John Markakis's new book, a study of nation-building, is characteristically written with erudition, lucidity and clarity. Yet his peremptory judgements appear to be premature and his expectations rather gloomy. Markakis's main contention is that, despite revolutionary upheavals, the unequal relationship between centre and periphery in Ethiopia remains essentially unchanged. He argues that the hegemonic position of the Abyssinians who built the empire persists, notwithstanding two radical political ruptures; this may augur a third rupture with dire consequences for state society. To avoid such a calamity, Ethiopia has to cross two frontiers: it must redress the historical inequalities that power has induced and address the unique problems of the peripheral lowland communities that have been scarcely integrated into the national state and that are the focus of this study.
Markakis dissects the double process of nation state and class formation in dizzying detail. He swoops down on the critical issues with remarkable precision, and his narrative combines stories, anecdotes, personal observations and interviews with critical assessments. The story that unfolds, beginning in Aksum, from which the modern nation state traces its descent, comprises three distinct but overlapping phases. The first stretches from the late 1890s to the mid-1970s, the second from 1974 to 1991, and the third from 1991 to the present; the periods roughly coincide with the lives of three regimes.
In the late nineteenth century, the Christian kingdom of Ethiopia nearly quadrupled in size by conquering a large number of peoples with varied cultures who occupied the cool highland and hot, semi-arid lowland peripheries to its south, east and west, creating new opportunities, needs and hardships. Because the highland shares geographic and climatic characteristics with the northern plateau and contains abundant human and material resources, it was soon integrated into the nation state. By contrast, the lowland periphery, which makes up more than half of the total land mass, has been generally neglected until recent years. As its many small and pastoralist groups were administered through an indirect system that used traditional authorities, the centre tried in vain to foster national integration through assimilation. Like its predecessor, the socialist military dictatorship that followed the imperial period was fiercely nationalist and centralist. Relying on a coterie of local party cadres, it could not contain the various insurgencies seeking either autonomy or independence, which eventually toppled it in 1991. The current Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) adopted a system of ethnic federalism that granted greater autonomy to the multitude of ethnic and linguistic groups, but without yielding power: it too created its own ancillaries from regional intellectuals. The government's failure to devolve power in accordance with the principles enshrined in the country's constitution and its failure to institute power-sharing between centre and periphery may yet lead to its fall and possibly the disintegration of the nation state.
But whatever the weaknesses of the federal system, the new regional elites are the result of the empowerment of historically marginalized and disadvantaged peoples. Although the democratic process has been flawed, it is debatable whether the current regime rules through mere political pawns. It may be argued that the federal system is a genuine endeavour to create a multi-ethnic, multilingual and multi-religious community, and that the centre's recurrent intrusions in state affairs are also a response to underhand attempts by regional authorities to secure spoils of office. It is, for instance, difficult to accept that the corrupt and messy administration in the Somali or Afar states, which the author so painstakingly describes, is the making of the centre alone. A few decades ago it would have been unimaginable that a member of one of the smallest ethnic and religious groups would be the country's chief executive today. For a country a generation away from a deeply entrenched imperial political culture, this is both a real and a symbolic milestone.
But given the harsh conditions of life and political tyranny, a third rupture is not unimaginable either, if a happy medium is not found by all concerned. Formerly disenfranchised communities have attained a new sense of self-respect and national dignity, and their leaders are no longer the cat's paws of the northern elite. No longer neglected, the lowland zone has evidently become a magnet for investment in commercial agriculture, hydrology and the extraction of minerals. Its leaders have become more self-assertive and it is unlikely that they will surrender the gains they have attained. Although it is possible that these changes will expedite the zone's integration into the nation state, Markakis laments the likely extinction of the precarious pastoralist mode of life without offering an alternative form of development. With an ever growing population, Ethiopia needs to utilize all of its available resources to improve its people's quality of life, and future political compromises may be less painful and more equitable.
Markakis has written a significant, though bloated, book: general readers may find the details overwhelming. There are also numerous inaccuracies and occasional gaffes: contrary to the author's assertions, Christians and Muslims have coexisted admirably well, the peasantry has been internally segmented, and the revolutionary army was eight times larger than its predecessor. Moreover, the author provides no examples of multi-ethnic empires dominated by core elites that have been transformed into democratic, pluralist societies; nor does he suggest how this can be done. But while some readers of this book will be bewildered, others will be delighted and invigorated: all will find it well worth reading.
