Sarvarian’s study offers a fresh and innovative glance at the question of the professional deontology of international advocacy. In this thoroughly-researched book the author poses the question of ‘whether the professionalization of international advocacy through the articulation of common ethical standards for counsel is desirable and feasible’ (3). In this way, he resurrects—in an era of proliferation of international courts and tribunals, and diversification of international litigation—an old (as the book reveals) yet neglected topic, namely, the ethical standards that apply to counsel and the regulation of advocacy at the international level.
The answer given is that the ‘professionalization of advocacy before international courts and tribunals is both desirable and feasible’ (282). To reach this conclusion, the author examines an extensive body of literature and employs not only the methods of historical and comparative analysis of a variety of international law regimes but also undertakes a detailed scrutiny of both soft law and hard law instruments. Examples include statutes and rules of procedure of international courts and ethical standards for counsel proposed—among other institutions—by the International Law Association (ILA) and the International Bar Association (IBA).
Comparative analysis reveals the commonalities and the differences amongst the systems (in Chapters 4 to 8, respectively) of the International Court of Justice, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), investment arbitration and the International Criminal Court. This demonstrates that diversity and pluralism both exist: these are nice terms to denote divergence which result from the haphazard nature of international justice and the differences in the profiles of its courts and tribunals as regards their subject matter, the identity of the parties appearing before them and their interests. However, pluralism is not an obstacle for diagnosing the need for advocacy to be regulated. The conclusion that the professionalization of advocacy is desirable, as it is linked with a number of key concepts such as procedural integrity and professionalism (Chapter 1), thus answers the first part of the book's research question.
The feasibility of the research question is discussed in Chapters 9 and 10. The first part of Chapter 9 is devoted, to international courts, their disciplinary powers, and the competence they (may) have to regulate counsel by prescribing and enforcing standards. The second part of that chapter discusses the various efforts, mostly by professional bodies and institutions like the ILA and IBA, to articulate such standards. The sophisticated analysis in Chapter 10 suggests a reform by introducing the—admittedly ambitious, yet also thought-provoking—idea of the establishment of an international bar. At a more general level, that chapter discusses the (mainly positive) consequences that a centralized regulatory authority and professionalization would bring. This ties in well with the discussion that takes place in Chapter 1 of the book concerning the pros and cons of a professionalized international advocacy. Sarvarian's prudent and pragmatic approach explains that the imposition of admission requirements in international judicial institutions is the last of a series of steps, with five preceding stages being necessary, including the articulation of common ethical standards by practitioners, which could then be given legal effect by courts and serve as the basis for harmonization and codification (19–20).
The book's conclusions show that it has been successful in delivering what it promises in its introduction. Sarvarian's robust analysis identifies a legal gap and employs forceful arguments to demonstrate the need that this gap be filled. As to the latter aspect of the book, this combines the merits of exemplary legal research and the clarity and sharpness of policy papers that address the questions of who can address the lacuna, and not only how, but also, to a lesser degree, what the content of such regulation might be. From the perspective of a public international lawyer who does not have mastery of the tools that other disciplines employ as a means for regulating the market, and without overlooking the danger of generalization and one-size-fits-all approaches, the analysis of Sarvarian and his call for reform are credible.
As is always the case, minor problems exist. For instance, the book's introduction omits any mention of the ECtHR chapter: indeed, the ECtHR rather inappropriately appears in the conclusions of the chapter on the CJEU (142), before then being discussed subsequently in a separate chapter. However, these slips do not undermine positive impression given by the book in terms of both its format and substance.
The only substantive comment that can be made relates to the normative orientation of the analysis, and its links with positive international law. But before continuing with what could be seen as a critique of the normative argument built in the book from the perspective of positive international law, it is important to acknowledge that Sarvarian is a connoisseur of public international law: this is demonstrated by his ability to situate his normative analysis in the context (and also the confines) of positive international law and highlight the links between the lex ferenda or the need for regulation, on the one hand, and the lex lata, on the other. Yet this is also where one may wish the book's analysis went a bit deeper and became more analytical. Some examples are briefly given below, but this also concerns the primarily normative argument the book makes (namely, the call for an international bar) and the questions surrounding its legal nature and the source from which its powers may stem. In similar terms, the discussion on jus cogens (11–12), and on the effect of State practice/approaches begs further analysis.
Regarding the last question, Sarvarian argues that the commonalities that his comparative examination identifies provide ‘a tenuous foundation for the articulation of common ethical standards for advocacy’ (58), and that ‘it is possible to identify universal or quasi-universal ethical principles that are both common to all of the major legal traditions of forensic advocacy and of general application to international courts and tribunals […, but] the search for uniformity is professional ethics is of limited effectiveness because of major philosophical divisions amongst national ethical traditions' (243). This raises the question of whether, and to what extent, the necessary conditions for custom are present or absent. This is implied in the analysis but not further investigated as an autonomous legal question.
To a degree, the same can be said of the discussion of sovereignty as a hindrance to the normative suggestions of the book—, that is, because States wish to continue to enjoy the privilege of appointing whomever they desire as their counsel. This is an important argument that deserved more analysis, both because the relevant arguments given in page 24 are terse and difficult to fully follow, but also because sovereignty (the conception/definition of which is briefly discussed on page 25) underpins a number of other arguments made in the book. Examples would include the role of States in appointing, shortlisting or suggesting candidates for the position of judge the persons they desire—who, as the book rightly suggests, are/shall be assigned the task of regulating counselling. Yet the appointment of judges/arbitrators is a question that falls outside the scope of Sarvarian's study. One can only hope that the references he makes to that question might be seen as an invitation to others (hopefully as dexterous as Sarvarian) to study it.
