional reform was not new to Mali. In November 2001, President Konaré appeared on national television to cancel a referendum planned for 23 December 2001. The 11-party collective opposition as well as the independent union of the judiciary described the reforms as unconstitutional. Konaré argued that he had acted ‘for the sake of democracy because the referendum vote “needed the support of the people’” (IRIN 2001). The reform proposed by Konaré granted the president constitutional immunity from prosecution and ‘handed over to the president total control of the country's supreme legislative body, the constitutional courts’ (IRIN 2001). Diplomats recognised the cancellation of the referendum as ‘good for democracy’ (IRIN 2001). A decade later, Touche pas à ma constitution was created in response to ATT's proposed constitutional reforms.Footnote ³ This umbrella organisation incorporated approximately twenty organisations including the two principal labour unions, the l'Union nationale des travailleurs du Mali (UNTM) and the Confédération syndicale des travailleurs du Mali (CSTM). The Malian National Assembly passed the constitutional reform project with little opposition on 2 August 2011. This opened the way for a public referendum for amending the constitution. Touche pas à ma constitution spearheaded multiple marches in Bamako protesting the referendum in the autumn of 2011 as well as a major campaign to make people aware of the referendum and the consequences of its passage (all the while never seeing the referendum itself). Ali Nouhoum Diallo, former president of the National Assembly was one of the central figures of the movement. On 30 December 2011 roughly three hundred people marched to protest the proposed referendum (Coulibaly Reference Coulibaly2011). While this is certainly not a movement of the masses, the participation of UNTM and CSTM increased the potential to mobilise people into the streets to challenge the reforms as the referendum approached. Statements by Touche pas à ma constitution illustrated a commitment to broad deliberation and democratic process as integral to any constitutional reform. Of course the effectiveness of the movement remains unknown, particularly given the derailment of elections in March 2012 with the coup d’état. It is, however, certain that ATT moved without hesitation towards the April 2012 referendum despite active calls to postpone it.

These examples demonstrate citizen wariness towards attempts by the executive to make any changes to the constitution. In both Benin and Mali the constitutions were created as the result of National Conferences and included widespread participation in constitution making. This participation increased citizen awareness of the constitution. In Mali, the reform process was marred by a lack of deliberation within the National Assembly and a lack of clarity on the content of the proposed amendments. This resulted in widespread challenges to the process and mobilisation and protests in autumn 2011 that amplified tensions in the capital (Coulibaly Reference Coulibaly2011). These tensions contributed to the political instability in Bamako that weakened the regime making it ripe for collapse in March 2012.

PARTICIPATORY CONSTITUTION MAKING IN MALI AND THE POLITICS OF PROCESS

The constitution of Mali was created following a remarkable series of events in which Lt Col Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT) deposed the regime of General Moussa Traoré on 26 March 1991. ATT became a hero, frequently referred to as a ‘soldier of democracy’, when he not only toppled the dictatorial regime led by Traoré but he lived up to his promise to allow democratic elections to determine who would be the first President of the Third Republic.

At the Malian National Conference in August 1991 representatives from all walks of life deliberated and negotiated the institutional structures that would form the core of the country's democracy. Roughly 2,000 participants took part in the National Conference, hardly a representative sample, and yet the forum included a wide range of individuals. Teachers, lawyers, labour unions activists, farmers, members of the military, and budding politicians all participated (Wing Reference Wing2010). The national conference and the constitution that emerged from the conference (passed by referendum on 12 January 1992) symbolise Mali's break from centralised rule under Moussa Traoré and the opening of political space in the country.

The 1992 constitution was written when no elected representative body existed. The recent challenges to the legitimacy of the constitutional revisions are embedded in a deep suspicion of the National Assembly and its role as a place of deliberation in which interests of ‘the people’ are represented. Former Minister Ousmane Sy argued:

These criticisms compare the manner in which the reforms were undertaken with the broad deliberative process through which the 1992 constitution was created and the referendum is framed as a threat. The rapid passage of the reforms by the National Assembly, coupled with high levels of illiteracy in the country, led members of Touche pas à ma constitution to argue that the referendum, even when voted on, would not be valid and was in fact a ploy by the President and his supporters to push through reforms that people would vote for without full knowledge of their effects. The vote would appear to have increased validity because it would rely on the high voter turnout associated with Presidential elections. The reality would be far different.

The first stage in the process of reforms included a ‘Committee of Experts’ made up of thirteen individuals who were professors, lawyers, civil servants etc. (République du Mali 2008). The list of those interviewed is quite extensive and includes politicians, judges, civil society leaders and many others (Diawara Reference Diawara2010). However, the purpose of deliberation and discussion (concertation) on possible reforms is that the concertations be extensive and inclusive rather than simply receiving ‘important individuals (former Prime Ministers, institutional presidents, former ministers, deputies, or civil society workshops, religious groups …)’ (Fofana & Doumbia Reference Fofana and Doumbia2011). One prominent individual who participated in the concertations argued that participants challenged the reforms and, while reports of the Commission claimed that the group supported the referendum, these challenges were not taken into consideration.Footnote ⁴ The model of dialogue from the 1990s included conversations designed to ‘mobilize all socio-professional levels of society in (Mali) at the regional and local level’ (Fofana & Doumbia Reference Fofana and Doumbia2011). Calls were made to have similar consultations so that ‘Malians would have the opportunity to say whether or not they agree (with the reforms)’ (Fofana & Doumbia Reference Fofana and Doumbia2011). This did not happen. This was in sharp contrast to the policy-making environment under President Konaré that included sweeping dialogues through regional and national concertations (Wing Reference Wing2010). The reform of the family code is the most significant policy reform in the country in that it spanned over two decades and citizens mobilised in massive numbers to protest a new law passed by the National Assembly in 2009. This was the largest popular mobilisation against a proposed policy change and was spearheaded by the High Islamic Council of Mali. As a result of popular mobilisation and threats of a coup at that time ATT backtracked and the code was revised with consultation from delegates of the HCIM (Interview, Mahmoud Zouber, Bamako, 29 May 2014).

The process by which the reforms unfolded and the proposed constitutional referendum contributed to the environment of suspicion of the state. In Mali a ‘loss of public confidence in public institutions help(ed) trigger the overthrow of President Touré's democratically elected government in 2012’ (Dulani Reference Dulani2014). While the referendum was not a topic of discussion across the Malian population, the turmoil surrounding the proposed referendum highlights a divide among Malian elites. The participatory process through which the constitution was created in 1991 embedded a strong attachment to the document and to the importance of citizen participation and dialogue as a key element of not only constitutional reform in the country but, more broadly, democracy in Mali (Kalambry Reference Kalambry2011).

THE PROPOSED REFORMS

Throughout the 1990s Mali struggled with how best to consolidate democracy. Widespread debates took place on multiple topics including central aspects of democratisation such as the reform of electoral law. Repeated calls were made for the need to reinforce the institutions of democracy (including the legislative and judicial branches). Given the lack of progress on either front, calls for constitutional reform should not be seen as unwarranted altogether. At the time of the coup, just five weeks prior to the scheduled 29 April vote, the referendum had not been published nor made available to the public. In fact, the proposed referendum has never been published although it was to be based on the 250-page ‘Daba Diawara Report’ released in 2010. According to Diawara, the reforms would ‘translate into important innovations that will redefine the contours of the institutional architecture of our democratic system’ (Fofana Reference Fofana2010).

In retrospect, it seems obvious that elites would be divided over the issue of increasing the power of the already powerful executive office. Review of the constitution began in the early years of ATT's second term as the President and he seemed eager to complete the reforms prior to the end of his mandate (Fofana & Doumbia Reference Fofana and Doumbia2011; Option 2011). Given the continued international support for Mali and its president, as well as the fact that ATT had effectively co-opted the opposition, the timing was right to centralise power more effectively through constitutional reforms that appeared to be inclusive. In essence, ATT had the ability given his international reputation, or so it seemed, to pull off a constitutional referendum if indeed any Malian president could. This avoids the question of why ATT would attempt reforms in the first place if he truly planned to abide by the term limits imposed by the constitution. It is unclear what he had to gain from the reforms if he was not planning on staying in power. There was, however, growing suspicion that elections would be no more than a passing of a baton to one of ATT's protégés and would mean that concentrating power within the executive would continue to benefit those elites who maintained power. Supporting this perspective is the fact that none of the four top contenders represented change. They were ‘all male, all of a similar age, all educated in France, all friends with the President, all establishment figures and all of similar orientation’ (Wan Reference Wan2012).Footnote ⁵ None of these contenders spoke out against the reform. Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, who was elected President in 2013, stated clearly that his party, RPM, had voted for the reform in the National Assembly.

Of all the possible reforms, presidential term limits was the most contested. Throughout the reform process questions were raised about whether or not presidential term limits would be lifted. When asked about this ATT told Radio France International ‘I am a man of honour, and there is life beyond power’ (‘Mali set for constitution referendum’ 2010). While constitutions were changed and executive term limits removed in several countries across the continent (Widner Reference Widner2013), ATT refrained from this bold manoeuvre to maintain power.Footnote ⁶

The referendum proposed by the Diawara Commission included the creation of a Senate ‘to improve oversight by the legislature over the executive’. The Senate would replace the High Council of Collectivities and the Senate President would become head of state if the national presidency became vacant through incapacitation or death (replacing the President of the National Assembly in this role). The High Council of Collectivities was designed to have a consultative role; however, the Senate would be a second chamber of parliament and participate fully in the legislative process (Traoré Reference Traoré2011). Criminal sanctions for media offences would be removed. A ‘leader of the opposition’ would be created and serve as a cabinet minister. Opportunistic floor crossing in the National Assembly would be sanctioned to strengthen discipline within political parties and ‘force them to make alliances on the basis of political programmes and not only of personal power ambitions’ (Souaré & Handy Reference Souaré and Handy2010). There would be a reorganisation of the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council, the High Court of Justice, and the Superior Council of the Magistrature (conseil supérieur de la magistrature) (Fofana Reference Fofana2010). These proposed changes might well have served to reinforce the opposition and strengthen political parties. They also further increased centralisation of power of the executive by allowing the President to appoint the Presidents of the Constitutional Court (formerly chosen by Court members), the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (former chosen by Council members) and the newly created High Council of Audio-Visual Communication. The Senate would include a number of seats to be appointed by the executive. The percentage of seats by executive appointment was never clear and some have claimed it was to be as high as 30%.Footnote ⁷ The creation of the Senate was questioned by a number of individuals who viewed it as an unnecessary increase in government expenditures. The reforms proposed did not necessarily consolidate democracy but certainly increased opportunities for corruption. Proposed reforms also included an alteration of Article 38 that was revised to read: ‘The president names the prime minister and terminates his functions.’ In the 1992 constitution the President's power is checked by the legislature because the Prime Minister could only be dismissed if he or she had offered his or her resignation. Critics argued that Malian reforms were untimely and unnecessary because the country had more important issues to address such as poverty, insecurity, education and health care. In addition, Touche pas à ma constitution stated:

While some positive changes were being proposed, they would come with increased executive authority. Finally, the timing of the proposed referendum was critical. The President of the Coordination of Organisations of the Democratic Movement (COMODE), Ali Nouhoum Diallo, argued that the coupling of the presidential election with the referendum was ‘sabotage’ that would likely result in a ‘fiasco’ that would lead to non-credible elections. The end result, Diallo predicted, would be the political class itself demanding the annulment of the elections and opening the door for ATT to remain in power (Daou Reference Daou2011). Diallo argued that ATT did not go through proper channels for negotiation in preparation of the referendum. Since 2002 ATT had said that he would spearhead the reform to the constitution, by 2011 time was running short and the end of his mandate was drawing near (Fofana & Doumbia Reference Fofana and Doumbia2011). In an article entitled ‘Institutional Reforms: What is the commando mission hiding?’ Diallo repeats that ‘it is not at the end of a mandate that one changes the rules of the game, especially when it concerns fundamental law, the constitution adopted February 25, 1992’ (Option 2011).

The politics around the referendum underscore the crises facing Malian democracy at the time. Many questioned the motives that were driving the President for the constitutional reform and why he did not leave reforms for his successor (Fofana & Doumbia Reference Fofana and Doumbia2011; Option 2011). Even once it was announced that the proposed revisions would not include a reform of Article 30, which restricts presidential term in office to two five-year terms, some wondered if he would respect this requirement and hand over power (Option 2011; Personal communication). In addition, the National Assembly had no record of acting independently of the President; therefore, the existing formal process for constitutional revision was called into question.Footnote ⁸ In many countries this might have been an ideal moment for open democratic debate regarding political institutions but the political environment in Mali had eroded to such an extent that little confidence remained in democratic procedures (Dulani Reference Dulani2014). There was a deep distrust of the President, who residents of Bamako began to refer to as ‘le roi ATT’ (king ATT). Members of the National Assembly benefited from access to rewards associated with consensus politics (Baudais & Chauzal Reference Baudais and Chauzal2006).

In hindsight, as evidence comes forth of the depths of corruption within the Malian state under ATT and the complicity of the state in narco-trafficking (Lacher Reference Lacher2012), the dangers of increasing the authority of the President are even clearer. On the other hand, Malian democracy needed reinforcement. The opposition had eroded away, deputies routinely changed political parties or created new parties, and the justice system was deeply corrupt. The question was, were constitutional reforms the solution needed to address the challenges of democratic consolidation in the country? In addition to the proposed changes themselves, the referendum caused an outcry over the process through which the reforms were written and the referendum proposed. Touche pas à ma constitution challenged the undemocratic nature of the new constitutional project because the proposed referendum was not the

Again, the movement makes the important point that the proposed changes do not have the same weight as the original constitution because of a lack of national consensus. Mme Sy Kadiatou Sow points out that hundreds of organisations, primarily youth organisations, were established overnight to defend the proposed constitutional reforms. Further questioning their legitimacy, she argues that these organisations received public financing (Fofana & Doumbia Reference Fofana and Doumbia2011). Malian political elites have a history of providing resources to underemployed or unemployed youth to rally for or against a chosen cause. This was widespread during elections in the 1990s. Sow's observation is important and hardly surprising.

The extent of deliberation in relation to the referendum is critical, not just the nature of the deliberation but who was included in the conversations. At a minimum the National Assembly would be the most obvious place for discussion of the pros and cons of changes to the constitution but even this did not happen. Those who argue in favour of a strong parliamentary role in constitutional reform or constitution-making often argue ‘by including citizens we risk making constitutions hostage to shallow and misinformed opinions, destructive “special interest” politics, or divisive group politics’ (Chambers Reference Chambers, Mendelsohn and Parkin2001: 238). In criticising the very modus operandi of Daba Diawara and his team Tiebilé Drame argues:

As we have seen, the process to which Dramé alludes in which the 1992 constitution was created was far more inclusive and deliberative and this garnered the document constitutional support and legitimacy. It also played an important role in the suspicion raised by the movement Touche pas à ma constitution over the ‘undemocratic’ process of the proposed constitutional reforms two decades later.

A QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY

In writing about Uganda, Devra Moehler argues that participatory constitution making can create ‘distrusting democrats’ or ‘citizens who are democratic in their attitudes but suspicious of their government institutions’ (Moehler Reference Moehler2008: 2). These individuals are more informed as citizens and willing to form opinions about the constitution but they do not necessarily view the constitution as legitimate. ‘Participation does not automatically confer constitutional legitimacy’ (Moehler Reference Moehler2008: 11). The constitutional crisis in Mali surrounding the referendum supports the idea of distrusting democrats in that those challenging the constitutional reforms had strong opinions about the constitution but unlike the Ugandan case the legitimacy of the 1992 Malian constitution is linked to its origin and the participatory process through which it was created. There were many elites who supported the coup who had challenged ATT and his attempts to reform the 1992 constitution as well as strong public opinion against altering Article 30 of the constitution that limits presidential mandate to two five-year terms. According to the 2008Afrobarometer Survey 78% of those surveyed agreed with or agreed very strongly that: ‘The constitution should limit the President to serving a maximum of two terms in office.’ In addition, 66% agreed that: ‘The President must always obey the laws and the courts, even if he thinks they are wrong’ and 71% believe that ‘people are treated unequally under the law’. The continued respect for and durability of the 1992 constitution are remarkable given the extent to which there is so little faith in the justice system to treat individuals equally before the law and the political class regularly abuse their positions and act with impunity.

Whether people respect the constitution for the process through which it was created as well as its content is hard to determine. Public opinion suggests support for its content and for the rule of law. Elite discourse suggests a commitment to the process by which it was made and to the importance of respecting the legacy of that process. Moehler and Eleanor Marchant emphasise the importance of the context in which participation occurs and the role of elites in contributing to citizen attitudes towards the constitution (Moehler & Marchant ms). In the case of Mali, elites on both sides of the constitutional reform debate value the participatory nature of 1992 constitution-making process as evidenced by the extent to which they emphasise dialogue and consensus as a core aspect of the process and one that should be emulated. The primary difference is that those challenging the reform oppose the recent procedures because they failed to live up to the process followed in 1992 and thereby undermine the entire initiative. As Moehler and Marchant argue, elites matter.

In Mali there were clear rifts among elites. Daba Diawara described the consultation that took place during the reform process as extensive (Africa 24 2010). ATT defended the project and stated that the process had included civil society and political actors (Fofana Reference Fofana2010). In an odd twist, in the aftermath of the coup Daba Diawara reportedly claimed that he was pushed to propose the text of the constitutional reforms by ATT and he did not actually support the process.Footnote ⁹ The core issue is that because of ATT's consensus politics the entire political class had had their legitimacy undermined and was not trusted to be accountable to the people in the process of constitutional reform. As an independent candidate ATT built a coalition government based on what he labelled ‘consensus’. The reality was that he had effectively co-opted any opposition and many politicians acted with impunity (Wing Reference Wing2013b).

It is widely understood that constitutions should be able to be amended through a formal legal process. While Diawara claimed that his committee acted in an open and participatory manner others criticised the process for its lack of dialogue. This criticism is valid when compared with the process by which the 1992 constitution was created. At issue here is the legitimacy of the political institutions during ATT's presidency and access to information. Because of the increasing illegitimacy of the President and the National Assembly there were widespread criticisms that no real discussion ever took place in the National Assembly or beyond the confines of the Committee of Experts over the content of the referendum. While the list of those interviewed about the reforms is lengthy (Diawara Reference Diawara2010), the proposed reforms were never presented to anybody for significant deliberation. Moussa Sow argues that given the context of generalised corruption the parliamentary vote was a farce (M. Sow Reference Sow2011). Because of the politics of consensus, deputies in the National Assembly and many in the political class did not speak out against the referendum. All the political parties aligned around the president. ‘The political class was left to devour itself and the opposition virtually disappeared’ (RFI 2012). The National Assembly, Sow argues, should have protected ATT from himself by refusing to support the constitutional reform. According to Sow, ‘it is irrefutable that this constitutional reform has many defects and it will be the death of the ideas of March 26’.Footnote ¹⁰

‘DEAF TO THE STREETS’

From December 2011 to the summer of 2012, thousands of Malians were in the streets for an array of reasons: protesting government neglect of the military; demanding peace and security; supporting French intervention; challenging intervention; supporting Captain Sanogo and challenging Sanogo. Prior to the coup d’état in March 2012 the Malian state was facing opposition from several sides. At the time, there was a growing suspicion among not only members of the political class outside the presidential majority but also Malians in general about the government in power. Distrust was increasing. In July 2011, Jeamille Bittar, president of the Industrial Chamber of Commerce (CCIM) and president of the Economic and Social and Cultural Council supported a ‘harmonization of elections’ and the prolongation of ATT's term in office until July 2012 when all elections would take place at once (Fofana Reference Fofana2011). Bittar, who was seen as benefiting from the status quo and thereby an extension of ATT's mandate (Fofana Reference Fofana2011),Footnote ¹¹ was questioned later concerning embezzlement of funds related to the CCIM (Dicko Reference Dicko2012). Although ATT spoke out against extending his mandate the discussion planted the seeds for suspicion.

On 30 November 2011 and 31 December 2011, protestors had rallied in the streets to challenge the proposed constitutional referendum (Coulibaly Reference Coulibaly2011). ATT remained ‘deaf to the streets’ and moved steadily ahead towards an April vote on the referendum (Daou Reference Daou2012). ATT seemed to have learned little from the failure of his successor to revise the constitution and he faced the same resistance met by Konaré. The fact that ATT had widespread international support as a model democrat likely contributed to his confidence as he moved blindly forward with the referendum.Footnote ¹² In February 2012 protestors, primarily women and families of military personnel, took to the streets demanding the army be reinforced in the North in battles against the MNLA (Thurston Reference Thurston2012). ‘ATT's regime was criticized not only for its poor management of the conflict in the North and for allowing armed men to enter Malian territory, but also for sanctioning laxity, impunity, corruption, and favoritism in the state administration’ (Hagberg & Korling Reference Hagberg and Korling2012: 118). The mutiny in the barracks in Kati on 21 March 2012 was the final straw and ultimately led to the collapse of ATT's regime.

REBUILDING DEMOCRACY

International support of the 1992 constitution was clear in the immediate aftermath of the coup when Captain Sanogo, who suspended the constitution within days of toppling ATT's regime, was forced to reinstate the original 1992 constitution under pressure of sanctions from neighbouring countries (Vogl & Calimachi Reference Vogl and Calimachi2012). The international community played a critical role in the reinstatement of the 1992 constitution. Once Sanogo stepped down, under threat of sanctions, every effort was made to adhere to the constitution during the crisis and the transition. For instance, the constitution requires that when a President is incapacitated the President of the National Assembly will take on this role and elections must be held within forty days. The President of the National Assembly, Dioncounda Traoré thus became the Interim President of the Republic and the National Assembly remained in place and the deputies of the National Assembly continued to serve.Footnote ¹³ Needless to say, given the on-going war in the country, the forty days was extended and the deputies remained long beyond their original terms of service, which challenged their legitimacy. Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was elected President after elections on 28 July and 11 August 2013. Legislative elections followed in November 2013.

While, on the one hand, the reinstatement of the constitution was a triumph, Sanogo still remained behind the scenes manipulating politics. In December 2012 he forced Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra to resign from office. Diarra was replaced by a less controversial figure, Django Cissoko. International pressure helped to reinstate Mali's constitution; however, effectively removing the military from politics and closing the gap between the political class and the people remained a challenge.

The rapid territorial expansion of the MNLA and radical Islamist groups in northern Mali in 2012 brought issues of religious and ethnic tolerance to the forefront of discussions about the country. Mali is a predominately Muslim country with over 90% of the population practicing some form of Islam, but the constitution follows the French model of laicité or secularism. The Malian constitution states clearly that Mali is a secular state, that there is no official religion in the country, and that political parties may not be based on religion. In the midst of the 2012–2013 crisis Malian officials made it very clear that certain constitutional principles were non-negotiable; namely, the secular nature of the state, as well as its territorial integrity (Diallo Reference Diallo2012; Nossiter Reference Nossiter2013). As negotiations continue, these principles remain inviolate. While calls were being made for the creation of an Islamic Republic of Mali there was a swift and firm stand, on the part of several leading imams, for secularism (IRIN 2013). As the international community expresses fears of growing extremist Islamist tendencies and terrorism in the region, it is critical to recognise the widespread support within Mali for the protection of the secular constitution and the important role that religious authorities have played in the fight against radical Islamist groups in the North.

Given the on-going nature of Tuareg rebellions in the country it is clear that Mali has failed to adequately address the diverse concerns of these populations. Administrative decentralisation was designed to allow for greater local governance across the country, including the North, but it was never fully and effectively implemented. So while defenders of the 1992 constitution emphasise the deliberative nature of its creation there is no doubt that it failed to resolve issues of concern to certain Tuareg leaders (Wing Reference Wing2013b).

The Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission was created on 25 April 2013 in an effort to move the country out of crisis. The emphasis on dialogue is certainly a nod towards Mali's history of concertations and dialogue. Unfortunately, the commission was relatively toothless. In late May 2013 a member of the commission complained: ‘It is a shame. Nothing happens. Absolutely nothing’ (RFI 2013). Other members challenged the legitimacy and the lack of funding for the entire operation (RFI 2013). The Commission was dissolved after the presidential elections and a Ministry of National Reconciliation was created. A project donor, the German Federal Foreign Office, explained the role of dialogue in Mali: ‘Dialogue is a traditional means of restoring balance that is deeply rooted within Malian culture. So far, the project has assisted 11 regional and local dialogue forums in the regions of Gao, Timbuktu and Ségou’ (German Federal Foreign Office n.d.). Despite efforts to support reconciliation and dialogue, tensions continue in northern Mali. The Malian military had been effectively prevented from entering the northern city of Kidal for months after the French occupation. It was not until July 2013, just less than three weeks prior to the scheduled 28 July presidential elections that the Malian army and the Kidal region governor returned to this Northern town.