Could Brazil and South Africa's rise as middle powers – along with Russia, China, India and other major emerging economies – be related to the growing prominence of the global middle class, which is expected to expand to 5 billion in 2030, eclipsing even the nineteenth-century middle-class expansion (Case Bryant Reference Case Bryant2011)? In short, how does rapid domestic economic growth, triggered by market liberalization amid massive income inequalities, shape South Africa and Brazil's middle power orientation? I argue that South Africa and Brazil's role as middle powers is a response to, and constitutive of, the very pressures characterizing globalization among emerging powers: namely, market liberalization versus redistribution and the need to make these pressures somewhat, if not entirely, compatible. Facing domestic constituencies that favour liberalization on the one hand and pro-redistributive groups on the other, state elites are motivated to adopt a middle power orientation through internal power plays as much as by considerations of international diplomacy. Although the analytic utility of a two-level games approach is hardly novel (Gourevitch Reference Gourevitch1978; Putnam Reference Putnam1998), such comparative analyses are relatively rare, despite growing academic interest in the role of rising states from the developing world. More generally, attempts to draw parallels between the South African and Brazilian political economies remain few and far between (Lieberman Reference Lieberman2003, Reference Lieberman2009; Seidman Reference Seidman1994). Using broad brushstrokes on a wide conceptual canvas, this article attempts to describe ‘snapshots’ rather than offer a detailed issue-based analysis – to unveil the outlines of a relatively neglected research agenda.
In order to do this, the article is structured as follows. After conceptually distinguishing traditional from emerging middle powers, the contextual significance of labour and industrialization is highlighted in relation to the class compromise that underlay the transition to democratization in South Africa and Brazil. However, the constraints of the international system and shifting domestic coalitions mitigated the development of substantive redistributive regimes. Finally, the foreign policy spillover of the resultant class compromise is briefly illustrated first by illuminating the complexities and contradictions that arise from efforts at mediating between ‘rogue states’ and the West and, secondly, South Africa and Brazil's attempts to effect redistribution by reforming global governance briefly in four issue areas.
Traditional and emerging middle powers: conceptual distinctions
While there is no shortage of literature on (traditional) middle powers, very few analyses have appeared regarding emerging middle powers. Drawing on the Gramscian basis underlying Robert Cox's framework (1989), Eduard Jordaan (Reference Jordaan2003) provides probably the most comprehensive distinction between traditional and emerging middle powers. Traditional middle powers (such as Canada, Australia, Norway and Sweden) tend to be stable social democracies, whereas democracy in emerging middle powers tends to be of a much more recent vintage. The former group came to the fore during the Cold War and tended to be concerned with politico-military issues; the latter emerged after the Cold War and tend to emphasize socioeconomic concerns. Finally, traditional middle power behaviour would more accurately be captured by the notions of ‘appeasement’ – the pacification and containment of potential threats to the international system – and that of emerging middle powers as ‘reformist’, since they wish to reform (in other words, gradually improve) but not radically transform the world system. Both groups of states – given their location within the global political economy – benefit in relative terms: traditional middle powers from being part of the core and emerging middle powers from being semi-peripheral powers. Of course, these distinctions become increasingly untenable the more emerging middle powers are incorporated into processes of global governance (the G8 being replaced by the G20) and as their roles increase, both in relation to the regulation of financial markets and as emerging donors in international development assistance.
Traditional middle powers tend to be relatively weak in their geographic immediacy, eschew regional cooperation efforts and even seek to establish some form of national identity independent of the dominant states of the region. In contrast, it is the emerging middle powers’ very dominance of their region and their keen pursuit of regional cooperation efforts that drive their middle power identity. One of the most glaring differences between traditional and emerging middle powers relates to their projection of societal values abroad. Reflective of the social democratic values underlying the welfare state, most traditional middle powers (at least during their heyday in the 1960s and 1970s) implemented extensive foreign aid programmes abroad: foreign aid appeared as an international institution akin to the safety net provided by domestic welfare (Noël and Thérien Reference Noël and Thérien1995). In contrast, emerging middle powers’ unequal insertion into the global economy profoundly constrains similar programmes (although some rising powers are also becoming aid donors themselves) (IDRC 2008). Rather, society in most ‘emerging powers’ remains marred by severe levels of inequality, uneven levels of effective authority (different levels of government being more effective than others or more effective ministries), societal pockets devoid of legitimacy (prevalence of gangs or strongmen) and the frequent use of patronage or clientelism to support fragile political coalitions. In short, many emerging middle powers conform to what Athul Kholi describes as fragmented multiclass states:
Leaders of these states attempt to promote industry by supporting private enterprise, but given the political compulsions of maintaining legitimacy, the relationship of state and business tends to be cooperative at times but distant and even conflictual at other times. Similarly ambiguous is the relationship of the state with the working class. In the absence of well-developed parties, leaders may emphasize a pro-working class rhetoric to shore up political support, but, on balance, they feel obliged to maintain a functioning private economy, including a working class whose gains must not outstrip gains in productivity. The relations between the political elite and the vast numbers of the poor, both in the cities and in the countryside, tend to be unorganized, encouraging both rhetorical populism and, on occasion, sharp conservative reactions to such populism. Populist ideologies and nationalism generally play a significant role in fragmented multiclass states, helping leadership legitimacy but constraining economic policy choices. (Kholi Reference Kholi2004: 400)
To intermediate in these contradictory demands, class compromise often emerges. However, it deviates from the northern European prototypes that consist of organized workers and capital with the state as mediator and enforcer. In this context, unionized workers accept private ownership as the means of production, while capitalists agree to transfer some profits to wages, tax-supported services and social insurance, thus raising productivity (Sandbrook et al. Reference Sandbrook, Edelman, Heller and Teichman2007: 18). In the developing world, the context is much more complicated. Firstly, in various respects the rules of the global economy are disadvantageous to the global South, given that peripheral economies tend to be dependent on a few industrialized countries for markets, imports and investment (hence, emerging middle powers seek to reform rather than transform the structures of global governance). Secondly, unlike the core economies where industrialization, democratization and social citizenship occurred in differentiated phases in the developing world, these processes overlap, and class compromises are pursued ‘before a productive capitalism has generated a strong material base, and in the context of a heterogeneous and differentiated class structure’ (Sandbrook et al. Reference Sandbrook, Edelman, Heller and Teichman2007: 19). One notable feature of the class compromise in the South African and Brazilian contexts is the prevalence of social policies and the ‘social wage’. Before attending to social policies in South Africa and Brazil and the way their class compromise shape a middle power orientation, some historical contextualization is called for.
Labour, industrialization and democratization
For all the criticism directed against the concept, in broad terms, the apartheid state exemplified many of the characteristics of a ‘bureaucratic-authoritarian’ state, not unlike Brazil under military rule. From 1963 to 1972 the rate of return on invested capital in South Africa ‘was the highest in the world and of the capitalist countries only Japan expanded more significantly than South Africa’ (Lieberman Reference Lieberman2001: 520), while Brazil was spoken of as the ‘miracle economy’ in the 1970s. However, a deepening of the industrial base in the 1960s and 1970s towards consumer durables and capital goods and greater exports triggered in both countries similar counter-reactions. The massive industrialization drive transformed both labour and business. Entrepreneurs came to diversify beyond established sectors with different sectors of capital demanding greater economic openness. Business in both South Africa and Brazil found itself frustrated by a low-wage economy limiting growth of a larger domestic market, especially for the high-cost goods produced. With increased manufacturing came the increased need for imported technology and, with that, an increased demand for skilled labour. Capital's dependence on skilled labour meant that manufacturers were less likely to hire and fire workers as may have been the case in the 1950s and early 1960s.
An exceptional geographic concentration of industry in Sao Paulo's so-called ABC districts and what became known as the PWV industrial triangle (Pretoria–Witwatersrand–Vereeniging) in today's Gauteng region greatly enhanced labour activists’ mobilizing capacity and the subsequent emergence of powerful trade union movements in both countries. In short, manufacturing triggered labour militancy (Seidman Reference Seidman1994: 15). Shop-floor organization extended beyond the factory to include the Catholic Church and a host of community groups as the base of a broad social movement driving democratization in Brazil. From this ‘new unionism’ – the organized political left, Catholic activists, intellectuals and social movements – was born the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) or Workers' Party. In South Africa, increased Black alienation coincided with the steady growth of trade union activism and the wide-scale formation of community movements constituting a similar broad front demanding democratization. However, despite the fact that the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) constitutes one of the most significant partners in the ruling Tripartite Alliance, the extent to which the African National Congress’ (ANC) history as a national liberation movement shapes its identity sets it somewhat apart from the ethos of the PT, although significant similarities in terms of social democratic aspirations remain.
Coming to power: restrained redistribution
As fervent adherents of state intervention to address massive levels of inequality, the ANC initially strongly favoured nationalization of key industries while the PT similarly opposed privatization of state enterprises and labour ‘flexibilization’, among a host of measures to restrain international demands for the adoption of neoliberal measures. Yet, at least three factors militated against the development of considerable redistribution regimes as initially envisaged by the Brazilian and South African left, namely the constraints of the international system and shifting domestic coalitions.
Constraints of the International System
Both the ANC and the PT were severely constrained by economic conditions on coming to power in 1994 and 2002, respectively. Whereas the South African economy had been cut off from the international capital markets for years and could not afford alienating foreign investors and financial institutions, Brazil's historical battle with hyperinflation superceded all other demands and quite simply dampened the prospects for major redistributive projects. Currency crises exacerbated processes whereby international norms regarding macroeconomic ‘discipline’ became more easily diffused and legitimated into the domestic policy-making process. In both countries, the left, once in government, was even more constrained ‘by the need to shift policies even further to the right than the Right would itself, so as to convince investors of its credibility’ (Amaral et al. Reference Amaral, Kingstone and Krieckhaus2008: 147).
Shifting Domestic Coalitions
Domestic coalitions also proved to restrict the scope of redistributive policy. When the PT finally won the presidential vote, it had to create coalitions with parties that some people in the PT would have preferred to keep at arm's length, most notably an alliance with the Liberal Party (PL) in 2002 that proved to be highly controversial. An alliance with the PL – known to be supported by evangelical pastors and wealthy businessmen – was necessary not only to enhance the PT's support in the state with the second largest electorate, Minas Gerais, but links between the leader of the PL and businessmen would help quell populist fears about a government led by Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva (Hunter 2008: 24).
In contrast, very little fragmentation marks South Africa's parliamentary system. With the ANC commanding nearly 66 per cent of parliamentary seats and a culture of strong party discipline (reinforced by a party list system in which the support of party mandarins rather than voter constituencies prevail), the institutional factors in the South African case approximate the complete opposite of the Brazilian system.Footnote 2 Moreover, during the early 1990s the terms of the democratic transition mandated the creation of a government of national unity and, with it, retention of a vast civil service in which bureaucrats from the ancien régime continued to occupy important positions, notably in the Treasury. Hence, the entire governance structure was ‘locked in’ to whatever new policy shift was undertaken, even if this included a clear conservative shift more to the centre.
However, in South Africa, despite the ANC's initial dependence upon its alliance with labour, the decision by labour and the South African Communist Party to subsume their economic policies to that of the ANC, in combination with corporatism, effectively overrode much of these ‘braking’ effects. Yet in Brazil, even within the PT the trade unions and social movements that had played such a crucial role in the rise of the Workers’ Party had limited capacity to provide ‘braking’ effects, although the PT retained its commitment to redistribution and the incorporation of popular participation in decision making (such as in the well-known participatory budgeting process). As in South Africa, civil society organizations initially supported the PT's historical agenda, but later – disillusioned and cut off from the policy-making process – formed the Coordination of Social Movements to counter growing corporatist pressures, expressed through such initiatives as the Economic and Social Development Council (CDES) (Hochstetler Reference Hochstetler2008: 33). In sum, these two factors – the constraints of the international system and the need for domestic coalitions, especially the limited ‘braking’ effects of labour – set the scene for an incomplete transition: the introduction of political equality while socioeconomic inequality remained. Given similar authoritarian pasts, policymakers in both Brazil and South Africa faced the dilemma of democratization coinciding with economic adjustment, as newly elected rulers had to negotiate their country's integration with a competitive global economy. One of the greatest challenges in this regard is the extent to which major industries had to be restructured, with industrial workers facing retrenchment and unions struggling to retain jobs precisely when workers acquired full rights of citizenship (Seidman Reference Seidman2010: 87).
However, between 2006 and 2010 in both South Africa and Brazil, economic policy evidenced a slight (but not fundamental) shift towards greater intervention and a clear move away from the more ‘soft’ neoliberal approach that had been followed earlier under Cardoso and during Mbeki's first term in office. In South Africa, not unlike Brazil, once the public debt and budget deficit had been trimmed, public investment increased markedly in the 2000s, especially in the form of public works programmes and social grants. This shift became more pronounced, if only in rhetorical terms, amid the putsch within the ANC to replace Mbeki in September 2008 by recasting Jacob Zuma, Mbeki's successor, in a new role as the messiah of the left. In many respects, though, ‘the succession battle was an undignified jostle for positions, leverage and influence’ (Marais Reference Marais2011: 375) rather than fundamental ideological differences. In an attempt to shore up support from the left disillusioned by the ANC's neoliberal shift since 1996, much was made of the fact that South Africa would now become a ‘developmental state’. Yet, amid much smoke and mirrors, Zuma's government has not introduced much that had not already been on the cards under Mbeki.Footnote 3
During Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva's (Lula) second term (2006–10), his government also sought to reconsolidate support, especially among the organized left, which had become disillusioned with the PT's drift towards the right, and to a lesser extent among the middle classes and the business elite. The policy shift included a more pronounced strategy of ‘national economic development’ and the ascendance of neo-developmentalists who sought to implement activist and redistributive fiscal and financial policies, ‘aiming to maintain high international reserves, raise aggregate demand, redistribute income, [and] expand consumer credit for the poor’ to temper more orthodox policy directed by the Central Bank’ (Morais and Saad-Filho Reference Morais and Saad-Filho2011: 35). With the alliance with domestic capital renewed, the government also underlined its commitment to organized workers and civil servants through higher wages and the targeted expansion of the bureaucracy. Finally, social provision was extended in three ways: the growth of the Bolsa Familia programme to 11.4 million households; the expansion of social security coverage (from 45 per cent of the workforce in 2002 to 51 per cent in 2010); and a rapid real rise in the minimum wage by 67 per cent between 2003 and 2010 (Morais and Saad-Filho Reference Morais and Saad-Filho2011: 35). Similarly, in South Africa, more than 14 million people or 28.2 per cent of the total population (of 49 million) are receiving social grants, with the social grant accounting for nearly 10 per cent of government expenditure and expected to increase at an annual rate of 10.6 per cent (excluding basic services such as education, health and housing) (Vollgraaff Reference Vollgraaff2011). Among developing countries South Africa and Brazil have the largest non-contributory pension programmes, reaching 5.3 million people in Brazil and 1.9 million in South Africa (at 2003 figures), at a relatively low cost of 1 per cent of GDP in Brazil and 1.4 per cent in South Africa, with significant impacts on poverty, given that such benefits are shared within households (Barrientos Reference Barrientos2003: 5). However, while the income of the poorest 50 per cent of Brazilians in 2006 grew at an annual rate of close to 12 per cent, faster than the 7 per cent rise across all income brackets, in South Africa inequality levels remained the same.Footnote 4
These redistributive measures began to feed into Brazil's projection of itself as an emerging middle power. In 2004 Lula launched the International Action against Hunger and Poverty as part of the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets for 2015 with the support of the presidents of France, Chile, Spain and Kofi Annan, the UN secretary-general. How did this class compromise, mediated by the state through an uneasy mix between economic liberalization on the hand and the need for redistribution on the other, inform Brasilia and Pretoria's adoption of a middle power orientation?
Class compromise and the foreign policy spillover
The consequence of the ANC and the PT's adoption of a relatively conservative macroeconomic policy against the backdrop of popular expectations of widespread redistribution ultimately resulted in a kind of class compromise also in the realm of foreign policy.
Probably one of the best indications of the degree to which differing ideological interests – between more neoliberal stakeholders on the one hand and pro-interventionists on the other – became incorporated is its reflection in the very constitution of the ruling regime. In the Brazilian case, economically important ministries such as the Central Bank, Finance, Agriculture and the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Development were run by centre and centre-right stakeholders in Lula's cabinet, with the Foreign Ministry allocated to the leftists. As Burges (Reference Burges2009: 160) suggests, ‘electoral victory had only been achieved because he [Lula] was able to assuage the fears of the Brazilian middle class and business elite that he would responsibly manage the economy. Yet his party faithful and core political constituency demanded the sort of radical nationalist policies that had come to mark the rhetoric of the Chávez presidency in Venezuela.’
Capitalizing on the PT's transnational labour linkages, the PT developed strong ties with the Alianza in Argentina, the Frente Amplio in Uruguay, and Venezuela after 1988 (in the 1980s, the PT was a strong supporter of Nicaragua and especially Cuba, where many key PT leaders spent time in exile). Given their diminishing progressive credentials at home, foreign policy allowed the Lula government to indulge in more long-standing ideological goals to the satisfaction of the many social movements, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and race and gender pressure groups that supported the PT's commitment to a foreign policy that endorsed a pronounced engagement with the global South (Cason and Power Reference Cason and Power2009: 128). While the PT-led cabinet ‘had the best connections to the export-orienting elite of any recent Brazilian government’ (Cason and Power 2009: 129), the progressive South–South agenda perfectly dovetailed the outward-oriented business interests of the latter, underwriting Lula's many trade missions to Asia, Africa and the Middle East.
Similar tensions between centrists and leftists prevail within the South African government, most obviously demonstrated by how Jacob Zuma replaced Thabo Mbeki as president, with the former supposedly being more sensitive to labour and demands for greater interventionism. However, attempts to quell party infighting by appointing former revenue head Pravin Gordhan to the more neoliberal Treasury and Ebrahim Patel, the former trade union activist, to the Ministry of Economic Development failed to such an extent that Zuma was compelled to seek legal advice as to which ministry was responsible for economic policy (Landsberg Reference Landsberg2010: 206). Further complicating matters is the growing salience of populist impulses within the ANC, notably associated with the president of the ANC Youth League, Julius Malema. Besides calling for the nationalization of mines and a regime change in neighbouring Botswana – this last action prompting his disciplinary hearing and possible expulsion from the party – Malema paid a ‘study visit’ to Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, noting approvingly that nationalization enabled the Venezuelan government to provide free education, health and affordable social services to the poor (Mail and Guardian 2010).
Not unlike the PT, the ANC, especially during the 1990s, found itself compelled to offer support to regimes such as Libya, Cuba and the PLO in Palestine, in return for their support for the ANC as part of the anti-apartheid movement. According to Mbeki, ‘when we decided to address the critical question of the ANC as an agent of change, we sought to examine ourselves as an agent of change to end the apartheid legacy in our own country. We also sought to examine what contribution we could make to the struggle to end apartheid globally’ (Gumede Reference Gumede2005: 197).
Mbeki's notion of an ‘African Renaissance’ – developed more practically into a New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) – sought to demonstrate that South Africa could usher into the world a society of states that were both African and modern. Invariably, like Lula and Cardoso, his leadership role included spearheading new opportunities for South African corporations in Africa and the rest of the developing world. Yet many within the ruling Tripartite Alliance questioned Mbeki's foreign policy priorities. For example, Jeremy Cronin, deputy general secretary of the South African Communist Party, slammed the concept of an African Renaissance as an escapist ploy that failed to deal with the hard issues of poverty and unemployment at home (Gumede Reference Gumede2005: 203). By 2002, South Africa had become the biggest foreign investor in Africa and the continent's largest source of foreign direct investment, led by six primary sectors – construction/manufacturing, financial services, mining, retail, telecommunications and tourism. Such is the degree of corporate penetration in the continent that leftist scholars now ponder the dynamics of South African ‘(sub)imperialism’, drawing specifically on lessons from Brazilian ‘(sub)imperialism’ under military rule in the late 1970s and 1980s (Samson Reference Samson2009). Interestingly, at its February 2010 party congress, a PT document entitled ‘The Great Transformation’(MercoPress 2010), drafted by Marco Aurelio Garcia, one of Lula's key foreign policy advisers, called for a dynamic regional development policy to be well received and understood by neighbouring countries in order to eliminate the fear of ‘Brazilian sub-imperialism’. The document cautioned against the ‘arrogant and predatory’ attitude of Brazilian corporations overseas, after Brazilian construction companies in Bolivia and Ecuador had been accused of offering bribes by President Correa.
Set against this backdrop, both South African and Brazilian foreign policies echo similar ‘developmental’ rhetorics. ‘Although South Africa is still committed to a market oriented economy,’ noted Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Sue van der Merwe in March 2010, ‘the current economic reality has served to reinforce our country's belief that we cannot rely on markets alone, and that economic growth and prosperity must be supported by an appropriate policy environment’ (Landsberg Reference Landsberg2010: 199, emphasis added). Her successor, Ebrahim Ebrahim, noted that the government would pursue a posture of ‘progressive internationalism’ (Landsberg Reference Landsberg2010: 200). In his inaugural speech, Lula argued that Brazil's diplomatic action would be guided by a ‘humanist perspective, and will be, above all, an instrument of national development’ (Bourne Reference Bourne2008: 160). ‘We are convinced that in the long run an attitude based on a sense of humanity that favours the promotion of development of the poorest and most vulnerable will not only be good to peace and prosperity around the world. It will bring benefits to Brazil itself,’ wrote Lula's foreign minister, Celso Amorim (Reference Amorim2010: 225).
Such sentiments are, of course, typical of middle powers in that they adopt an activist orientation and engage themselves in global issues beyond their immediate geostrategic sphere of influence. Middle powers do not necessarily involve themselves in all conflicts, but foreign policy often evinces a focus on conflict resolution through mediation and diplomacy and a generally high level of multilateral involvement in a changeable array of international issues. These dimensions are examined below by illuminating the complexities and contradictions that arise from efforts at mediating between ‘rogue states’ and the West, namely Iran in the case of Brazil and Libya in the case of South Africa. Thereafter Brasilia and Pretoria's attempts to effect redistribution by reforming global governance are illustrated very briefly in four domains: (1) representation at the United Nations Security Council; (2) climate change negotiations; (3) trade talks; and (4) representation on the boards of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.
Caught between human rights and the recognition of ‘rogue regimes’: intervention in Iran and Libya
Both emerging and traditional middle powers tend to be sensitive to problems that threaten the structural basis of world order and often sponsor efforts to address these problems (Cox Reference Cox1989). There is a notable tendency in this regard to play a mediating role as a way of resolving conflict. The cases of South African intervention in the wake of violent uprisings against Gaddafi in 2011 and the crisis over Iran's acquisition of nuclear material mediated by Brazil (supported by Turkey) in May 2010 are for the purposes of this article less significant in so far as whether these efforts were ‘successful’ or not. Rather, these cases briefly illustrate the extent to which such intervention initiatives often struggle to find endorsement across divergent societal groups, thus revealing the complexity of the class compromise.
Under the terms of the Tehran Declaration of 17 May 2010 brokered by Turkey and Brazil, Iran would exchange 1,200 kilos of low-enriched uranium for 120 kilos of fuel, and this was to be ‘a gateway for broader negotiation regarding Iran's nuclear programme’ (Amorim Reference Amorim2010: 223). Yet, irrespective of the outcome of the negotiations, Western powers announced that a new round of sanctions would be imposed against Iran by the UN Security Council ‘on the very day the so-called Vienna Group submitted its comments to the Tehran Declaration to the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], allowing no time for Iran to reply’ (Amorim 2010: 223). Consequently, on 9 June, Brazil and Turkey voted against the sanctions against Iran in the Security Council – the first time that Brazil voted against a resolution that was approved. Domestically, the initiative was widely seen as playing into the hands of the PT and the left, with Brazil's human rights record compromised by Lula appearing as a friend of Ahmadinejad, whose regime stood ‘accused of stealing an election, brutally suppressing dissidents and defying the UNSC on a pressing security issue’ (De Almeida Reference De Almeida2010; Roett Reference Roett2010: 146–7; Sotero Reference Sotero2010: 74).
Similar doubts were cast on South Africa's human rights commitments in relation to Libya. Although Pretoria – out of step with the BRIC states (Brazil, Russia, India and China), who abstained – supported UN Security Council Resolution 1973 in favour of civilian protection, it ultimately found itself ‘duped’ by Western powers when such authorization led to NATO intervention in Libya. This followed failed attempts by Zuma, who had been authorized in April by the African Union (AU) to mediate the conflict and seek an exit strategy for Gaddafi, adding to Pretoria's chagrin. South Africa initially refused to acknowledge Libya's rebel National Transitional Council and resisted attempts to unfreeze funds for Libya's reconstruction. Ironically, Pretoria's failed mediation efforts prompted accusations of continued support for Gaddafi, while, according to one account, South Africa supported Resolution 1973 for fear that an abstention might have been construed as a disregard for human rights (personal communication with senior South African government official, 8 September 2011). Much as some found Brasilia pandering to the left, South Africa's obstinate position was regarded as a ‘relatively cheap way to maintain Pretoria's revolutionary credibility, principally for its domestic audience’, and the indiscriminate suggestion of ‘one size fits all’ national unity governments as the ‘African solution to African problems’ (Kornegay Reference Kornegay2011; Mills Reference Mills2011).
Aspirations for global redistribution: the promise of institutional reform
Given the contours of the class compromise at home and the tensions between neoliberals and neo-developmentalists, a great deal of international activism is aimed at reforming international institutions on the assumption that the process of globalization should not be resisted but rather transformed to take advantage of new opportunities for growth in the developing world. It is in this context that Brasilia and Pretoria's roles in the reform of international institutions are significant in so far as domestic opposition to liberalization can be overturned by contending that more can be accomplished by being inside the structures of global governance – specifically the Bretton Woods institutions – than outside.
To cite South Africa's Thabo Mbeki:
The choice for countries of the South is not whether to engage with globalization or not, but how to engage with it. It is essential for governments and people to engage with the process critically, to re-shape and re-direct its impact. The objective must be to enhance citizens’ incorporation and access to the benefits of globalization, while minimizing polarization and social exclusion, and mitigating these effects when and where they do occur. (Mbeki Reference Mbeki2001)
In his inauguration speech, Lula also noted the need to realize the potential gains from globalization while working towards reforming it – through multilateral institutions – to address social deficits:
Our foreign policy shall also reflect the desire for change manifested at the ballot box. Under my Government, Brazil's diplomatic efforts will be guided by a humanistic perspective directed, above all else, at providing instruments for the Nation's development. Through our foreign trade, through the obtaining of advanced technologies and through the quest for productive investment, Brazil's foreign relations will aim at improving the living conditions of Brazilian men and women, at increasing income levels and generating dignified jobs. Trade negotiations are today of vital importance. With respect to the FTAA, through understandings with Mercosur, the European Union and the World Trade Organization, Brazil will combat protectionism, struggle to eliminate trade barriers and attempt to obtain fairer and more appropriate conditions for fostering the Nation's development. We shall seek to eliminate the outrageous agricultural subsidies practiced in the developed countries, that harm our farmers by denying them their comparative advantages. With the same ardor, we shall take pains to remove unjustifiable barriers to our exports of industrial goods. In all of these forums, it is essential that we maintain spaces and flexibility for our own development policies in the areas of social and regional development, the environment, agriculture, industry and technology. (da Silva Reference da Silva2008)
Hence, both Pretoria and Brasilia seek – with varying degrees of success – to effect redistribution at the global level. In practical terms, the tactic of ‘soft balancing’ prompted coalitions such as the G20, the India–Brazil–South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA) in 2003 and the subsequent formation of the BRICSA (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) in December 2010.
Soft balancing does not directly challenge US military dominance, but draws on non-military means to delay, frustrate and undermine unilateral policies by forming diplomatic coalitions and strengthening economic ties between middle powers through sectoral collaboration (Flemes Reference Flemes2009a: 165). Whereas neither South Africa nor Brazil allow American military bases on their territory and have avoided expressed alignment with US security policies – both countries strongly opposed the US invasion of Iraq – cooperation prevails regarding the war on terrorism. For South Africa and Brazil, a major redistributive victory would be permanent membership of the UN Security Council.Footnote 5 However, such attempts to democratize international politics sit uncomfortably with the idea of a new hierarchical security order that would subsequently emerge and be legitimized by them (Nel Reference Nel2010: 956). South Africa and Brazil's UN Security Council claims are complicated: in the South African case by the African Union's consensus position that Africa's permanent presence on the Security Council should be a rotational one, and for Brasilia by Brazil and India's rejection of the UN High-level Panel that suggested a regular system of rotational members. Moreover, Brazil's claim to such a seat qua regional power is of very recent vintage (Flemes Reference Flemes2009b: 405; Spektor Reference Spektor2010: 200).
Redistribution was even more prominently and decisively articulated in relation to positions taken during climate change negotiations. Both South Africa and Brazil held sustainable development and poverty eradication to be the overriding principles governing their participation based on the Delhi Declaration of 2002. Both countries based their positions on the fact that they carry virtually no historical responsibility for climate change and that they are compelled to prioritize the eradication of socioeconomic inequalities through development. The Third IBSA Dialogue Forum in New Delhi in October 2008 introduced the principle of equitable burden sharing adopted in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as the ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ principle separating Annex 1 (industrializing) from non-Annex 1 signatories (developing countries) (Dröge Reference Dröge2010: 92). Pushing for a substantial agreement rather than merely a political declaration, Lula offered financial and technological support for poor countries during the Copenhagen Summit, while South African demands emerged as some of the the most comprehensive among the developing world.Footnote 6 Whereas cooperation between the US and the BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) essentially saved the day and resulted in an agreementFootnote 7 – albeit non-binding – South Africa's bridge-building role in the negotiations between the ‘North’ and ‘South’ seems to be subject to differing interpretations.Footnote 8
Brazilian and South African efforts to redistribute power in the governing structures and procedures of the World Bank and IMF as members of the G20 were less successful, despite the fact that the severity of the global financial crisis of 2007–8 made an enhanced role for the emerging economies even more imperative. Coordinating the BRIC position at the G20 2008 Sao Paulo finance ministers’ meeting, Brazil argued against the maintenance of the veto powers of the major countries, while South Africa recommended a recomposition of the board, and for the raising and rebalancing of shares (Manuel Reference Manuel2009). However, the G20 ambition of increasing the quota shares of developing countries was met only partially. The World Bank approved a slight shift of voting shares in favour of developing countries (a 4.59 per cent shift to developing and transition countries since 2008). In the case of the IMF, China became the third largest stakeholder. Brazil, China, Russia and India gained a further 6 per cent of shares (IMF 2011; Jakobeit Reference Jakobeit2010), while the appointment of the former French finance minister, Christine Lagard, as managing director of the IMF dashed hopes that the role would be appointed on merit and not from Europe, as convention dictated.Footnote 9
The most obvious instances of seeking a redistribution in the configuration of power was the decision by Brazil, South Africa, India and other emerging countries to soft balance against the US, EU, Japan and Canada and resist the broadening of the Doha Round agenda at the Cancun World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial meeting in 2003 in favour of securing freer global agricultural markets. Linking it to the need for a ‘developmental’ trade round – as enunciated during the G20 Summit in Seoul in December 2010 – also enabled Brazil and South Africa to ‘sell’ their trade stance to divergent domestic constituencies. Obviously playing well among the business elite, most notably Brazil's influential agro-industrial producers, such Southern coalition building also served symbolic purposes of demonstrating solidarity to the rest of the developing world, especially to the left (even if, in practice, the interests of less-developed countries did not always align with those of middle-income countries such as South Africa and Brazil). Whereas South Africa worked hard at developing a common African position on an issue-by-issue basis, Brazil's foreign minister, Celso Amorim, ‘went so far as to bluntly tell the G-90 group of least developed countries that they should trust Brazil to protect their interests in global trade talks’ (Burges Reference Burges2009: 167). While Brazil came to lead the G20 at the WTO due to its carefully developed counter-offer at Cancun, South Africa led the NAMA 11 group (Non-Agriculture Market Access). Moreover, ever since the Hong Kong WTO Ministerial Summit in 2005, Pretoria has pushed a developmental agenda supported by several domestic social groups, including the trade union movement and some civil society organizations (Landsberg Reference Landsberg2010: 193).
Conclusion
Fragmented multiclass states, characterized by severe levels of inequality, uneven levels of effective state authority and frequent use of patronage or clientelism to support fragile coalitions, often prompt some form of class compromise to intermediate contradictory demands. Since demands for redistribution from some societal groups usually need to be set against the expectations for greater marketization and liberalization from others, success in the sphere of foreign policy implies the adoption of a middle power orientation. Given the difficulty of consistently projecting national values and interests commensurate with the expectations of all societal groups at home, foreign policy makers attempt to make symbolic demonstrations of support with other perceived ‘progressive’ social forces compatible with material demands as well as the aggressive pursuit of trade liberalization and various forms of support for domestic enterprise. For example, South Africa and Brazil packaged increased trade with others in the South as a demonstration of ‘Southern solidarity’; they call for global redistribution commensurate with their own domestic efforts to redistribute wealth or they continue to provide moral support to the likes of Cuba, the Palestinians or even Iran while trying to direct global reforms as members of the G20. As emerging middle powers, neither South Africa nor Brazil challenge or threaten the status quo. However, benefiting from their relative privileged positions in the global economy into which their societies are incorporated on an extremely uneven basis, Brazil and South Africa act as the ‘loyal opposition’ or ‘the canary in the coal mine’, and thus require a certain degree of autonomy from the major powers. In short, their middle power orientation can be seen as a response to, and constitutive of, the class compromise that aims to overcome their domestic divergences.
