Introduction
This paper examines Spinoza’s use of the word “infinite” and its cognates in the context of seventeenth-century (and earlier) accounts of the infinite, and within Spinoza’s work as a whole. The infinite is central in Spinoza’s thought. It plays important roles in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect (1658), the Short Treatise (1663), the Principles of Cartesian Philosophy (1663), the Political Treatise (1675-77), the correspondence, and, of course, the Ethics (1675). In the Ethics, it first occurs at E1D6: “Per Deum intelligo ens absolute infinitum, hoc est, substantiam constantem infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque aeternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit.”Footnote 1
While E1D6 describes both God and his attributes as infinite, for the past thirty years or so, discussion of the infinite in Spinoza usually has centred around the infinitude of the attributes, and not of God or substance simpliciter. While George KlineFootnote 2 marks the beginning of this trend, it is Jonathan Bennett’s argument that Spinoza uses “‘infinite’ as a virtual synonym for ‘all’”Footnote 3 that drives most of the discussion in the literature. Following Kline, but modernizing Spinoza in his usual way, Bennett reads “infinite” as Spinoza’s universal quantifier and thereby infers that there needn’t be more than two attributes (extension and thought) in Spinoza’s ontology. Alan Donagan agrees with Bennett that “how many attributes God has will . . . depend upon how many there are. There is no implication that their number must be enormous.”Footnote 4 Edwin Curley, on the other hand, rejects the view that “infinite attributes” is consistent with a finite number (i.e., two) of attributes, blaming the popularity of Bennett’s approach on contemporary philosophers’ “aversion to the view that God has infinitely many unknown attributes.”Footnote 5 Curley himself is so committed to the importance of retaining the contrast between “infinite” and “finite” that, in his version of the Ethics, he translates “infinitis attributis” as “an infinite number of attributes,” interpolating the “number of” without even a footnote to indicate that his translation is also (more than is inevitably the case with any text) an interpretation – an interpretation that crucially overlooks E1D6’s characterization of God as “ens absolute infinitum”; that is, as an absolutely infinite being, in a sense of “infinite” that clearly has little if anything to do with numbers of things.
Curley’s translation of E1D6 is extremely telling in that it explicitly makes infinity a mathematical concept for Spinoza, as it was for Leibniz and most of those who followed him. It is in a mathematical sense that Bennett’s claim that there need be only two attributes in Spinoza’s ontology fails, on Curley’s view, to retain the usual contrast between the infinite and the finite. However, I argue that Spinoza’s conception of the infinite was not a mathematical one. Indeed, if Spinoza never tells us how many attributes there are (and, in his mature work, he never does), this is precisely because, for Spinoza, anything truly infinite eludes counting – not because it is so large as to be uncountable, but because it is just not the kind of thing that can be enumerated or measured. I argue that, for Spinoza, the infinite is the utterly indeterminate – a conception that has affinities with the via negativa of Jewish theology.
I muster evidence for this argument by examining Spinoza’s use of the term “infinite” and its cognates throughout his corpus, paying special attention to the way in which Spinoza juxtaposes indeterminacy with finitude in his E1P15 discussion of God’s extendedness and of the indivisibility of extended substance, and to Spinoza’s much-quoted Ep. L dictum “determinatio negatio est.” While we nowadays conceive of the infinite mathematically, I argue that Spinoza’s conception was closer to a grammatical one – a conception whose traces are still evident in the infinitive tense of verbs. I offer supplementary evidence for this conclusion from Joseph Ratner and Harry Wolfson’s nearly century-old debate about the infinite in Spinoza and from Pierre-Sylvain Regis’s definitions of “infinite.” Finally, I conclude by considering and dispatching a number of arguments against this account of the Spinozan infinite as indeterminate.
Indivisible Substance
At E1P13, Spinoza famously declares that “absolutely infinite substance is indivisible.” Since, for Spinoza, substance just is absolutely infinite, this amounts to the proposition that substance is indivisible. At E2P2, he holds that substance is extended: “Extension is an attribute of God; i.e., God is an extended thing.”Footnote 6 This forces the reader to ask in just what sense something extended could be indivisible. Historically, extended substance usually was conceived either as composed of discrete parts, in which case it is finitely divisible – Berkeley and (at least the early) Hume took this view –, or as a continuum, in which case it is infinitely divisible – this was, of course, Descartes’s position. However, Spinoza denies that substance is either finitely or infinitely divisible. One possible gloss of Spinoza’s puzzling claim is that substance qua substance is indivisible, but that substance qua extended substance is divisible. However, this is belied by the corollary to E1P13: “No substance, and consequently no corporeal substance, insofar as it is substance, is divisible.”Footnote 7 That is, not even substance qua extended substance is divisible, for Spinoza. How on earth could this be?
Spinoza offers two main arguments at E1P13 for the indivisibility of substance. If substance is divisible, the first argument runs, then the parts into which substance is thus divided will themselves either be substances or not. If they are substances, then (according to Spinoza) they must have all of the following properties: they must be infinite, be self-caused, have nothing in common with one another, and possess attributes unique to themselves.Footnote 8 Spinoza maintains that it is absurd that several substances of the same nature could exist. On the other hand, however, if the parts produced in the division of substance are not themselves substances, then the division of substance in fact annihilates it. This violates Spinoza’s position that substance cannot cease to be. Thus, neither the notion of a part of substance as a substance itself nor the notion of a part of substance as a non-substance is tenable.
In a Scholium to E1P13, Spinoza offers a second argument for the indivisibility of substance. Since substance is necessarily infinite, he writes, and since a part of substance could only mean a finite substance, the very notion of a part of substance involves a contradiction. This argument not only seems to betray considerable confusion about infinities;Footnote 9 it also suggests that Spinoza regards any division of substance as resting upon that substance’s possessing actual parts. However, one of his earlier works, Principles of Cartesian Philosophy (PPC), shows that he had carefully considered the possibility of infinitely dividing a continuum. There, in a discussion of a proposition concerning the indefinite extension of matter, he energetically challenges a Zenoist argumentFootnote 10 against local motion. Spinoza characterizes Zeno as having argued that, if local motion were possible, then there would be no difference between a body moving in a circular motion at the highest speed and a body at rest. The explanation for this is given via the example of a wheel, ABC. The more quickly the wheel moves about its centre, the more quickly A moves through points B and C. At a certain speed, for instance, it might take A half an hour to return to its initial starting point. At twice that speed, it would take only fifteen minutes. At the highest speed, however, A has at every moment already completed the circle and returned to its point of origin. If A is at every moment at the same point, then it is motionless. Thus, for Zeno, if local motion is granted, then there is no discernible difference between a body moving at the fastest motion and a body at rest. This is absurd. Therefore, we ought not to grant local motion. Spinoza accepts that the conclusion is absurd, but rather than rejecting local motion, he instead rejects the premise that there is such a thing as a highest speed, and the related premise that time is divisible into moments. He illustrates this by employing Zeno’s wheel in a thought experiment of his own devising. I will not rehearse here the details of that thought experiment. It is enough to note Spinoza’s conclusion: “Therefore if a part of matter moves, it moves through some space, a space that, however small it is imagined to be, is nevertheless divisible, and consequently so is the time through which the motion is measured. Consequently the duration of that motion, or its time, is divisible, and is so to infinity.”Footnote 11
While this argument seems to offer good prima facie evidence that Spinoza regarded continua as infinitely divisible rather than indivisible, some caution is warranted. As is well known, Spinoza wrote the PPC for one of his pupils as a primer on Descartes’s philosophy, not as an expression of his own views. Despite this, it is worth observing that Spinoza here addresses a Zenoist paradox that does not occur in Descartes, and indeed, considers it at length. Whether this discussion constitutes a digression into Spinoza’s own views, or simply support for Descartes that goes beyond straight exegesis, is an open question.Footnote 12 Assuming that Spinoza, like many Cartesian scholars, took Cartesian time to be discrete, this argument for the infinite divisibility of time suggests that the view Spinoza is here presenting is his own. In any case, whether we take Spinoza’s argument to represent his own position or his interpretation of Descartes’s, what is important to note is that at the time he wrote the PPC, Spinoza was well aware of one line of argument that continua are divisible.
In his penetrating analysis of Spinoza’s inheritance of the concept of prime matter, Charlie Huenemann argues that substance is indivisible for Spinoza because there is nothing outside of substance by which it can be divided.Footnote 13 For Huenemann, substance cannot be divided for the same reason that water cannot be divided by itself; something other than water, such as land or a boat, must slice through it in order to divide water into two bodies. In the case of substance, there is simply no analogue for land or boats. Nothing exists besides substance to do the dividing. While Huenemann’s account offers a clear and plausible explanation for the indivisibility of substance, I think that he is mistaken. I do not think that Spinoza is making the comparatively weak point that substance cannot be divided because there is nothing available to do the dividing. I think rather that he holds that substance could not possibly be divided because, even if, per impossibile, there were something around to divide it, it is intrinsically indivisible.
Absolutely Infinite Substance
Spinoza tells us in E1P13 that substance is indivisible because it is absolutely infinite. In his explication of Definition 6, he explains that “if a thing is absolutely infinite, whatever expresses essence and does not involve any negation belongs to its essence.” For this reason, he writes, absolutely infinite substance has infinite attributes. This explication goes a long way toward explaining the indivisibility of substance. To divide is to cut off – literally to see as two. This cutting is an act of negation. It says of part of a thing that it is no longer part of that thing. In a word, division says no, but substance as absolutely infinite says yes. For Spinoza, any measurement or counting is always such a cutting off. In absolutely resisting such cutting off, substance is thus what Kant would later term an intensive magnitude. Only extensive magnitudes – many of Spinoza’s modes fall into this category – are divisible. Qua intensive magnitude, substance could not possibly be divided.
Near the beginning of his so-called “Letter on the Infinite,”Footnote 14 Spinoza diagnoses confusions concerning the infinite as the result of
failure to distinguish between that which must be infinite by its very nature or by virtue of its definition, and that which is unlimited not by virtue of its essence but by virtue of its cause. Then again, there is a failure to distinguish between that which is called infinite because it is unlimited, and that whose parts cannot be equated with or explicated by any number, although we may know its maximum or its minimum. Lastly, there is the failure to distinguish between that which we can apprehend only by the intellect and not by the imagination, and that which can also be apprehended by the imagination.
In each of the three dyads Spinoza identifies in that passage – to wit, (1) infinite by nature or by definition and unlimited not by essence but by virtue of its cause, (2) called infinite because unlimited and called infinite because uncountable, and (3) apprehendable by the intellect and apprehendable by the imagination – the first term concerns the infinite as an intensive magnitude susceptible only of reason (the absolute infinite) and the second concerns an extensive magnitude susceptible of division, enumeration, and imagination (the infinite in kind). Throughout his writings, when Spinoza discusses the infinitude of God or substance qua substance, he means it in the sense of the absolutely infinite. He typically reserves discussions of the infinite in kind for his treatment of the modes of substance.
In Ep. XII and elsewhere, Spinoza highlights this distinction between intellect and the imagination and between the intensive and extensive magnitudes that are their respective domains by contrasting measure, time, quantity, and duration, on the one hand, with substance, eternity, and being, on the other.
Thus, in his Metaphysical Thoughts (CM), Spinoza argues that duration is intelligible only when applied to finite creatures, since duration is composed of parts but God’s attributes must be indivisible: “[W]ith regard to duration we should note something that will be useful to us later when we speak about eternity, to wit, that [duration] is conceived as longer and shorter and as if composed of parts, and, secondly, that it is an attribute of existence only, not of essence.”Footnote 15 But “we can never attribute duration to God without at the same time destroying the true conception we have of him. That is to say, by attributing duration to him, we would be dividing into parts that which of its own nature is infinite and can never be conceived except as infinite.”Footnote 16 Hence, “duration is in no way intelligible without created things.”Footnote 17
In Ep. XII, Spinoza extends the discussion beyond duration and eternity to include measure and number:
Measure, Time and Number are nothing other than modes of thinking, or rather, modes of imagining. It is therefore not surprising that all who have attempted to understand the workings of Nature by such concepts, and furthermore without really understanding these concepts, have tied themselves into such extraordinary knots that in the end they have been unable to extricate themselves except by breaking through everything and perpetrating the grossest absurdities. For there are many things that can in no way be apprehended by the imagination but only by the intellect, such as Substance, Eternity, and other things. If anyone tries to explicate such things by notions of this kind which are nothing more than aids to the imagination, he will meet with no more success than if he were deliberately to encourage his imagination to run mad. Nor again can the Modes of Substance ever be correctly understood if they are confused with such mental constructs (entia rationis) or aids to the imagination. For by so doing we are separating them from Substance and from the manner of their efflux from Eternity, and in such isolation they can never be correctly understood. . . . Further, it is obvious from the above that neither Number, Measure, nor Time, being merely aids to the imagination, can be infinite, for in that case Number would not be number, nor Measure measure, nor Time time.
So, for Spinoza, anything absolutely infinite is partless, excludes negation, and is always the object of the intellect, not the imagination. What else can we say about it? An eighty-year-old discussion is useful on this point. Harry Wolfson identifies the “infinite” in Spinoza with “indeterminate.” Against the contemporary extensive understanding of “infinite” as describing an endless series or an endlessly divisible continuum, Wolfson invokes Aristotle’s distinction between the infinite as “that which is incapable of being traversed because it is not its nature to be traversed – this corresponds to the sense in which the voice is ‘invisible’ . . . [and the infinite as] that which admits only of incomplete traverse or scarcely admits of traverse.”Footnote 18 Wolfson argues that when Spinoza uses the term “infinite,” he does so in the same way that one might describe a voice as invisible. That is, just as a voice is invisible because visibility is not intelligibly assertable of voice, Spinoza’s God is infinite because finitude – limitation of any sort – is not intelligibly assertable of God. Wolfson links this sense of God as infinite with the medieval Jewish tradition of negative theology, arguing that “the term infinite stands in Spinoza for such terms as unique, incomparable, homonymous, indeterminate, incomprehensible, ineffable, indefinable, unknowable, and many other similar terms.”Footnote 19 Joseph Ratner criticizes Wolfson’s account by identifying “indeterminate” with “indefinite” and pointing out that Spinoza clearly distinguished between “infinite” and “indefinite.”Footnote 20 Wolfson’s rebuttal to Ratner distinguishes “indefinite,” which Wolfson reads as “immeasurable,” from “indeterminate,” which he claims to have used “in its legitimate sense of ‘indefinable’ as the privative of determinatio used by Spinoza in his dictum: Determinatio negatio est (Epistola L).”Footnote 21
Now, the string of terms for which, on Wolfson’s view, “infinite” stands in for Spinoza is not without its difficulties. Citing Spinoza’s E2P47 argument that “The human mind has adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God,” Ratner rightly criticizes the equivalence that Wolfson draws between “infinite” and “unknowable.” And, I shall raise some concerns with the infinite as unique later on. However, in general, Wolfson’s terms are at least true to Spinoza’s spirit in that the list, like Spinoza, cautions against an anthropocentric view of God.
Spinoza’s warnings against conceiving of God anthropocentrically are well-known. However, in this context, the following passage from CM, in which Spinoza criticizes quantitative conceptions of God, is especially apposite:
Yet writers on all sides, in treating of the immeasurableness of God, appear to attribute quantity to God. For from this attribute they wish to conclude that God must necessarily be present everywhere, as if they meant that if there were any place where God was not, his quantity would be limited. This same point is even more clearly apparent from another argument they produce to show that God is infinite or measureless (for they confuse these two terms) and also that he is everywhere. If God, they say, is pure activity, as indeed he is, he is bound to be everywhere and infinite. For if he were not everywhere, then either he cannot be wherever he wants to be, or else (note this) he must necessarily move about. This clearly shows that they attribute immeasurableness to God insofar as they consider him to be quantitative; for it is from the properties of extension that they derive these arguments for asserting the immeasurableness of God. Nothing could be more absurd.Footnote 22
It is clear from this passage that, for Spinoza, God’s infinitude is not a matter of size. When anthropocentrism leads us to think of him quantitatively, we get him wrong.
While the conception of the infinite as indeterminate is, in the wake of Leibniz’s and Newton’s mathematization of the term, alien to us today, it was, following Aristotle, a legitimate medieval usage of the term.Footnote 23 Indeed, this usage still lingers in grammar in the infinitive mood of verbs. A verb in the infinitive is so called because it is indeterminate, and as it were awaits determination of number, person, tense, and mood. In a sense, “to run” is infinitive because it is pure possibility, not yet actualized, as “She ran,” “Marcus will have been running,” “The bulls would run,” and so forth. “To run” is infinitive not because it denotes running that is endlessly divisible, but because it is not even intelligible to ask of “to run” whether or not the running is still underway, who the runner is, or how many runners there are. For “to run,” anything is possible, precisely because the verb has not been determined and hence limited (which, for verbs, of course, goes by the name “conjugation”).
The analogy that I am drawing between God’s infinity and verbs in the infinitive is just that – an analogy. However, the source and target of the analogy are not as distant from one another as it might appear. There has always been an intimate relationship between the terms of metaphysics and those of grammar. “Substance” is cognate with “substantive,” the term for a non-adjectival noun. Attributus is Latin for “predicate.” By convention, there is a strong analogy between the relationships that hold between the grammatical subject and predicate on the one hand and the ontological substance and attribute on the other. However, it bears observing that, while the analogy that I have drawn broadly coheres with this tradition, its specifics reverse the tradition. Where substance usually has been thought of as the grammatical subject, and hence as a noun, I am suggesting that Spinoza conceived substance as more closely analogous to a verb – both due to the greater indeterminacy inherent in verbs in the infinitive,Footnote 24 and due to Spinoza’s conception of God as pure activity, as pure power. It bears observing that unlike Latin, which is a noun-based language, Hebrew privileges the verb. We thus should not be surprised if Spinoza, who received his earliest religious instruction in Hebrew and who wrote a Hebrew grammar for use in scriptural study, conceives of God as verb-like. This conception of God is the “I am that am” of Exodus 3:14. Indeed, this “I am that am” puns God’s name (YHWH) with the Hebrew verb hayah, “to be.” It is plausible that Spinoza too identifies God, and hence substance, with this most infinite of infinitive verbs.Footnote 25 After all, even in Latin, essentia is just the nominalization of esse.
Indeed, to take this grammatical excursus just a little further, it is worth noting that both “entity” (ens) and “substance” (substans) began as participles – respectively, being and substanding.Footnote 26 Writing on Suarez’s influence on Berkeley with respect to the esse-existere distinction, Stephen Daniel argues that, for both Suarez and Berkeley, a thing’s “act of being (ens as a participle) . . . identifies it as that thing (ens as a noun). For example, being human is what identifies and constitutes a human being . . . its act of being is the ‘formal concept’ by which it is known. Its act of being is not something that it does but is rather what it is”Footnote 27 [emphasis Daniel’s]. While Spinoza is explicit that language is inadequate to capture the nature of God, he might well have agreed that the infinitive verb comes closest to communicating our idea of God as pure act.
Whether or not we accept this analogy between the infinite and verbs in the infinitive, it is important to emphasize that the non-mathematical (that is, intensive rather than extensive) conception of the infinite identified by Wolfson was au courant when Spinoza was composing the Ethics. A mere generation after Spinoza, Pierre-Sylvain Regis, one of the dons of late seventeenth-century French Cartesianism, was explicit that this sense of infinite as indeterminate is the only notion of infinitude that can be applied to God. In the “Dictionnaire” appended to his 1704 L’usage de la raison et de la foi, he offers two distinct definitions for “infinite.” According to Regis, something can be infinite in nature or infinite in size. However, only the first of these applies to God:
Infinite. God is infinite in nature, because he is not determined to any genus of being, and he is not infinite in size, because he is neither large nor small.
Infinite. If a thing is conceived without boundaries, it is infinite in size; and if its form does not determine it to any particular species of being, it is infinite in nature.Footnote 28
Regis more fully develops his conception of God’s infinity in chapter 26 of the same work in his discussion of God’s nature and attributes:
I say . . . that God is absolutely infinite to signify that he is not included in any genus, nor in any species: since, if he was included under a genus, that genus would be Being; and according to Aristotle, Being cannot be a genus, since a genus supposes differences outside of itself; and in fact there are no differences outside of Being: since non-being cannot be a difference. God therefore does not belong to any genus. Neither can he belong to a species; since a species is composed of a genus and a difference. . . . Moreover, God is not an individual, since an individual supposes a species just as a species supposes a genus: now, God does not suppose either of these: he is therefore not an individual: he therefore has no particular determination, unless it is this one of not being able to have any. God is therefore absolutely infinite according to his nature.Footnote 29
Regis’s conception of God’s infinitude is admittedly different from Spinoza’s. Most importantly for our present purposes, Regis denies that God is capable of receiving modes, and therefore argues that he not only is indeterminate, but in fact completely resists any determination.Footnote 30 On these grounds, he concludes that God is not a substance (like created beings are) but a “supersubstantial being.”Footnote 31 This is clearly not a view that Spinoza could or would have maintained. My reason for citing Regis here is not to claim that his and Spinoza’s accounts of God are the same. (Indeed, Regis’s appendix to L’usage, “Réfutation de l’opinion de Spinosa, Touchant l’existence et la nature de Dieu,” militates against making such a claim.)Footnote 32 However, Regis’s account of infinity makes clear that there is no anachronism in attributing to Spinoza the conception of the infinite as indeterminate that Wolfson suggests.Footnote 33
While the connections that Spinoza draws between the infinite and the indeterminate are frequently oblique, he is very explicit in his identification of the pure being of substance as fundamentally indeterminate. The following passage from Ep. XXXVI “To John Hudde” (ca. June 1666) is sufficiently rich to merit quoting at length:
[I]f the Being is Thought, it cannot be conceived as determined in Thought, but only as undetermined, and if the Being is Extension, it cannot be conceived as determined in Extension, but only as undetermined. . . . it is a contradiction to conceive under the negation of existence something whose definition includes existence, or (which is the same thing) affirms existence. And since ‘determinate’ denotes nothing positive, but only the privation of existence of that same nature which is conceived as determinate, it follows that that whose definition affirms existence cannot be conceived as determinate. For example, if the term ‘extension’ includes necessary existence, it is just as impossible to conceive extension without existence as extension without extension. For if it were conceived as determinate, it would have to be determined by its own nature, that is, by extension, and this extension by which it would be determined would have to be conceived under the negation of existence. This, according to the hypothesis, is a manifest contradiction. . . . [‘Imperfection’] signifies that a thing lacks something which nevertheless pertains to its nature. For example, extension can be said to be imperfect only in respect of duration, position, or magnitude; that is to say, because it does not last longer, because it does not retain its position, or because it is not greater. But it will never be said to be imperfect because it does not think, for nothing like this is demanded of its nature which consists solely in extension, that is in a definite kind of being, in which respect alone it can be said to be determinate or indeterminate, imperfect or perfect. And since God’s nature does not consist in one definite kind of being, but in being which is absolutely indeterminate, his nature also demands all that which perfectly expresses being; otherwise his nature would be determinate and deficient. This being so, it follows that there can be only one Being, God, which exists by its own force. For if, let us say, we suppose that Extension involves existence, it must needs be eternal and indeterminate, and express absolutely no imperfection, but only perfection. And so Extension will pertain to God, or will be something that expresses God’s nature in some way; for God is a Being which is indeterminate in essence and omnipotent absolutely, and not merely in a particular respect. And thus what is said of Extension (arbitrarily chosen) must also be affirmed of everything which we shall take to be of a similar kind.
The great merit of understanding God’s infinity as indeterminacy and not endless divisibility is that doing so elegantly comports with Spinoza’s repeated insistence that God is simple. In his early CM, Spinoza discusses this simplicity in terms of God’s thought: “God’s idea through which he is called omniscient is unique and completely simple. For in actual fact God is called omniscient for no other reason than that he has the idea of himself, an idea or knowledge that has always existed together with God.”Footnote 34 In his Dictionnaire entry on Spinoza, Bayle criticizes Spinoza for having denied God’s simplicity by making finite modes parts of a composite God, and terming them merely “modifications” instead of “parts.”Footnote 35 However, at E1P12, Spinoza energetically denies that the relationship between substance and modes is a part-whole relationship. For Spinoza, finite modes are not component parts of God, but rather particular determinations of God as indeterminate Being. Thus, in the Short Treatise, Spinoza maintains “that ‘part’ and ‘whole’ are not true or real entities, but only ‘things of reason,’ and consequently there are in Nature neither whole nor parts.”Footnote 36 Later, in Ep. XXXV,Footnote 37 he argues that substance “is simple, and not composed of parts. For in respect of their nature and our knowledge of them component parts would have to be prior to that which they compose. In the case of that which is eternal by its own nature, this cannot be so.”
Immediately after this remark, Spinoza continues that God “cannot be conceived as determinate, but only as infinite. For if the nature of that Being were determinate, and were also conceived as determinate, that nature would be conceived as not existing beyond those limits.” Here, Spinoza not only represents “determinate” and “infinite” as antonyms (thereby indirectly but unmistakably tokening the synonymy of “infinite” and “indeterminate”); he also represents God’s indeterminacy and simplicity as intimately related.
In a subsequent letter to John Hudde, the same correspondent to whom Ep. XXXV is addressed, Spinoza expands on his argument for God’s indeterminacy, maintaining that “‘determinate’ denotes nothing positive, but only the privation of existence of that same nature which is conceived as determinate.”Footnote 38 For Spinoza, being qua Being is inherently indeterminate. For a thing to be determinate is for it to be, in a manner of speaking, an admixture of Being and non-being. Determinacy is finitude, and finitude contains within its concept non-being. It is for this reason that existence is the essence of indeterminate substance, but is not part of the essence of the finite (i.e., determinate) modes of that substance. This coheres with the famous Ep. L dictum quoted above by Wolfson. Here, in full, is the passage from Ep. L to which Wolfson makes reference:
With regard to the statement that figure is a negation and not anything positive, it is obvious that matter in its totality, considered without limitation, can have no figure, and that figure applies only to finite and determinate bodies. For he who says that he apprehends a figure, thereby means to indicate simply this, that he apprehends a determinate thing and the manner of its determination. This determination therefore does not pertain to the thing in regard to its being; on the contrary, it is its non-being. So since figure is nothing but determination, and determination is negation, figure can be nothing other than negation, as has been said.
Spinoza’s E1P15S defence of his claim that God is extended lends further weight to the suggestion that we should read “infinite” as “indeterminate” for Spinoza. There, Spinoza considers a number of arguments from imaginary interlocutors against conceiving of God as extended. These opponents, charges Spinoza, deny that God is corporeal on the grounds that “by body we understand some quantity having length, breadth, and depth, bounded by a definite shape; and nothing more absurd than this can be attributed to God, a being absolutely infinite.” In fact, there is no particular difficulty in conceiving of a body of infinite length, breadth and depth, in the sense of a large, endlessly divisible magnitude. We may not be able to picture such a body, but we can conceive of it, and since Spinoza himself denigrates the cognitive faculty of imagination later in the same scholium,Footnote 39 he should not be worried about our inability to picture anything. For Spinoza, the real source of the absurdity of conceiving of God as “some quantity having length, breadth, and depth, bounded by a definite shape” is that length, breadth, and depth – in combination, shape – are all determinations, and God as pure Being is indeterminate – an intensive, not extensive, magnitude that can no more be measured than divided.
Reading the infinite as indeterminate in the sense of being indeterminable also comports with Spinoza’s scholium to E1P8, where he writes: “Since in fact to be finite is in part a negation and to be infinite is the unqualified affirmation of the existence of some nature, it follows from Proposition 7 alone that every substance must be infinite.” However, as he warns us in CM, we must be careful not to imagine negation as itself a kind of being. In finite modes, being is limited, but the limit is not itself a being.Footnote 40
Another way to think about the determinate character of finite modes is in terms of degrees of perfection. For Spinoza, perfection is just completeness. To be missing nothing is to be perfect. Thus, E2D6: “By reality and perfection I mean the same thing.” Since God is utterly indeterminate, he is not limited in any way; he is missing nothing. In short, he is perfect. As such, God’s being is ontologically prior to that of the finite modes. In CM, Spinoza explicitly connects God’s perfection with his infinitude and boundlessness:
We have previously shown that no being can be conceived as finite and imperfect (i.e., as participating in nothingness) unless we first have regard to the perfect and infinite being, that is, God. So only God must be said to be absolutely infinite, in that we find him to consist in actual fact of infinite perfection. But he can also be said to be immeasurable or boundless insofar as we have regard to this point, that there is no being by which God’s perfection can be limited. From this it follows that the infinity of God, in spite of the form of the word, is something most positive; for it is insofar as we have regard to his essence or consummate perfection that we say that he is infinite.Footnote 41
Two Spinozistic Pay-Offs
A happy consequence of this reading of “infinite” is that it rescues Spinoza from two difficulties – a clumsy error of which he is sometimes accused and a deeper (apparent) tension in his thought.
The locus for the “clumsy error” is E1P13Schol. and Spinoza’s claim there that a part of infinite substance is necessarily finite. If we read “infinite” as “endlessly divisible” or “uncountably large,” then Spinoza is wrongly assuming that there is only one size of infinity and that anything smaller is finite. However, if we read “infinite” as “indeterminate,” then Spinoza is making the much more plausible claim that a part of a whole is always some determination of that whole – that partness entails some kind of limitation. And, to limit substance is to destroy it.
The indeterminacy reading of “infinite” that I am proposing also offers help with a more serious problem for Spinoza, one concerned with the number of attributes. At E2P7S and elsewhere, Spinoza writes as if there are only two attributes – Extension and Thought. However, elsewhere he seems to suggest that there are more than two attributes. The usual passage scholars adduce as evidence that Spinoza thought there were more than two attributes is E1P11: “God, or substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists.” One explanation that is sometimes offered for the apparent tension between the infinite attributes of E1P11 and the two attributes of E2P7S is that Spinoza held that, among God’s infinite attributes, human beings have cognitive access only to two. If this is right, then attributes must exist in re, and not merely in intellectu – and indeed, some of them exist only in re. However, this account, convenient as it may be, ignores E1D4’s definition of “attribute” as “that which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence.” This is the only definition in the Ethics that employs the locution of “that which the intellect perceives.” It is difficult to believe that Spinoza would have adopted this ungainly phrase if he meant that an attribute is the (or perhaps better, an) essence simpliciter of substance. On the contrary, as Ep. IX makes very clear,Footnote 42 the crucial conceptual difference between substance and attribute is that the latter by definition exists in intellectu: “I understand the same by attribute [as I do by ‘substance’], except that attribute is so called in respect to the intellect, which attributes to substance a certain specific kind of nature.” If there are attributes, not only must they be conceivable by us, they must be actually conceived by us. If there are an infinite number of attributes, they too must be actually conceived by us. We do not – and indeed cannot – conceive an infinite number of attributes. We must therefore conclude that when Spinoza says that substance has infinite attributes, he does not mean that substance has an infinite number of attributes. Rather, he means that the attributes of substance, like substance itself (from which they are, after all, only conceptually and not really distinct) are indeterminate.
Objections and Replies
I would like to conclude by surveying three important objections to reading the infinite in Spinoza as indeterminate.Footnote 43 My replies to them, though necessarily brief, will help to limn the shape of the Spinozan ontology that falls out of the account I am proposing. In brief, the three challenges ask (1) How can something indeterminate be unique / a unity? (2) How can something indeterminate be a thing? and (3) How is this account consistent with Spinoza’s necessitarianism? My answers are, respectively, (1) It can’t, (2) It can’t, and (3) It’s complicated.
Objection 1: How could something indeterminate be unique? How could it be a unity?
I have been maintaining that, for Spinoza, substance fundamentally evades quantification of any kind. But one is a quantity. If Spinoza regards God as unique and/or as a unity, then it is simply incorrect to say that he regards substance as unquantifiable.
Reply: On my account, God is neither one nor many for Spinoza. Rather, he is the pure being that underwrites the one and the many. Spinoza is always happy to maintain that God is not plural. Indeed, E1P5, the key proposition in Spinoza’s purported substance monism, in fact holds not that there is one substance, but rather that there cannot be more than one substance: “In the universe there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute.” However, he also frequently suggests that neither uniqueness nor unity properly apply to God. He is particularly explicit about this in CM, where he argues that “unity is in no way distinct from the thing itself or additional to being and is merely a mode of thinking whereby we separate a thing from other things that are similar to it or agree with it in some respect,”Footnote 44 concluding that “In truth, if we wished to look into the matter more rigorously, we might perhaps show that God is only improperly called one and unique. But this question is of little importance – indeed it is of no importance – to those who are concerned with things rather than words.”Footnote 45 Ep. L is similarly eloquent about the status of God’s unity for Spinoza: “Now since the existence of God is his very essence, and since we can form no universal idea of his essence, it is certain that he who calls God one or single has no true idea of God, or is speaking of him very improperly.”
In short, while it is indeed inconsistent to claim that Spinoza regards substance as unquantifiable and God as unique, the inconsistency is easily avoided by drawing upon ample textual evidence that Spinoza was not committed to God’s unity or uniqueness. Of course, denying that God is a unique unity for Spinoza does not entail that he regarded substance as a plurality or as a member of a species. If, as I maintain, Spinoza did not regard God as a unity, it is because he regarded any attributions to substance of either unity or plurality to be fundamentally ill-formed.Footnote 46
Objection 2: How could something utterly indeterminate be a thing at all?
Reply: It can’t. Spinoza does not consider God a thing. This is the force of my argument that Spinoza’s substance is more aptly likened to a verb than to a noun. For Spinoza, God is pure act. It is finite (and perhaps infinite) modes that comprise the things in Spinoza’s ontology. For Spinoza, God is the (participular) ens; only modes are res. Spinoza’s clearest articulation of this position occurs at E2D7: “By individual things [res singulares] I mean things that are finite and have a determinate existence. If several individual things concur in one act in such a way as to be all together the simultaneous cause of one effect, I consider them all, in that respect, as one individual.”
Objection 3: How can a necessitarian like Spinoza build his ontology on indeterminacy?
Spinoza’s necessitarianism is well known. At E1P36, he famously maintains that “Nothing exists from whose nature an effect does not follow.” His demonstration of that proposition is quite explicit that “Whatever exists expresses God’s nature or essence in a definite and determinate way.” How could the author of these words have maintained that, at its most ontologically fundamental level, the universe is characterized by absolute indeterminacy?
Reply: Spinoza is indeed a necessitarian, but his necessitarianism operates at the level of transeunt causation, and hence at the ontological level of finite modes. Indeed, as we saw above, he regards transeunt causation as so crucially important at the modal level that he makes it the principle of individuation for res singulares. For Spinoza, to be an individual thing just is to be a transeunt cause. All of the passages that are usually adduced in support of the necessitarian, mechanistic-deterministic account of Spinoza confirm this. To wit, CM 1,iii: “The Possible and the Contingent are not affections of things.” E1P33: “Things could not have been produced by God in any other way or in any other order than is the case.” E1P33S1: “I have shown here more clearly than the midday sun that in things there is absolutely nothing by virtue of which they can be said to be ‘contingent’. . . . a thing is termed ‘contingent’ for no other reason than the deficiency of our knowledge.” These passages all explicitly make reference to things. Unlike substance, individual things are not absolutely indeterminate but fully determined. In Spinoza’s idiom, this is not a grand metaphysical claim; it simply follows analytically from the definition of “thing.”
What is crucial to note, however, is the distinctive character of Spinoza’s determinism. It is not just a theory about efficient causation. A full picture of Spinoza’s theory of causation must include both modal – i.e., transeunt – causation and substantial – i.e., immanent – causation. For Spinoza, “God is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things.”Footnote 47 To understand Spinoza’s ontology, it is crucial to grasp that the immanent causation that he attributes to God is not an internalized version of efficient causation, but rather a commitment to God’s indeterminacy, and the status of modes as non-causalFootnote 48 determinations of God. While Spinoza recognizes transeunt, and hence efficient, causation at the modal level, his overarching metaphysics is grounded in indeterminacy.
It is Spinoza’s conception of things, countable individuals, that is importantly deterministic. Determinism, the billiard ball relay race of causes and effects, is not Spinoza’s whole metaphysics. It is merely his principle of individuation for things. If, like Leibniz’s, Spinoza’s universe were only furnished by individual things, then determinism would be everything for him. However, Spinoza’s universe contains more than things. Thus, the deterministic universe is just a subset of the Spinozist universe simpliciter – a universe that is, at bottom, indeterminate.Footnote 49
