In this book G. presents unique interpretations of certain central points in Plato's Philebus. G.’s main aim is to salvage genesis (‘becoming’) as opposed to ousia (‘being’) from a degradation that is common among interpreters. Presumably to bolster this effort, G. often translates genesis and related words as ‘emergence’ etc., which can sound positive. This rendering follows S. MacKenna's translation of Plotinus (p. 145). As G. notes, most interpreters ascribe to Plato the view that, while ousia is good, genesis is deficient in goodness, so it would have been better if there were no genesis in the first place, but only ousia. Against this view, G. argues that genesis can be no less good than ousia (p. 98 et al.). The good life – the good that we humans can achieve – is certainly not a being, but something emergent; however, this fact does not devalue the good life at all. There is ‘a goodness proper to the journey itself, as they say’ (p. 99).
One of the main sources of the common interpretation that G. rejects is Socrates’ anti-hedonist argument at Phil. 53c4–5a11, which relies on the claim of the ‘subtlers’. As G. notes, most interpreters have assumed on the basis of this argument that (1) for Plato ousia is ontologically superior to genesis; that (2) for him something's ontological superiority (or inferiority) implies its superiority (or inferiority) in terms of goodness; and that hence (3) for him ousia is superior to genesis in terms of goodness. G. accepts (1), but rejects (2) and (3) (pp. 83–6). For Plato goodness is not restricted to ousia, but extends to genesis as well. This is the Philebus’ version of the Republic’s contention that goodness transcends being (Rep. 509b7–9). According to G., the common misinterpretation arises because the subtlers’ thesis is mistakenly ascribed to Socrates; rather, ‘Socrates is indeed asking us to reject’ the subtlers’ strict identification of being with the good (p. 82). However, there is a potential problem with G.’s interpretation. That is, Protarchus appears to accept the subtlers’ identification, and Socrates never corrects him. So, on G.’s interpretation, Socrates would leave Protarchus holding a view that is entirely wrong on a crucial matter.
In any case, G. offers two examples of emergent goods. They are, first, a ‘mixture’ of something unlimited with limit (Phil. 23c1–7c2), such as the good life, and, second, pure pleasure (Phil. 50e5–2d2). ‘Mixtures’ are emerging goods because in them ‘a right mixing is ongoing’ (my emphasis, p. 52). The second example of an emerging good, i.e. pure pleasure, is the focus of the book as a whole. G. says that for Plato all pleasures, including pure pleasure, are emergent things in that they are ‘dependent on the ongoing fulfilment of a deficiency of being’ or a lack (p. 99). Nonetheless, G. says that for Plato pure pleasure is good. This does not mean that pure pleasure (merely) conduces to the emergence of some good; rather, it is ‘intrinsically good’. I do not claim to understand perfectly what G. means by this, but two passages from his book are especially relevant. He says of the pure pleasure of learning – the other type of pure pleasure being that of perceiving absolute beauty – that ‘it contributes a unique expression of goodness to the good life through its imposition of measure into the good life as “measure-in-emergence”’ (p. 71). I take G. to mean that learning, together with its pleasure, makes a unique contribution to producing and maintaining the good life, and that the goodness of the good life finds one of its unique expressions in the pleasure of learning. G. also writes, ‘Something is intrinsically valuable in the positive sense … if its goodness (and its causal contribution to the good life) cannot be reduced to other sources’ (p. 100). I believe G. means that pure pleasure is good in its own manner on its own dimension of the good life (p. 98; G. speaks of we humans as ‘living beings who … allow measure to reverberate through all levels of their lives’ [p. xii]). Pure pleasure is intrinsically good, although its emergence presupposes the presence of some other things, such as the items ranked higher in the list at 66a4–c10, like measure and intelligence (p. 98). In making these and other points, G. claims that the good life only emerges if the person whose life it is exercises his/her intelligence and thereby joins in causing it to emerge (pp. 62–6).
Most importantly, G. offers a beautiful, engaged reading of Plato's account of learning and its pleasure at Phil. 51e7–2b9. In fact, it is from G.’s fascination with the truth of that account that the core ideas for the book emerged (p. ix). G. says, by way of commentary on Plato (pp. 86–98), that, with regard to certain things that we have never learned, we are unaware that we lack that learning, so we are of course not distressed by those lacks. One day we may learn something of this sort, and the filling of that lack comes as a surprise. While we are being filled with learning, we have a pleasure unaccompanied by pain, which is an unexpected gift. Only then do we realise that we lacked learning, so that we may regret our past lack through reasoning. Such experiences of learning open us to the horizon of what is new. Pure pleasure thereby ‘makes possible a good and true increase in drive and motivation’ (p. 95). However, G. interestingly adds that ‘we … must not strive “to have our minds blown” at each event’, which would be perversely seeking for genesis for its own sake (p. 92, cf. Phil. 54e1–5a11). So, for G., although the pleasure of learning is intrinsically good, we must not seek for it as such. Rather, we have to ‘appropriate ourselves as learners’ (p. ix).
We have seen most of the main points in G.’s book. Now let us look at its whole structure, while mentioning a few more important points. After an introduction of four pages, the main body is divided into two parts. Part 1, ‘Basic Dialectical Concepts’, has two chapters. Chapter 1, ‘The Learning Procedure’ (31 pages), discusses the Philebus from the beginning to 22b9. Here, G. identifies in the second (15b2–4) of the three metaphysical questions a worry to the effect that if we say, of a henad, that it is, we may be pluralising it (pp. 18–19). G. also relates the methodology discussed in this chapter to the central issue of the good by saying that ‘to know is to understand the good version of the known’ (p. ix). Chapter 2, ‘The Mixed Life and Its Cause’ (30 pages), discusses Phil. 22c1–31b1, paying attention to why the four kinds of entities should be distinguished from one another. Part 2, ‘Pure Pleasure and Knowledge in the Order of the Good Life’, has two chapters. Chapter 3, ‘The Intrinsic Goodness of Pure Pleasure’ (33 pages), selectively discusses the section at 31b2–55c3; G. says little on false pleasures, for instance. Chapter 4, ‘Purity and the Sciences’ (38 pages), addresses 55c4 to the end of the dialogue. Here, G. argues that pure intellection is present in any science (p. 130). Finally, there is the conclusion, ‘Why Should the Good Come to Be?’ (4 pages).
As I read the book, I occasionally wished that G. had written a little more plainly. However, this nice book shows how interestingly the Philebus can be read from a viewpoint that is both provoked by certain aspects of the dialogue and bears the mark of the engaged interpreter.
