“Human dignity” has become a rallying cry for social and political movements worldwide. The concept is enshrined in international human rights documents and national constitutions, and it is often said to be a key value underlying human rights and democracy. Appeals to human dignity, however, have been criticized for their vagueness and their lack of philosophical grounding. What is human dignity, and can the attribution of a unique dignity to human beings be justified? In his book Human Dignity George Kateb presents a spirited defense of the concept. He argues that human dignity is an essential component of support for human rights and a crucial feature of the relationship between humanity and the natural world.
In Kateb's view, the concept of human dignity comprises two elements: the equal status of every human individual and the unique stature of the human species relative to other species. The first part of Kateb's book examines the idea of equal individual status, principally in order to show that this element of human dignity plays an indispensable role in the defense of human rights. For Kateb, human dignity is an “existential value” (10) that applies to every person simply by virtue of his or her identity as a human being. Dignity precludes treating human beings as though they were “less than human,” which Kateb seems to understand as treating human beings like tools or infants instead of as “agents with purposes” (38). According to Kateb, human rights should generally be defended both on the basis that they serve to reduce human suffering and on the basis that they protect human dignity. But the goal of protecting human rights may at times diverge from the goal of reducing human suffering, as in utilitarian-calculation scenarios in which the violation of rights can prevent the suffering of the greater number, or Brave New World scenarios in which people live comfortably without suffering but have their rights violated. A robust defense of human rights against utilitarian or paternalistic assault, Kateb maintains, requires the recognition of human dignity.
In the second part of his book, Kateb takes up an ancient but lately neglected issue: the dignity of humanity as compared to animal species and the rest of nature. Kateb argues that humanity possesses dignity in the sense of a unique stature. Humanity is “the highest species on earth,” and the human species differs from all others in being partly “not natural” (17). Unlike many historical writers, Kateb rejects any theological reason for humanity's “not natural” character. Instead, he traces his claim about unique stature to two features of human beings.
The first feature is humanity's ability to serve as the “steward of nature,” (x) which can be accomplished by recording nature's history, appreciating nature, and preserving natural species. For Kateb, humanity's elevated status does not justify indifference or cruelty toward animals; rather, humanity rises above nature precisely because it can serve nature. The second feature contributing to humanity's unique stature, in Kateb's view, is the possession of unique and commendable qualities that enable humanity to achieve a “partial break with nature,” (x) such as language, self-consciousness, agency, and unpredictability. According to Kateb, these qualities give human beings an unlimited store of potential; they enable people to break out of established patterns through “an upsurge of free creativity” (134).
Kateb's principal contribution to our thinking about human dignity lies in his willingness to examine the question of what makes human beings unique. Many of those who invoke human dignity simply assume that individual human beings possess unconditional value, but Kateb goes deeper. He provides a “philosophical anthropology” (131) to explain the specific sources of human value and catalogues “commendable traits” (11) that separate human beings from other species. For Kateb, this philosophical anthropology helps to support the idea of equal individual status and, by extension, human rights.
Kateb is not always clear about the precise relationship between human uniqueness and equal individual status. He provides no deductive argument from humanity's unique qualities to equal individual status, perhaps in part because he wants to preserve human rights for human beings who lack qualities such as language and agency (a subject about which Kateb does not say a great deal). Rather the thrust of Kateb's philosophical anthropology is motivational. By encouraging us to recognize the deep springs of human potential, Kateb strengthens our resolve both to respect equal individual status and to realize human potential through, among other things, the stewardship of nature. Kateb provides a valuable account of the human qualities that “make humanity a cause for wonder in its own eyes” (123). While his account leaves much to be discussed with regard to humanity's relationship to nature, Kateb has performed an important service in reopening the historical conversation about a form of dignity based on humanity's special traits.
Kateb's account of human uniqueness focuses to a significant extent on the idea of human potentiality. For Kateb, the fact that human beings have unlimited creative potential provides crucial support for human dignity. But can potential really support human dignity? After all, human beings have as much potential to do evil as to do good, as much potential to perpetuate a stifling status quo as to innovate and change. Kateb does acknowledge the great destruction that human beings have wrought upon themselves and nature. But like Renaissance writer Pico della Mirandola in his oration “On the Dignity of Man,” Kateb seems to believe that there is something noble or elevated about human freedom and creativity independently of how they are exercised. Whether this is the case is an important issue for further consideration.
Another intriguing aspect of Kateb's book is a thread that runs through his account of the dignity of humanity, namely, an effort to instill in readers a sense of wonder at the natural world and at humanity itself. This sense of wonder is meant to serve as an alternative to religious reverence, which Kateb rejects both for being unfounded and for directing wonder away from the world toward a transcendent realm. It is not obvious, however, that such a sense of wonder can be instantiated in contemporary societies. Kateb recognizes this difficulty; he worries that the culture of today's capitalist democracies discourages the form of wonder that fuels humanistic achievement and the appreciation of nature. Perhaps, then, religion—at least as embodied in practices and traditions—could have something to offer. If part of the aim of religious life is to inculcate a sensitivity to the awe-inspiring aspects of nature and humanity, then it is worth asking whether secular societies could incorporate some elements of religious life without endorsing religious beliefs.
If it is possible for contemporary societies to imbue their members with a sense of wonder, the question remains how this would affect people's practical decision making. Kateb seems to hope that such a sense of wonder would encourage people to fulfill their potential, in part by serving as stewards of nature. In a similar vein, Kant can be read as suggesting that reverence at human moral capacity empowers people to do their duty. It remains a significant question, however, whether wonder and reverence are genuinely able to motivate us to pursue worthy action.
Today the concept of human dignity is both ubiquitous and elusive. Kateb offers important and timely encouragement in the effort to understand the multifaceted idea of human dignity—and to protect it in contemporary social and political circumstances.
