After the Napoleonic Wars, central Europe frequently witnessed important diplomatic discussions, and cities such as Vienna, Aix-la-Chapelle, Carlsbad, Troppau, and Laibach served as the places for rendezvous of European monarchs and diplomats. Austrian Chancellor Clemens Wenzel Lothar Nepomuk Prince von Metternich-Winneburg played a leading role at these meetings between 1814 and 1822, and he particularly wanted them to take place in the territories of the Austrian Empire because he could therefore better control their course and exert influence over the events to an extent undoubtedly exceeding the real power of the state whose interests he advocated.Footnote ¹ This is exactly what happened after 1814, and the subsequent years were definitely the happiest period in the life of the man known for his extraordinary diplomatic talent as well as his vanity. It was all the more difficult for him to reconcile himself with the loss of the position of the “coachman of Europe” in the 1820s when the alliance formed by the five European powers (Great Britain, France, Prussia, the Austrian Empire, and Russia) failed to solve the Greek war of independence. The July Revolution of 1830 then created a gulf between the liberal and conservative powers, so that neither the willingness of the five powers to cooperate under his leadership nor the necessary conditions for his leadership existed in the 1830s.Footnote ²

The goal of this article is to explain Metternich's effort to go back in time and step once more into the limelight during the attempts to solve the Eastern Question at a ministerial conference in Vienna that he proposed in 1839. Although this gathering ultimately did not take place, its project is an excellent example of Metternich's desire to revive his bygone influence and his “peace management” by using the meeting to end the disputes among the Great Powers and thereby contribute to the preservation of peace on the continent. The research also shows that central Europe did not entirely stand aside from the conflict between Russia and the two maritime powers, France and Great Britain, in the Near East, but took part in solving it through the Austrian Empire. Moreover, this region was also influenced by the events within the Ottoman Empire, as was demonstrated during the Rhine Crisis of 1840 that was to a certain extent a result of Metternich's unsuccessful peace initiative from the previous year.

The topic under discussion has already been explored by other historians, but only briefly in works focusing on the second Turko-Egyptian conflict of 1839–1841, particularly by Adolf Hasenclever and Eugéne Guichen,Footnote ³ or in those dedicated to British or Russian foreign policy, such as the works of Sir Charles K. Webster and Harold Ingle, who presented the British or Russian perspective.Footnote ⁴ These authors used only a limited number of documents for the elaboration of this topic, and usually did not include those of Austrian origin. Consequently, a study from the “Austrian point of view” based upon the research of an adequate number of documents relevant to the analysis is still lacking, leaving a still little-known chapter in the nineteenth-century diplomatic history.

The Ottoman Empire was as dangerous a barrel of gunpowder in the late 1830s as the Balkans were on the eve of the Great War. Although the empire was de jure governed only by Sultan Mahmud II from Constantinople, half of it was de facto controlled by Mohammed Ali from Alexandria. A constant tension prevailed between the two men, and a clash could break out at the slightest pretext. Any possible aggression on the part of the Egyptian governor could provoke a Russian intervention in the Straits, which had already happened in early 1833. In July of the same year, Tsar Nicholas I pledged to help the sultan again if he was attacked. The problem lay in the fact that France and Great Britain refused to allow a unilateral Russian intervention in the Ottoman Empire and declared that if the tsar's troops appeared on the Bosphorus, they would send their fleets into the Sea of Marmara. Nicholas I reacted with the statement that such a proceeding would equal to casus belli for Russia. Consequently, a war between the two Oriental despots could have fatal consequences not only for the Levant but also Europe.

As for the Ottoman Empire, the animosity that existed between Russia and the two maritime powers was unfortunate for a simple reason: it was entirely unfounded. All the European powers including Austria and Prussia desired the preservation of the Suttan's weak state because they saw that condition as the fundamental premise for the preservation of the balance of power; exactly for this reason Russia supported Mahmud II against Mohammed Ali in 1833. Nevertheless, Great Britain and France distrusted the tsar's intentions and disliked the growth of his influence over the sultan's court. Their anti-Russian behavior in the Near East logically led to the worsening of their relations with Nicholas I, and this mutual ill will was augmented in the mid-1830s by differences in the attitudes of the liberal and conservative powers to the affairs in other parts of Europe, particularly in the Iberian Peninsula.Footnote ⁵

Metternich was not pleased with the given situation because the gulf between Russia and the maritime powers made the solution of all European questions more difficult, not only the eastern one. He was also well aware of the fact that the misunderstanding regarding the Ottoman Empire was entirely pointless because, as he knew very well, Nicholas I desired its preservation much like the other monarchs. Therefore, in the interest of general peace, Metternich tried to reduce the tension between the two quarreling camps. To dilute the anti-Russian aversion dominating in London and Paris, he did not hesitate to address to the two governments his sincere protestations of the tsar's good intentions toward the “Sick Man on the Bosphorus.” This effort produced no positive reaction because no one in either capital trusted him. He fared no better in St. Petersburg, where he directed his wish that the tsar more openly explain his aims instead of concealing them behind his pride hurt by the behavior of British and French diplomats. The Austrian chancellor particularly disagreed with Nicholas I's decision to keep secret the content of the Münchengrätz Convention, which resulted in the liberal powers' suspicion of the Austro-Russian secret agreement on the partition of the Ottoman Empire. Metternich also could not agree with the fact that the tsar considered the Eastern Question his private affair; according to the chancellor, it was a European and not only a Russian matter.Footnote ⁶ Metternich concealed none of these opinions from the two sides, and he was more frank with them than has been generally presumed.

It undoubtedly grieved the elderly chancellor to see the relations among the powers spoiled by unreasonable jealousies and misunderstandings. To remove them, he not only used simple persuasion but also attempted to assume the role of mediator in spring 1833 and head a conference that would solve the complicated situation of the Ottoman Empire and its relations with the European powers. He found this method to be the most suitable for assuring peace on the continent, and when, for example, the conference in Carlsbad eased the tension over the situation within the German Confederation, he saw no reason why another one held in Vienna would not have a similar effect in the Levant.Footnote ⁷

Unfortunately for Metternich, during that period the British foreign policy was led by Henry John Temple Lord Palmerston, who rejected the idea of a conference in Vienna and assumed the same negative attitude toward Metternich's proposal the following year that the Great Powers' representatives in Vienna should be charged with supervising the affairs in the Near East.Footnote ⁸ Metternich therefore had no option other than to abandon his project for making Vienna a center of discussions over the Eastern Question, the project that had preoccupied him for eighteen long months.Footnote ⁹

Palmerston's attitude resulted, first, from his strong distrust of Metternich, whom he even labeled a “slave of Russia,” and second, from the fact that he himself wanted to lead the events and direct the discussions concerning the future of the Ottoman Empire.Footnote ¹⁰ Therefore, he proposed his own plan, which was basically identical to the Austrian one, only with a different location for the conference: London. Now, the objection came from Vienna because Metternich had no reason to satisfy the wish that Palmerston had twice denied him. Moreover, the chancellor feared that the metropolis on the Thames might become a permanent center of European affairs. After the experience with the London conferences on the Greek and Belgian questions, he voiced his opposition to the possibility of “granting any kind of permanency to the London conference; of gradually elevating it to the status of a political institution, and thus attributing to it the significance and the influence of an Areopagus [a Court of Appeal] in which the representatives of the three continental Powers would be restricted to the role of accomplices in the reformatory policy of the two Maritime Courts.”Footnote ¹¹

The two statesmen's contest for power and prestige deepened their mutual animosity, and the usually calm Metternich was even sometimes given to making strong statements against the British Foreign Secretary.Footnote ¹² Sir Charles K. Webster explained their unwillingness to agree to a conference in the other's capital by the incompatibility of their characters and opinions as well as the same desire each man had for his own prestige and control of affairs. This opinion is undoubtedly correct, and particularly in the case of Metternich, the question of prestige was rather important, as shown in Prussian Envoy Count Mortimer Maltzan's words regarding Metternich's wish to “close his long and nice political career with an act crowning his high reputation.”Footnote ¹³

Nevertheless, Webster did not point out another difference between the motives the two men had to hold a conference in his own capital. Palmerston maintained a distinctly anti-Russian attitude, and the discussions he planned on the Eastern Question were intended to prevent the conservative power from military intervention in the Ottoman Empire owing to the “great jealousy it would excite in the West.”Footnote ¹⁴ This strong partiality, however, made him an unsuitable person to lead the talks proposed for an agreement to be reached between the maritime powers and Russia. In contrast, Metternich really stood between both quarreling parties when he rightly advocated a peaceful Russian policy in the east while simultaneously being well aware that a second Russian unilateral military intervention in the Straits was impossible.

The most important difference between holding a conference in London or in Vienna thus lay in the fact that in the capital on the Danube the discussions would be led by a man who could really fulfill the role of mediator, whereas in London, the British Foreign Secretary would represent only one position, and, despite the fact that Great Britain and Russia pursued the same goal in the Levant—the preservation of the Ottoman Empire, their mutual distrust and ill will could render any accord unattainable. This undoubtedly was another reason that Metternich constantly rejected the idea of a conference on the Eastern Question under Palmerston's leadership. The one exception came in summer 1838, when the chancellor himself suggested that the Great Powers gather at the seat of the British Government to arrange joint action against Mohammed Ali in Egypt, who was threatening to declare his independence at that time. Metternich could make this concession because he correctly predicted that Mohammed Ali's separatism was not a serious problem. That soon proved to be the case because the Egyptian governor abandoned his very public plan for independence. The chancellor also knew that there was consensus among the Great Powers in this matter, as none of them wanted to see the foundation of an Egyptian empire in the Levant.Footnote ¹⁵ Russia and Great Britain would definitely coordinate their navies' actions more easily before the port of Alexandria than Constantinople, and the discussions in London about the former were unlikely to be long and complicated. The talks ultimately did not take place because Nicholas I saw no reason to agree to them after Mohammed Ali's retreat. Metternich accepted this position and also refused to negotiate in London, where Palmerston modified the chancellor's original proposal when he tried to link the talks about Mohammed Ali with the question of the Straits and therefore make the proposed conference an instrument for his own anti-Russian policy instead of a setting for general agreement.Footnote ¹⁶

Palmerston's failure in 1838 could hardly cause Metternich any grief, particularly when it still gave the chancellor hope for his own conference on the Eastern Question. Although he formally abandoned this project in 1834, he, in fact, never entirely gave it up. This ambition resurfaced in spring 1839 due to the worsening relations between Mahmud II and Mohammed Ali that culminated in war. Because the former's defeat was generally expected in European cabinets, they once again presumed the possibility of their own intervention on his behalf, with the accompanying risk of a clash between the maritime powers and Russia in the Straits. Metternich was persuaded that this outcome could be avoided either by the sultan's unlikely victory or, in the case of the Ottoman forces' defeat, by uniting the Great Powers prior to their intervention. The crucial problem lay in the fact that there was no consensus among the leading European states.Footnote ¹⁷

According to Metternich, the best way to create the desired union and find a way out of the deteriorating Near Eastern crisis was, unsurprisingly, negotiation among the powers involved. As he declared in early June 1839, “It is absolutely necessary for the four Great Powers to come to agreement among themselves on the joint measures that will be undertaken in the event of the Porte being threatened by a catastrophe.”Footnote ¹⁸ In his opinion, the solution had to be found quickly to avoid the outbreak of war between Mahmud II and Mohammed Ali or, if the powers came together too late, to terminate it as soon as possible. Once the threat of war had been removed, the long-term peaceful coexistence between the sultan and his Egyptian vassal had to be arranged.Footnote ¹⁹

Unsurprisingly again, Metternich was convinced that this goal was to be attained in Vienna, which would become the diplomatic capital of Europe once again with the chancellor at the head of affairs mediating between the liberal powers and Russia. Consequently, his plan fulfilled his dream of his mastery over Europe and the frank belief that a well-functioning pentarchy unhampered by needless distrust and jealousy was necessary at a time when Mohammed Ali could overthrow the Ottoman Empire. As he wrote, “In a matter of urgency of this nature, we see no separate Austria, no separate Russia, no separate France. On the contrary, we are, to our way of thinking, uniting the Great Powers in one fascicle [fasces], and the good [read: effective intervention] that will be done by the abilities of the one or the other will be in our eyes of benefit not only to the sultan but to the whole of Europe as well.”Footnote ²⁰

To be able to create this union, Metternich had to persuade the Great Powers to agree to participate in the Viennese negotiations. He defended the venue for the meeting by its geographical position; among the capitals of the Great Powers, Vienna was situated the shortest distance from Constantinople, which meant closest to the developing crisis, and on the way to Paris, London, and Berlin. For this reason the diplomats in Vienna were able to react promptly to the changes in the Ottoman Empire.Footnote ²¹

Metternich hoped that this argument would facilitate the acceptance of the plan. He was convinced that the tsar would easily consent to it and would not refuse the assistance of the man who closely stood by him during the 1830s.Footnote ²² He also did not doubt the support of his second conservative ally, Prussia. This German power had no interests in the Levant and did not pursue any active policy of its own in this region. Its king, Frederick William III, in fact considered Vienna to be the most suitable city for the achievement of general consensus and supported the idea.Footnote ²³

In contrast to both eastern courts, Metternich considered the acceptance of his project in Paris and particularly in London to be less certain. The basic impediment for the close cooperation of the two maritime powers was their continuous distrust of Russia. It was still difficult for Metternich to dispel their fears about the tsar's aims in the Near East, and nothing indicated in early 1839 that the bad relations between the British lion and the Russian bear were likely to become more cordial. The relations between St. Petersburg and Paris were even worse, being seriously affected by Nicholas I's personal aversion toward the “king of the barricades,” Louis Philippe, which actually amounted to unbridgeable hatred.Footnote ²⁴

The antipathy existing between the tsar and the French king was in sharp contrast to the good relations prevailing between Ballhausplatz and the Tuileries. Unlike Nicholas I, Metternich did not regard Louis Philippe as a threat to conservative values and assessed, though never accepted, the king's proposals for cooperation in European affairs. He also considered the king to be a man of reasonable views and a barrier against a revolution. Since the mid-1830s, Metternich corresponded with him and gained his confidence.Footnote ²⁵ Consequently, the king trusted Metternich's abilities and influence in St. Petersburg more than Palmerston did and was definitely more willing to recognize the chancellor as the leader in the solution of the Near Eastern crisis. Metternich was well aware of this compliancy and decided to make the best of it; he tried to use Louis Philippe to persuade Palmerston to agree to the ministerial conference in Vienna. The chancellor tried in this way to use France as a “wooden horse” in dealing with London because he believed that the French intercession would placate Her Majesty's cabinet. Therefore, in his instructions to the Austrian ambassador in Paris as well as in meetings with the French representative in Vienna between May 18 and 20, he drew attention to the necessity for general consent over the Eastern Question because only the close cooperation of the Great Powers could assure a reasonable solution to the forthcoming crisis. He suggested creating this union in Vienna.Footnote ²⁶

The French premier, Marshal Victor Soult, preferred London or Constantinople to be the center of negotiations, but Metternich knew that he could count on the king, and this belief proved to be well-founded when France accepted the Austrian proposal on June 4. This assistance, however, was not disinterested. The king believed that he would detach Austria from Russia in the case of the latter's refusal to participate in the prepared ministerial conference.Footnote ²⁷ He expected in such an event the deterioration of Austrian-Russian relations and the creation of a union between Vienna and Paris. This prospect was to be proved lacking in any foundation in the near future; even at the moment of his utmost personal humiliation, Metternich put reason before emotion and did not sacrifice the vital alliance with conservative Russia for an entente with liberal France.

Having won in Paris in early June 1839, Metternich turned his attention to London, where he had to overcome the more difficult obstacle to his plan. He had already made the same proposal to Palmerston as he had to Paris with the offer of the rapprochement between Austria and Great Britain and the warning that a successful intervention in the Levant that would not threaten the general peace was possible only if it were undertaken in the name of the alliance and not by one power alone.Footnote ²⁸ Palmerston was not pleased to relinquish the leadership of the eastern affairs to Metternich, but he was aware of the fact that a chance for a conference to be held in London was negligible; he well remembered the Russian refusal from the previous year, and nothing indicated that Nicholas I would behave any differently in summer 1839. Moreover, the situation in the Ottoman Empire was deteriorating considerably. Therefore, albeit reluctantly and with reservation, Palmerston finally accepted Metternich's offer.Footnote ²⁹ His words written to the British ambassador in Vienna on June 20 prove how difficult the concession was for him: “We do not know what to say about a conference at Vienna. Metternich is so feeble and timid and tricky and so much swayed by Russia, and by nature so prone to crooked paths and to playing off one party against the other. And so fond of staving off difficulties and putting off the evil day, that I greatly doubt whether a Vienna conference would lead to anything good.”Footnote ³⁰ He ascribed the concession to the fact that the consent of France had been ensured, which confirms the correctness of the chancellor's chosen tactic toward the western powers.Footnote ³¹

When Metternich opened the door to the round table meeting, he paid great attention to its form. He carefully avoided calling it a “conference” or even “congress,” and whenever he found these words in diplomatic correspondence, “a malaise seized him.”Footnote ³² He claimed that Vienna was to witness a series of informal discussions between himself and the representatives of the Great Powers, who would be informed about the attitudes of their respective governments and empowered by a certain freedom of action, which would enable them to arrive at the plan for the pacification of the Levant. The assumed solution would be sanctioned by the governments and put to the sultan and his vassal for consideration.Footnote ³³

Metternich had several reasons for taking a stand on the form of the Viennese meeting. First, he did not want the Ottoman Empire to take part in the discussions, which would have been inevitable if the representatives had been summoned to a formal conference; at the congress in Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, the principle had been adopted that the interests of a third country could not be discussed at a conference or congress without its participation. Metternich distrusted the ability of the Ottoman diplomacy too much and was too familiar with the sultan's uncompromising attitude to be willing to face them in Vienna. He was also not sure whether Mahmud II would give his representative in the Austrian capital sufficient authority to negotiate over the internal affairs of his own empire.Footnote ³⁴

Moreover, according to Metternich, an unofficial gathering of diplomats would enable them to achieve a goal faster than more formal summits attracting more general attention. The memory of the negotiations over the Belgian question at the London conference that had lasted for eight long years was too fresh, as is evident from his words written in mid-June: “It is not in a similar way that any good can be done because such a conference offers to the two maritime powers a great opportunity to extend the discussions in ways that could cause immense political embarrassment to the more reliable cabinets that will take part in it, as well as to the whole of Europe. The example of the London conference is certainly a case that proves what dangers and Anglo-French absurdities can result from diplomacy structured in this form.”Footnote ³⁵ Metternich also thought that he could better control an informal meeting than a summit.

The most important reason for his reluctance to use the term “conference” for the forthcoming negotiations was Metternich's conviction that Nicholas I was better disposed to consent to talks of a less formal kind, which seems to indicate that Metternich was not absolutely sure of the tsar's agreement to the plan and that the chancellor, like Palmerston, remembered the Russian rejection of the London conference the previous year. Regardless of how Metternich designated the meeting, however, in practice it would have been a “ministerial conference” if it had ever taken place, which is also shown by the chancellor's words to the French ambassador: “For God's sake, let us say nothing of the kind, let us avoid the word [conference] to be sure of having the event; we will have one [a conference] eventually or a little later, but, at the beginning, it is important that we present ourselves modestly.”Footnote ³⁶

Metternich's actions created an illusory harmony among the Great Powers and, at the turn of June and July 1839, his ambitions seemed as though they would soon be fulfilled. He was pleased by the course of events, and he worked very hard, as much as fifteen hours a day, on the preparation for the meeting.Footnote ³⁷ The only thing detracting from Metternich's satisfaction was the fact that even at the end of July he had still not received an answer from St. Petersburg on his proposal. The Russian ambassador in Vienna, Dmitrij Pavlovic Tatishchev, was residing at that time at the tsar's court, and Chargé d'Affaires Struve had no instructions concerning the Russian participation in the Viennese negotiations. Nevertheless, Metternich showed no apparent apprehension that Nicholas I would reject the plan, and he explained the delay in the tsar's answer by the fact that the invitation had been sent to St. Petersburg later than to Paris and London.Footnote ³⁸ He also presumed that it would be accepted without reservation: “What we have so far done is only preparation, but to complete it, we have to obtain the Russian word of approval, and I am expecting this approval with absolute confidence.”Footnote ³⁹

The question of the degree of Metternich's confidence in the tsar's positive attitude cannot be satisfactorily answered, but it definitely existed to a great extent and was certainly intensified by the course of events in the Ottoman Empire from June and early July, when the Ottoman army was defeated in Syria, the Ottoman navy defected to Alexandria, and Mahmud II died in Constantinople.Footnote ⁴⁰ According to Metternich, this outcome of the crisis only underlined the necessity of a union among the Great Powers and it was in their interest to agree to the talks in Vienna. The meeting's immediate result was intended to prevent the Ottoman ministers from making overly excessive concessions and to discourage Mohammed Ali from demanding too much. Later, a settlement for the pacification for the Levant was to be addressed to Constantinople and if accepted there, then to Alexandria for unconditional accession.Footnote ⁴¹

On the other hand, the Ottoman losses raised the problem of the Great Powers' military intervention in the Straits. Although the cabinets in Paris and London agreed to discussions with Russia in Vienna, they still did not believe its intentions and they still demanded reciprocity with regard to the military power engaged in the Straits if it was the only means to prevent Mohammed Ali from seizing Constantinople. At the beginning of June, Metternich had already faced the maritime powers' demands on the collective defense of the Ottoman capital against a possible Egyptian attack, with British, French, and even several Austrian warships assisting the Russian squadron in the Sea of Marmara.Footnote ⁴²

Metternich considered this request to be unnecessary because he believed that Russian forces were sufficient to protect Constantinople, and the maritime powers' fleets would be more useful in Alexandria, but he could not flatly refuse it with respect to the British and French ambassadors' participation in the forthcoming talks. It is also true that he did not see any risk in this cooperation either for Russia or the Porte, if it was undertaken in union with other Great Powers, and it were in line with his opinion that the Eastern Question was to be solved by all of them rather than just Russia because every power desired the preservation of the Ottoman Empire and no single country was to be its sole protector.Footnote ⁴³ Therefore, much as he had previously defended the Russian right to intervene on the Bosphorus, he openly started to restate his old view that the tsar had no right as well as no power to prevent the other European powers from taking part in the task in which they were also concerned.Footnote ⁴⁴ He suggested to Nicholas I on June 21 that he should agree to the military intervention of France and Great Britain in the Straits if the Egyptian army approached. “They want to cooperate so that the Russian power should not be the only one to which the sultan and his empire are obligated for their existence. They keep at their disposal naval forces only to maintain a balance of power, and they want their flags to be seen in the Sea of Marmara. Can one prevent them from doing it? I do not believe so, and therefore it will be necessary to invite them and turn an isolated operation into a joint action. To give it explicitly the character [of a joint action], several Austrian ships could take part in it.”Footnote ⁴⁵ He repeated this proposal eight days later, when he more explicitly advocated the possible operation of a small Austrian squadron on the Golden Horn and its unifying role: “With the maritime powers demanding its presence, and Russia making the same request to us, it would actually prove the benefit of uniting the Great Powers in a cause common to all of Europe if our fleet was sent but not needed.”Footnote ⁴⁶

With hindsight, this concession to the maritime powers proved to be a mistake that contributed considerably to the tsar's distrust of the Viennese talks' goal. As Ficquelmont reported on June 29, Nicholas I still regarded the closure of the Dardanelles to the British and French fleets as a question of honor, and he instructed the Russian representative in Constantinople, Butenev, to leave the city if the sultan permitted them to enter the Sea of Marmara.Footnote ⁴⁷ The problem escalated during July when the two maritime powers' request almost became an ultimatum and Soult and Palmerston started roundly to demand permission for their warships to pass through the Dardanelles if the Russians were called upon to defend Constantinople.Footnote ⁴⁸ This pressure was intensified by the French and British fleets' presence in the vicinity of the Dardanelles, together numbering sixteen line-of-battleships, four corvettes, five brigs, and two steamships in early August.Footnote ⁴⁹

The Austrian chancellor was indignant at the resulting aggressive conduct of the two western cabinets, which he regarded not only as entirely unnecessary but also dangerous for the success of the Viennese negotiations. He labeled their behavior in the Straits' Question as a “French fury” and a “bad English game.”Footnote ⁵⁰ He would agree with their fleets' presence before the port of Constantinople in the case of need, but such a moment did not come and to raise a demand in such a manner was a useless provocation of Russia.Footnote ⁵¹ Moreover, he saw the cooperation of the western powers with Russia in the matter of the Straits as a way to save the sultan's throne and assure stability in the east. Nevertheless, the steps of the maritime powers' representatives, particularly the French ambassador, Baron Albin-Rein Roussin, who was very active in this matter, could destabilize the relations among the powers.Footnote ⁵² Therefore, Stürmer was instructed to refrain from participating in the proceeding of his British and French colleagues and to keep the Austrian squadron in Smyrna apart from the two fleets.Footnote ⁵³ Metternich refused to agree with their close cooperation because, as he wrote in late July, “our presence will be wherever it will be able to serve to confirm the existence of the union of the Great Powers, and it will not take place where exactly the opposite will occur.”Footnote ⁵⁴ On the other hand, he definitely disagreed, naturally not very strongly, with the tsar's refusal to cooperate with them. Metternich wrote about the conduct of Russia and the two maritime powers, “What both parties are mistaken about is that everyone is seeking something in the question that cannot be found in it, and this is the most dangerous element that could lead to an equally grave affair.”Footnote ⁵⁵

On August 7, 1839, Metternich summarized in his instructions to the Austrian ambassador in Paris, Count Anton Apponyi, the behavior of the cabinets in London and Paris as “an inopportune folly concerning a question that had not to be put.”Footnote ⁵⁶ It was particularly France that he found guilty, not only for Roussin's activities in Constantinople but also for announcing to another French representative in Berlin that Roussin had raised the request regarding the British and French warships' presence in the Sea of Marmara with Metternich's approval. This statement clearly was not true but its lack of substance could hardly be known in St. Petersburg.Footnote ⁵⁷ Metternich reacted sharply in his instructions to Paris: “The French cabinet is full of intrigues, and it is simultaneously unbelievably clumsy. With these two characteristics, it is impossible to advance in the affair successfully, or even advance at all. This is a regression . . . They see only themselves in Paris . . . All for and through France! These are the words that sound good to French ears but grate on the ears of others.”Footnote ⁵⁸ He declared that Soult should “brandish a sabre” less in the interest of solving the conflict, and he posed this rhetorical question to Apponyi: “What do the Dardanelles have in common with the breakdown in relations between Mohammed Ali and the Porte?”Footnote ⁵⁹

Metternich's growing displeasure at both maritime powers' conduct was connected with the disquiet increasing in Vienna since mid-July owing to the silence prevailing in St. Petersburg about a meeting.Footnote ⁶⁰ Some diplomats residing in the Austrian capital even regarded the tsar's refusal to take part in it for granted.Footnote ⁶¹ The sharp tone of the instructions of August 7 was caused by the unfavorable news that had just arrived from St. Petersburg. What they had suspected was true: Nicholas I had informed Ficquelmont at a ball on July 25 that the Near Eastern crisis was to be solved directly between the two quarreling parties. Mahmud II's death was not the tragedy for him that it was for Metternich because it could open the way to the settlement between the Porte and Mohammed Ali. Because the Russian monarch considered such a development of the affair to be a certainty, he saw no topic for discussions in Vienna where, as he expected, the other Great Powers would have united against him and forced him to cooperate in the Straits.Footnote ⁶² He feared that Austria would take the side of Great Britain and France, and this assumption was particularly based upon Metternich's advice to him in June to cooperate with the maritime powers in the Sea of Marmara and the prince's willingness to send the Austrian squadron there.Footnote ⁶³ Metternich can be easily criticized for this basic mistake, but he had some reason to believe in the Russian approval because Beauvale had discussed the possibility of naval cooperation in the Straits with Nesselrode in autumn of the previous year, and he did not get a negative reaction.Footnote ⁶⁴

Nevertheless, the Straits question was only the tip of the iceberg. The tsar and his vice chancellor also feared that the powers would demand a guarantee of the independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, something that Soult had actually suggested in summer 1839. Since Russia was not prepared to guarantee the latter, it led to the possibility of Russia being isolated in this matter. Although there is no proof that Metternich planned to promote this idea, it signified little at the time when the Russian monarch and his vice chancellor were not generally disposed to the solution of the Eastern Question in Vienna. They did not believe Metternich and were not prepared to make him the mediator between Russia and the maritime powers.Footnote ⁶⁵

German historian Adolf Hasenclever wondered how Metternich could presume that Russia would agree for Vienna to be a center of negotiations on the Eastern Question when Count Orlov told Maltzan during his stay in this city in March 1839 that the tsar opposed such a plan.Footnote ⁶⁶ The problem lies in the fact that Orlov as well as Archduke Alexander, who was in Vienna at the same time, told the chancellor nothing, and Maltzan kept the information from the two Russians secret.Footnote ⁶⁷ Sainte-Aulaire, who had reservations about the tsar's consent in July, also said nothing to Metternich about his doubts.Footnote ⁶⁸ Even Struve explained matters in such a way in early July that the Belgian representative in Vienna was persuaded that the answer from St. Petersburg would be positive.Footnote ⁶⁹ Nesselrode even informed Ficquelmont on June 10 that Russia remained open to solutions to other than solely bilateral cooperation between Russia and the Porte, and even on July 13, Nicholas I assured the Austrian ambassador during a military parade that he did not want to solve the Turkish question without the consent of Europe.Footnote ⁷⁰

At the same time, however, the tsar complained several times that the invitation to the Viennese talks had been dispatched to Paris and London before being sent to St. Petersburg. Metternich explained this procedure by the necessity of first ensuring the participation of the maritime powers. Having succeeded, he sent a letter full of flattery that, however, was really nothing other than an announcement of a fait accompli. One cannot be surprised that the tsar was displeased with the way the talks were being called to action.Footnote ⁷¹ This was undoubtedly Metternich's other mistake that further contributed to Nicholas I's unwillingness to agree to Russian participation in the meeting, expressed in late July.

Having heard the tsar's refusal, Ficquelmont personally went to Vienna to convey the information, and, despite a delay due to a slight accident involving his coach, he arrived in only eight days, on August 5. Three days later, the Russian messenger confirmed what Metternich had heard from his ambassador.Footnote ⁷² The chancellor deeply regretted the tsar's decision as well as Ficquelmont's vacation of his post at such an important moment, but he did not give up and worked with Ficquelmont toward the goal of saving his dream by changing the tsar's attitude.Footnote ⁷³

The result of the discussions between Metternich and Ficquelmont was a personal letter that the Count sent to Nesselrode on August 7 in which he advocated the chancellor's plan aimed at securing the cooperation of the pentarchy in the Near East because it was still needed. The crisis was in no way averted (particularly because Metternich was personally working against the direct settlement between the Porte and the Egyptian governor) and the future of the Ottoman Empire was still uncertain, which also meant that the question of the Straits could complicate the relations among the Great Powers. The two problems were not simply Russo-Austrian affairs because these two powers did not have the might to solve them alone and the other members of the pentarchy also had the right to participate in the preservation of the Ottoman Empire. France and Great Britain not only had their own interests in this region but were also strong maritime powers on the other side of the Straits, and any attempt to exclude them from the affair would have definitely ended in a conflict. “To divide the four powers into two different camps is to cut the Turkish Empire in half; it is to destroy it, so to speak; it is to put a cause of an inevitable war into the center of its debris; it is to assume our position on the side of the weakest, the least intelligent, the least rich; it is to abandon to our adversaries the richest, the strongest, and the most intelligent part. This division, [which will be] the inevitable result of the principle of renouncing an entente of the five Great Powers, proves that it is an affair that can only be resolved by negotiation.”Footnote ⁷⁴ Because the disagreement in particular existed between the two maritime powers and Russia, and Austria stood between them, Metternich had suggested Vienna as the venue for reaching an understanding. He now asked the tsar and his vice chancellor to recognize that the preservation of the Ottoman Empire was not a question that could be resolved only by the two Imperial courts because it was a European problem that could be only solved by all the prominent European courts. The solution was entirely necessary because, as he stated, “it is a question of general peace or general war.”Footnote ⁷⁵

These arguments had no effect in St. Petersburg, and the only consequence of the chancellor's extraordinary assignment was his exhaustion due to overwork, that, together with a fever, led to the gradual worsening of his health between August 11 and 13, and finally to a breakdown. A rumor of a heart attack immediately spread through Vienna, but fortunately for the old prince, the disease was not that serious. He had to remain in bed till August 25, and the members of the thereby paralyzed diplomatic corps could do nothing but wait for hourly reports about the chancellor's condition.Footnote ⁷⁶ After treatment, he departed on September 10 to his chateau in Johannisberg in the Rheinland where he spent six weeks recovering.Footnote ⁷⁷

Baron Ottenfels, the Advisor of the State, assumed the leadership of the chancellery as he usually did during Metternich's absence, but Ficquelmont, who had to return quickly from his vacation in Savoy, took control over the Near Eastern crisis. His temporary presence as the head of Austrian diplomacy was a clear signal to St. Petersburg about the uninterrupted support of the Danube Monarchy for its conservative eastern ally because Ficquelmont was the most pro-Russian of all Austrian diplomats.Footnote ⁷⁸ This was soon shown when he tried to placate Russia by insisting that the British and French fleets be removed further from the Dardanelles. The fact that must be emphasized is that Ficquelmont followed the course already begun by Metternich before his departure from Vienna. In late August, the chancellor had ordered the Austrian squadron to sail from Smyrna to Rhodes, and he persuaded Beauvale and Sainte-Aulaire to instruct their ambassadors in Constantinople not to insist on the fleets entering into the Sea of Marmara. Austria definitely could not afford to lose its Russian ally, and the above-mentioned steps prove that the Austrian diplomatic elites were well aware of it.Footnote ⁷⁹

On the other hand, Nicholas I also did not desire Russia's relations with Austria to worsen, and therefore Nesselrode showed great favor to Austria's chargé d'affaires and the tsar made the best of the anniversary of the Battle of Borodino when he named Archduke Albert of Habsburg a colonel of the Uhlan regiment of the Duke of Nassau. Moreover, he sent a letter to Metternich with best wishes for his recovery and complimentary words about his good qualities.Footnote ⁸⁰

This flattery could not be as successful as Nicholas I probably hoped because his refusal to consent to the Russian participation in the meeting, which led to its failure, was far too painful for Metternich. The chancellor did not conceal his disappointment in talks with foreign diplomats. After his sincere defense of the Russian Near Eastern policy, he felt betrayed. The humiliation was all the more poignant because he himself had assured the diplomatic corps in Vienna all along that the tsar would accept the project with pleasure, that he would agree entirely with its views, and that foreign diplomats could count on Russia's participation in the meeting on the Eastern Question because Russia, as the chancellor had declared many times, desired a joint solution.Footnote ⁸¹ He had told Beauvale that Russia's agreement to the negotiations was a mere formality and he answered for the tsar; he assured the government in Paris that “an absolute conformity in views and volition exists between Vienna and St. Petersburg;” and he said to the Bavarian representative, Maximilian Emanuel von Lerchenfeld, “The tsar entirely agrees with us and certainly also wants to proceed with us.”Footnote ⁸²

Metternich was as offended after the tsar's refusal as he had been self-confident before it, and his bitterness was visible long after the failure of the planned talks.Footnote ⁸³ During a meeting with Austrian orientalist Anton Prokesch von Osten on December 7, 1839, Metternich explained the Russian refusal this way: “Europe is composed of three national tribes: Germanic, Romance, and Slavic. In the Germanic one, the word ‘honor’ is very powerful; in the Romance one, it has degenerated into a question of honor; in the Slavic language, the word does not even exist at all. The Germanic and Slavonic tribes are represented in the Russian cabinet, and the policy is determined according to whichever one prevails. Both principles live in the tsar, but he inclines toward the Slavic one.”Footnote ⁸⁴ Seven days later, Maltzan wrote to Berlin that “the relations between the two imperial cabinets will not regain the sincere and cordial character that they enjoyed in previous times. The blow struck by the Russian cabinet to Mr. Chancellor of the Court and the State is too profound and sensitive for it ever to heal. The thorn will remain in the wound, and I fear that the bad memories will exist forever between the two Great Powers.”Footnote ⁸⁵ The Prussian envoy was largely correct because the Austrian chancellor definitely displayed considerable coolness toward Russia at least during the Near Eastern crisis of 1839–1841.

Metternich's irritation was caused not only because his project failed, but also because the tsar's actions pushed him aside in solving the Near Eastern crisis. Even before Metternich's departure to Johannisberg, Nicholas I had decided to join forces with Great Britain directly, and his attempt found a positive echo in London.Footnote ⁸⁶ Consequently, when the chancellor returned to Vienna on October 29, 1839, he found the situation in international affairs entirely changed.Footnote ⁸⁷ The Russian-British rapprochement was in progress and, after Christmas, London rather than Vienna became the center of discussions about the Eastern Question. The initiative was thus in Palmerston's hands, and Metternich could only assist in the effort to reach a settlement of the Turko-Egyptian conflict.Footnote ⁸⁸ It lasted till mid-1841 and endangered European peace due to the disagreement between France and the other Great Powers, which led to the Rhine Crisis in the late summer and autumn of 1840.Footnote ⁸⁹

The idea of the ministerial conference in Vienna thus failed and Metternich did not experience a time of glory but a confrontation with a painful reality: his self-confidence was weakened, his nerves were on edge, and his face allegedly showed signs of his having aged a great deal.Footnote ⁹⁰ One can agree with Webster's claim that “the blow was undoubtedly the most severe which Metternich experienced before the Revolution of 1848.”Footnote ⁹¹ The dislocation of the center of negotiations to London was an unquestionable defeat for the chancellor, who had relied too much on the tsar's willingness to see the eastern affair settled in the metropolis on the Danube. Nicholas I acted in a way unexpected by Metternich, and with his decision to transfer leadership to Palmerston, he disappointed Metternich for the second time in Near Eastern affairs in the 1830s. The first time was in 1833 when his conservative ally did not inform him about the planned signing of the Russian-Ottoman convention, and the ignorance of its existence put Metternich in an awkward position and caused him great embarrassment. In 1839 his frustration was much greater because he believed that he had sufficiently proved his goodwill toward Russia by his loyal behavior in preceding years.

This was unfortunately not the case, and strong fears of Metternich's possible anti-Russian conduct prevailed in St. Petersburg. Nicholas I and Nesselrode worried that the chancellor would join the two maritime powers if Russia did not proceed in compliance with his wishes.Footnote ⁹² Beauvale seems to confirm the validity of this misgiving when he wrote in late July 1839 that Metternich's action was similar to the time that he had distanced himself from Napoleon and allied himself with the anti-French alliance. “I have been in this trade long enough to have seen Prince Metternich separate himself from Napoleon, and the process was precisely similar to that which is taking place at present. He will do his best to avoid a separation, he will try to the end to keep Russia with him, but at every failure he will advance a step toward us.”Footnote ⁹³ This opinion was also held by Russian historian Serge Gorïanov and to a certain extent by other historians,Footnote ⁹⁴ for example, Matthew Anderson, who claimed that “Austria's wavering attitude now [in the summer of 1839] made her seem a very uncertain ally.”Footnote ⁹⁵

The studied correspondence not only from 1839 but also from previous years, however, shows that Metternich never planned to proceed without Russia and such an eventuality was entirely impossible for two reasons: first, Austria could not break the alliance with its conservative ally; second, the isolation of Russia, in other words a rupture among the powers, was exactly what Metternich tried to prevent—and an eventual exclusion of this Great Power from the Viennese negotiations would inevitably have had such a result. The tsar's refusal was so painful for Metternich for precisely this reason, and it was also for this reason that he refused to open the discussions without Russian participation and tried to change the tsar's attitude. It was therefore due to the tsar's refusal that the conference did not take place because, at least for Metternich, it made no sense without the presence of the Russian ambassador. The discussions without his participation were compatible with Palmerston's aims at that time but not with Metternich's. The prince defended Russian policy in the Near East entirely in conformity with his notion of peace management even after Russia's disavowal of his plan.Footnote ⁹⁶ He told Beauvale and Maltzan on September 6, 1839, “I answer even at this hour for the good intentions of Russia, and I have never ceased to believe that she will support us in the objective we are trying to attain.”Footnote ⁹⁷

The main goal of Metternich's proceeding in this affair has generally been explained as restricting Russia and subordinating its actions to the control of other Great Powers. He had more reasons to be anxious about the maritime powers' unpredictable and aggressive policy, however, and he definitely wanted to restrict them to the same extent as Russia to prevent dangerous conduct by either side, requesting certain concessions from all parties to bridge the differences among them: namely, an end of the maritime powers' distrust toward Russia and their willingness to cooperate with it, and the tsar's renunciation of an exclusive role in solving Ottoman affairs. In this way Metternich wished to stabilize the situation in the Near East and preclude further deterioration in the relations among the Great Powers. This effort was correctly assessed by the representative of the United States in Vienna in early October 1839. “Austria, in fact, appears to act the part of a mediator in the whole business and to use her influence to calm the jealousies and suspicion known to exist, in all matters relating to Turkey, between the English, French, and Russian Governments. It is this character which gives to Austria the great weight she possesses in the conferences and which has enabled her to make the Powers less distrustful of each other and to induce them to act with a certain degree of unity in the important and over-agitated question.”Footnote ⁹⁸

Metternich proposed to save the Porte by eliciting their cooperation, even in the Straits, which he found to be a necessary concession to France and Great Britain, but which finally proved to be the main reason for the Russian refusal to participate in the Viennese talks. Nevertheless, in late 1839, Great Britain and Russia decided to cooperate, and Nicholas I agreed with the naval presence of other powers' fleets in the Sea of Marmara, which was exactly what Metternich had advocated in the summer of the same year.Footnote ⁹⁹ The motivation of the tsar's conduct is well known at the present time: he preferred to deal with Great Britain directly without the control of another power, and, moreover, to isolate France through this maneuvre, in which he finally succeeded.Footnote ¹⁰⁰ Nothing was illogical in this proceeding, but one cannot help but wonder at the consternation at the chancellery at Ballhausplatz with the Russian consent to the presence of the western fleets in the Straits, which had previously been declared to be incompatible with the tsar's honor and the principle reason for the condemnation of Metternich's conference plan. There was, moreover, another shift in Russian policy in late 1839: Nicholas I originally rejected the negotiations in Vienna, explaining that they were unnecessary when the sultan was prepared to accede to considerable losses in the settlement with his Egyptian vassal, which was not only acceptable for the tsar but also recommended by him to the Porte. Later, however, owing to the improvement of the Russian-British relations and with the aim of separating France, which was supporting Mohammed Ali, Nicholas I became a zealous supporter of the sultan. This was exactly what Metternich had requested of the other powers in spring and summer 1839.

Due to Nicholas I's conduct, it was Palmerston who controlled the path to the solution of the Near Eastern affairs at the turn of the 1830s and 1840s. It was a certain paradox because it was the British Foreign Secretary, who with his Russophobia had significantly contributed to the tension in the relations among the Great Powers, particularly in the Levant, that made the settlement of the Near Eastern affairs almost impossible for such a long time. One must understand that the struggle between Palmerston and Metternich for leadership over diplomatic affairs was not only a contest between the two ambitious men but also a conflict between two different ways of thinking. Whereas for Palmerston a conference was a tool to separate Austria and Russia and to obtain the latter's submission to the will of the liberal powers, for Metternich it was a way to unite the two quarreling parties on the basis of their wish to preserve the Ottoman Empire.Footnote ¹⁰¹

The signing of the second London Straits Convention on July 13, 1841, undoubtedly pleased Metternich because it brought about a closure to the cold war of the 1830s and eased the tension among the Great Powers caused by the Eastern Question. This tension was, as Metternich knew very well, entirely unnecessary, and as Alan Sked correctly claims, the problems stemming from it could have been prevented if the two sides had listened to Metternich's counsels in the early 1830s.Footnote ¹⁰² In this respect, Metternich's “peace management” undoubtedly served Europe better than Palmerston's anti-Russian policy, which particularly served British interests and lasted for most of the 1830s.